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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to remedy a gap in legal literature by addressing the 
phenomenon of vigilantism from a legal perspective, and seeking to 
conceptualise and understand the problem.   
To this end, it first arrives at a working definition of vigilantism for a 
legal context by critically analysing previous (non-legal) efforts to define 
vigilantism and identifying and discussing elements of a proposed crime of 
vigilantism.  The focus then shifts to interrogating the relationship between 
(the erosion of) state legitimacy and vigilante self-help.  After demonstrating 
the usefulness of the concept of legitimacy as an overarching framework for 
understanding the state-vigilante relationship, three dimensions of legitimacy 
(legal, normative and demonstrative) are explained and the assumed nexus 
between (deficient) state legitimacy and vigilantism is clarified.  Next, factors 
precipitating state delegitimation in the criminal justice context are identified 
so as better to grasp the role of deficient state legitimacy in fostering 
vigilantism – and concomitantly, how the state might remedy such 
shortcomings.  While it is argued that state delegitimation is by no means the 
only factor contributing to the emergence and prevalence of vigilantism, a 
common thread running through many vigilante narratives is that the failure of 
criminal justice agents to do their job properly opens a law-and-order gap that 
vigilantes are only too willing to fill with their own brand of “justice”.  To 
appreciate the role played by vigilantes as informal criminal justice 
“providers”, vigilante counter-legitimation strategies and rituals are then 
explored.  They are compared to those utilised by their formal counterparts, 
with the aim of better delineating the common ground (or lack thereof) 
between state-sanctioned criminal justice and vigilantism.  Thereafter, various 
divergent state responses to vigilantism are outlined and critically evaluated, 
divided into chapters focusing on state relegitimation strategies premised on 
exclusion (e.g., criminal prosecution) and inclusion (e.g., restorative justice).  
The emphasis throughout is on how to address vigilantism in such a way as to 
balance a non-negotiable respect for human rights with the need to respond 
to pressing community order and security concerns.  It is concluded that 
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vigilantes may indeed be willing to abandon violent means of problem-solving 
sufficiently to legitimate – and work in partnership with – a formal criminal 
justice system committed to addressing issues of crime and disorder in a 
community-responsive, inclusive, respectful and restorative manner. 
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ABSTRAK 
Die oogmerk van hierdie studie is om die leemte wat tans in 
regsliteratuur bestaan te remedieer deur die verskynsel van vigilantisme 
(“vigilantism”) te konseptualiseer, begryp en aan te spreek vanuit ŉ 
regsperspektief. 
Ten einde die bogenoemde oogmerk te bereik, word daar eerstens ŉ 
bruikbare definisie van vigilantisme in die regskonteks afgelei deur die kritiese 
analise van voormalige (nie-wetlike) pogings om vigilantisme te definieer.  
Verder word die elemente van die voorgestelde misdaad van vigilantisme 
identifiseer en bespreek.  Daarna verskuif die fokus na ŉ ondersoek van die 
verhouding tussen die (verbrokkeling van) staat legitimiteit en vigilantisme.  
Nadat die nuttigheid van die legitimiteitskonsep as ŉ oorkoepelende 
raamwerk vir die begrip van die staat-vigilante verhouding gedemonstreer is, 
word drie vlakke van legitimiteit (wetlik, normatief en demonstratief), bespreek 
en die aangenome nexus tussen die (onvoldoende) staat legitimiteit en 
vigilantisme word verduidelik.  Volgende word die faktore wat lei na die 
ontkenning van staat legitimiteit in die konteks van die (straf)regspleging 
identifiseer, ten einde die rol van onvoldoende staatslegitimiteit in die 
bevordering van vigilantisme te begryp.  Daar word ook gefokus op hoe die 
staat hierdie tekortkominge kan regstel.  Daar word aangevoer dat alhoewel 
die ontkenning van die staat se legitimiteit nie die enigste bydraende faktor tot 
die ontstaan en algemeenheid van vigilantisme is nie, daar ŉ duidelike en 
algemene denkpatroon onder vigilantes heers dat die gebrek aan ŉ 
doeltreffende strafregstelsel ŉ gaping in die reg skep.  Vigilantes is al te 
geredelik bereid om hierdie gaping met hulle eie vorm van geregtigheid aan te 
vul.  Ten einde die rol van vigilantes as informele kriminele geregtigheid 
“verskaffers” beter te verstaan, word die teen-legitimasie strategieë en rituele 
van vigilantes ondersoek.  Hierdie strategieë en rituele word dan vergelyk met 
dié wat deur formele eweknieë aangewend word, met die oog op die 
uitbeelding van ŉ gemeenskaplike basis (of die afwesigheid daarvan), tussen 
straf wat goedgekeur is deur die staat en vigilantisme.  Hierna word verskeie 
uiteenlopende antwoorde op vigilantisme uitgelê en krities geëvalueer.  Dit 
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word verdeel in hoofstukke wat fokus op strategieë vir die herlegitimasie van 
die staat, beide gebaseer op uitsluiting (bv. strafvervolging) en insluiting (bv. 
herstellende geregtigheid).  Daar word deurgaans gefokus op hoe om 
vigilantisme aan te spreek op so ŉ wyse dat daar ŉ balans getref word tussen 
ŉ nie-onderhandelbare respek vir menseregte en die behoefte om antwoord 
te bied op die dringende orde en sekuriteit bekommernisse onder die 
gemeenskap.  Die gevolgtrekking wat gebied word, is dat vigilantes wel bereid 
sal wees om gewelddadige vorms van probleemoplossing te staak, mits ŉ 
legitieme, saamwerkende en formele regsplegingstelsel, toebetrou tot die 
oplossing van misdaad en wanorde in ŉ gemeenskapsbetrokke, inklusiewe, 
respekvolle en regstellende wyse, geskep kan word. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
“Necklacing is a cry for help from Etwatwa 
2015-09-20 
At the height of the struggle against apartheid, many people were killed in what was termed 
necklacing – putting a tyre around a person’s neck and setting it alight. 
Most of those who suffered this fate were accused of being impimpis (snitches) for betraying 
comrades to the apartheid government.  It is a painful past that the country does not want to 
remember or revisit.   
However, the reports this week from Etwatwa in Springs, Ekurhuleni, of four young men 
being set alight by angry community members have refocused the attention on those dark 
days of our history.  One of the victims escaped death – the others were not so lucky. 
Similar acts have been reported throughout the country recently.  The actions of the 
Etwatwa residents tell an important side of the story. 
We do not condone any acts of necklacing, barbaric attacks on others or vigilantism.  But 
according to the community of Etwatwa, members of the Overloaded (OVL) gang, which the 
four youngsters belonged to, were terrorising residents to such an extent that some were 
afraid of going to work, while pupils could not walk to school.  Residents say OVL started as 
a group that targeted nyaope-smoking youths in the community – until it transformed into a 
gang stealing from residents and terrorising them.  Police remained oblivious to their 
predicament, so the residents decided to take the law into their own hands. 
These acts of lawlessness in communities would not be allowed, or even considered by 
residents, if police were doing their jobs – by being visible at all times and arresting 
criminals.   
When the police service fails to do its duty, it leaves room for communities to pursue 
vigilante justice, regardless of whether their victims are provably guilty.” 
 – F Haffajee, City Press editorial (2015-09-20).   
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1 1 Filling the gap 
The subject of this study is vigilantism.1   The concept of people “taking 
the law into their own hands”,2 or resorting to “self-help”3 or “mob justice”,4 is a 
familiar part of the lexicon of anyone who reads South African newspapers 
regularly.  Surprisingly, despite its ubiquity, vigilantism has largely been 
overlooked as a topic of legal research, and if dealt with,5 engagement has 
taken the form of condemnation.  Its legal neglect is unfortunate and 
inexplicable, since the fundamental issues of law, order, justice and power 
that lie at the heart of vigilante activities have a myriad of significant legal 
implications.  As will be shown, vigilantes who take the law into their own 
hands to punish deviance seemingly exemplify an instance where “law” and 
“order” are detached from each other for practical reasons, with vigilantes 
choosing order over law.6  Their attitude to the law appears to be that its real-
world application does not necessarily serve the ideal of justice it purports to 
embody.7  In addition, vigilantes’ ambiguous positioning “in the interstices 
between state and society, law and disorder, legitimacy and illegitimacy”8 
points to the ongoing and dynamic interaction between state9 and popular 
                                            
1 Defining vigilantism is the topic of chapter 2.  It may provisionally be understood as the unlawful and 
intentional use of force by private citizens to punish someone who is the perpetrator of real or 
perceived forms of deviance.  It is aimed (at least in part) at offering guarantees of collective security 
and social order in circumstances where there is a real or perceived absence of effective formal 
guarantees of order and security. 
2 Newsroom “Delft Residents Taking Law Into Their Own Hands” (2015-09-10) 91.3FM The Voice of 
the Cape <http://www.vocfm.co.za/delft-residents-taking-law-into-their-own-hands/> (2015-10-21). 
3  Editorial “Zero Tolerance For Mob Justice” (2014-06-14) DispatchLive 
<http://www.dispatchlive.co.za/opinion/editorial-zero-tolerance-for-mob-justice/> (2015-10-21), 
where vigilantism is termed a “horrific form of ‘self-help’”. 
4 News “'We're Going to Burn These Thieves'” (2015-08-19) IOL <http://beta.iol.co.za/news/crime-
courts/were-going-to-burn-these-thieves-1902503> (2015-10-21).  This article also has a link to a 
disturbing video of mob justice being meted out in Snake Park, Soweto. 
5 For instance, in case law where acts of vigilantism are prosecuted. 
6 E Stettner “Vigilantism and Political Theory” in H J Rosenbaum and P C Sederberg (eds) Vigilante 
Politics (1976) 65. 
7 R G Abrahams Vigilant Citizens: Vigilantism and the State (1998) 154. 
8 D Pratten “Introduction The Politics of Protection: Perspectives on Vigilantism in Nigeria” (2008) 78 
(1) Africa 1 3. 
9 It is recognised that it might be more technically accurate to use the term “government” instead of 
“state” when referring to the governmental institutions wherein state power lies and through which 
state power is wielded.  Although where the focus is the “internal relationship between a society and 
its governing coercive organization”, the two terms are often used interchangeably or equated (see 
the sources quoted in E Heath Robinson “The Distinction Between State and Government” (2013) 
7/8 Geography Compass 556 558), theoretically they are distinct.  Heath Robinson (2013) 
Geography Compass 556 distinguishes them on the basis that “[s]tates are nonphysical juridical 
entities of the international legal system, whereas governments are organizations with certain 
coercive powers.  The relationship between a government and its state is one of representation and 
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justice whereby vigilantes “find themselves enmeshed in zones of 
contestation around the legitimate exercise of authority”.10  It is submitted that 
these considerations, as well as its wider societal and political repercussions, 
make vigilantism a fascinating and fertile topic for legal research.  
Just as vigilantes perceive themselves to be “filling the gap” left by 
unsatisfactory law-enforcement,11 this study aims to fill a gap in legal research 
by remedying the law’s failure to engage properly with vigilantism.  The 
central question of this research is: 
How may the phenomenon of vigilantism be conceptualised, 
understood and addressed from a legal perspective?   
In order to answer this question, vigilantism is analysed within the 
theoretical framework of legitimacy so as to determine the nature of the 
relationship between (deficient) state legitimacy and vigilantism.  More 
specifically, three main aspects are considered:  
(1) What factors may contribute to such state delegitimation from a 
vigilante perspective – i.e., what is the relationship between the 
erosion of state legitimacy and vigilante self-help?  
(2) What techniques do vigilantes employ to legitimate their actions to 
themselves and others, such as the wider community and the 
state?  
                                                                                                                             
authorized agency.”  According to C Flint & P Taylor Political Geography: World-Economy, 
Nation-State and Locality (2007) 137, “government can be interpreted as the major agent of the state 
and exists to carry out the day-to-day business of the state.  Governments are short-term mechanisms 
for administering the long-term purposes of the state.”  The term “state” is preferred for present 
purposes, firstly, because as it suggests an exercise of power more abstract, more permanent than 
“government”, it avoids the undesirable overtones of party politics, and recognises that although a 
particular government may fall, the state itself continues to exist.  Secondly, using the term “state” 
rather than “government” is in line with Weber’s traditional conception that an essential 
characteristic of the modern state is its claim to monopolise the use of force, and that “the use of 
force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it” (M 
Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1968) 56).  Whether the state 
may indeed claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion is an issue that is central to this study 
– and is a claim that, as will become clear, is hotly contested by vigilantes.  
10 Pratten (2008) Africa 5. 
11  See B Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread: Vigilante Violence During South 
Africa’s Period of Transition (2001) 27, who notes that vigilantism’s existence may be explained as a 
way of filling the “policing gap” left by failing authorities.  
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(3) How may the state best counter vigilantes’ self-legitimation 
strategies and relegitimate itself – i.e., what is the most effective 
way to respond to vigilantism so as to harness (or neutralise) 
vigilante power?  Inherent in relegitimation is a focus on solutions 
that are forward-looking, involve reintegration rather than simply 
condemnation, and uphold and advance constitutional values.  
 
1 2 Setting the scene 
Before elaborating on this study’s aims, objectives and methodology, 
some of the main themes running through this research will be highlighted 
briefly.  The City Press editorial quoted above 12  sets the scene for a 
preliminary reflection on vigilantism: What are its origins?  What are its 
essential nature and defining characteristics? And what is its connection with 
other sources of punitive power, particularly those originating from the state?  
 
1 2 1 A historical perspective 
A first aspect alluded to in the editorial is that in South Africa the term 
“vigilantism” has not always had its present-day primarily crime-fighting 
connotations.  In the African townships of the 1950’s, “vigilance associations” 
were mechanisms for dispute settlement that strongly emphasised traditional 
values, being anti-urban, anti-youth and strongly disciplinarian.13  During the 
1970s there was a revival of extra-state, mass-based vigilantism and dispute 
settlement in the form of the lekgotla,14 which drew on a similarly conservative 
moral code espousing traditional authority structures and patriarchy.  
Makgotlas denounced the harsh punishment techniques15 of the “vigilance 
                                            
12 F Haffajee “Necklacing is a Cry for Help From Etwatwa” (2015-09-20) News24 
<http://www.news24.com/Opinions/Necklacing-is-a-cry-for-help-from-Etwatwa-20150918> (2015-
10-12). 
13 J Seekings “Social Ordering and Control in the African Townships of South Africa: An Historical 
Overview of Extra-State Initiatives from the 1940s to the 1990s” in W Schärf and D Nina (eds) The 
Other Law: Non-State Ordering in South Africa (2001) 76. 
14 Plural: makgotla. 
15 Such as thrashing disrespectful youth with a sjambok (whip). 
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associations” as being barbaric, preferring to focus on pre-emptive solutions 
to violent crime with the aim of restoring community harmony.16  The township 
revolts of 1984-1986 brought new forms of extra-state justice into existence, 
namely “People’s Courts”.  Unlike the makgotlas’ emphasis on restoring a 
romanticised pre-colonial past, the efforts of People’s Courts were directed 
towards promoting the political project of advancing liberation and “people’s 
power” and were broadly aligned, organisationally and ideologically, with 
those radically opposed to the apartheid state.17  People’s Courts increasingly 
used violent and summary means – “necklacing”18 was a typical killing method 
– to quash impimpis (those deemed to be in league with the apartheid 
authorities).  From the mid-1980s the term “vigilante” was a pejorative label 
reserved for the violent, reactionary and state-supported groups that 
attempted to impose a more conservative and “traditional” order by crushing 
those – including the young “comrades” active in the People’s Courts – who 
challenged apartheid’s socio-political status quo.19  Certain renegade ANC-
initiated self-defence unit (“SDU”) members – comtsotsis – of the 1980s and 
early 1990s who acted against criminals rather than impimpis, or who used 
violence for personal gain instead of to advance political objectives, are also 
                                            
16 Seekings “Social Ordering and Control in the African Townships of South Africa: An Historical 
Overview of Extra-State Initiatives from the 1940s to the 1990s” in The Other Law: Non-State 
Ordering in South Africa 81-85. 
17 89-92. 
18 “Necklacing” entails placing a petrol-filled tyre around the victim’s neck and setting it alight.  The 
ensuing death is particularly painful, being caused not only by the burns, but also by asphyxiation 
either by the fumes released by the burning rubber or the sudden extraction of the oxygen around the 
tyre as it starts to burn (A Minnaar “The New Vigilantism in Post-April 1994 South Africa: Crime 
Prevention or an Expression of Lawlessness?” (2001) (May 2001) Institute for Human Rights and 
Criminal Justice Studies 1 48). 
19 See N Haysom Mabangalala: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa (Occasional Paper 
10) (1986); N Haysom (1989) “Vigilantes: A Contemporary Form of Repression”; Seekings “Social 
Ordering and Control in the African Townships of South Africa: An Historical Overview of Extra-
State Initiatives from the 1940s to the 1990s” in The Other Law: Non-State Ordering in South Africa 
93; D Bruce & J Komane “Taxis, cops and vigilantes: Police attitudes towards street justice” (1999) 
17 Crime and Conflict 39; Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 7-11; and S J Cooper-
Knock & O Owen “Between Vigilantism and Bureaucracy: Improving Our Understanding of Police 
Work in Nigeria and South Africa” (2015) 19 (3) Theoretical Criminology 355 n 31.  Examples of 
conservative vigilante squads operating in various South African townships were the A-Team, Ama-
Afrika, Pakatis, Mabangalala, Amadoda, Witdoeke, Amasolomzi, Amabutho, Mbhokhoto and the 
Green Berets. 
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sometimes retrospectively classified as vigilantes, and their activities are 
distinguished from those of the “real” SDU comrades.20   
Post-1994, vigilantism’s right-wing and politically-inspired connotations 
made way for the current conception of vigilantism as a response to crime and 
disorder rather than a means to get rid of political opponents.  While there are 
aspects of contemporary vigilantism that resonate with its pre-1994 forms – 
most notably vigilantes’ penchant for brutal methods of punishment, 
vigilantism’s tendency towards conservatism, and its populist mandate – the 
dynamics and motivations of vigilante violence in South Africa today are not 
the same as those of pre-1994 vigilantism.  Although an exploration of 
vigilantism cannot overlook its historical roots and their continued effect on its 
modern-day manifestations, aspects of which will be considered in later 
chapters, the present focus is primarily on vigilantism in the more recent 
crime-fighting sense, and not on its historical forms. 
 
1 2 2 Crime or Punishment? 
A second theme of the study is a feature of vigilantism vividly illustrated 
by the editorial, namely the way in which vigilantism exemplifies the insight 
that the ostensibly clear boundary between crime and punishment is often 
blurred and arbitrary.  This is because of the twofold “displacement of 
culpability” 21  inherent in vigilantism.  On the one hand, vigilantes view 
themselves as the purveyors of “morally sanctimonious violence”22 that needs 
to be meted out to evildoers in the absence of suitable formal remedies.  On 
the other, the formal criminal law perspective on vigilantism obstinately 
ignores the underlying causes of vigilantism, with the state in the main 
preferring simply to blame vigilantes for acting violently and to punish them for 
taking the law into their own hands.  
                                            
20 See Bruce & Komane (1999) Crime and Conflict; Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily 
Bread 11-14. 
21 N Sundar “Vigilantism, Culpability and Moral Dilemmas” (2010) 30 (1) Critique of Anthropology 
113 114. 
22 W Burrows Vigilante! (1976) xv. 
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Vigilantes thus occupy “an awkward borderland between law and 
illegality”, paradoxically breaking the law in order to respect it. 23   The 
uncertain and contested nature of the distinction between deviance and 
responses to deviance, including vigilantes’ ambiguous status as both victim 
and perpetrator, is an important theme of this research – and one with 
significant legal implications.  While there have in recent years been a 
growing number of attempts by criminologists, sociologists and 
anthropologists to describe and account for specific manifestations of 
vigilantism in various parts of the world,24 as mentioned above25 vigilantism is 
a topic that has received little or no legal attention.  Typically, the formal legal 
system unequivocally condemns violent vigilante acts out of hand.26  While 
this reflexive response is understandable in the light of the brutal “justice” 
often meted out by vigilantes, as will be elaborated in § 2 4 2, it is submitted 
that it would be preferable to arrive at a more reflective and nuanced 
evaluation of vigilante behaviour that recognises vigilantes’ status as both the 
wronged and the wrongdoers.  
 
1 2 3 A slippery phenomenon 
A third theme of the present research is the equivocal nature of 
vigilantism, clearly evident in the City Press excerpt: The OVL gang members 
necklaced for terrorising the community started out as vigilantes themselves, 
targeting nyaope-smoking youths.  The power of the vigilante group to 
                                            
23 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 7, 153. 
24 See, e.g., T G Kirsch & T Grätz Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa (2010); D Pratten & A Sen 
Global Vigilantes: Perspectives on Justice and Violence (2007); Abrahams Vigilant Citizens; M K 
Huggins Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extralegal Violence (1991); 
H J Rosenbaum & P C Sederberg Vigilante Politics (1976); W Schärf & D Nina The Other Law: 
Non-State Ordering in South Africa (2001); D Nina Re-Thinking Popular Justice: Self-Regulation 
and Civil Society in South Africa (1995); B Baker Taking the Law Into Their Own Hands: Lawless 
Law Enforcers in Africa (2002); D Feenan Informal Criminal Justice (2003); C Knox & R 
Monaghan Informal Justice in Divided Societies: Northern Ireland and South Africa (2002) and L 
Johnston “What is Vigilantism?” (1996) 36 British Journal of Criminology 220. 
25 At § 1 1. 
26 See, e.g., Jansen and others v S [2008] JOL 22398 (C) at 2, where Brusser AJ stated: “The concept 
of vigilantism is absolutely antithetical to the concept of the due process of the law and, as such, 
cannot be condoned.”  See also Hoffman AJ in S v Schrich 2004 1 SACR 360 (C) at 370, who refers 
to the “serious threat which vigilante action poses to the very fabric of society as we know it.” 
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transform itself – in the case of the OVL, from protecting to threatening the 
community – points to an aspect related to vigilantism that is important for this 
research, namely that it is in essence “ephemeral, volatile, and quick to 
change”.27  A large proportion of vigilante acts are carried out by spontaneous 
groups that do not endure beyond the length of time it takes to mete out 
punishment, and even the vigilante groups that are more organised tend to 
teeter precariously in the no-man’s-land between “pure” criminality and 
incorporation into some form of state-sanctioned crime-fighting initiative.28  
One of the motivations for undertaking this research is to evaluate the 
feasibility of state efforts that encourage vigilantes to become legitimate 
criminal justice partners, including whether such incorporation might reverse 
the tendency of vigilante groups to degenerate into delinquency.   
Needless to say, vigilantes’ mutability and impermanence also makes 
generalising about vigilantism very challenging, since its multifaceted nature 
makes definitive and straightforward demarcations unfeasible.  Achieving 
conceptual clarity requires resorting to a theoretical delineation of vigilantism’s 
“ideal type” characteristics, with the elements identified being at best a rough 
approximation of any particular real act of vigilantism. 29   However, the 
advantage of engaging in theorising about vigilantism in general terms rather 
than focusing exclusively on specific vigilante incidents is that the insights 
offered may be applicable in a range of practical contexts. 
 
1 2 4 The role of legitimacy: the state-vigilante relationship 
A last noteworthy vigilantism-related theme mentioned in the editorial is 
that vigilantism is in many instances something that occurs in response to 
(in)action by the state.  Rightly or wrongly, vigilantes view the state as not 
having fulfilled its positive obligation to protect citizens from all forms of 
                                            
27 J A Bidaguren & D Nina “Governability and Forms of Popular Justice in the New South Africa and 
Mozambique: Community Courts and Vigilantism” (2004) 1-2 (31) Social Justice 165 178. 
28 See § 7 3 2 for more on the challenges of vigilante incorporation. 
29 See § 2 3 for more on “ideal types” in the vigilante context. 
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violence, 30  and they respond by appropriating to themselves certain 
responsibilities and powers of the formal criminal justice system to punish 
deviants.  The state-vigilante relationship is a core preoccupation of this 
study.  
As will become apparent, vigilante groups operate at the intersection of 
state and society31 – “twilight institutions”32 that “challenge the authority of the 
state from within and from outside, using its own language of authority, and at 
the same time draw on, if not directly mimic, its procedural and symbolic 
forms of legitimacy”.33  By in effect co-opting an aspect of state power – 
punishment – that is (ideally) the exclusive preserve of the criminal justice 
system, vigilantes themselves exercise a form of public authority that requires 
legitimation.34  Hansen and Stepputat argue that sovereignty is not a de iure 
quality given to those in power, but is rather “a tentative and always emergent 
form of authority grounded in violence that is performed and designed to 
generate loyalty, fear, and legitimacy from the neighborhood to the summit of 
the state.”35  The implication is that “public authority – or ‘stateness’ – can wax 
and wane”, 36  meaning any claims by the state (or other actors such as 
vigilantes) to wield legitimate force are just that – assertions that are 
contested and may be challenged.37  From this perspective, the existence of 
vigilante groups is a stark reminder of the precarious foundation of state 
legitimacy, and the state’s need to “perform” its sovereignty continuously and 
convincingly by justifying its exercise of power in practice, or risk being fatally 
undermined.   
                                            
30 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 12(1)(c).  See also J Malan “The Inalienable 
Right to Take the Law Into Our Own Hands and the Faltering State” (2007) 4 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 642. 
31 D J Smith A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (2007) 
167. 
32 C Lund “Twilight Institutions: An Introduction” (2006) 37 (4) Development and Change 673; C 
Lund “Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa” (2006) 37 (4) 
Development and Change 685. 
33  L Buur “Reordering Society: Vigilantism and Expressions of Sovereignty in Port Elizabeth's 
Townships” (2006) 37 (4) Development and Change 735 at 750. 
34 Lund (2006) Development and Change 673; 678. 
35 T B Hansen & F Stepputat “Sovereignty Revisited” (2006) 35 (1) Annual Review of Anthropology 
295 297. 
36 Lund (2006) Development and Change 686. 
37 L Buur “Domesticating Sovereigns: The Changing Nature of Vigilante Groups in South Africa” in T 
G Kirsch and T Grätz (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa (2010). 
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This study uses the concept of legitimacy as an overarching framework 
for understanding the complex and dynamic relationship between state and 
citizen in the criminal justice sphere, as well as the nature of the threat posed 
to state sovereignty by vigilantism.  Beetham’s38 definition of legitimacy as the 
rightfulness of power, focusing not on belief in legitimacy as such, but on 
whether feeling obliged to obey is justifiable on normative grounds39 is the 
point of departure for an analysis of the relationship between vigilantism and 
the state in this study.  Three cumulative and complementary aspects of 
legitimacy required for the justified exercise of power are identified, which may 
be termed legal legitimacy, normative legitimacy and demonstrative legitimacy 
respectively.40 
As will be argued in chapter 3, vigilantism does not necessarily 
undermine the state’s legal legitimacy (rule-derived validity) by rejecting (or 
more commonly challenging) the idea of a state or political order per se.  
Although their conduct has the potential for subversion, vigilantes are 
essentially a “conservative mob”41 who seldom desire to institute completely 
new laws and moralities.  Rather, they seek to supplement the criminal justice 
system in circumstances where they perceive the state to have failed to 
provide satisfactory assurances of collective security and social order.  Thus 
vigilantism is an intrinsically relational concept, with the decision to resort to 
vigilantism often actually presupposing the existence of the state.  It is 
therefore simplistic to view the categories of “state” and “vigilante” as two 
completely discrete and separate domains that are in opposition to one 
another.42  As noted by Kirsch and Grätz, vigilante violence may instead be a 
specific way of executing state power, with vigilante crime-fighting discourses 
and actions being a “precarious analogue” to those of state agencies.43 
                                            
38 D Beetham The Legitimation of Power (2013). 
39 “Normative” compliance is used in this study to denote an internal moral obligation to obey owing to 
a belief in the rightfulness of the authority in question, as opposed to compliance due to fear or 
external coercion.  For more on the moral obligation to obey, see  xiii and § 3 2 1 below. 
40 These labels are my own, not Beetham’s. 
41 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 4. 
42 Buur “Domesticating Sovereigns” in Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa 28. 
43 T G Kirsch & T Grätz “Vigilantism, State Ontologies & Encompassment: An Introductory Essay” in 
T G Kirsch and T Grätz (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa (2010) 10. 
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In respect of Beetham’s second legitimacy component, normative 
legitimacy, it is argued that vigilantes do indeed dispute whether the state’s 
power is justified in terms of shared beliefs and values.  In the context of the 
state-citizen power relationship, one of the fundamental justifications for the 
state’s existence is its purported ability to ensure the physical security of its 
citizens.  In Hobbesian terms,44 the vigilante perceives the state as having 
violated the “social contract” whereby all citizens renounce their natural right 
to self-protection on condition that the sovereign safeguards these rights on 
their behalf.  Where the state fails to discharge these responsibilities, state 
claims to wield a monopoly of legitimate force lose moral authority, and each 
citizen’s dormant right to self-help revives until such time as the state is 
factually able to assume its protective duties.45  This aspect of legitimacy may 
help explain why vigilantes believe that their violent conduct is a justified 
response to the state’s inability to serve its fundamental function of dealing 
effectively with threats to order and social stability.46 
A third dimension of legitimacy is legitimacy through expressed 
consent,47 or demonstrative legitimacy.  Where a system of power such as the 
state cannot enforce respect for its rules or becomes chronically unable to 
justify itself in terms of shared beliefs – in other words, if it is unable to 
effectively “perform its sovereignty” – the negative aspects of power relations, 
which may have become obscured and redefined by the legitimation process, 
“are starkly exposed, and experienced for what they are”. 48   The 
disillusionment that accompanies eroded legitimacy exacerbates citizens’ 
resentment and frustration, and may result in them being less inclined to 
actively and willingly co-operate with those in power.  Vigilantes’ temporary 
usurpation of state power to fill the policing vacuum left by the state’s seeming 
inability to preserve a satisfactory level of social order and collective security 
                                            
44 See § 3 5 2 2 below for more. 
45  Malan (2007) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 346-351; see also U Yanay “Co-opting 
Vigilantism: Government Response to Community Action for Personal Safety” (1993) 13 (4) Journal 
of Public Policy 381 at 383. 
46 C Shearing “The Relation Between Public and Private Policing” (1992) 15 Crime and Justice 399. 
47 See Beetham Legitimation of Power 12, who refers to “evidence of consent expressed through 
actions”. 
48 D Beetham The Legitimation of Power (1991) 109. 
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may be characterised as a potent demonstration of significant state 
delegitimation.   
This study hopes to show that the underlying dynamic of (state) 
legitimacy erosion and delegitimation followed by (vigilante) counter-
legitimation is a very useful explanatory framework for understanding the 
dynamic involved in vigilante violence.   
 
1 3 Aims and objectives 
Taking into account the above context and the need to conceptualise, 
understand and address vigilantism from a legal perspective, this study has 
several aims:   
A key preliminary objective is to argue for the separate criminalisation 
of vigilantism, including identifying and explaining the elements of such a new 
crime, and in so doing arrive at a workable definition of vigilantism that may 
be employed in a legal context.  At present, a form of collective liability is often 
employed in cases of mob killings, whereby it is possible to hold all 
participants liable for murder regardless of whether they causally contributed 
to the victim’s death.49  Rather than simply tarring all co-perpetrators with the 
same (bloody) brush, it is proposed that vigilantism be distinguished from 
other forms of violence by making it a separate crime with its own 
requirements for liability and legal consequences.  Utilising such a crime of 
vigilantism in practice would allow for “fair labelling”50 of vigilantes and for the 
tailoring of vigilante-specific punishment options that acknowledge the 
underlying motivations for vigilante violence.  
An important second goal is to ascertain the relationship between the 
emergence of vigilantism and state legitimacy – i.e., to explore the extent to 
which vigilantism is a product of weak or eroded state legitimacy.  By 
                                            
49 See § 6 3 2 2 for more on the workings and iniquities of the common purpose doctrine. 
50 See A Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (2006) 88 and J Chalmers & F Leverick “Fair Labelling 
in Criminal Law” (2008) 71 (2) Modern Law Review 217; also § 2 7 below. 
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pinpointing and categorising aspects of state performance that may make 
people and communities more vigilante-prone, it is hoped that this may 
facilitate state agencies’ efforts to deal more effectively with vigilantism.   
A third aim is to determine how vigilantes are able to position 
themselves as a viable criminal justice alternative: what self-legitimation 
techniques do vigilantes employ to convince others to choose their method of 
violent justice in the competitive “multi-choice policing”51 context of South 
Africa today, where the maintenance of communal order, security and peace 
appears to be anything but a state-monopolised commodity?  Addressing this 
question of vigilante counter-legitimation also entails identifying the overlaps 
and contrasts between formal criminal justice enforcement methods and 
vigilantism, as well as differentiating vigilantism from other non-state policing 
options lawfully available to citizens.   
The last and perhaps most significant objective is to consider how the 
state may best relegitimate itself in the face of the threat to its authority posed 
by vigilantism.  There are various ways that the state may counteract 
vigilantism, including by means of exclusion (focusing on the policing and 
criminalisation of vigilante conduct) and inclusion (aimed at co-opting and 
integrating vigilantes in various capacities).  A problematic tension inherent in 
the issue of state relegitimation is the need to take seriously the state’s desire 
to condemn the (unconstitutional) use of force implicit in most vigilante 
activities, while simultaneously acknowledging the desirability of harnessing 
the (positive) crime-fighting energies of those who may understandably feel let 
down by state law-enforcement agencies.  Crucially, any proposed solution(s) 
must be compatible with the state’s self-legitimated identity as human rights 
guarantor and its concomitant constitutional obligations.  
 
                                            
51  See B Baker “Multi-Choice Policing in Africa: Is the Continent Following the South African 
pattern?” (2004) 35 (2) Society in Transition 204 at 204-205; also B Baker Multi-Choice Policing in 
Africa (2008). 
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1 4 Underlying assumptions 
A core premise of this research is that vigilantism has a distinctive 
status as a “moralistic crime”,52 and that as such, it is not merely yet another 
expression of seemingly senseless collective violence.  An underlying 
assumption is therefore that vigilante violence can only be explained 
convincingly by taking vigilantism “out of the realm of the exotic”. 53  
Vigilantism cannot simply be accounted for with reference to conventional 
theories of deviance,54 since its dynamics and underlying motivations55 are 
distinguishable from those of other forms of criminal behaviour – indeed, they 
are crucial for understanding and explaining it.  This point of departure 
justifies studying vigilantism as a discrete legal phenomenon, and arguing in 
favour of specifically-targeted solutions to its criminal manifestations. 
A second linked assumption is that understanding vigilantism as more 
than merely a private criminal activity requires recognising that while 
vigilantism is not invariably a direct response to (in)action by state agencies, 
vigilantes would be less inclined to resort to self-help if they perceived the 
state to be capable of satisfactory law and order maintenance.  This 
conception of vigilantism as an “inevitable symptom of persistent and chronic 
state failure”56 further implies that it is to a not insignificant degree within the 
power of the state to take positive steps to address the issue of vigilantism, 
and also to curb or eliminate many of its harmful manifestations. 
A last crucial underlying assumption is that any state attempts to tackle 
vigilantism should be executed within a human rights framework.  Solutions 
that promote the realisation of constitutionally-entrenched rights and freedoms 
– particularly human dignity – should at all times be preferred to those that 
unjustifiably undermine or limit them.  This belief informs the proposal that 
                                            
52 D Black “Crime as Social Control” in D Black (eds) Towards a General Theory of Social Control 
Volume 2: Selected Problems (1984). 
53 Huggins Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America 13-14. 
54 For more on attempts to use criminological theories to explain vigilantism, see Appendix A. 
55 Contra R Senechal De La Roche “Collective Violence as Social Control” (1996) 11 (1) Sociological 
Forum 97, who argues in favour of classifying collective violence without referring to its motivations 
or considering its ritualistic aspects or social function. 
56 J R Martin “Vigilantism and State Crime in South Africa” (2012) 1 (2) State Crime 217 219. 
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vigilantism be criminalised separately, as well as the notion that vigilante 
incorporation rather than exclusion should be considered where feasible. 
  
1 5 Methodology 
Reflecting ex post facto on this study’s exact methodological approach, 
it was difficult to isolate the specific methodologies that were employed.  
While its aims were clear, the theoretical particulars of the way in they were to 
be achieved was less apparent.  This mindset seems to be prevalent among 
the legal fraternity, with many colleagues in legal academia appearing to be of 
the view that legal scholars don’t “do” methodology.  To put it in more 
technical terms, it is sometimes said that in legal research, “explicit theoretical 
perspective is often lacking”,57 with the focus of research being what will be 
investigated, not how.  Westerman remarks that the conflation of the “how” 
and “what” questions in legal research is due to law being simultaneously the 
object of research and the theoretical perspective from which that object is 
studied.58   While this construction of law as a completely self-contained and 
unitary entity may well be misconceived,59 there is no doubt that even diverse 
legal approaches still share certain norms and conventions.  An attempt will 
be made to isolate the most common methodological approaches to legal 
research, and then to consider whether this study employs them primarily 
from an “insider” or an “outsider” perspective.60  
                                            
57 P C Westerman “Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a Reflection of the 
Debate on Law” in M Van Hoecke (eds) Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method 
for What Kind of Discipline? (2011) 88-89. 
58 90.  
59 For more see R Cotterrell Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory 
(2006) 30, where he deconstructs it as being “misleading and counterproductive”, and § 1 5 2 below.  
For an example of the varying conclusions that may be reached by applying distinctive philosophies 
of law, see Fuller’s “The Case of the Speluncean Explorers”, discussed in M Douglas How 
Institutions Think (1986) 4-8. 
60 It must be noted that my fields of interest and expertise straddle the insider-outsider divide.  On the 
one hand, I lecture criminal law and am legally trained, with various law degrees from Stellenbosch 
University (see M Nel Incest: A Case Study in Determining the Optimal Use of the Criminal 
Sanction LLM University of Stellenbosch (2003)).  On the other, my interest in vigilantism was 
initially piqued during criminology studies at Cambridge University, which included completing a 
short thesis exploring the link between vigilantism and legitimacy (see M Nel Crime as Punishment: 
The Legitimacy of Vigilantism M.Phil in Criminology University of Cambridge (2005)), the insights 
of which have informed this more detailed and legally-orientated study. 
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1 5 1 The nature of legal research and its implications for this study 
It may be useful first to highlight some typical characteristics of 
traditional legal research, briefly explaining the role of each in determining 
how law61 and social science are combined in this study.   
First, law is largely a hermeneutic discipline, with texts and documents 
being the main research object, and the researcher being tasked with their 
interpretation.62  The aim of legal research is to scrutinise the precise meaning 
and scope of legal rules, concepts, principles and constructions in terms of 
coherence, fit and analogy. 63   The preoccupation of legal research is to 
interpret texts and argue about a choice among conflicting interpretations, or 
to balance a particular law with other laws or legal principles to determine 
their respective relevance and validity. 64   The inevitability of choosing a 
certain interpretation above alternative ones links with a second central 
characteristic of legal research, namely its normativity.   
Normative questions relate to determining what “should be” – what is 
desirable – and not necessarily what “is”.65  Legal research is an inherently 
normative discipline, both in the sense that it describes and systematises 
norms, and because, as noted above, it “takes normative positions and makes 
choices among values and interests”.66   Decisions about which values or 
                                            
61 Law may be concisely defined as a body of rules and norms that is distinguished from (the many) 
other systems of norms on the basis that it emanates from the state and that adherence to its rules is 
enforceable by means of state sanction.  The relevant law at issue falls within the broader discipline 
of public law – i.e., the law dealing with the relationship between the state as authoritative power and 
its subordinates or subjects, or between different branches of state authority (C Snyman Criminal 
Law 6th (2014) 3). Within this field, the present focus is primarily on aspects of criminal law and 
criminal procedure.  Criminal law is a state-imposed system of substantive rules and obligations that 
allows the state to prosecute and impose punishment on those that disobey its edicts, and criminal 
procedure comprises the formal rules whereby the rules of substantive law are enforced. 
62 M Van Hoecke “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?” in M Van Hoecke 
(eds) Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (2011) 
4; 11. 
63 14; C McCrudden “Legal Research and the Social Sciences” (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 632 
633-634. 
64 Van Hoecke “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?” in Methodologies of 
Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? 12. 
65 J Hage “The Method of a Truly Normative Legal Science” in M Van Hoecke (eds) Methodologies of 
Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (2011) 27-28. 
66 Van Hoecke “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?” in Methodologies of 
Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? 10. 
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interests should take preference must be made, which entails giving more 
weight to some values or interests than others. 
It is submitted that studying law as a normative system only from “the 
inside”, limiting one’s “empirical data” to purely legal sources,67 is problematic 
– particularly when engaged in the study of a topic such as vigilantism.  
Focusing exclusively on legal sources risks overlooking the value of “law in 
action”,68 as distinct from “law in the books”.  The quest for “better law”69 may 
be well expedited by considering elements that are external to law and legal 
doctrine, including insights from philosophy, morality and history, and 
empirical research undertaken in fields such as sociology, criminology, 
anthropology, economics and political science. 70   Failing to do so in 
appropriate circumstances may potentially undermine a third typical 
characteristic of legal research, namely its pragmatic, instrumental logic. 
Westerman rightly observes that the aim of legal research is arriving at 
a good and workable order, with the quality of legal research being dependent 
on its outcome.  The merit of the outcome of legal research is determined by 
such criteria as “coherence, consistency, practicality, effectiveness, legitimacy 
and fairness”.71  This technocratic, instrumentalist understanding of law is 
highlighted by Riles, who notes that “[t]o think like a lawyer is to think of law 
as a tool or a means to an end, whether one imagines law as a tool of social 
justice or a tool or corporate interests”.72  One could take it further: engaging 
in high-quality normative legal research surely entails using the best tools one 
may have at one’s disposal, including extra-legal ones. 
Taking into account the three characteristics mentioned above, namely 
the hermeneutic, normative and instrumental nature of legal research, it is 
                                            
67 2. 
68 This phrase is attributed to Roscoe Pound (1910): see McCrudden (2006) Law Quarterly Review 
637. 
69 Van Hoecke “Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?” in Methodologies of 
Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? 10. 
70 10. 
71 Westerman “Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a Reflection of the Debate 
on Law” in Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? 
92-93. 
72 A Riles “Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage” (2006) 108 
(1) American Anthropologist 52 59. 
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apparent that interpreting and understanding the legal dimensions of 
vigilantism requires making value judgments relating to how best to use law to 
achieve a social outcome that addresses vigilantism in a manner that is, inter 
alia, fair and effective.  Considering the paucity of vigilantism-related legal 
sources, this makes an engagement with non-legal sources inevitable.  In 
undertaking a study conceptualising vigilantism from a distinctly legal 
perspective – something that has never before been done – it is therefore 
necessary to incorporate and employ non-legal sources so as to accomplish 
primarily legal aims.  General sources from academic writings in the fields of 
inter alia sociology, criminology, anthropology and political science form an 
indispensable foundation for acquiring empirical information about vigilantism.  
Sources concerning related and analogous topics such as policing, penology, 
private security and restorative justice are utilised where appropriate to 
ascertain how vigilantism should be understood within a wider criminal justice-
related context.  Owing to the lack of legal information related specifically to 
vigilantism, legal and non-legal sources are at times perforce consolidated 
and used interchangeably as authority for the arguments advanced and 
conclusions reached, rather than separating out law and non-law.  Law is 
combined with non-law for more than mere considerations of expedience, 
however.  A transdisciplinary approach that deliberately integrates sources 
from law and the social sciences also serves to underline an important theme 
permeating this research, namely that even when undertaking legal research, 
distinguishing rigidly between law and non-law in practice is not only artificial, 
but may be unhelpful, since – as noted above – legal and extralegal 
approaches and objectives frequently overlap.  
In line with the normativity of legal research, when discussing aspects 
of criminal law and procedure relevant to vigilantes in this study, the main aim 
is not to engage in a detailed legal analysis of what the law relating to 
vigilantes is at present – although the current legal position is certainly set out 
in chapters 2 and 6.  Instead, the legal dimension on which the study centres 
is the normative aspect of jurisprudence – what the law ought to be.  Since 
any kind of criminal penalty entails the infliction of discomfort or suffering, 
state punishment stands in particular need of moral justification to distinguish 
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it from forms of harm purposely inflicted on others by non-state parties.  The 
need for law to correspond with justice is even more acute from a vigilante 
perspective.  This is because vigilantes’ central concern is not the nature of 
the law as such, but the relation between the official system of law and 
achieving decent standards of order and justice.73   
In determining how best to reform vigilante-related aspects of legal 
rules that fall short of the required standard for moral and legal justification, 
this study uses the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 74  (the 
“Constitution”) – and more specifically, the fundamental rights entrenched in 
its Bill of Rights – as the legal standard for evaluating and critiquing the 
current legal position and putting forward any claims about what the law 
should be.  On the basis of these rights, it is also possible to establish how 
state authorities ought to act in their dealings with vigilantes “on the basis of a 
moral benchmark of what justice requires”. 75   It will be argued that in 
attempting to combat vigilante violence the state has an imperative to further 
the interests of justice, upholding the “human dignity, equality and freedom”76 
of all citizens by promoting the common good in forward-looking, non-
punitive,77 restorative and procedurally fair ways. 
It is recognised that a post-modern critique to this proposed approach 
(that has as its central concern questions about the best and most legitimate 
foundations of authority and sovereignty in the vigilante context), is that it 
does not prioritise issues relating to “how” power is actually exercised under 
such sovereignty.78  Normative “what” questions have been given precedence 
since they are in line with the study’s legal focus: a key preoccupation of law 
is, after all, that which is normative, evaluative and prescriptive.  Choosing 
“what” over “how” questions is certainly not meant to imply that (for example) 
                                            
73 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 154.  Justice in this vigilante sense, says Abrahams, is “not so much a 
deep philosophical issue as a gut-level feeling of satisfaction that perceived wrongs are righted 
through the identification and punishment of those who perpetrate them”.  
74 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
75 R West Normative Jurisprudence: An Introduction (2011) 187. 
76 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 36(1). 
77 Where appropriate and feasible. 
78 See C Gordon “Goverment Rationality: An Introduction” in G Burchell, et al. (eds) The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (1991) 7. 
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Foucault’s concept of governmentality79 and his insight that “government is 
not just a power needing to be tamed or an authority needing to be legitimized 
… [but] is an activity and an art which concerns all and which touches each”80 
are not valid and useful for vigilantism research.  Indeed, in § 4 2 3 this study 
does explore governmentality’s links with the so-called “responsibilisation 
strategy” whereby the state sheds its “sovereign” style of top-down command 
and develops a form of rule involving the enlistment of others in the task of 
crime control,81 and considers responsibilisation’s potential role in legitimising 
violent self-help. 
 
1 5 2 Insider v outsider perspectives on law: positioning this study 
There are numerous perspectives from which to undertake an 
examination of how the law may best address the social issue of vigilantism.  
According to Kempny,82 being reflexive about one’s own positionality is not 
mere self-indulgence, but is instead a “self-conscious reflection of how one is 
located within certain power structures, and how this may influence methods, 
interpretations, and knowledge production”. The distinction focused on here is 
the insider-outsider dichotomy: this study’s own methodological perspective 
may only properly be determined by considering whether engagement with 
non-law is principally from the perspective of a legal insider or a legal 
outsider.  The distinction between an “internal” and an “external” approach 
must be explained briefly. 
Westerman’s observation that the law is simultaneously the object of 
legal research and the theoretical perspective from which it is studied was 
                                            
79 Govermentality is a “modality that involves the enlistment of others, the shaping of incentives and 
the creation of new forms of cooperative action” (D Garland The Culture of Control: Crime and 
Social Order in Contemporary Society (2001) 125).  See M Foucault “Governmentality” in G 
Burchell, et al. (eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (1991) 102-103 for an 
extended definition of the term governmentality.  See also D Garland “'Governmentality' and the 
Problem of Crime: Foucault, Sociology, Criminology” (1997) 1 (2) Theoretical Criminology 173 for 
ways in which the concept of governmentality is relevant in the criminal justice context.  
80 G Burchell, C Gordon & P Miller The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (1991) x. 
81 See Garland Culture of Control 124-127. 
82 M Kempny “Rethinking Native Anthropology: Migration and Auto-Ethnography in Post-Accession 
Europe” (2012) 2 (3) International Review of Social Research 39 42. 
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noted above.83   This insight accords with an “internal” approach to legal 
research.  Nelken argues that law has its own ways of interpreting the world: 
law as a discourse determines, in accordance with that discourse, what is to 
count as truth, and does so for specifically legal purposes.  It provides its own 
explanations for the social world, interpreting social life in its own terms.84  
Thus traditional legal analysis is often viewed as an (at least relatively) 
autonomous field of experience or discourse that can “legitimately be 
described by reference to its own sources”. 85   In terms of this “internal” 
approach,86 law is separated from its context and an attempt is made to word 
societal problems in exclusively legal terms that may be solved without 
considering anything that is not “law”.87  The implication is not that legal 
“insiders” do not engage with other disciplines, but merely that they gauge the 
usefulness of such involvement in terms of its contribution to better “internal” 
legal analysis.88   
Such an “internal” approach to legal research may be contrasted with 
an “external” one, which emphasises the study of law at work within society as 
opposed to law existing in a social, economic and political vacuum.89  In 
studying “law in action”, the externally-oriented researcher positions 
themselves as an “outsider”, rejecting the assumption that law is autonomous 
and self-contained, instead examining it using the same tools and 
methodologies used to study any other social phenomenon or political or 
economic practice.90   
Self-examination confirmed, as suspected, that this study’s point of 
view is predominantly a legal one.  Having such a legal perspective is not 
somehow “less than” having a social science one – less intricate and 
insightful, more unproblematic and one-dimensional.  Quite the reverse: 
                                            
83 At § 1 5 above. 
84  See D Nelken “The Truth About Law's Truth” in A Febbrajo and D Nelken (eds) European 
Yearbook in the Sociology of Law 1993 (1994) discussed in Cotterrell Law, Culture and Society 48. 
85 Quoted in McCrudden (2006) Law Quarterly Review 635. 
86 633. 
87  M Van Hoecke Methodologies of Legal Research: What Kind of Method For What Kind of 
Discipline? (2011) vii. 
88 McCrudden (2006) Law Quarterly Review 635. 
89 634. 
90 641. 
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McCrudden rightly notes that the law is complex, nuanced and contested.  It 
is:  
“more often in the process of becoming, than settled.  Law is not a 
datum; it is in constant evolution, developing in ways that are 
sometimes startling and endlessly inventive … That is its 
fascination.”91   
My fascination and engagement with the law is first and foremost that 
of an insider.  This study does not claim to involve true socio-legal research, 
which is a typical “external” approach that uses empirical social science 
disciplines to investigate and understand the role of law as social 
phenomenon.92   Adhering to a legal paradigm – as opposed to one based on 
social science – does not mean that the benefits of drawing on non-law are 
undermined or trivialised, however.  On the contrary: wanting to use the law to 
achieve social effects requires recognising the vital connection between law 
and social reality.  The two are of necessity interdependent: whilst law is 
certainly a product of its social context, the social context is itself in part a 
product of law.93   
Indeed, the duality between the insider and outsider perspectives on 
legal research may be more apparent than real.  According to Cotterrell, such 
an absolute dichotomy between legal insiders and outsiders is a “misleading 
and counterproductive” construction of certain kinds of legal thought that 
purport to close law off as self-contained and distinct from the non-legal 
environment.94  He emphasises that there is not simply one community of 
legal interpreters, and law is “not a single system but a complex of 
overlapping systems of regimes of regulation”.95  Depending on the standpoint 
of a particular legal interpretive community, it is a distinct possibility that those 
who would appear to non-lawyers to be “insiders” could find themselves to be 
                                            
91 648. 
92 637; Cotterrell Law, Culture and Society 55. 
93 McCrudden (2006) Law Quarterly Review 649. 
94 Cotterrell Law, Culture and Society 30. 
95 36. 
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legal “outsiders” – observers rather than participants. 96   Cotterrell’s 
recognition of legal plurality and the fluidity of the inside-outside divide 
regarding legal research is both intriguing and appealing.  It accords with the 
insight above regarding the complex and contested nature of law, and with 
McCrudden’s view that legal research:  
“now embraces a pluralism of methodological approaches … 
What is emerging are approaches that combine both the internal 
and the external approaches … pinpointing what is distinctive 
about law as a social construction, as well as examining its inter-
relationship with other social phenomena.”97  
The sociological enquiry embodied in this study may not have led to a 
“radical extension and reflexivity” of any understanding of the law,98 but the 
study does embrace the incorporation of social science as an important tool 
for broadening legal understanding.  Legal ideas function as a means of 
structuring and transforming the social world.  Appreciating them in this 
sense, whilst recognising their power and limits, 99 is the first step towards 
understanding that law “is sometimes best studied not in isolation but as an 
element of a complex cultural milieu”.100  The study attempts to reframe non-
law (in particular the lived reality of vigilantes and their supporters, as 
observed from the point of view of the social scientist) by viewing it through a 
legal lens.  As noted earlier,101 its engagement with the social sciences is 
chiefly transdisciplinary, as opposed to interdisciplinary.  This implies that 
while results and perspectives are borrowed from other disciplines to 
illuminate the legal research undertaken, the study remains grounded in the 
law.102    
                                            
96 35. 
97 McCrudden (2006) Law Quarterly Review 642. 
98 Cotterrell Law, Culture and Society 62. 
99 63. 
100  J M Conley & W M O'Barr “Legal Anthropology Comes Home: A Brief History of the 
Ethnographic Study of Law” (1993-1994) 27 (1) Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 41 44. 
101 See § 1 5 1 above. 
102 See M Gullestad “Overcoming the Division Between Anthropology 'At Home' and 'Abroad'” (2015-
05-01) EASA Online <http://www.easaonline.org/downloads/Gullestadeasa.pdf> (2015-12-04) 9 for 
more on the distinction between “interdisciplinary” and “transdisciplinary”. 
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According to Nelken, when the law borrows from scientific disciplines 
and practices it seems to do so as it sees fit, taking what it deems useful, on 
its own conditions for its own purposes.103  This rings true.  The extensive 
drawing on non-legal sources and insights employed here remains 
instrumental at heart, with the primary purpose being problem-solving rather 
than the “thick description” beloved of anthropologists and their ilk.104  The 
study’s reflection on empirical evidence such as ethnographic data is 
unapologetically from a predominantly theoretical perspective and at an 
abstract level.  The aim is to use such data to come to general conclusions 
about how to understand and address vigilantism and related phenomena in a 
legal context per se, rather than to analyse in depth particular manifestations 
of vigilantism.105  This exposes my research to the charge that I, like other 
legal scholars employing social science research for their own ends, am 
plagued by an:  
“irksome sense of amateurism, of free play and frivolity about the 
details … the propensity … to play freely and loosely with 
concepts, to mix and match, to do some structuralism here and 
some psychoanalysis there without a clear sense of theoretical, 
epistemological, or ethical commitment”.106   
I plead guilty.  When it comes to methodology, the crucial question for 
the purposes of this study is not the exact theoretical nature of the research 
method(s) employed, but rather whether the legal lens used will serve to 
illuminate and clarify – rather than distort and obfuscate – the social reality of 
vigilantism-plagued communities.   
  
                                            
103 Nelken “The Truth About Law's Truth” in European Yearbook in the Sociology of Law 1993 101-
102. 
104 Riles (2006) American Anthropologist 63. 
105 This is one of the primary reasons why this study does not consider the historical development of 
vigilantism in South Africa in any great depth. 
106 Riles (2006) American Anthropologist 57. 
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1 6 Outline of thesis 
Following this introduction to the topic in chapter 1, chapter 2 of the 
study attempts to arrive at a working definition of vigilantism in a legal context.  
Previous attempts to define vigilantism are critically analysed and the 
elements of a proposed crime of vigilantism are identified and discussed 
systematically.  
Chapter 3 elaborates on the usefulness of legitimacy for 
conceptualising the relationship between the state and those who engage in 
vigilantism.  The various dimensions of legitimacy are explained in the context 
of vigilantism and the assumed link between (possibly deficient) state 
legitimacy and vigilantism is clarified. 
Chapter 4 explores the factors precipitating state delegitimation (and 
hence, it is argued, an increased propensity for vigilantism).  It examines 
various practical obstacles to effective state enforcement of criminal 
prohibitions, identifies ways in which the state’s own policing strategies may 
inadvertently be encouraging vigilantism, and considers the implications of 
incongruent state and citizen law-enforcement beliefs for vigilantism. 
Chapter 5 focuses on vigilante counter-legitimation strategies and 
rituals with the objective of comparing them to those utilised by the formal 
criminal justice system.  By highlighting the differences and similarities in their 
respective aims, procedure, punishment, treatment of suspects, etc. the 
common ground, or lack of it, between state-sanctioned criminal justice and 
vigilantism may be better delineated. 
In chapters 6 and 7, various possible state responses to vigilantism are 
outlined and critically evaluated. The discussion of state relegitimation through 
exclusion in chapter 6 includes an elaboration of the relevant crimes with 
which vigilantes may be charged, the challenges faced by the state in 
prosecuting vigilantes en masse and how criminalising vigilantism separately 
may give the state scope to deal with vigilantes in more restorative ways.  
Chapter 7 considers inter alia the possibility of incorporating vigilantes into 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 26 
already-existing state-sanctioned policing or dispute resolution initiatives, and 
reflections on how community crime-fighting zeal may be channelled whilst 
maintaining the necessary formal oversight.  In addition, more general state 
strategies aimed at rectifying the legitimacy problems identified in chapter 4 
are posited.   
Chapter 8, the last chapter of the study, concludes with some remarks 
on the significance of vigilantism in the South African legal context and makes 
final recommendations as to how to approach this vexing issue in a manner 
that balances a respect for human rights with the need to acknowledge 
community law-enforcement concerns. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 27 
2 CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS VIGILANTISM? 
 
2 1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to formulate a workable definition of 
vigilantism for use in the legal context.  A back-to-basics strategy will be 
employed to arrive at a legally defensible definition for vigilantism, 
necessitated by the fact that case law and other legal sources are of no real 
assistance in this regard.  The systematic approach followed utilises the 
general principles of criminal liability as a logical framework for 
conceptualising the nature of the conduct engaged in by vigilantes.  The 
requirements identified for the crime of vigilantism are thus conceived of as 
individualised variants of the well-established elements that need always to be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt before criminal liability may ensue.  The 
reason for using the elements of the crime as a point of departure for 
understanding vigilantism from a (criminal) law perspective is that vigilantism 
must be defined in terms of it being conduct that is (at least prima facie) 
criminal.  This observation may appear self-evident, but as will become clear 
in due course, non-legal attempts to define vigilantism often tend to lose sight 
of it.1  Taking this into account, the discussion below corresponds roughly with 
the key elements that the state must prove to convict someone of a crime, 
namely: that the person must have acted in a manner that is proscribed by 
law (actus reus or conduct); that the act in question is unjustified 
(unlawfulness); and that the person can be blamed for their unlawful conduct 
(mens rea or fault).  Relevant aspects of these elements are considered 
critically and in detail, following which the chapter concludes by arguing in 
favour of the separate criminalisation of vigilantism.  A legal definition of a 
proposed crime of vigilantism is put forward, and its essential components 
explained.  This definition is the point of departure for the analysis of 
vigilantism in subsequent chapters.  
                                            
1 See Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology for an example in the context of criminology. 
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2 2 Background and history 
Before embarking on an attempt to define vigilantism legally, however, 
it is necessary to outline the origin and history of the term vigilantism.  
Etymologically, the word “vigilante” is originally a Spanish adjective meaning 
“watchful”, and as a noun is mainly used to mean a “watchman” or “guard” in 
that language.  Its Latin root is the adjective vigilantem (nominative vigilans), 
which means “watchful, anxious or careful”.  The word “vigilante” was adopted 
into North American English in the nineteenth century, entering popular 
vocabulary through the (1866) writings of Thomas Dinsdale.  He wrote about 
the 1860s Vigilantes of Montana, a group of concerned citizens who 
organised themselves against a corrupt local sheriff and other “undesirables” 
who crossed their path.2  The word, and the common related term “vigilance 
committee” or “vigilant society” seemed to have had chiefly positive 
connotations.  Those opposed to the activities of such groups pejoratively 
referred to them as “stranglers”.3  Other early vigilante groups were referred to 
as “regulators” and “moderators”, or had more specific titles such as “White 
Caps”4 and the notorious Ku Klux Klan.  Abrahams5 notes that it is only more 
recently that there has been a growing tendency in North America to view the 
term “vigilantism” – with its associations of violence – more disapprovingly.   
In early British contexts the term “vigilante” does not seem to have 
been used, but – in all likelihood as a result of the violent activities of 
American vigilante groups – it has long had negative connotations. 6   In 
English, the collection of words that include “vigil”, “vigilance” and “vigilante” 
co-exist with a second set that has partly overlapping meanings, including 
“wake” “watch” and “watchful”.  These words are Germanic in origin, but 
appear to share the same ancient Indo-European roots as their Latin 
                                            
2 R G Abrahams “What's in a name?  Some thoughts on the vocabulary of vigilantism and related 
forms of 'informal criminal justice'” in D Feenan (eds) Informal Criminal Justice (2002) 27. 
3 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 4-5; Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal Criminal Justice 27. 
4 It is interesting to note that a South African conservative vigilante group operating in Cape Town in 
the 1980’s called themselves the Witdoeke (white cloths) (L Buur & S Jensen “Introduction: 
Vigilantism and the Policing of Everyday Life in South Africa” (2004) 63 (2) African Studies 139 
142), although this link may be purely coincidental. 
5 Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal Criminal Justice 27. 
6 27. 
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counterparts.7  Curiously, however, in contemporary English usage the idea of 
“neighbourhood watch”, which generally implies non-violence and co-
operation with police, is often used in sharp contrast to vigilantism.8 
In 1980s South Africa, the term “vigilantes” connoted violent, organised 
and reactionary groupings operating within black communities, which, 
although not receiving official recognition, were politically directed in the 
sense that they acted to neutralise individuals and groupings opposed to the 
apartheid state and its institutions. 9   In the post-1994 democratic era 
vigilantes do not direct their actions against political opponents so much as 
address issues relating to crime and disorder.10  In addition, as will become 
apparent, the vigilante mandate does not confine itself to addressing pure 
crime, but also encroaches into the sphere of the enforcement of non-criminal 
norms.  While vigilantism’s historical roots cannot be ignored, it is 
contemporary vigilantism that is the focus of the present study. 
 
2 3 Legal challenges 
Now that the origin and historical context of the word vigilantism have 
been explained briefly, a distinctly legal meaning of the term must be 
considered.  It has already been noted11 that there is a dearth of helpful case 
law to draw on as a resource when conceptualising and characterising 
vigilantism in a distinctly legal way.  Indeed, the paucity of legal mentions of 
vigilantism, let alone nuanced and reflective ones, is striking.  Vigilantism is 
only very occasionally referred to in court judgments, and when it is, such 
references tend to be superficial and unsubstantial.  No authoritative South 
African case law could be identified where vigilantism is defined, as opposed 
to merely being referred to.  Courts seem content to adopt the attitude of 
                                            
7 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 5. 
8 See, for example, L Johnston “Crime, Fear and Civil Policing” (2001) 38 (5-6) Urban Studies 959, 
who makes a clear distinction between “responsible citizenship” as embodied by groups such as 
neighbourhood watches, and “autonomous citizenship”, which includes acts of vigilantism.  
However, in § 7 4 3 it will be seen that South African vigilantes co-opted as neighbourhood watch 
members seem to find it very hard to turn away completely from their former violent tendencies. 
9 Haysom Vigilantes: A Contemporary Form of Repression.  See also § 1 2 1 above. 
10 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 7. 
11 See §§ 1 5 1 and 2 above. 
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Justice Stewart when he defined obscenity simply by declaring: “I know it 
when I see it”. 12   There has been no legislative attempt to define or to 
consider vigilantism in depth either.  The national spokesperson for the 
Department of Justice and Correctional Services recently acknowledged, 
“Mob justice is not defined [in law] and it has never been considered [as a 
separate phenomenon], it’s covered by specific offences.”13   
While the courts and the executive acknowledge that vigilantism exists, 
they seem to share popular culture’s reflexive – albeit unreflective – 
assumption that vigilante violence deserves harsh condemnation.  Without 
exception, the case law considering vigilantism has something negative to say 
about it.  Sometimes the objections are vague and all-encompassing, such as 
Hoffman AJ’s reference in S v Schrich14 to “the serious threat which vigilante 
action poses to the very fabric of society as we know it”.  In the same vein, 
Brusser AJ in Jansen v S declined to reduce the sentences of disciplinary 
committee members for kidnapping and serious assault with a sjambok, 
stating: 
 “[T]o do so would be lending the court’s approval to vigilantism and 
anarchy, which as I have set out above, a court should never do.  
As much as the civil law frowns upon self help even more so should 
the court frown on self help in criminal cases.”15   
The judiciary usually dismisses out of hand self-help in general, of 
which vigilantism is but one manifestation.  For example, in Chief Lesapo v 
North West Agricultural Bank it was held:  
“No one is entitled to take the law into her or his own hands.  Self 
help, in this sense, is inimical to a society in which the rule of law 
                                            
12 Jacobellis v Ohio 378 US 184 (1964) 197. 
13 N Prince “Call For 'Mob Justice' Policy” (2015-04-07) IOL News <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-
courts/call-for-mob-justice-policy-1.1841537#.VS0Fz0IwyfQ> (2015-04-14). 
14 S v Schrich 370D. 
15 Jansen v S 5. 
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prevails … Taking the law into one’s own hands is … inconsistent 
with the fundamental principles of our law.”16 
While invariably subjecting those who take the law into their own hands 
to severe criticism, members of the judiciary have nevertheless on occasion 
acknowledged that vigilante acts are on some level rational and explicable – 
an almost understandable form of the administration of “justice” carried out by 
community “courts”.  A good example of this contradictory stance is Navsa 
JA’s statement in S v Thebus: 
“This case clearly demonstrates that law and order break down 
even further with catastrophic consequences when vigilante action 
is resorted to … Ignoble methods can never serve an ostensibly 
noble cause.  Law enforcement agencies will do well to note that 
inaction and apathy on their part lead to this kind of behaviour.”17   
On the one hand, Navsa JA summarily condemns vigilantism because 
of its barbaric methods; but on the other, he takes judicial notice of the fact 
that vigilante acts are simply straightforward attempts to advance the “noble” 
cause of addressing a long-standing and ongoing problem, namely the state’s 
woefully inadequate response to societal order and security demands.  That 
vigilantes can at once evoke both the (overt) condemnation and the (perhaps 
subliminal) sympathy of the criminal justice system makes vigilantism a 
fascinating subject for legal inquiry.  Exposing such judicial equivocality is the 
first step towards arriving at a definition of vigilantism that views it not as black 
or white, but as a more subtly-shaded “twilight” phenomenon.18   
The failure to conceptualise vigilantism clearly is by no means confined 
to the purely legal sphere.  Even the 2014 Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations 
between SAPS and the Community in Khayelitsha (“Khayelitsha 
Commission”), which came into being as a direct result of numerous 
incidences of vigilantism in the township, and one of the primary aims of 
                                            
16 Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and another 2000 1 SA 409 (CC) para 11. 
17 S v Thebus and another 2003 2 SACR 319 (CC) 578J-H. 
18 Lund (2006) Development and Change; Lund (2006) Development and Change. 
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which was to investigate vigilantism, makes little attempt to explain what it 
means per se.  It confines itself to the following terse definition of vigilantism: 
“actions of the community to punish people perceived as offenders”.19  
The underlying judicial attitude of ambivalence towards vigilantism 
noted above is replicated in non-legal contexts.  This is exemplified by the 
frequent use of oxymoronic terminology such as “popular justice”, “vigilante 
justice”, “kangaroo court”, 20  “lynch-justice”, 21  “vengeance attacks”, 22  “rogue 
justice”, 23  “mob justice” 24  and “Bundu Court killings” 25  to refer to the 
phenomenon.  A term such as “mob justice” combines the notion of a “mob” – 
the “unstable or excitable crowd”, the common, disorderly and riotous mass of 
the people26 – with the connotations of peace, respect, moral rightfulness and 
objectivity invoked by the word “justice”.  Abrahams observes that vigilantism 
may confusingly combine opposing elements: “sectional and common 
interests, conservatism and radicalism, elitist and populist values, intolerance 
and caring decency”.27  The coexistence of these antagonistic or disparate 
elements that characterises vigilantism may help account for the tendency to 
describe, and respond to, this phenomenon in such an ambivalent manner.   
However, highlighting the internal contradictions of judicial, and other, 
responses to vigilantes does not advance this chapter’s cause of arriving at a 
legal definition of vigilantism a great deal.  Notwithstanding Buur and Jensen’s 
warning that vigilantism should be studied “as practice rather than an object of 
analysis with clear-cut conceptual and empirical boundaries”,28 the central 
task of unpacking vigilantism by identifying its constituent elements must now 
                                            
19 C O’Regan & V Pikoli Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency 
and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community of Khayelitsha (2014)385-386. 
20  See SAPA “'Vigilantes' in Court for Kidnapping, Assault” (2014-07-20) IOL News 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/vigilantes-in-court-for-kidnapping-assault-
1.1717887#.VQQE-0IwyfS> (2015-03-14). 
21 S v Basson 2011 JDR 0827 (Nm) para 5. 
22 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 385. 
23 C Africa, J Christie, R Mattes, M Roefs & H Taylor Crime and Community Action: Pagad and the 
Cape Flats, 1996-1997 (1998) 3. 
24 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 385. 
25 According to O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 385, this is the term used by the 
South African Police Service (“SAPS”).  
26 Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal Criminal Justice 30. 
27 25. 
28 (2004) African Studies 148. 
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be addressed.  A caveat is required here: it would be presumptuous to 
assume that a multifaceted, labile and slippery phenomenon such as 
vigilantism could easily be reduced to a straightforward definition.  Hence, 
delineating the characteristics or general elements of vigilantism must be 
regarded as illustrating an “ideal type”, 29  an archetype (albeit somewhat 
individualised for operationalisation in a South African context).   The “ideal 
type” (a term coined by sociologist Max Weber) is an analytical construct that 
employs the hypothetical conceptualisation of the phenomenon being 
scrutinised to serve as a yardstick against which real-life manifestations 
thereof may be compared.30  According to Martin, the aim of constructing such 
a “perfect” example is to provide conceptual clarity as well as a useful 
comparative tool “unaffected by the ‘messiness’ of real-life empirical 
observation”.31  For this reason, the “ideal” elements of vigilantism identified 
below are certainly not meant to approximate all instances of vigilantism in 
practice, let alone constitute an exhaustive substantive picture from which no 
aspect of a particular vigilante act could ever deviate.  While some examples 
of individual vigilante practices are referred to, the focus of the discussion in 
this chapter is relatively general, elaboration about the specifics of vigilante 
behaviour being reserved for later chapters. 
 
2 4 Conduct proscribed by law 
For criminal liability to ensue, the first step is to identify a particular 
perpetrator or perpetrators.  Compliance with the conduct element of the 
crime requires the state to prove that a human being has committed an act 
that has been defined as criminal by a competent lawmaker.  When 
addressing this element in relation to vigilantism, two aspects in particular 
require further consideration.  First, the notion of who the human being is who 
perpetrates an act of vigilantism must be expanded upon, raising questions 
                                            
29 R G Abrahams “Some Thoughts on the Comparative Study of Vigilantism” in D Pratten and A Sen 
(eds) Global Vigilantes (2007) 443. 
30 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 7; Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal Criminal Justice 26. 
31  J R Martin “Vigilantism and Informal Social Control in South Africa” (2010) 23 (3) Acta 
Criminologica 53 58. 
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such as the following: Is vigilantism necessarily a group activity, or would a 
“lone vigilante” also warrant inclusion?  And, is vigilantism committed by 
private individuals only, or may state agents also be vigilantes?  Second, the 
nature of vigilante conduct itself needs to be unpacked, and some typical 
manifestations identified.  In particular, the violent nature of much vigilante 
conduct must be highlighted. 
 
2 4 1 Vigilante perpetrators 
2 4 1 1 Group or individual or both? 
The first question to be addressed is whether vigilantism is necessarily 
a group phenomenon.  While individual vigilantes are certainly not unheard of, 
vigilantism is more commonly carried out as part of a group.32  Terms like 
“mob justice” used synonymously with vigilantism cement the popular 
perception that vigilante acts are committed collectively.  Indeed, scholars 
such as Senechal De la Roche appear to view vigilantism purely as a form of 
group conduct, classifying it as a form of “collective violence”.33  Similarly, 
Baker, who regards vigilantism as a form of informal policing, is of the view 
that it entails some degree of organised action, which implies that it is 
perpetrated by a group rather than single individuals.34   Swanepoel and 
Duvenhage’s definition also limits vigilantism to the collective context.35  In 
addition, all the examples of vigilante action cited in the Khayelitsha 
Commission’s report depict it as being committed by more than one person.36  
The Commission heard testimony from witnesses relating to the “whole 
community”37 participating in a vigilante assault and killing, a “large group of 
boys attack[ing] and stabb[ing] [a robbery suspect] to death”,38 “a group of 
                                            
32 Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal Criminal Justice 26. 
33 Senechal De La Roche (1996) Sociological Forum. 
34 Baker (2004) Society in Transition 207. 
35 L Swanepoel & A Duvenhage “Vigilantism as a Feature of Political Decay in the Post-1994 South 
African Dispensation” (2007) 39 (1) Acta Academia 123 127. 
36 See, for instance, O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 90-95. 
37 91. 
38 93. 
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community members … a large crowd” 39  killing a suspected robber, and 
“approximately among 40-50 … members of the community in the mob”40 
severely assaulting a man while police looked on.  Unsurprisingly, then, the 
Khayelitsha Commission report’s definition of vigilantism – “actions of the 
community to punish people perceived as offenders” 41  – implies group 
participation, rather than the conduct of a lone individual in the community.   
The collective nature of South African vigilantism is also reflected in 
recent media reports about vigilante conduct, which focus on seemingly 
ubiquitous spontaneous mob justice in the vast majority of instances.  A few 
examples include: a group of twenty men armed with “hammers, axes, stones, 
knives and glass bottles” attacking and killing a foreigner who had stabbed 
and killed a suspected thief; 42  members of the community allegedly 
“organis[ing] themselves and conduct[ing] a manhunt” before beating to death 
a man suspected of robbery, rape and murder;43 and a group of fifteen people 
kidnapping suspected criminals, subjecting them to a “kangaroo court” and 
assaulting them.44   
Case law on spontaneous acts of vigilantism is rare, probably owing to 
the fact that such vigilantism is “shrouded in a conspiracy of silence”. 45   
Incidents are often not reported, and witnesses are reluctant to come forward 
for fear of intimidation, posing a challenge to police and prosecutors alike.46  
Case law mentioning vigilantism tends to focus on its more organised 
collective manifestations, including: S v Thebus, 47  where members of the 
vigilante group People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (“PAGAD”) were 
                                            
39 94. 
40 94-95. 
41 385-386 (emphasis added). 
42 S Mukadam “Mob's Bloody Vengeance” (2013-06-27) IOL News <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-
courts/mob-s-bloody-vengeance-1.1538636#.VQQHZUIwyfR> (2015-03-14). 
43  SAPA “Three in Court for Mob Attack Video” (2014-05-16) IOL News 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/three-in-court-for-mob-attack-video-
1.1689744#.VQQF_EIwyfS> (2015-03-14). 
44 SAPA “'Vigilantes' in Court for Kidnapping, Assault” IOL News. 
45 Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007) Acta Academia 126.  See also A Von Schnizler, G Ditlhage, L 
Kgalema, T Meapa, T Mofokeng & P Pigou Guardian or Gangster?  Mapogo A Mathamaga: A Case 
Study (2001) 21 for more on fear as a means by which vigilante group Mapogo A Mathamaga wields 
influence.  
46 See § 5 4 1 1 for more on the “conspiracy of silence” surrounding acts of vigilantism. 
47 S v Thebus. 
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involved in a shoot-out with alleged drug dealers; S v Jansen 48  where 
members of the Beaufort-Wes Gemeenskapsvereniging kidnapped and 
brutally beat the complainant with sjamboks; S v Mlotsana,49 where members 
of a stock-theft-fighting group called Iliso-Iomzi kidnapped and tortured 50 
suspected housebreakers; S v Whitehead,51 where a group of more than 70 
(white) men attacked and bludgeoned striking (black) municipal workers; S v 
Zuko, 52  which concerned members of an organisation of business-people 
called Masizake apprehending and assaulting suspected robbers; S v 
Schrich,53 involving PAGAD G-force members on a mission to shoot drug 
lords and gangsters; and Mzanywa v Minister of Safety and Security,54 where 
members of the community resolved to assault three suspected thieves, and 
then found and assaulted them severely with sjamboks. 
As illustrated above, the type of vigilantism most prevalent in South 
Africa is definitely collective action, but “lone vigilantes” are not unheard of.  A 
good example from case law is the instance of Joshua,55 a resident of Delft (a 
gang-ridden suburb of Cape Town) whose wife had been robbed at knifepoint.  
Joshua went in search of the robbers armed with a shotgun.  He confronted a 
group of teenage Hard Livings gang members, one of whom fitted the 
description of one of his wife’s robbers, and demanded his wife’s purse.  This 
youth (Marlin) swore at him, threatened him with a broken bottle, and gave a 
command to the other group members that Joshua perceived as threatening.  
Joshua’s response was to shoot and kill not only Marlin, but also two of the 
other gang members who were attempting to run away (Mervin and Fabian) 
and to injure a third (Ivan).  He then chased a fourth youth (Etienne) and 
followed him in the direction of a nearby residence, where he shot and killed 
two other men (Jacobs and Hassan) and a dog, seemingly unprovoked.  
                                            
48 Jansen v S. 
49 Mlotsana and others v S [2005] JOL 15458 (Tk). 
50 Unless otherwise specified (see § 4 2 7 2 below), this study uses torture in its generic, non-legal 
sense to refer to the infliction of brutal or severe pain or suffering, which is not necessarily imposed 
by state agents. 
51 Whitehead and others v S [2006] JOL 17765 (NC); S v Whitehead and others 2008 1 SACR 431 
(SCA). 
52 Zuko v S [2009] 4 All SA 89 (E). 
53 S v Schrich. 
54 Mzanywa v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] JOL 16112 (Ck). 
55 See S v Joshua 2003 1 SACR 1 (SCA). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 37 
Although the court never uses the word “vigilante” to describe Joshua, it is 
clear that his initial act at least was prompted by a desire to resort to self-help 
against those he thought had attacked his wife.  On appeal Joshua argued 
that he had shot because he believed himself to be in danger, and was 
acquitted of the murder of Marlin and the attempted murder of Ivan, found 
guilty of culpable homicide in respect of Mervin and Fabian’s deaths, but 
convicted of murdering Jacobs and Hassan.56   
While the lone vigilante appears to be the exception in South African 
literature, this manifestation of vigilantism is frequently mentioned in vigilante 
texts from other jurisdictions.  Only four of the eleven examples of vigilantism 
mentioned by Les Johnston in his seminal article on vigilantism57 are of a 
collective nature, with the same number being individual vigilantes and the 
remainder groups of less than four.  Media reports of vigilantism from outside 
Africa tend to follow this trend.  A typical example is the story of Stinson 
Hunter, a self-styled “paedophile hunter” who sends “messages purporting to 
come from a young girl to men on adult websites”, thereby luring them to 
engage in child sexual grooming. 58   He is described in the article as a 
“vigilante” although, as is elaborated on later at § 2 4 2, the fact that his 
conduct does not even threaten the use of force means it would fail to fulfil 
that proposed element in the definition of vigilantism.59  
In summary, while the existence of the “lone vigilante” shows that 
vigilantism is not a purely collective phenomenon, South African vigilantes do 
most often engage in acts of group violence.  A question that still remains is 
how the criminal justice system should respond to such collective aggression.  
It is not possible to convict “the mob” as such for murder or assault, but it is 
often difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain which particular group member 
                                            
56 The legal principles relating to private defence and putative private defence applied in this case are 
discussed in more detail at §§ 2 5 1 and 2 6 2 below. 
57 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology. 
58 I Burrell “The Paedophile Hunter: Vigilante's Success Adds to Pressure for Greater Police Resources 
in Child Sex Crackdown” (29-09-2014) The Independent 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-paedophile-hunter-vigilantes-success-adds-to-
pressure-for-greater-police-resources-in-child-sex-crackdown-9763501.html> (14-03-2015). 
59  The violent and community-orientated nature of South African vigilantism – in contrast to its 
seemingly more individualistic and less violent first world counterpart – is explored further in 
chapter 5 below. 
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was responsible for the harm caused, thereby assigning individual blame.  
Should members of a vigilante group be held personally accountable as 
murderers for merely encouraging the actual perpetrators to kill or assault, 
where their own degree of involvement in carrying out the violence itself is 
minimal or non-existent?  Such controversial issues – including whether it is 
indeed in accordance with the state’s human rights obligations to impose 
collective liability – are explored further in § 6 3 2 2 with specific reference to 
the common purpose doctrine, which potentially allows for violent acts 
committed by one member of a vigilante group to be imputed to all other 
group members, provided the criminal conduct falls within the scope of their 
common design.60  At this point, however, it is apposite to continue with the 
attempt to conceptualise vigilantism. 
 
2 4 1 2 Acting in private capacity  
One of the six vigilantism requirements proposed by Johnston is that it 
must be private individuals who undertake vigilante acts, not state agents.61  
This is contrary to the opinion of the numerous authors who also classify as 
vigilantism abuses of power by state agents (such as policemen) who identify 
with the established order and use excessive force to maintain that order.62  It 
is submitted that the perspective that perpetrators of vigilantism are just 
ordinary, private citizens has much to commend it.  Defining vigilantism 
broadly enough to include all forms of “establishment violence”,63 irrespective 
of whether its source is public or private, obscures the significant differences 
between public abuse of power and private vigilantism, and runs the risk that 
neither phenomenon is explained satisfactorily.64  
                                            
60 J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 4th (2013) 467. 
61 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 224. The view is endorsed by numerous others, 
including Baker (2004) Society in Transition 207; Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal 
Criminal Justice 26; and Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007) Acta Academia 127. 
62  See, e.g., Cooper-Knock & Owen (2015) Theoretical Criminology; Rosenbaum & Sederberg 
Vigilante Politics; P Sederberg “The Phenomenology of Vigilantism in Contemporary America” 
(1978) 1 Terrorism 287; Huggins Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America; Bruce & 
Komane (1999) Crime and Conflict 41. 
63 As do Rosenbaum & Sederberg Vigilante Politics 10. 
64 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 225. 
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However, Johnston’s contention that state agents such as the police 
are “automatically barred” 65  from performing vigilante actions is open to 
doubt.  His view is that police officials continue to enjoy full police powers 
even when off duty; thus their conduct can never truly be “private” for the 
purposes of this element of vigilantism. 66   It is submitted, however, that 
determining whether state agents can be termed vigilantes or not should not 
depend on whether they possess (nominal) off-duty state powers.  Instead, 
what is decisive is whether they view themselves (subjectively) as “willingly 
accountable”67 to the state for their actions, and also whether (objectively) 
they are acting within the course and scope of their employment at the time of 
the relevant conduct.  The question of when a state employee’s criminal 
conduct may be regarded as being performed under the authority of the state 
was considered in K v Minister of Safety and Security68 in the context of the 
law of delict.  Three off-duty policemen in uniform had raped K, and the court 
had to determine whether the Minister could be held vicariously liable for their 
actions.  Here, the court endorsed the subjective and objective dimensions 
mentioned above, finding that the test for vicarious liability contains:  
“both a factual assessment (the question of the subjective 
intention of the perpetrators of the delict) as well as a 
consideration which raises a question of mixed fact and law, the 
objective question of whether the delict committed is ‘sufficiently 
connected to the business of the employer’ to render the 
employer liable”.69   
O’Regan J concluded that despite the fact that they had been pursuing 
their own objectives at the time they committed the rape, the policemen had 
simultaneously breached their duty as state employees to protect K, a 
member of the community, from harm.  K had trusted them enough to accept 
their offer of a lift because they were policemen, and thus a sufficiently close 
                                            
65 T Dumsday “On Cheering Charles Bronson: The Ethics of Vigilantism” (2009) 47 Southern Journal 
of Philosophy 49 52. 
66 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 224-225. 
67 Dumsday (2009) Southern Journal of Philosophy 53. 
68 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC). 
69 Para 45. 
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connection between their wrongful conduct and the nature of their 
employment had been demonstrated for delictual liability to ensue.70   
In terms of this reasoning it would be very hard to envisage a scenario 
where a policeman was acting in their own private capacity while performing 
purported vigilante acts, since resorting to vigilantism is inextricably 
intertwined with a perceived lack of policing.  It is nevertheless submitted that 
it is necessary to evaluate each set of facts on its own merits, and that it may 
be conceivable for policemen or other state officials to abandon their 
employment in a sufficiently decisive manner by engaging in a vigilante “frolic 
of their own” that their conduct could in no way be regarded as merely 
amounting to an abuse of state power.  In S v Schrich, for instance, the 
appellant was still a member of the South African National Defence Force 
(“SANDF”) when he embarked on a mission to shoot drug-lords and 
gangsters as a member of the vigilante group PAGAD’s “G-force”.  The 
appellant was explicitly labelled as a vigilante by the state: the prosecution 
distanced themselves from his conduct and argued in aggravation of sentence 
that “[v]igilante action cannot be tolerated by society”.71  Schrich no doubt 
perceived himself as a vigilante acting in his private capacity too, despite 
ostensibly being a state agent.  Thus his conduct could plausibly meet the 
“private citizen” vigilantism requirement for present purposes. 
In contrast, there are the unfortunately all-too-frequently reported 
instances of police officials turning a blind eye to acts of vigilantism – or even 
being in cahoots with vigilantes themselves.  For example, a witness testifying 
before the Khayelitsha Commission told of a brutal and noisy vigilante attack 
that happened only metres away from the restaurant where a group of 
plainclothes policemen were having lunch.  They did not intervene, and it was 
left to the uniformed policemen who arrived 15 minutes later to rescue the 
victim.72  Similarly, Harris notes that some respondents in her study perceived 
the police as supporting, or even participating in, acts of vigilantism, which 
                                            
70 Para 57. 
71 S v Schrich 363I. 
72 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 94-95. 
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“paints police with a vigilante label themselves”.73  In both of these kinds of 
scenario the police appear to be acting (or failing to do so!) in their official 
capacity, and for this reason it is suggested that their crime amounts to a 
public abuse of power as opposed to a private act of vigilantism.74 
By exploring the motivations of private vigilantes as distinct from – and, 
indeed, not infrequently opposed to – state concerns and priorities, this study 
hopes to shed light on the dynamics of vigilantism as a reaction to perceived 
state inadequacies.  It also makes sense to limit the conceptualisation of 
vigilantism as a distinctly criminal phenomenon to instances which concern 
the relationship between the state as an authoritative power and the private 
(vigilante) individual as subject of such power,75 and not to muddy the waters 
by considering vigilantism to include instances of state abuse of power.   
Now that it has been shown that this study limits the definition of 
vigilantism to the conduct of private citizens (possibly including state agents 
acting in their private capacity), exactly what these private citizens do that 
amounts to vigilantism must be expanded on. 
  
2 4 2 What prohibited conduct do vigilantes typically perpetrate? 
Violence has been described as an “integral feature of vigilante 
methodology”, 76 and this viewpoint must be endorsed.  Vigilante violence 
appears to be an exercise of social control77  in response to the “real or 
perceived deviance”78 of the “generic criminal”.79  The precise reasons for 
exercising such force are considered in depth at § 2 6 3 below.  The aim of 
the discussion at this point is not to focus on why vigilantes do what they do, 
or even whom they target, but merely to show that their conduct does indeed 
                                            
73 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 28. 
74 See § 7 3 2 for more on the police turning a blind eye to acts of vigilantism. 
75 Snyman Criminal Law 3. 
76 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 4. 
77 Black “Crime as Social Control” in Towards a General Theory of Social Control Volume 2: Selected 
Problems 13. 
78 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 230. 
79  L Buur “Crime and Punishment on the Margins of the Postapartheid State” (2003) 28 (1) 
Anthropology and Humanism 23 25. 
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(at least potentially) comply with the definitional elements of various serious 
offences, thus underscoring the prima facie criminal nature of what they do.   
Empirical studies and media reports of vigilantism seem to concur: 
vigilantism is associated with violent methods and corporal punishment.  Most 
academic definitions of vigilantism assume that violence – or the threat 
thereof – is an essential component of vigilantism.80  Even authors who do not 
concede that vigilantes necessarily engage in forceful action note that only 
groups who at least permit the use of force as part of their “operational 
philosophy” may qualify as vigilantes.81  Lee and Seekings make the telling 
point that the threat of violence is implicit in even the most peaceful forms of 
community court, which makes it difficult to distinguish meaningfully between 
“a non-violent and restitutive form of popular justice, rooted in and 
accountable to the ‘community’, and a violent and punitive form of popular 
justice executed by irresponsible and ‘lawless’ individuals”.82   Johnston,83 
Martin84 and Dumsday85 concur with Rosenbaum and Sederberg that while 
“[v]iolent force may not be used on all occasions … its future utilization is 
always implied”.86  
The forceful (and criminal) acts potentially committed by vigilantes to 
achieve their “crime-fighting” objectives may be divided into two main 
categories: crimes against specific victims, and crimes against wider 
community interests, including the interests of the state.  The former category 
may again be sub-divided into crimes against the life and bodily integrity of 
the target of vigilantism, and crimes against the vigilante victim’s property.  
Relevant crimes against life and limb with which vigilantes may be charged 
include murder; attempted murder; culpable homicide; assault with intent to 
cause grievous bodily harm; common assault and kidnapping.  Arson and 
malicious damage to property are property crimes typically associated with 
                                            
80 Buur & Jensen (2004) African Studies; Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal Criminal Justice 
26; Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread. 
81 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 228. 
82 “Vigilantism and Popular Justice after Apartheid” in D Feenan (eds) Informal Criminal Justice 
(2003) 113. 
83 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology. 
84 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica. 
85 Dumsday (2009) Southern Journal of Philosophy. 
86 Rosenbaum & Sederberg Vigilante Politics 28. 
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vigilantism.  As regards infringement of the interests of the community, it is 
likely that most vigilante “mobs” also make themselves guilty of public 
violence, which entails a number of people acting together in a manner that is 
serious enough to “forcibly disturb the public peace or security or to invade 
the rights of others”.87  The thorny issue of whether vigilantes may undermine 
the authority of the state sufficiently to be guilty of crimes against the state 
such as treason or sedition is considered in § 3 4 1 below. 
Vigilante incidents reported in recent newspaper articles confirm the 
violent nature of vigilantism, and include: 
• The stoning and setting alight of a suspected witch in her uMlazi home;88 
• A large mob in Pietermaritzburg dragging robbery suspects out of their 
houses and attacking them with spades, hammers, sticks, pangas and 
spears.  Their houses were then torched and the suspects were also set 
alight;89  
• A woman who was a local councillor from Ga-Rankuwa and two others 
assaulting a suspected rapist by kicking him all over his body and throwing 
him to the ground.  He later died in hospital;90  
• A group of fifteen “vigilantes” from Acornhoek kidnapping six people 
suspected of being criminals, subjecting them to a “kangaroo court” and 
beating them;91  
• Two women from Mpumalanga sjambokking a woman they suspected of 
having an affair with one of their husbands;92  
• One of two rape and murder suspects dying after sustaining serious 
injuries inflicted by three vigilantes in Komatipoort;93  
                                            
87 Burchell Principles 755. 
88  N Barbeau “Man Pleads Not Guilty for uMlazi Murder” (2015-04-23) IOL 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/man-pleads-not-guilty-for-umlazi-murder-
1.1849635#.VToISUIwyfR> (2016-01-29). 
89 S Peters “MEC Shocked at Vigilantism” (2014-10-9) IOL News <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-
courts/mec-shocked-at-vigilantism-1.1762906#.VQ_Ur0IwyfS> (2015-03-23). 
90  SAPA “Councillor in Court for 'Vigilante' killing” (2014-08-28) IOL News 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/councillor-in-court-for-vigilante-killing-
1.1742721#.VQ_WNkIwyfS> (2015-03-23). 
91 SAPA “'Vigilantes' in Court for Kidnapping, Assault” IOL News. 
92  SAPA “Sisters Sentenced for Assaulting 'Mistress'” (2014-06-26) IOL News 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/sisters-sentenced-for-assaulting-mistress-
1.1710056#.VQ_ZHEIwyfS> (2015-03-23). 
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• A rape, murder and robbery suspect being kicked and pummelled to death 
with the back of an axe by community members in Tonga, Mpumalanga;94 
• Community members killing a man by “necklacing” in Philippi;95 
• The home of an alleged drug-dealer being petrol-bombed and the owner 
being shot dead outside it in Grassy Park;96 and 
• Seven community members of Khayelitsha allegedly kidnaping, torturing 
and killing three men after they broke into the home of one of the members 
and stole a television set.97 
As is evident from this random sample of recent media reports, the 
majority of the acts described are very brutal, with often victims dying during 
the act of vigilantism, rather than afterwards.  Harris suggests that vigilantes 
intend to kill – i.e., their main aim and object is to cause death, which is “built 
into the form that the vigilante act adopts”.98  This is definitely true of killing 
methods such as “necklacing”.99  At least in the (South) African context, it 
appears to be true that vigilante acts often involve excessively violent acts of 
– quite literal – “overkill”.  The extremely violent nature of vigilante assaults 
even where death does not occur on the scene is borne out in a University of 
Stellenbosch study carried out between July and December 2012 at four 
health care centres in Khayelitsha, which compares the injuries sustained by 
those attacked by residents in vigilante incidents with those of victims of 
“ordinary” interpersonal violent attacks.  The research found that the severity 
of injuries sustained by the 148 victims of “community assault” was 
substantially higher than those of other assault victims, and they were more 
                                                                                                                             
93  SAPA “Mob Justice Trio to Remain Behind Bars” (2014-03-24) IOL News 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/mob-justice-trio-to-remain-behind-bars-
1.1665652#.VQ_dukIwyfS> (2015-03-23). 
94 SAPA “Three in Court for Mob Attack Video” IOL News. 
95  D Knoetze “Cape Man Dies in Necklacking” (10-06-2013) IOL News 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/cape-man-dies-in-necklacing-1.1530009#.VQ_hQUIwyfR> 
(23-03-2015). 
96  D Knoetze “Alleged Drug Den Petrol-Bombed” (2013-07-31) IOL News 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/alleged-drug-den-petrol-bombed-
1.1555632#.VQ_iLUIwyfQ> (2015-03-15). 
97  J Otto “Vigilante Killing: Seven to Stand Trial” (2013-07-29) IOL News 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/vigilante-killing-seven-to-stand-trial-
1.1554177#.VQ_jNUIwyfR> (2015-03-15). 
98 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 17. 
99 See chapter 1 n 18. 
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likely to suffer from “crush syndrome” as a result of blunt force such as the 
use of sjamboks.100 
It is clear from the above that while vigilante conduct may tangentially 
be aimed against property rights or other interests, the threatened 
infringement of its victims’ bodily integrity – and in many instances their right 
to life – seem to be typical features of vigilantism.  As will be explained further, 
however, not all violence employed for the purposes of self-help is necessarily 
vigilantist in nature.101  The use or threat of such force may be formally state-
sanctioned, and would therefore not qualify as vigilantism for the purposes of 
this study.102  Now that the prohibited conduct in which vigilantes engage has 
been examined, it is necessary to move on to an account of this unlawfulness 
aspect of vigilantism.  
 
2 5 Unlawfulness 
It is submitted that vigilantism is unlawful and non-state-sanctioned in 
at least three senses: First, the conduct perpetrated by vigilantes is illegal in 
the narrow sense in that it complies with the definitional elements of one or 
more crimes, as explained in § 2 3 above.  Second, vigilantes’ “crime-fighting” 
efforts are themselves not sanctioned by the state.  As will become clear, 
while the state does permit other forms of violent self-help, vigilantes’ 
particular brand of taking the law into their own hands is viewed as unjustified 
from the perspective of the formal criminal justice system.  This is because it 
is deemed contrary to the legal convictions of the community (the boni 
                                            
100 S Forgus, W Delva, C Hauptfleisch, S Govender & J Blitz “Community v. Non-Community Assault 
Among Adults in Khayelitsha, Western Cape, South Africa: A Case Count and Comparison of Injury 
Severity” (2014) 104 (4) SAMA 299; S Fokazi “Vigilante Attacks 'More Severe'” (22-04-2014) 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/vigilante-attacks-more-severe-1.1678851#.VQ_av0IwyfS> 
(23-03-2015). 
101 Contra Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 228, who appears to assume that force 
employed solely for defensive purposes amounts to vigilantism, thus failing to distinguish 
sufficiently between (justified and legitimate) private defence and vigilantism. 
102 This reference to “formal” state sanctioning refers to the official state legal position.  It does not 
imply, however, that “informal” state sanctioning does not take place.  Even though some state 
agents such as police officers may – and do – turn a blind eye or even actively approve of particular 
acts of vigilantism, examples of which are discussed in § 7 3 2 below, if conduct exceeds the bounds 
of what is justified in terms of the law it is unlawful (officially non-state sanctioned). 
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mores), and it is therefore also unlawful in this wider sense.  A third sense in 
which vigilantes act illegally relates to vigilantism’s “extra-legal” quality: 
vigilantes do not play by the state’s rules or regard themselves as willingly 
accountable to the state.103  The latter two aspects (relating to vigilantism’s 
unjustifiability and extra-legal nature) are explored further below. 
 
2 5 1 Vigilantism as contra bonos mores: vigilantism v private defence 
As already mentioned, vigilantes (rightly or wrongly) regard the state as 
not having fulfilled its positive obligation to protect citizens from all forms of 
violence. 104   Their response is to appropriate certain law-enforcement 
responsibilities and crime-fighting powers for themselves.  The 
characterisation of violence as being “an effort to do justice or undo an 
injustice”105 is thus particularly apposite in the instance of vigilantism.  Though 
vigilantes may view their conduct as justified, rather than as simply a private 
criminal activity, it is clear that this opinion is not shared by the state.  As 
mentioned above,106 in various court cases, taking the law into one’s own 
hands in general, and vigilantism in particular, have been depicted as “a 
serious threat … to the very fabric of society as we know it”;107 as potentially 
violating human rights;108 as undermining the due process of law;109 and even 
as promoting anarchy.110  The state’s obvious reluctance to accord vigilante 
acts even a measure of legitimacy is striking, especially since the state is 
theoretically prepared to allow citizens to “fill the void” in instances where the 
state itself is unable (or unwilling) to fulfil its responsibility by effectively 
responding to a public demand for order and security.111  If it is not possible 
for the state, through the police and courts, to provide citizens with protection 
                                            
103 Dumsday (2009) Southern Journal of Philosophy 53. 
104 S 12(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  See also Malan (2007) 
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg and §§ 1 2 4 above and 3 5 2 2 below. 
105 H Zehr “Evaluation and Restorative Justice Principles” in E Elliot and R M Gordon (eds) New 
Directions In Restorative Justice: Issues, Practice, Evaluation (2005) 298. 
106 At § 2 3. 
107 S v Schrich 370D. 
108 S v Hena and another 2006 2 SACR 33 (SE) 40A-E; Zuko v S para 19. 
109 Jansen v S; Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank. 
110 S v Kleinbooi 2012 JDR 1623 (ECB); Jansen v S; Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank. 
111 M R Enion “Constitutional Limits on Private Policing and the State's Allocation of Force” (2009) 59 
Duke Law Journal 519. 
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where it is urgently and immediately required, it has long been 
acknowledged112 that individuals have an “inherent right” to resort to self-help 
by taking the law into their own hands.  Acting in private defence113 to repel an 
unlawful attack upon a legally-protected interest is justified according to the 
legal convictions of the community on the grounds that the “defender” 
temporarily acts on behalf of the state to uphold the law.114   
But why is the state prepared to delegate the use of force to private 
citizens in certain defined circumstances and not in others?  Private defence 
and vigilantism are two forms of self-help that may at first appear to be very 
similar.  The former is a complete legal defence 115 permitting the use of 
reasonable and necessary – even deadly – force to ward off an attack.  It 
could be argued that vigilantes should therefore be entitled to rely on this 
ground of justification.  After all, their actions are frequently driven by a 
“fervent belief in the capacity of counterviolence to, well, counter violence”.116  
Why is the state willing to bestow legitimacy on the conduct of an individual 
resorting to self-help in private defence, but not on acts of vigilantism?  To 
answer this question, the requirements of private defence must be applied to 
the vigilante scenario to establish the extent to which vigilante conduct may 
be massaged to fit into the private defence mould.  The aim is to clarify why 
the actions of vigilantes are regarded as contra bonos mores instead of as 
justified private defence by the criminal justice system.   The main 
requirements for private defence examined below are that the attack that is 
warded off must be unlawful, imminent or commenced and must be upon a 
legally protected interest; and that the defensive conduct resorted to must be 
necessary, reasonable and directed against the attacker. 
 
                                            
112 See Snyman Criminal Law 102-103; Burchell Principles 117; Malan (2007) Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg. 
113 The term “private defence” is preferred to “self-defence”, since this ground of justification may also 
be raised where an identifiable third party’s interests are being defended.  
114 J Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure: General Principles of Criminal Law 4 
(2011) 121; C Snyman Criminal Law (2008) 103. 
115 I.e., the accused is acquitted if the defence is raised successfully, since their conduct is deemed 
justified and therefore not unlawful. 
116 J L Comaroff & J Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa: Policing the Boundaries of 
Freedom” in T R Tyler (eds) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives (2007) 
223. 
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2 5 1 1 Attack requirements 
2 5 1 1 1 Actual unlawful attack 
The first requirement for private defence is that it must be in response 
to an actual unlawful attack.  On one level it is clear that vigilantism is indeed 
a reaction to real or perceived deviance,117 an attempt to punish or hold a 
particular alleged wrongdoer accountable. 118   The examples of vigilante 
violence mentioned earlier119 were all preceded by apparent transgressions 
ranging from drug-dealing, adultery and witchcraft to theft, murder and 
robbery which posed a real or perceived threat to community security, and the 
perpetrators of such acts were the targets of the subsequent vigilante 
violence.  
In respect of this normative aspect of vigilantism120 – that vigilantism is 
often a “moralistic response to deviant behavior” 121  – it is apparent that 
vigilantes do not confine themselves to policing criminal wrongs.  Buur and 
Jensen are of the view that the concept of crime used by vigilantes is 
“profoundly polyvalent”: 122  Vigilantes aim at purging the community of all 
“activities contrary to particular dominant groups’ version of morality”, whether 
or not these are defined as criminal by the state.  In his definition of 
vigilantism, Johnston recognises the fact that deviance as defined by 
vigilantes may not necessarily correspond in all respects with state-defined 
crimes: vigilantism may be directed at social or communal control, rather than 
crime control.123  To encompass this insight, he concludes that “vigilantism 
may be said to arise when some established order is under threat from the 
transgression, potential transgression or the imputed transgression of 
                                            
117 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 230; R Monaghan “'One Merchant One Bullet': The 
Rise and Fall of PAGAD” (2004) 12 (1) Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 1 14. 
118 Senechal De La Roche (1996) Sociological Forum 103.  See also §§ 2 5 1 2 3 and 2 6 3 1 below. 
119 At § 2 4 2 above. 
120 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 229. 
121 Senechal De La Roche (1996) Sociological Forum 98.  On the moralistic nature of vigilantism and 
self-help, see also Black “Crime as Social Control” in Towards a General Theory of Social Control 
Volume 2: Selected Problems 1 and Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 79. 
122 Buur & Jensen (2004) African Studies 147.  See also Buur (2006) Development and Change 754. 
123 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 228. 
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institutionalized norms”.124  Dumsday125 argues that vigilantes need not even 
necessarily be upholding established norms or aiming to address perceived 
threats to the status quo, as asserted inter alia by Johnston,126 Abrahams127 
and Rosenbaum and Sederberg. 128   His view is that vigilantism merely 
requires: 
 “a concern on the part of the vigilante for what he or she sees as 
justice or the good of society, whether those values pertain to the 
attempted enforcement of positive law, natural law, societal 
custom, or all three.  The aim of the vigilante need not include the 
upholding or reforming of any established order, legal or 
otherwise”.129   
He goes so far as to say that a vigilante may even defend a system of 
values unique to themselves, provided the value defended is upheld as a 
norm by the wider society.130  While Dumsday’s point that vigilantes need not 
uphold the established order only is well made, it is uncertain what he means 
by “wider society”; would a belief that is upheld by a particular small minority 
group, even if not espoused by the majority, suffice? 
The above makes it clear that vigilantism may be a response to a 
normative breach that is not unlawful from a legal perspective.  It is evident 
that some of the “attacks” to which vigilantes responded mentioned above – 
most obviously adultery and witchcraft – would not qualify as “unlawful”, since 
such conduct is not prohibited by law.  The implication is that the first hurdle – 
that private defence must be a response to an actual unlawful attack – would 
not be met in such cases.  State non-recognition of the existence of “culturally 
diverse conceptions of crime” 131  for the purposes of private defence is 
                                            
124 230. 
125 Dumsday (2009) Southern Journal of Philosophy 55-56. 
126 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 230. 
127 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 16. 
128 Rosenbaum & Sederberg Vigilante Politics 4. 
129 See also D Nina “Dirty Harry is Back: Vigilantism in South Africa - The (Re)emergence of 'Good' 
and 'Bad' Community” (2000) 9 (1) African Security Review 18 21, who suggests that “vigilantism 
will invoke an ‘imagined order’ that either existed in the past (in its decadent mode), or never existed 
but is desired (in its idealised mode).” 
130 Dumsday (2009) Southern Journal of Philosophy 56. 
131 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 228. 
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unfortunate from the standpoint of the vigilante.  In the context of anti-
witchcraft vigilantism, for instance, it is extremely doubtful whether a spiritual 
attack, such as being cursed by a witch, would be classified as an actual, 
unlawful one for private defence purposes.  Although those victimised by 
supernatural attacks may perceive no meaningful distinction between 
“ordinary” criminal violence and witchcraft, since both cause them harm and 
thus form “part of the same moral universe of evil”,132 the point of departure in 
South African law is to deny the existence of witchcraft.133   From a legal 
perspective, therefore, a perceived metaphysical attack emanating from a 
witch would not be equated with an actual physical one;134 furthermore, fear 
alone is insufficient to justify acting in private defence, and there would thus 
be no ground of justification available to the anti-witchcraft vigilante.135   
Notwithstanding the non-criminal nature of some of the “attacks” to 
which vigilantes respond, a more radical speculation is that vigilante conduct 
is a response to an unlawful attack in another sense.  Is it not possible to 
argue that the very state inaction that is the catalyst for vigilantism136 is in 
itself an unlawful attack taking the form of an omission, or failure to act?  
There is without doubt a positive obligation on the state to protect citizens 
from violent crime, a duty that has been affirmed in the context of the law of 
delict in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security137 as well as subsequent 
cases. 138   But is the failure to comply with this legal duty necessarily a 
blameworthy one in the criminal law sense?  According to Martin,139 it is.  He 
                                            
132 S Jensen & L Buur “Everyday Policing and the Occult: Notions of Witchcraft, Crime and 'The 
People'” (2004) 63 (2) African Studies 193 206. 
133 See H Ludsin “Cultural Denial: What South Africa's Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the Future of 
its Customary Law” (2003) 21 (1) Berkeley Journal of International Law 62 108 and M Nel “Violent 
Enforcement of Traditional Beliefs: Witchcraft, Vigilantism and State Legitimacy” (2014) 27 (2) 
Acta Criminologica 25 28. 
134 Needless to say, as soon as there is a physical manifestation of witchcraft that amounts to an 
infringement of rights – for example, if the suspected witch administers poison to their victim, 
infringing the victim’s right to bodily integrity – the requirement of an actual attack that violates a 
legally-protected interest would be met. 
135 Burchell Principles 118.  The related question of whether occult attacks are aimed against interests 
deemed worthy of legal protection is considered below at § 2 5 1 1 3. 
136 See § 4 2 5 for more details. 
137 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 62. 
138 See Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA); Minister of Safety 
and Security v Van Eeden (Women's Legal Centre Trust, as Amicus Curiae) 2003 1 SA 389 (SCA); 
Minister of Safety and Security v Hamilton 2004 2 SA 216 (SCA).  
139 Martin (2012) State Crime. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 51 
argues that the South African state and its agents, the police, are indeed 
guilty of state crimes of omission in that they have neglected their 
responsibility to provide order and security to those most in need of it.  
Rodgers goes even further, noting in the Nicaraguan context that state 
violence “operates in a way that is heuristically comparable to the 
governmentality of … gang violence”.  Both gangs and the state have 
“become [loci] for parochial elite interests, who have captured the state 
apparatus and are promoting an exclusive social order based on the violent 
separation of … society into ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ population groups.” 140  
Although the conception of the state as gang is somewhat extreme, the 
insight that society is separated into those for whom state security provision is 
available and those who are excluded from it is in line with Martin’s insight 
that the state is neglecting its responsibility towards a large proportion of 
marginalised individuals and communities.  While vigilantes may certainly be 
mobilised “in defence of successful community members”, 141  vigilantes 
themselves are almost without exception the marginalised, those whose 
interests the state does not protect effectively, if at all.  In the context of 
vigilantism aimed at non-criminal deviance it may be argued that formal 
avenues of redress are essentially irrelevant142 in any event.   
In concluding that vigilantism is a response to state crime Martin draws 
on Green and Ward, 143  who conceptualise state crime as having two 
elements, namely human rights violation and organisational deviance.  As 
regards the human rights violation requirement, Martin144 contends that the 
most serious and pertinent human rights infringement that engenders 
vigilantism is the state’s breach of the right to equality.  Section 9(1) of the 
Constitution states: “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to 
                                            
140  D Rodgers “The State as a Gang: Conceptualizing the Governmentality of Violence in 
Contemporary Nicaragua” (2006) 26 (3) Critique of Anthropology 315 326. 
141 Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 25.  See, e.g.,  30-32 for a case where a seemingly 
middle-class man (he owned brick-making machines and a car) approached the Amadlozi vigilante 
group for assistance in tracking down the person who had stolen his machines.  Despite his relatively 
wealthy status, he had asked the Amadlozi for help because the police investigation had yielded no 
results. 
142 Rosenbaum & Sederberg Vigilante Politics 12-13. 
143 P J Green & T Ward “State Crime, Human Rights, and the Limits of Criminology” (2000) 27 (1) 
Social Justice 101. 
144 Martin (2012) State Crime. 
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equal protection and benefit of the law.”  The state violates this right through 
its unequal provision of criminal justice services, since there is an effective 
absence of state police in indigent, crime-prone neighbourhoods.145  Buur 
notes: 
“[T]he townships have become spaces of exception; spaces in 
which the law is, if not completely suspended, then, at least, 
enforced primarily by local justice structures that are governed by 
values and practices other than human rights and due process”.146   
As is elaborated on in § 4 2 2, in this literal and/or figurative “no go 
area”, where the effectiveness of state power in controlling crime is diluted 
due to unwillingness and difficulty of access combined with community 
alienation, tension and hostility,147 state guarantees of collective security and 
social order are no more than illusory.   
In respect of the organisational deviance element of state crime, Green 
and Ward148 assert that deviant conduct (which for present purposes is the 
incompetent, discriminatory and corrupt provision of criminal justice 
services)149 must not only be illegitimate, but must also be labelled as such.  
Interestingly, their view is that deviancy labels may be applied “from below”, 
implying that popular delegitimation of the state150 may be a symptom of 
organisational deviance.  By temporarily usurping state power to fill the 
policing vacuum left by the state’s seeming inability to preserve a satisfactory 
level of social order and collective security, vigilante violence is in this sense a 
demonstration of significant loss of state legitimacy, and thus an indicator of 
organisational deviance.   
From this perspective, then, vigilantism may be regarded “as much a 
form of resistance to state crime as … a defensive reaction against 
                                            
145 218. 
146 Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 35. 
147 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens. 
148 Green & Ward (2000) Social Justice. 
149 See from § 4 2 5 below for more. 
150 See § 3 6 below for more. 
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conventional offending”.151  The argument has its appeal, since it correctly 
concentrates on the underlying causes of vigilante violence rather than 
focusing merely on its surface manifestations.  In so doing, it allows for the 
possibility of extending private defence to cover instances of vigilante violence 
that would otherwise not have been regarded as a reaction to an “actual” 
attack.  However, even if this line of reasoning is cogent to a degree, for 
reasons that will become apparent, it does not necessarily follow that vigilante 
conduct may be equated with private defence merely because it is carried out 
in response to state crime.  That the “actual attack” requirement is complied 
with is only the first step in determining whether it is possible for (some) 
vigilantism to be justified as private defence. 
 
2 5 1 1 2 Attack commenced or imminent 
A second private defence requirement relating to the attack is that it 
must have commenced or be imminent.  If the response to the unlawful attack 
is retaliatory or pre-emptive, it cannot be justified.  This requirement is often 
problematic in the vigilante context.  Some authors 152  would appear to 
exclude all vigilantism as unjustified on the basis of this “immediate response” 
requirement.  In this vein, Johnston argues that vigilantism entails at least 
minimal planning and organisation in order to avoid reducing the term to 
“mere reactive violence” and so rendering it meaningless. 153   Dumsday 
agrees with Johnston, implying that the “altruistic” situation where people 
apprehend a criminal and mete out punishment is not vigilantism because 
“[a]n angry overreaction does not make one a vigilante”; he submits that only 
where “altruistic vigilantes” are patrolling and on the lookout for crimes to stop 
would their punishing the criminal amount to vigilantism. Dumsday is surely 
mistaken: his example falls squarely within what may be classed as 
vigilantism.  While all reactive violence is not vigilantism, characterising 
                                            
151 Martin (2012) State Crime 231. 
152  Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 222; Dumsday (2009) Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 51. 
153 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 222. 
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vigilantism as a form of reactive violence, as does Black,154 is not incorrect 
per se.  It is submitted that it is not the (over-)reactive or spontaneous nature 
of conduct that determines whether it is vigilantism, but rather whether or not 
such conduct is formally state-sanctioned.  For this reason Johnston’s 
regrettable conflation of private defence and vigilantism is particularly 
problematic.  It leads him not only to conclude that some vigilante violence 
may be lawful, but also obliges him to argue that a measure of planning, 
premeditation or organisation is inherent in vigilantism so that he can 
distinguish it from private defence, which necessarily entails an immediate 
response.  In this manner he attempts to “explain away” such dubious 
“vigilante” examples as the acquittal of a man defending himself against 
armed assailants on the basis that the response is immediate instead of 
premeditated, and so does not qualify as vigilantism.155  However, the reason 
the man defending himself against armed assailants is not a vigilante is not 
due to the spontaneous nature of his reaction, but rather because his 
response is not unlawful, being condoned by law as a manifestation of private 
defence.  Johnston’s line of reasoning for making preparatory activity a 
requirement for vigilantism is unconvincing overall, in particular his torturous 
contention that spontaneous group vigilantism is nevertheless premeditated in 
the sense that particular social conditions predispose participants to engage 
in it.156  Martin rightly criticises Johnston’s blurring of the boundaries between 
“situational predisposition and the process of premeditation”, transforming 
premeditation from an “act of conscious deliberation to an endemic, socially 
conditioned reflex”.157   
In relation to whether vigilantism should be defined as organised 
collective violence or not, Senechal De La Roche also excludes what she 
terms “lynching” from the category of vigilantism on the basis that the former 
is much more disorganised and temporary, whereas the latter has “the 
capacity for sustained collective action”.158  Since the fluid and informal nature 
                                            
154  Black “Crime as Social Control” in Towards a General Theory of Social Control Volume 2: 
Selected Problems. 
155 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 222. 
156 222. 
157 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 57. 
158 Senechal De La Roche (1996) Sociological Forum 104-105. 
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of even the most highly organised vigilante groups has already been noted, 
contrasting vigilantism with lynching in this way does not appear to be 
particularly helpful.  By overlooking vigilante groups’ common underlying 
motivation and focusing instead on their supposedly differing degrees of 
organisation, Senechal De La Roche’s differentiating between lynching and 
vigilantism contributes very little to the present quest to define vigilantism in a 
distinctively legal way.  Whether organised or disorganised, why vigilantes do 
what they do is what sets them apart from other perpetrators of collective 
violence.  For this reason, despite a measure of group mobilisation being a 
regular feature of much ad hoc as well as recurrent collective vigilantism, 
organisation, unless used in Johnston’s wide sense of planning so minimal or 
far-removed from the vigilante act itself as to be almost meaningless, is not a 
necessary element of vigilantism.  For present purposes, therefore, no 
distinction will be drawn between spontaneous, unorganised vigilantism 
(“lynching”) and its more planned and premeditated manifestations.  They 
share so many common features that any attempt to tell them apart amounts 
to a distinction without a difference.   
Rejecting Johnston’s requirement that vigilantism must be planned, 
organisated and premeditated implies that vigilantism may indeed be 
spontaneous and immediate, meted out to those who are busy perpetrating 
criminal acts, or are imminently about to do so.  There may thus be vigilante 
scenarios where the immediate response private defence requirement is 
complied with.  However, it must be acknowledged that vigilantes do often 
“punish” as a warning against future deviance, or exact vengeance for an 
attack that has already terminated, making their conduct pre-emptive or 
retaliatory rather than defensive in nature.  There are two counter-arguments 
to this.  First, many vigilante actions, such as those aimed against drug 
dealers or habitual thieves, may be viewed as a response to an inevitable 
future “attack” that forms part of a cycle of “violence” or “criminality”.  It was 
acknowledged in S v Engelbrecht159 in the context of domestic violence that 
where an attack is “imminent, pending, hanging over [one’s] head, 
threatening, ready to befall [one], foreseeable, and inevitable”, it is permissible 
                                            
159 S v Engelbrecht 2005 2 SACR 41 (W) para 396. 
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to act in private defence against it in the interlude between violent or cruel 
episodes160 provided the other private defence requirements have been met.  
While this is not an appeal court decision, the reasoning is persuasive, and its 
basic premise could be extended by analogy to the vigilante scenario.  
Second, if the argument advanced previously about vigilantism being a 
response to a passive state “attack” is convincing, the unlawful attack 
responded to is wider than simply the immediate actions of a particular social 
deviant.  State failure itself could be characterised as a continuous source of 
rights-infringement against which vigilantes are entitled to defend themselves 
and others.   
Overall, then, while the requirement that the unlawful attack that is 
warded off must be actually happening or immediately threatening for private 
defence to succeed does not automatically exclude all vigilante action from its 
ambit, it must be conceded that much vigilante conduct fulfils this condition 
loosely at best. 
 
2 5 1 1 3 Attack against legally-protected interests 
A third requirement is that private defence may be invoked only where 
the legally protected interests of the defender or of third parties are being 
infringed by an unlawful attack.  Such third parties need not have in any sort 
of special protective duty towards or relationship with the defender.  However, 
Burchell regards vigilantes’ claims to be acting to uphold the interests of the 
community at large, as opposed to those of particular individuals, to be a point 
of distinction between vigilantism and private defence.  He is of the view that it 
cannot be lawful to attack “persons or organisations thought to be a danger to 
society [at large]”.161  The validity of this distinction is questionable.  In most 
instances, vigilantism occurs in response to acts of crime or social deviance 
that do have identifiable victims, and its immediate aim is to target those 
responsible for causing such individual harm.  Also, in light of what has 
                                            
160 Para 389. 
161 Burchell Principles 120. 
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already been said concerning an expanded definition of “unlawful attack”, it is 
possible to argue that each participant in an act of vigilantism has rights and 
interests that are personally being violated/attacked on an ongoing basis by 
state inaction in the face of crime.  Thus there is the sense that vigilantes are 
defending their own underlying interests, as well as those of whichever third 
party on whose behalf they profess to be acting in the moment.  
What is admittedly problematic as regards the requirement of a legally-
protected interest is the phenomenon of vigilante acts in response to forms of 
non-criminal deviance.  Using once again the example of a witchcraft “attack”: 
since the state does not deem the right to be free from occult violence – from 
“supernatural death”162 – to be an interest recognised and protected by law, 
this “right” is unenforceable.  Victims of witchcraft violence are therefore in a 
no-win situation.  Faced with state apathy, their only option to safeguard 
themselves against the (perceived) metaphysical attack of witches who 
secretly use supernatural powers to cause immediate harm is to resort to self-
help.  However, for the same reason that the state will not protect their 
interests in such an instance – because the interest concerned is not 
regarded as worthy of legal recognition – such self-help would also not be 
justified as private defence.163  The same would apply to vigilante violence in 
response to adultery and other non-criminal wrongs: the perpetrator has 
essentially been left without a legal remedy, and the only options available to 
uphold their interests are extra-legal ones.  Pointing this out is certainly not 
meant to imply that adulterers or witches deserve violent punishment, but 
merely to draw attention to the dilemma faced by those who do hold such 
beliefs. 
 
                                            
162 S v Mokonto 1971 2 SA 319 (A) 324C. 
163 Nel (2014) Acta Criminologica 36. See also SAPA “Mamelodi Dad Convicted for Killing Family” 
(2013-10-21) News24 <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Mamelodi-dad-convicted-for-
killing-family-20131021> (2015-03-25) for an example of where reliance on private defence was 
rejected out of hand in the case of a man who killed his wife, claiming that she was a witch-turned-
snake who had attacked him and his two daughters. 
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2 5 1 2 Defence requirements 
2 5 1 2 1 Necessary 
As regards the private defence requirements relating to the defensive 
conduct, the first one is that the conduct must be necessary.  The obvious 
issue pertinent to an inquiry into vigilante methods is why they choose to take 
the law into their own hands rather than exhausting the formal crime-fighting 
channels available to them.  First, it must be noted that while the defensive 
conduct must be necessary, this does not mean that private defence may be 
utilised only as an absolute last resort.  There are, for instance, numerous 
reported cases of private defence succeeding as a ground of justification 
despite the accused not having attempted to phone the police before warding 
off an unlawful attack, even though there was the opportunity to do so.164  
According to S v Engelbrecht, private defence will only fail where the “legal 
system, the South African Police Service and society [are not afforded] a fair 
chance of helping” someone wishing to rely on the defence. 165   As is 
elaborated on chapter 4, there is considerable evidence that vigilantism is not 
resorted to lightly, but is perpetrated in extremis chiefly by those who have 
been repeatedly let down by the state to the extent that they perceive self-
help to be the only option that remains open to them.  Taking into account the 
dysfunctionality of formal justice options in environments where vigilantism is 
most prevalent, this necessity requirement could doubtless be met in many 
instances of bona fide vigilantism.  As will be demonstrated in due course,166 
the vigilante perception that the formal criminal justice system will offer them 
little assistance is probably understandable – and justified – in the South 
African context.   
 
                                            
164 E.g. S v T 1986 2 SA 112 (O), where a 16-year-old schoolboy was acquitted of murdering a bully on 
the basis of private defence, despite not even considering the option of contacting the police for 
assistance.  See also S v Joshua, where the accused successfully argued that he acted in private 
defence on one of the counts of murder despite making no attempt to resort to official channels 
before seeking out and killing those who had robbed his wife of her possessions. 
165 S v Engelbrecht para 418 (emphasis added). 
166 See chapter 4 below. 
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2 5 1 2 2 Reasonable 
A real difficulty with fitting vigilantism into the private defence mould 
relates to the requirement that the defensive conduct must be objectively 
reasonable.  Although proportionality between attack and defence is not an 
absolute requirement, it is in the public interest that there be a measure of 
proportionality between the seriousness of the attack and the manner and 
extent of the defence, “lest private defence degenerate into private 
vengeance”. 167  It must be emphasised that lethal force is permissible in 
private defence, even to protect interests of a lesser value than life.168  It is not 
necessarily the fact that vigilantes assault or kill which is problematic, but the 
exceptionally violent way that their victims are tortured or meet their deaths.  
Vigilante violence frequently goes far beyond what is required simply to ward 
off the unlawful attack, and thus exceeds the bounds of private defence.  
Some of the reasons for this “overkill” are detailed in subsequent chapters.169  
Suffice it to say that what is euphemistically referred to as the “African 
manner” 170  of justice on the website of Mapogo A Mathamaga, a large 
vigilante cum private security organisation, may entail stoning, “necklacing”, 
sjambokking and other brutal methods of retaliation that are not compatible 
with the ideal of human rights, to say the least.  In advertising their crime-
fighting services, Mapogo states:  
“People who are found in possession of our customer’s goods do 
not have the luxury of long-lasting court cases and being found 
                                            
167 Burchell Principles 124. 
168 See, for instance, the controversial case of Ex Parte die Minister van Justisie: In Re S v Van Wyk 
1967 1 SA 488 (A), where private defence succeeded in the case of a man who set up a shotgun trap 
that shot and killed a thief who broke into his shop to steal at night.  His protection of property 
interests by means of lethal force was deemed reasonable and necessary in the (exceptional) 
circumstances of that case. 
169 See, e.g., §§ 4 3 2 4 and 5 2 1 2 below for more on the significance of corporal punishment. 
170 An article cited as part of the “In the Press” section of the Mapogo website quotes its founder, 
Monhle John Magolego, as approving of corporal punishment as the “African way”: “I am a firm 
believer in corporal punishment, and if a young man has been naughty his buttocks must be exposed 
so that he can be sjambokked as a genuine punishment and deterrent.” (Anonymous “Embattled 
Mapogo Moves into the Mainstream” Mapogo A Mathamaga <http://mapogoafrica.co.za/?p=65> 
(2015-03-25). 
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innocent on a technical point. They will immediately be dealt with in 
a traditional way”.171 
This extract hints not only at the threat of violence implicit in vigilante 
conduct, but also at its grossly disproportionate nature. 172   In addition, it 
alludes to the antagonistic attitude of advocates of vigilantism towards the 
formal criminal justice process, which must always take the human rights of 
the individual into account.173  The routine utilisation of exceptionally brutal 
methods is a crucial point of distinction between private defence and 
vigilantism, and is an important – and well-justified – reason why the 
condoning and legitimation of the majority of vigilante actions by legal 
authorities is unlikely to be forthcoming.  
 
2 5 1 2 3 Directed against the unlawful attacker 
The last requirement for private defence is that it must be directed 
against the unlawful attacker.  While there are certainly accounts of innocent 
people becoming victims of vigilante violence, going after innocents is not 
vigilantes’ objective; indeed, their main aim is to target attackers – or at least, 
perceived deviants – and not to subject uninvolved members of the alleged 
wrongdoer’s group or social category to punishment or social control. 174  
Taking what has been said above about the unlawful attack into account, it 
may be argued that vigilantism is aimed against the unlawful attacker in a dual 
sense – the immediate violence is aimed at the socially deviant perpetrator of 
the positive attack, but it is also directed against the state – a violent and 
                                            
171 Anonymous “Mapogo A Mathamaga” Mapogo A Mathamaga <http://mapogoafrica.co.za> (2015-
03-25) 
172 Theft (that infringes the right to property) is weighed up against assault with intent to cause grievous 
bodily harm by sjambokking (that violates the right to bodily integrity, and potentially even the right 
to life). 
173 For more on this aspect, see § 4 3 2 5 below. 
174 This distinguishes it from rioting and terrorism – see Senechal De La Roche (1996) Sociological 
Forum 103. 
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symbolic demonstration of state delegitimation175 to ward off the state crime of 
failure to protect the community from positive acts of violence.176 
 
2 5 1 2 4 Awareness that action is in private defence 
Snyman proposes an additional requirement for private defence, 
namely that it entails the actor being aware that they are acting in private 
defence.177  Vigilantes certainly share the same sense of moral righteousness 
as a true actor in private defence would profess to possess – even more so, 
perhaps, since when warding off a deviant attack in the only way they deem 
possible, vigilantes frequently claim to be acting to protect the interests of 
individuals in the wider community, and not merely their own.  In this regard, 
Abrahams notes that vigilantes “typically lay claim to the moral high ground as 
the guardians of society”.178   
However, maybe the requirement that there be conscious 
acknowledgement that what is being done is simply to repel an attack in 
circumstances where state agents are unable do so, is at the heart of why 
vigilantism cannot truly be equated with private defence.  While it is perfectly 
possible to construct a hypothetical vigilante scenario that nominally complies 
with all the other requirements for private defence outlined above, the 
motivation for vigilante violence invariably goes beyond the mere warding off 
of a single unlawful attack.  That their self-help conduct may in practice 
correspond with that of an individual acting in private defence should not be 
viewed as an indication that vigilantes view themselves as acting within the 
legal parameters laid down by the state.  As will be shown in § 3 6, far from 
simply entailing the fleeting appropriation of state power so as to assist 
                                            
175 See especially § 3 6 below. 
176  For more on how the state may be conceived of as committing a crime of omission by not 
adequately protecting its citizens in line with its legal duty to do so, see the discussion of Martin 
(2012) State Crime and Rodgers (2006) Critique of Anthropology above at § 2 5 1 1 1.   
177 Snyman Criminal Law 111. 
178 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 79. 
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temporarily in upholding the legal order, as is the case for private defence,179 
vigilante violence demonstrates an active undermining of such state authority. 
 
2 5 1 2 5 Concluding remarks regarding the distinction between vigilantism 
and private defence 
In conclusion, although acts of valid private defence are sometimes 
classified as vigilantism, this study’s scope is confined to vigilante actions that 
exceed the bounds of lawful private defence.  Failing to distinguish between 
the two is problematic in the quest to conceptualise vigilantism as conduct 
that is criminal and at variance with the legal convictions of the community.  
As explained above, while vigilantism prima facie has much in common with 
private defence, these superficial similarities belie a crucial distinction 
between the two based on why they do what they do.  As is detailed further at 
§ 2 6 3, when the motives for vigilantism are considered, vigilantes’ aim is 
certainly not merely to uphold the law temporarily on behalf of the state.180  
While vigilantes might believe their conduct to be morally justified, they are 
fully aware that their conduct is not formally state-sanctioned.  This wilful 
refusal to play by the state’s rules – one of the features characterising 
vigilantism as a criminal act – is now considered in more depth.  
 
2 5 2 Vigilantism as extra-legal/illegal 
There are various ways to conceptualise the nature of the relationship 
between vigilantes and the state.  The first perspective – championed by 
Johnston – is that “[i]llegal and extra-legal action are not … preconditions of 
vigilantism. 181   Indeed, he is of the view that vigilantes “may work 
                                            
179 Snyman Criminal Law 102. 
180 For this reason, too, vigilantes would also be unable to rely on putative private defence excluding 
fault.  See § 2 6 2 below for more. 
181 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 233.  See also D Sharp, S Atherton & K Williams 
“Civilian Policing, Legitimacy and Vigilantism: Findings From Three Case Studies in England and 
Wales” (2008) 18 (3) Policing and Society 245 248-249, who opine that “vigilantism … can receive 
an implied legitimacy by those in authority, that is, the police.” 
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harmoniously with and within the state” 182  – an argument he is able to 
advance because he places little emphasis on vigilantes threatening or using 
actual force to achieve their ends.  Although Johnston accepts that the 
(potential) use of force is a requirement for vigilantism, he waters down this 
requirement to the point that it serves little function.  As mentioned earlier, not 
only does he include within its ambit (presumably lawful) force employed for 
purely defensive purposes, but he also emphasises that “even where self-help 
groups enjoy a potential to exercise or threaten force that potential may not, in 
itself, be unlawful”. 183    This statement can only be understood within a 
context where actual force is either not resorted to at all or used purely 
defensively within the narrow bounds of private defence, since in other 
instances its exercise would, indeed, be contrary to law.  In a seemingly 
contradictory fashion, however, Johnston contrasts the conduct of self-
protection agents or groups located within the broad framework of community 
crime-prevention (such as neighbourhood watch groups, citizen patrols and 
private security guards) with that of vigilantes.  The former, which he terms 
“responsible citizenship” is “within the legal ambit of the state”.  It is often 
sponsored and officially sanctioned by the formal criminal justice system and 
its agents, and supplements state functions in the policing sphere.184  The 
latter, which he labels “autonomous citizenship”, is self-help engaged in by 
private voluntary agents without state authority or support: 185  instead of 
supplementing the state, such active citizens act as state substitutes.  It is 
unclear whether Johnston’s understanding of state support entails only active 
support – overt official state approval – or whether passive unofficial support – 
those instances where specific state agents implicitly condone the actions of 
vigilantes – could also be included.   
How can Johnston state that vigilantism is not necessarily illegal 
conduct, while also contending that it occurs without state approval?  He 
makes no attempt to explain why the state might want to withhold support 
from crime-fighting initiatives that are not illegal.  Perhaps in order to explain 
                                            
182 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 57. 
183 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 233. 
184 225; L Johnston The Rebirth of Private Policing (1992). 
185 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 226. 
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this apparent paradox, Dumsday deconstructs the Johnston “lack of state 
approval” requirement by focusing on the mindset of vigilantes themselves, 
rather than the attitude of the state towards them.  He maintains that vigilante 
“autonomy” in this context refers not to a lack of permission by the state, but 
rather to a lack of a mindset of accountability by the vigilante; vigilantes are 
not willingly accountable for their violent actions in the sense that they do not 
take orders from the state or subject themselves to state reprimand (although 
of course they may be reprimanded – punished – and thus held accountable 
by the state despite having this attitude).  They simply do not care what the 
state thinks of what they do.186  Dumsday’s argument neatly sidesteps the 
thorny question of whether or not vigilantes act in an extra-legal fashion by 
focusing on their (subjective) state of mind instead of the (objective) question 
of whether they act with formal state permission.  Certainly it is 
understandable why the state should disapprove of a group that does not 
want to play by the state’s rules, regardless of whether its activities actually 
transgress legal bounds. 
A second viewpoint of the state-vigilante dynamic seems to assume a 
relationship between the state and vigilantes that is inherently antagonistic.187  
Unlike the Johnstonian perspective, scholars holding this view consider 
unjustified violence to be an inevitable component of vigilante conduct.188  
Since such disproportionate violence is per se not state-sanctioned, this 
implies that vigilante conduct likewise can under no circumstances be officially 
condoned by the state.  A proponent of this approach is Harris,189 who views 
violence as integral to vigilantism.  Her notion of vigilantism comprises only 
“activities that occur beyond the parameters of the legal system”.190  Martin, 
who endorses Harris’s outline of vigilante attributes,191 is also of the view that 
vigilantism is by definition non-state-sanctioned.192 
                                            
186 Dumsday (2009) Southern Journal of Philosophy 53. 
187 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 57. 
188 See e.g. Buur & Jensen (2004) African Studies.  
189 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread. 
190 6. 
191 3. 
192 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 58. 
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It is submitted that a more nuanced perspective regarding the nature of 
vigilante-state interactions is required: while not denying that vigilante 
organisations exist outside the framework of the law, what they do is 
nonetheless a form of private policing, a “mechanism of governance that can 
be provided by state and non-state parties alike”.193  The boundary between 
state and non-state policing is a “‘twilight space’ occupied by an alternative 
citizenry that ‘stands in’ for the state”.194  In this sense, vigilantism may be 
seen as a product of the state’s neoliberal tendency 195  to empower 
communities to “participate in the production of their own security”; 196 
vigilantism is thus a side-effect of the blurring of the boundary between public 
and private that accompanies such outsourcing of government functions.197  
As Bénit-Gbaffou astutely remarks, “can one give residents the duty to ensure 
their neighbourhood’s own security, and refuse them the right to exclude 
whomever they consider a threat (or even a risk) to their own local social 
order?”198 
                                            
193  Baker (2004) Society in Transition; B Baker “Protection From Crime: What Is On Offer for 
Africans?” (2004) 22 (2) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 165 165; B Baker “Living With 
Non-State Policing in South Africa: The Issues and Dilemmas” (2002) 40 (1) Journal of Modern 
African Studies 29. 
194 A Sen & D Pratten “Global Vigilantes: Perspectives on Justice and Violence” in D Pratten and A 
Sen (eds) Global Vigilantes (2007) 5; also Lund (2006) Development and Change 678. 
195  According to Foucault, neoliberalism entails the “economisation” of previously noneconomic 
spheres and endeavours (W Brown Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution (2015) 
52).  The related term “governmentality” refers to the “shift away from the power of command and 
punishing targeting particular subjects and towards the power of conducting and compelling 
populations ‘at a distance’” (117).  “Governance” signifies “a transformation from governing through 
hierarchically organized command and control … to governing that is networked, integrated, 
cooperative, partnered, disseminated, and at least partly self-organized” (123).  Such self-
organisation entails a hollowing-out of the state, a “governing without government” and a 
“responsibilising” of individuals – a regime in which “the singular human capacity for responsibility 
is deployed to constitute and govern subjects and through which their conduct is organized and 
measured, remaking and reorientating them for a neoliberal order” (123-124; 133).  In the criminal 
justice context, responsibilisation as a “manifestation of human capitalization” (133) involves 
mobilising private individuals to contribute towards the provision of their own security instead of 
relying on top-down, centralised law-enforcement.  For more on this concept of “deep” neoliberalism 
and its link with governmentality, see R Venugopal “Neoliberalism as Concept” (2015) 44 (2) 
Economy and Society 165 170.  See also Lund (2006) Development and Change 692; Comaroff & 
Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: 
International Perspectives 217. 
196 C Bénit-Gbaffou “Police-Community Partnerships and Responses to Crime: Lessons From Yeoville 
and Observatory, Johannesburg” (2006) 17 (4) Urban Forum 301 310.  See also Foucault 
“Governmentality” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality for more on the role of 
“governmentality” in informing this trend. 
197 Lund (2006) Development and Change 692. 
198 Bénit-Gbaffou (2006) Urban Forum 310-311. 
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This third perspective is particularly instructive, since “insurgent 
practices”199 such as vigilantism cannot be properly understood unless they 
are seen as evolving alongside – and often entwined with – formally state-
sanctioned forms of social control, resulting in a “complex pattern of 
overlapping [policing] agencies”.200  In this domain of “multi-choice policing”201 
there is no clearly distinguishable demarcation between sphere of influence of 
the state and civil society; instead, it is a zone of “ongoing contestation”.202  
Even Johnston203 observes that there is a fine line between vigilance and 
vigilantism.  The margin between community policing in sustained partnership 
with local state police and community-initiated policing, where there is no such 
liaison,204 is especially indistinct in instances where, as is fairly common with 
vigilantes, groups initially function within the parameters of the law but 
subsequently shift from co-operating with the police to taking the law into their 
own hands.205   
If vigilantism is seen as performing a private policing function it must be 
recognised, too, that the distinction between voluntary vigilante groups and 
commercial security firms is likewise not always clear-cut.206  While Johnston 
asserts that there is a “crucial” distinction between private commercial activity 
and private voluntary activity, and excludes groups with a commercial motive 
from the ambit of vigilantism, it is submitted that non-profit-making is not 
necessarily a defining characteristic of vigilantism.   What is relevant is not the 
voluntary status of the group in question, but their positioning vis-à-vis formal 
modes of policing.  An illegitimate “protection racket”-style private security 
operation that serves aims of combating social deviance and advancing 
community order may well be classified as vigilantist even if it charges for its 
                                            
199  P Meth “Unsettling Insurgency: Reflections on Women's Insurgent Practices in South Africa” 
(2010) 11 (2) Planning Theory and Practice 241 255. 
200 Baker (2004) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 170. 
201 Baker (2004) Society in Transition 205. 
202 Buur (2006) Development and Change 741. 
203 L Johnston “Private Policing, Vigilance and Vigilantism: Commercialisation and Citizenship and 
Crime Prevention Strategies” in T Bennet (eds) Preventing Crime and Disorder: Targeting 
Strategies and Responsibilities (1996). 
204 W Schärf “Community Justice and Community Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (2001) 32 
(1) IDS Bulletin 74 78. 
205 See, e.g., § 7 3 2 below. 
206 D Sharp & D Wilson “'Household Security': Private Policing and Vigilantism in Doncaster” (2000) 
39 (2) The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 113 130. 
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services, particularly if its business success is reliant on the perception that it 
is prepared to operate outside the law.207  A good example of a vigilante 
group that “commodifies” the violence it wields208 is Mapogo A Mathamaga, 
which operates as a non-state-sanctioned and abusive form of private 
commercial security with a flexible fee structure depending on the financial 
status of its clients.209  While vigilante groups such as Mapogo may have a 
secondary profit-making aim, their primary focus remains punishing deviance 
and promoting community security.  In this respect vigilantism may be 
distinguished from commercial “protection-racket” organisations that are not 
focused on “crime-fighting”.  While vigilantes and organised crime groups 
such as the Mafia share an interest in protection, Abrahams210 correctly notes 
that while vigilante protection is primarily an informal substitute for the criminal 
justice system, the Mafia’s “good works” and “law and order” flavour also 
extend to a “particularistic and informal civil law” aimed at protecting 
businesses that are unable to avail themselves of more formal and open 
procedures. 
Taking what has been said above into account, the most cogent 
perspective on the state-vigilante dynamic is one which recognises that 
vigilantism is both illegal (unjustified in terms of formal legal rules) and extra-
legal (existing outside the framework of the law), whilst acknowledging that it 
is nevertheless a “way of executing state power”,211 with the relationship of 
vigilantes and state agencies being at times both intimate and “convivial”.212 
 
  
                                            
207 130-131. 
208 Baker (2004) Society in Transition 209. 
209 Schärf (2001) IDS Bulletin.  See B Oomen “Vigilantism or Alternative Citizenship?  The Rise of 
Mapogo A Mathamaga” (2004) 63 (2) African Studies 153 157-158 for a breakdown of Mapogo’s 
typical fee structures. 
210 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 166-167. 
211 Kirsch & Grätz “Vigilantism, State Ontologies & Encompassment” in Domesticating Vigilantism in 
Africa 10. 
212 Buur “Domesticating Sovereigns” in Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa 28. 
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2 6 Fault (blameworthiness or mens rea) 
Now that the objective actus reus – unlawful conduct – components of 
vigilantism have been considered, it is necessary to focus on those elements 
that concern the perpetrator’s subjective state of mind (mens rea) at the time 
of the vigilante act.  It has already been explained that vigilantes often engage 
in acts of extreme violence.  What must be explained further, however, is why 
the state deems vigilantes personally blameworthy for their conduct, and 
conversely, the grounds upon which vigilantes dispute this attribution of 
culpability.  It would be unwise for the judiciary to dismiss as irrelevant what 
vigilantes say about why they do what they do.  Acknowledging their 
underlying motivations, and taking these into account as a component of a 
separate offence of vigilantism, is key to arriving at a just and workable 
definition of vigilantism as a crime.  As will become clear, the judiciary is 
compelled to walk an uncomfortable tightrope between acknowledging as 
mitigatory the root causes of vigilantism (which entails owning up to the 
failures and shortcomings of the criminal justice system itself) and ignoring 
those root causes (which risks undermining the integrity and legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system in the eyes of vigilantes and the communities they 
claim to serve).   
 
2 6 1 Intention and direction of will 
In order to be convicted of any of the crimes mentioned in § 2 4 2 
above, a perpetrator must both direct their will towards committing the 
prohibited conduct, and must commit it while knowing it to be unlawful.  
Although the point of departure is that only those who deliberately cause harm 
ought to be punished, the concept of intention has extended over time to 
cover not just deliberately willed but also foreseen conduct.213   
In the case of vigilantism, there can be little doubt that, in South Africa 
at least, vigilantes who engage in acts of violence most often certainly do 
                                            
213 Burchell Principles 344. 
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direct their will towards achieving214 the death or injury of their victims.  This is 
evidenced by their methods; extreme forms of corporal punishment that 
cannot help but cause serious injury or death.  There are two ways of 
understanding the “direction of will” requirement in relation to vigilantes:   
The first perspective on vigilante mens rea views vigilantes’ causing 
death or injury to their chosen victims as being their main aim and object215 – 
it is what they desire to happen.  Because committing the prohibited act is the 
certain goal216 of a vigilante perpetrator, vigilantes therefore have intention (to 
kill, injure, harm, etc.,) in the form of dolus directus – (direct) intention in its 
ordinary everyday meaning.  The reason why they desire to kill or injure their 
victims is regarded merely as their motive for acting, and does not form part of 
the intention requirement per se.  Motive is a legal concept distinct and 
separate from intention.  Whereas (direct) intention entails that an accused 
knows and wills an unlawful act or result,217 and is a form of the element of 
the crime fault that must be proven by the state beyond reasonable doubt for 
criminal conviction, motive is the accused’s reason for committing the conduct 
in question.  While it may be a useful tool for establishing intention, the motive 
behind a person’s act is immaterial for the establishment of guilt as such.218  
The criminal justice system ignores motive for the purposes of proving 
whether a crime has been committed because “individual motives are too 
complex and obscure to provide a reliable basis for determining liability for 
punishment”.219  By disregarding the explanation for a person’s actions, the 
law in effect divorces the morality of their conduct from its legal 
consequences.  Thus a seemingly laudable motive would at most be a factor 
considered by the court in mitigation of sentence;220 likewise, an especially 
heinous motive will not ensure conviction unless the conduct in question is 
otherwise unlawful and committed with the required mens rea (guilty mind).221  
                                            
214 Snyman Criminal Law 177. 
215 Burchell Principles 346. 
216 Snyman Criminal Law 177. 
217 177. 
218 Burchell Principles 348; Snyman Criminal Law 186. 
219 Burchell Principles 349. 
220 R v Peverett 1940 AD 213; S v Hartmann 1975 3 SA 532 (C); S v Nkwanyana 2003 1 SACR 67 
(W). 
221 Burchell Principles 350. 
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As already mentioned, vigilantes claim to have pure motives: they believe 
their conduct to be morally justified, since they feel impelled by righteous 
anger and community duty to perform violent self-help in circumstances where 
they perceive there to be no other feasible alternative available.222  According 
to this perspective, vigilantes’ ostensibly pure motives might be taken into 
account when determining an appropriate punishment, but would be irrelevant 
for deciding whether they should be convicted or acquitted in the first place. 
The second perspective distinguishes between general and specific 
intent in the vigilante scenario.  According to this argument, while vigilantes do 
have the general intention to harm others, this is not in actual fact their 
primary aim and object.  Rather, it is merely an inevitable by-product of 
achieving their true goal: punishing deviance so as to enhance collective 
security and build a moral community in the face of state apathy, inadequacy 
or incompetence.  According to this interpretation of vigilante mens rea, 
vigilantes have the form of intention known as dolus indirectus in respect of 
the harm they cause to their victims.  Indirect intention is present where the 
unlawful conduct or consequence is not an accused’s aim and object, but is 
foreseen as “virtually certain” if their main objective is to be achieved.223  
Because of the degree of force used in most acts of vigilante punishment, it 
can scarcely be said that vigilantes foresee death or injury only as a 
possibility, which is the requirement for the lesser form of intention termed 
dolus eventualis.  The methods vigilantes employ lead to a compelling 
inference that such unlawful consequences are foreseen as unavoidable, not 
merely possible – hence, they would seem to act with dolus indirectus.   
According to this second perspective, then, vigilantes’ desire to achieve 
security and social order is not simply their reason for causing harm, but is in 
fact a necessary element of the crime itself.  If vigilantes’ main aim is the 
desire to punish wrongdoers in order to enhance collective security, this 
elevates their crime-fighting objectives to a status higher than mere motive: it 
is a crucial component of their activities, the driving force behind their crimes.  
                                            
222 J Reiner “The Social Organization of Vengeance” in D Black (eds) Toward a General Theory of 
Social Control Volume 1: Fundamentals (1984). 
223 Burchell Principles 346 
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Burchell acknowledges that “[t]he definition of dolus directus in terms of the 
‘aim and object’ of the accused to commit the crime, appears … to make 
motive or purpose a specific element of that special form of intention”.224  The 
insight that there may indeed be instances where it is hard if not impossible to 
distinguish an accused’s main aim (intention) from their purpose (motive) is an 
important one.  It is submitted that crafting a separate crime of vigilantism 
requires recognising vigilantes’ goal of making the community a safer and 
more secure place to live in through punishing deviance as a special form of 
specific intention – i.e., making their underlying objectives form a crucial 
element of the crime.  Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt that a 
particular crime was committed with the specific aim and object (dolus 
directus) of offering guarantees of collective security and/or of enhancing 
social order by inflicting punishment on wrongdoers would allow courts to 
distinguish clearly between vigilantism and purely gratuitous violence, and 
thus better enable courts to fashion appropriate punishments for those 
convicted of vigilantism.  This penalty aspect is considered further at length in  
§§ 6 3 2 3 and 7 5. 
The idea that two forms of intention could be required to find an 
accused guilty of a particular crime is not unprecedented.  For example, in 
terms of international criminal law, the mental element of the crime of 
genocide requires not only “intent and knowledge” of all the material elements 
of that crime, but also the “specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such”.225  Having the purpose of 
systematically destroying a group in whole or in part is a precondition for 
individual criminal responsibility for genocide, regardless of whether the group 
is actually destroyed.  Similarly, convicting an accused of the crime of assault 
with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (“GBH”) requires two manifestations 
of intention: the intention to assault as well as the intention to cause GBH.  An 
accused with the specific intent to cause GBH may be convicted of assault 
GBH regardless of whether serious harm – or any harm at all – actually 
materialises; conversely, even where serious injury is caused, if an accused 
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225 G Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 192; 207-210. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 72 
lacks the specific intention to cause GBH they are at most guilty of common 
assault.  Thus if this specific intent to cause GBH is present and can be 
proven, it in effect “transforms” common assault into assault GBH.  Similarly, it 
may be argued that vigilantes’ goal of protecting their community by punishing 
perceived deviance in the absence of effective state provision of security may 
be seen as transforming the general crimes of murder, assault, etc. into the 
specific crime of vigilantism.   
Of the two ways of understanding vigilante intention outlined above, the 
second approach is more persuasive.  While the first perspective relegates 
vigilante rationales to the secondary status of mere motive, the second 
acknowledges that vigilantes’ motivations are what set them apart from 
“ordinary” criminals, and that for this reason, their specific intent should form 
part of the elements of a separate crime of vigilantism.  However, regardless 
of whether vigilantes’ motivations are deemed to be their motive or their 
specific intention, the reasons why they do what they do are discussed at 
length below at § 2 6 3.   
 
2 6 2 Intention and consciousness of wrongfulness 
Having thoroughly explored the implications of the “direction of will” 
requirement of intention for a crime of vigilantism, it is now necessary to 
consider briefly whether vigilantes also possess the required consciousness 
of wrongfulness for intention to be present – i.e., do they indeed know or at 
least foresee that what they are doing is against the law, or might they instead 
conceivably perceive their conduct to be legally justified?  If such subjective 
knowledge of unlawfulness is lacking, intention in the technical legal sense of 
the word is absent.  Thus even if – as was argued above226  – vigilante 
conduct does exceed the bounds of that permitted in terms of private defence, 
it must still be considered whether vigilantes may raise the defence of putative 
private defence excluding fault.  This defence applies where an accused 
genuinely but mistakenly subjectively believes that their conduct falls within 
                                            
226 At § 2 5 1 2 5. 
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the bounds of this recognised ground of justification, whereas on the objective 
facts their conduct exceeds such limits.227  Could vigilantes accused of crimes 
such as murder and assault not be acquitted on the basis that they lack 
intention since, owing to their bona fide mistaken belief that they were entitled 
to act in defence of protected legal interests, they have no consciousness of 
wrongfulness?  If such belief were reasonable as well as genuine, their 
conduct would also not be negligent.228 
Despite it appearing to be a promising avenue of criminal defence for 
the vigilante, it is submitted that vigilantes are unlikely to be able to rely on 
putative private defence in practice.  In the context of comparing private 
defence and vigilantism, 229  the question of whether vigilantes’ conduct is 
objectively justified was raised, and the conclusion was that it was not – inter 
alia because vigilantes aim is not merely temporarily to uphold the legal order 
on the state’s behalf.  Assuming this is correct, it would be disingenuous to 
claim that vigilantes honestly but mistakenly believe that all they are doing is 
temporarily warding off an unlawful attack on behalf of the state, as is required 
for successful reliance on putative private defence: the scope of what they do 
goes well beyond what would be sanctioned by law in terms of private 
defence, but this does not deter them from continuing anyway.  Assuming – 
with good reason, it is submitted – that vigilantes know or foresee that the law 
would frown upon their version of private defence, their subjective state of 
mind definitely denotes intention.  According to Burchell, for the “knowledge of 
unlawfulness” requirement of intention to be fulfilled it is sufficient for an 
accused to foresee the possibility that their conduct is “contrary to the law in 
the broad sense” and yet to proceed, “reckless as to whether it was or not”.230  
It is thoroughly unconvincing to argue that vigilantes might be unaware of the 
                                            
227 See. e.g., S v De Oliveira 1993 2 SACR 59 (A) 63H-J, where the legal principles relating to putative 
private defence are discussed; also S v Joshua; S v Naidoo 1997 1 SACR 62 (T), where the putative 
private defence was successfully relied upon to exclude intention.  
228 This is because the test for negligence measures the conduct of the accused against that of a so-
called “reasonable person”.  If the reasonable person would also mistakenly have believed it justified 
to act in private defence, this shows that the accused’s conduct does not deviate from that which is 
expected of the reasonable person.  This form of putative private defence would be relevant in the 
instance of crimes such as culpable homicide, where the requisite form of fault is negligence not 
intention. 
229 See from § 2 5 1 above. 
230 Burchell Principles 383. 
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state prohibitions on murder or assault, for example, or that they might not 
know that their actions are in contravention of such proscriptions, as well as in 
excess of what is permitted in terms of private defence.  
There can be little doubt that vigilantes are aware that their conduct is 
not legally justified; nevertheless, there is a strong argument to be made that 
they view it as morally justified.  It is now necessary to consider how vigilantes 
explain the motivations behind their acts – their “ostensibly noble cause”231 – 
in more detail. 
 
2 6 3 Vigilante motivations 
In discussing why vigilantes do what they do, the term “motivations” is 
used, rather than either “motive” or “specific intention”, to denote that 
regardless of which of the two approaches to direction of will discussed above 
is followed in practice, decoding vigilante objectives is central to 
understanding their particular brand of violence. 
It was noted previously that vigilantes claim to have pure motives.  
However, even if such assertions are accepted at face value, from a legal 
perspective this does not detract from vigilantes’ mens rea: although 
vigilantes take the moral high ground, distinguishing their conduct from that of 
“real” criminals, 232  there is no denying that they direct their will towards 
performing harmful acts, including murder, assault, kidnapping, malicious 
damage to property and arson, despite knowing them to be against the law.233   
The paradox of vigilantes claiming to fight crime whilst simultaneously 
committing it is at the heart of the ambiguity of legal responses to vigilante 
violence.  One of the aims of this study is to determine whether the default 
legal response – that morality and the application of the law should part ways 
where vigilante motivations are concerned – is the most helpful perspective 
                                            
231 S v Thebus 578I. 
232 See, e.g., § 5 2 1 1 below. 
233 See, e.g., S v Hartmann, R v Peverett and S v Nkwanyana for instances where individuals claimed to 
be acting with laudable motives when causing death – euthanasia-type cases – but were nevertheless 
convicted of murder. 
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when it comes to tackling vigilantism, and to explore ways in which the 
criminal justice system may indeed take cognisance of vigilantes’ motivations 
when deciding on the most appropriate way to deal with them.  With this in 
mind, it is submitted that vigilantes have two main and interconnected 
motivations for their actions, namely punishing their chosen victims and 
offering guarantees of security and order to the communities whom they 
“serve”.  
 
2 6 3 1 Punishing deviance 
There is disagreement among scholars regarding whether vigilantism 
necessarily entails a punishment component.  Whereas Johnston views 
punishment, while commonly occurring, as “a variable, rather than a constant, 
feature of vigilantism”,234 authors such as Harris,235 Baker,236 and Martin237 
consider its punishing function to be a theoretical prerequisite, a defining 
characteristic of vigilantism.  This second perspective regards “punitive 
violence [as] integral to vigilante methodology” 238  – a primary means of 
distinguishing vigilantism from other forms of violence.  
While Johnston’s view that punishment can be distinguished from 
“mere” violence on the basis that is “premeditated, systematic, calculated, and 
often displays ritualistic and quasi-judicial characteristics”239  has a ring of 
truth, 240  his contention that not all acts of vigilante violence constitute 
punishment is misconceived.  First, the examples of “vigilantism” he cites as 
not having a punishment element do not support his argument.  They involve 
state-sanctioned self-help (shooting a burglar in private defence during a 
struggle; citizen street patrols aimed at prevention only), and as such cannot 
be regarded as true examples of vigilantism at all.241  Second, by arguing that 
                                            
234 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 233. 
235 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 4; 23-24. 
236 E.g. Baker (2004) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 165. 
237 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica. 
238 57. 
239 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 233. 
240 See § 5 4 1 1 below for more on the ritualistic and quasi-judicial nature of vigilante practices. 
241 For more on vigilantism as non-state sanctioned, see § 2 5 2 above. 
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where vigilante violence is thwarted, by police intervention for instance, no 
punishment is involved, he fails to recognise that for legal purposes it is 
irrelevant whether intended harm actually materialises: the law denounces 
unsuccessful attempts to punish by violent means for many of the same 
reasons that it condemns attempts that succeed. 242   His argument is 
tantamount to contending that someone who aims to shoot another, but 
misses, or who is prevented from shooting at the last moment by forces 
beyond his control, should not be held liable for attempted murder because no 
injury was caused.  It ignores that person’s blameworthy state of mind and the 
fact that their criminal conduct – albeit incomplete – demonstrates their 
propensity to cause harm.  Similarly, it is hard to understand how Johnston 
could dismiss a 16-year-old suspect who was interrogated, while being 
threatened with being cut with a knife or doused with petrol if he failed to 
reply, before being dumped by the roadside, as not having been subjected to 
“actual punishment”. 243    Presumably he does so because he fails to 
appreciate that assault includes both the application of force and inspiring the 
belief in one’s victim that physical force is immediately to be applied to 
them.244  For the duration of the assault the 16-year-old was surely under the 
impression that impairment of his bodily integrity was immediately to take 
place,245 and would have felt that he was being punished.  Last, even if one 
does regard the dubious vigilante example of the citizen street patrol as 
“autonomous” rather than “responsible” citizenship, Johnston is mistaken in 
his view that such vigilantism aimed primarily at preventing wrongdoing rather 
than punishing it per se cannot simultaneously amount to punishment.  What 
he overlooks is that regardless of their purported chief motivation, such 
vigilantes’ violent conduct generally does – and is intended to – inflict harm on 
those subject to it.  Even where punishment is not vigilantes’ primary aim, 
vigilante victims certainly experience the hurt they suffer as punishment.246   
                                            
242 See also Snyman Criminal Law 275; Burchell Principles 515-517. 
243 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 233. 
244 Burchell Principles 577. 
245 Snyman Criminal Law 447. 
246 Contra Black “Crime as Social Control” in Towards a General Theory of Social Control Volume 2: 
Selected Problems, who argues that “collective liability” informal social control does not require 
victims to be aware that they are being “punished” for their “misdeeds”. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 77 
Bearing the above in mind, it may be concluded that punishment is 
indeed an integral component of vigilantism. 247   The victims of vigilante 
violence are not random targets.  Vigilantes inflict pain and suffering on those 
they perceive to be wrongdoers worthy of condemnation, which is precisely 
what punishment entails.  What will be considered next is what vigilantes 
hope to achieve by punishing those whom they regard as deviants.  The 
discussion that follows isolates the various potential justifications that have 
been put forward for criminal punishment in general, and applies each so-
called “punishment theory” to vigilante-inflicted punishment in particular.  The 
aim is to show that there is a good deal of overlap, at least as regards the 
ostensible reasons for punishment provided by vigilantes and by the formal 
criminal justice system, but also to highlight their differences, where 
applicable. 
 
2 6 3 1 1 Link to punishment theories 
Any punishment – whether emanating from the state or from private 
individuals – entails an infringement of the rights of those who are punished.  
In the same way as judicial officers need to make explicit to the person being 
punished as well as the wider community their reasons for imposing a 
particular penalty in order for their conduct not to be perceived as arbitrary 
and irrational, so too vigilantes’ legitimacy may be enhanced if they are able 
to justify their resorting to extreme force to the satisfaction of the communities 
they purport to serve.248  The various rationales for imposing punishment are 
known as punishment theories.  Punishment theories are divided into two 
main categories: absolute and relative punishment theories.  Absolute 
theories, which are sometimes viewed as a single theory, 249  have a 
retrospective focus and view punishment as an end in itself, whereas relative 
                                            
247 See also D Garland “Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in 20th Century 
America” (2005) 39 (4) Law and Society Review 793 795; 828, where he characterises the “public 
torture lynchings” that took place in the USA between 1890 and 1940 as “first and foremost, 
collective [summary] criminal punishments”. 
248 For more on this aspect of vigilante self-legitimation, see § 5 2 1 below. 
249 See e.g. Snyman Criminal Law 11. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 78 
theories are forward-looking, seeing punishment as a means to achieve a 
variety of further ends. 
The idea behind the absolute (or retributive) theories is that one who 
has caused harm must suffer harm.  There are various ways to express this 
idea:   
First, the focus of punishment may be to appease the community by 
satisfying their thirst for vengeance against the wrongdoer.  The perception of 
vigilantes as “avengers of wrong” 250  who mete out “instant, retributive 
justice”251 is widespread in popular252 and vigilante discourse.  It is borne out 
by the extent to which the extreme force used by vigilantes may be seen as 
gratifying community members’ punitive sentiments, thus giving their basic 
urge for violent retribution free rein.253 
Second, punishment may be regarded as a way for a wrongdoer to be 
restored to moral goodness by paying his debt to society – the idea of 
punishment as atonement.  Buur and Jensen endorse the vigilante viewpoint 
that deviant outsiders may be redeemed through vigilante violence and pain, 
thus enabling them to “re-enter the moral community”.254  Vigilantes view 
corporal punishment as a necessary and corrective means to exorcise evil 
and immoral behaviour.255  
Third, punishment may serve a denunciatory function: it is a way of 
formally expressing condemnation of the deviant behaviour, and thus also 
symbolically proclaiming community beliefs and values by demonstrating how 
those who violate them will be treated.  Indeed, vigilante violence’s crucial 
symbolic function of sanctifying deeply-cherished societal values has long 
been recognised.256 
                                            
250 Baker (2002) Journal of Modern African Studies 39. 
251 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 3; also Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 58. 
252 See Nina (2000) African Security Review 18. 
253 Nel (2014) Acta Criminologica 31. 
254 Buur & Jensen (2004) African Studies 147-148. 
255 148. 
256 See R Brown “The American Vigilante Tradition” in H Graham and T Gurr (eds) The History of 
Violence in America (1969); R Brown “The History of Vigilantism in America” in H J Rosenbaum 
and P C Sederberg (eds) Vigilante Politics (1976). 
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Fourth, punishment is seen as a wrongdoer’s “just desert” in that it 
restores the moral balance of society 257  that has been disturbed by the 
deviant behaviour.  The idea of restoring moral balance presupposes that the 
extent of punishment must be proportionate to the extent of harm caused by 
the wrongdoer258 – i.e., that the punishment must “fit” the crime.  Vigilante-
inflicted penalties seldom comply with this requirement.  As has already been 
seen, it is common for a petty thief to be killed by vigilantes – a punishment 
grossly disproportionate to the crime.  
There are also numerous relative (or utilitarian) punishment theories, 
which justify punishment on the basis of its social benefit:   
First, punishment may be of such a nature that it incapacitates 
wrongdoers, making it difficult or impossible for them to reoffend.  The aim of 
punishment is thus to prevent future deviance.  The most common 
incapacitating punishment resorted to by vigilantes is their use of the ‘death 
penalty’.  Harris goes so far as to say that death is “built into the form that the 
vigilante act adopts”. 259   Needless to say, someone who is dead is 
permanently prevented from reoffending. 
Second, punishment may be aimed at instilling fear260 in the wrongdoer 
so that they will be less inclined to commit further wrongs.  This idea of 
punishment as persuasive tool may extend to the wider community; after 
witnessing the pain and suffering inflicted on a wrongdoer, those who have 
not yet offended may be disinclined to commit deviant behaviour in order to 
avoid being exposed to similar punishment themselves.  Harris separates out 
this “warning” aspect of vigilantism from its “punishing” (presumably 
retributive) function.  Although she conflates warning (deterrence) and 
prevention, the value of individual and general deterrence is clearly foremost 
in Harris’s conception of the secondary function of vigilante punishment.  She 
                                            
257 The idea behind this is symbolised by the “mystical balance” of the scales of justice that have been 
upset needing to be corrected, or restored to equilibrium – see C Shearing “Punishment and the 
Changing Face of the Governance” (2001) 3 (2) Punishment and Society 203 206. 
258 Snyman Criminal Law 13. 
259 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 4. 
260 Vigilantism’s capacity to instil fear in both its immediate targets and those who witness violent 
vigilante punishment is considered further in § 5 4 1 1 below. 
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rightly points out that “[the public], visible and immediate nature of vigilante 
violence, as well as the extreme pain that is inflicted on victims, serves as a 
deterrent for both the victim and members of the audience”,261 and observes 
that “[i]t warns the victim and onlookers that their future actions will be 
violently punished if they do not follow the vigilante ‘rules’”.262  The idea of 
extreme violence in the form of corporal punishment being a more effective 
deterrent than more human rights-focused penalty options is also a common 
theme in vigilante discourse.263  The punishment theory of general deterrence 
makes it permissible to impose an exemplarily harsh punishment that is 
disproportionate to the harm inflicted by the wrongdoer, on the basis that it will 
better deter prospective malefactors.  The wrongdoer is in effect sacrificed for 
the sake of the community to further the aim of deterrence and community 
solidarity.  The operation of this type of scapegoat mechanism in the context 
of the vigilante version of general deterrence is explored at length in § 5 3 2 1. 
Third, the punishment theory of reinforcement regards punishment as 
an educational tool – a means of creating and reinforcing respect for societal 
norms, thus inducing obedience and inhibiting contraventions.  The idea 
behind this punishment theory is that the norms and standards of society 
need to be given moral weight not only by prohibiting certain conduct, but also 
by backing up the prohibition with suitable punishments.   Meth argues that 
even very violent vigilante practices may be justified as being a means of 
forming a “moral community” by teaching criminals appropriate moral codes 
and so “correcting immoral behaviour”. 264   Buur confirms that vigilante 
violence may perform the function of socialising its victims into knowing the 
difference between right and wrong, thus helping them to become moral 
human beings.265 
Fourth, punishment may be seen as a way to reform wrongdoers by 
“re-educating” them to become useful members of society.  Mapogo A 
                                            
261 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 24. 
262 23. 
263 See, for instance Oomen (2004) African Studies, where a cow thief who was beaten by a Mapogo A 
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Mathamaga’s website says that its African style of justice aims at immediately 
dealing with miscreants “in a traditional way to an extent that they will become 
exemplary citizens serving an integral part in our community.”266  While this is 
probably merely a rationalisation to make their violence more palatable for 
external consumption, the sense of violence as educational medium has 
already been referred to above, and the idea of vigilante punishment as a 
means of rehabilitation has a modicum of persuasive force. 
Needless to say, it is unnecessary and unhelpful to isolate one single 
punishment theory as being the one that best accounts for all cases of 
vigilante violence.  As is the case with state punishment, while the underlying 
foundation justifying punishment must always be that punishment is deserved, 
with retribution being the indispensable point of departure in this regard, there 
will necessarily be additional purposes for punishment in each particular 
instance.  Because vigilantes target those they perceive to be deviant, their 
form of violence falls loosely within the broad category of retribution.  
However, using the term retribution in the vigilante context has the 
troublesome implication that the victim “somehow deserves what is meted 
out”267 to them.  The extreme violence of much vigilantism certainly does not 
sit comfortably within the bounds of what is usually conceived of as “deserved 
punishment” in the legal sense.  Beyond the permanently incapacitating 
function of the ‘death penalties’ imposed by vigilantes, the only possible 
explanation for disproportionately harsh vigilante ‘sentences’ is with reference 
to the punishment theory of general deterrence; in being given an over-harsh 
punishment, the individual wrongdoer is sacrificed for the good of the wider 
community.  This punishment theory has rightly been criticised on the grounds 
that it reduces the individual to a mere instrument ostensibly so as to improve 
society, instead of as a “free, responsible agent who gets only what he 
deserves”.268   
                                            
266 Anonymous “Mapogo A Mathamaga” Mapogo A Mathamaga. 
267 Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal Criminal Justice 29. 
268 Snyman Criminal Law 17.  See also S v Dodo 2001 1 SACR 594 (CC) para 38: “To attempt to 
justify any [punishment] without inquiring into the proportionality between the offence and the 
period of imprisonment, is to ignore, if not to deny, that which lies at the very heart of human 
dignity.  Human beings are not commodities to which a price can be attached; they are creatures with 
inherent and infinite worth; they ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means to 
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There is no doubt that the disproportionality which vigilante punishment 
almost inevitably entails violates the right to human dignity, in addition to the 
right to bodily integrity and even to life.  It is thus clear that while they share 
with the formal criminal justice system the desire to offer community members 
greater peace of mind and security, vigilantes prioritise the protection of 
communal interests above individual human rights when inflicting punishment.  
Key underlying justifications for punishment – both formal and informal – are 
to satisfy the community’s righteous indignation (retribution), to protect them 
from potentially dangerous deviants (prevention) and to deter other 
community members from wrongdoing (general deterrence).  For vigilantes, 
these concerns are paramount, unmitigated by considerations of just desert.  
This vigilante desire to guarantee security and exercise social control at all 
costs will now be elucidated further. 
 
2 6 3 2 Promoting community interests 
In his characterisation of vigilantism, Johnston emphasises that one of 
its important aims (in addition to its being a normative response to deviance) 
is social control motivated by a desire to offer guarantees269 of security270 in 
the face of an ineffective system of formal control.  He regards the expectation 
of personal security as fundamental to social identity, “something which the 
average citizen demands as a condition of life in a civilized society”. 271  
Vigilante action is one of the ways to fulfil that demand: in a social context 
where security is “commodified”, “employing” vigilantes is an important means 
of obtaining security services in the absence of adequate state provision.  
                                                                                                                             
an end.  Where … a sentence, which has been imposed because of its general deterrent effect on 
others, bears no relation to the gravity of the offence … the offender is being used essentially as a 
means to another end and the offender’s dignity assailed.” 
269 Shearing (1992) Crime and Justice 401-402 notes that the idea of a “guarantee” in this context can 
be linked to the Old English word “grith”, defined as “guaranteed security, defence, safe-conduct”.  It 
has connotations of protection and sanctuary. 
270 In this context, security is defined as “a state of affairs that allows the stable enjoyment of life and 
property” – see J Brodeur & C Shearing “Configuring Security and Justice” (2005) 2 (4) European 
Journal of Criminology 379  385. 
271 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 231-232. 
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This ties in with Baker’s view of vigilantism as one of many forms of policing272 
– policing being defined by him as “any organised activity that seeks to ensure 
the maintenance of communal order, security and peace”,273 and is confirmed 
by Weisburd’s empirical research endorsing the role of the vigilante as agent 
of community social control.274  As is indicated below, however, vigilantes 
regard their continual everyday policing practices275 as more than simply a 
means of advancing community safety and security; vigilante violence plays a 
crucial role in creating and confirming the moral values of the communities in 
which vigilantes operate – values which may well be contrary to those of the 
state. 
Johnston views security as involving the preservation of an 
“established order” against internal threat. 276  However, there is no reason 
why a vigilante ideology should necessarily be “in favor of ‘what is’”,277 as 
Rosenbaum and Sederberg put it, as opposed to invoking an “imagined order” 
that either existed in the past, or never existed but is desired.278  Rather than 
simply upholding the unsatisfactory status quo, vigilantism may actually be a 
“rudimentary social movement” 279  attempting to establish a counter-
hegemonic new vision of community values and ideals.  From a vigilante 
perspective, those who engage in vigilante acts are not merely addressing 
security concerns, thus guaranteeing “a particular vision of order”:280 they are 
also “the embodiment of the moral, virtuous community”281 itself – tasked with 
                                            
272 See, e.g., I Loader “Plural Policing and Democratic Governance” (2000) 9 (3) Social and Legal 
Studies 323 on the distinction between “the police” and “policing”. 
273 Baker (2004) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 165; B Baker Security in Post-Conflict 
Africa: The Role of Non-State Policing (2010) 9. 
274 D Weisburd “Vigilantism as Community Social Control: Developing a Quantitative Criminological 
Model” (1988) 4 (2) Journal of Quantitative Criminology 137 151-152. 
275 Buur & Jensen (2004) African Studies 146. 
276 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 321. 
277 H J Rosenbaum & P C Sederberg “Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence” in H 
Rosenbaum and P Sederberg (eds) Vigilante Politics (1976) 27. 
278  Nina (2000) African Security Review 21-27.  See also Dumsday (2009) Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 55-56 and § 2 5 1 1 1 above. 
279 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology 232. 
280 Schärf (2001) IDS Bulletin 43.  See also S Bangstad “Hydra's Heads: PAGAD and Responses to the 
PAGAD Phenomenon in a Cape Muslim Community” (2005) 31 (1) Journal of Southern African 
Studies 187 207, who opines: “The underlying discourse of [vigilante group] PAGAD is a language 
that speaks of the protection of community, that speaks of the need to ‘protect our children’ and the 
‘reinstatement of a moral order’”. 
281 Buur & Jensen (2004) African Studies 146. 
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“conjur[ing] the community from the ashes”.282  This links with the educative 
function of vigilantism referred to earlier in the context of the reinforcement 
punishment theory: 283  By inflicting violence on those who “undercut and 
imperil”284 what they define as values that are important to the community, 
vigilante groups are in effect establishing and enforcing “new visions of moral 
being and social responsibility”.285  As is detailed from § 5 3 below, vigilantism 
aims to promote community cohesion by defining group membership in terms 
of those who are excluded as “the repulsive other”.286  Thus in the process of 
providing security guarantees, vigilantism also achieves a form of community-
building287 that entails marshalling the moral community against those forces 
who would threaten to destroy social order and collective security. 
 
2 6 4 Fault: conclusion 
The discussion of mens rea above shows clearly that in addition to 
their conduct objectively being unlawful and prohibited by law, vigilantes do 
indeed possess consciousness of wrongfulness in the sense that they 
subjectively know or foresee that their conduct is not state-sanctioned.  Their 
intention to commit a crime notwithstanding, the analysis of vigilante 
motivations makes it clear that – at least ostensibly – vigilantes do view their 
own actions as morally justified.  This is because they believe the targets of 
their violence to be deserving of punishment, and see what they themelves do 
as necessary for enhancing collective security and building a moral 
community in the face of state apathy, inadequacy or incompetence.  
Needless to say, their seemingly praiseworthy motivations are not grounds for 
a complete acquittal in the eyes of the law, however.  As is argued below in 
§§ 6 3 2 3 and 7 5, in appropriate instances vigilantes’ motivations could – 
                                            
282 Comaroff & Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: International Perspectives 233. 
283 See § 2 6 3 1 1 above. 
284 Buur (2006) Development and Change 754. 
285 Comaroff & Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: International Perspectives 233. 
286 R Thurston Witch, Wicce, Mother Goose: The Rise and Fall of the Witch Hunts in Europe and North 
America (2001) 34. 
287 Meth (2010) Planning Theory and Practice 245. 
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and probably should – be taken into account as a powerful factor in mitigation 
of sentence in the penalty phase of the trial, even where the serious and 
violent nature of the crime committed would in other circumstances warrant an 
especially harsh punishment.  
 
2 7 Defining vigilantism as a crime  
Now that the groundwork has been laid by analysing vigilantism from 
the perspective of the elements of criminal liability, what still remains is to 
arrive at as concise a legal definition for the phenomenon as possible, which 
nonetheless still contains all its essential elements.  The definition below 
assumes that vigilantism should be a separate criminal offence so that those 
formerly charged with specific offences committed during episodes of 
vigilantism could be convicted instead of vigilantism itself.   
There are many reasons for advocating the separate criminalisation of 
vigilantism, many of which are canvassed in more detail at § 6 3 2 3.  The 
main reason for criminalising what vigilantes do as vigilantism per se is that is 
simply fairer.  As will become plain in § 6 3 2 2, where a group of vigilantes is 
involved in a killing, the tendency is for the state to charge all participants with 
murder, irrespective of their degree of participation.  Even minor participants, 
whose conduct has not been proven to have contributed causally to the death, 
may be successfully prosecuted, provided they share a so-called “common 
purpose” with the actual killers.  It is submitted that this practice contradicts 
the principle of “fair labelling” whereby, according to Ashworth, “[f]airness 
demands that offenders be labelled and punished in proportion to their 
wrongdoing”. 288   The labelling of an offence should be fair both in the 
descriptive sense (in that it captures the essence of the wrongdoing itself) and 
in the sense of that it fairly differentiates the offence from other criminal 
acts.289  Offence names communicate information about the offender to the 
public as well as to decision-makers and agencies operating both within and 
                                            
288 Ashworth Principles 88-89. 
289 Chalmers & Leverick (2008) Modern Law Review 238-239. 
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outside the criminal justice system, enabling such audiences to respond 
appropriately. 290  Offenders also have a legitimate interest in protecting their 
reputation against the stigma that may result from the use of imprecise or 
potentially misleading labels.291  Having the offence name reflect the true 
nature of the offender’s conduct is therefore necessary both for reasons of 
fairness to the offender as well as for public protection.  
Applying the case in favour of fair labelling to vigilantes, it has been 
argued above292 that the motivation for vigilante conduct is distinct from that of 
other violent crimes, and for that reason vigilantes (not only minor 
participants, but also those who actually cause serious harm) should be 
separately labelled so as to denote the nature of their wrongdoing accurately.  
Being labelled a “vigilante” as opposed to a “murderer” could have far-
reaching (and potentially positive) ramifications for an offender, both relating 
to how their case is handled by the courts and to matters such as their future 
employment prospects.  From a criminal justice perspective, the significant 
difference between charging an accused with vigilantism as opposed to 
murder, assault, public violence etc. is that the vigilante motivation is included 
in the definition of the crime itself, with the idea being that it should be taken 
into account when determining an appropriate (more community-based and 
restorative) sentence.  It is submitted that charging those involved in serious 
incidents of mob justice with vigilantism would be a win-win in practice.  
Because it is to an accused’s benefit to be convicted of vigilantism rather than 
a crime such as murder, the state would be more likely to obtain their co-
operation by offering them the option of pleading guilty to vigilantism, rather 
than having to go to trial on a more serious charge.  This could reduce costs 
and eliminate potential delays in the criminal justice process.  While the 
assumption is that having vigilante motivations would be a mitigating factor, 
specifically defining vigilantism as a crime nevertheless makes it clear that the 
conduct in question is definitely not state-sanctioned.   
  
                                            
290 E.g., making informed decisions about how to punish or whether to employ a particular offender. 
291 Chalmers & Leverick (2008) Modern Law Review 237. 
292 At § 2 6 3. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 87 
The proposed crime of vigilantism consists of:  
(1) a person or persons acting in their private capacity (2) 
unlawfully and (3) intentionally (4) using or threatening to use 
force (5) which is directed against the person and/or property 
of another (6) who is the perpetrator of an actual, potential or 
imputed criminal or non-criminal wrongdoing, (7) with the 
specific aim of (a) punishing such person and (b) offering 
guarantees of collective security and/or enhancing social order 
(8) in circumstances where there is a real or perceived absence 
of effective formal guarantees of order and security. 
A few points of clarification about the various elements of vigilantism 
identified above:  
Unlike that of Johnston,293 this definition makes no assumption about 
whether vigilantism is premeditated or spontaneous – it could be either.  
Element (1) is included to show that vigilantism may be perpetrated by 
individuals and groups alike, but not by agents of the state acting in their 
official capacity.  Element (2) implies not only that acts of vigilantism must not 
fall under any of the recognised grounds of justification, but also underlines its 
formally non-state-sanctioned status.  Element (3) refers to the fact that 
vigilantes direct their will towards acting unlawfully, despite knowing or 
foreseeing that their conduct is prohibited by law.  Element (4) focuses on the 
crucial (potential) violence aspect of vigilantism, while element (5) 
acknowledges that vigilantism may entail acts of violence against both the 
person and the property of victims, such as the burning of their houses.  
Element (6) defines the victims of vigilante violence by specifying that they are 
singled out for punishment because they individually are perceived to be 
wrongdoers, rather than simply being “innocent” members of a wider group or 
social category that has been deemed undesirable and targeted for this 
reason.  This distinguishes vigilantism from phenomena such as “xenophobic” 
attacks, where acts of violence are committed indiscriminately against the 
target group, with perpetrators imposing a form of collective liability whereby 
                                            
293 Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology. 
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any member of the relevant social category may be vulnerable to attack.294  It 
also excludes violent collective protest (what may be termed social justice 
activism),295 where the focus is often to destroy state property such as public 
libraries and clinics to express grievances about service delivery, rather than 
to fight crime or deviance.296  Element 7 refers to vigilantes’ specific intention.  
Element (7a) emphasises vigilantism’s punishment function, with punishment 
being used in the multifaceted sense explained in the section about 
punishment theories above, encompassing aspects such as retribution, 
prevention, deterrence and reinforcement.  Element (7b) is required to show 
that vigilantes act not only in their own interest, but also out of concern for the 
wider community interests in achieving security and order.  Element (8) is an 
attempt to acknowledge vigilantes’ perception that their acting as state 
substitutes is a necessary measure if security and order are to be upheld or 
maintained.  To prevent the risk of the state not choosing to utilise the crime 
of vigilantism for fear of having to prove that their criminal justice provision is 
ineffective to obtain a conviction, it may even be preferable for there to be a 
presumption that this element has been complied with in circumstances where 
obtaining effective access to formal policing is objectively impracticable, 
provided that all the other elements listed above are present.  Conversely, if 
state alternatives were indeed readily available, but there was no attempt to 
resort to them, this requirement could also help safeguard the state from 
those accused of serious offences such as murder falsely claiming to have 
acted as vigilantes so as to escape harsher punishment.  Although element 
(8) has a subjective dimension, since it refers to the “real or perceived” 
absence of formal security guarantees, it should be easy to show that an 
accused’s belief that formal security options were unfeasible was not genuine 
                                            
294 For more on this useful point of distinction between vigilantism and phenomena such as rioting and 
terrorism, see Senechal De La Roche (1996) Sociological Forum 102-105.  See also L B Landau 
Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia. Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa 
(2011) for an insightful exploration of the 2008 spate of xenophobic attacks in South Africa, 
particularly T Monson “Making the Law; Breaking the Law; Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: 
Sovereignty and Territorial Control in Three South African Settlements” in L B Landau (eds) 
Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa 
(2011), where xenophobia is analysed in terms of its impact of state sovereignty. 
295 K Von Holdt, M Langa, S Molapo, N Mogapi, K Ngubeni, J Dlamini & A Kirsten The Smoke That 
Calls: Insurgent Citizenship, Collective Violence and the Struggle for a Place in the New South 
Africa:  Eight Case Studies of Community Protest and Xenophobic Violence (2011) 130. 
296 For an elaboration, see 26-28. 
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but mala fide in instances where accused could easily have allowed the state 
the opportunity to help them and chose not to do so.  
Now that a working definition of vigilantism has been arrived at for 
utilisation in the legal context, the focus must shift to the link between 
vigilantism and legitimacy.  This task – which is embarked on forthwith – 
requires first defining legitimacy, and then explaining the relevance of the 
existence (or lack thereof) of state legitimacy for understanding vigilantism.
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3 CHAPTER THREE: UNDERSTANDING LEGITIMACY 
 
3 1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to conceptualise the legitimacy of power 
in such a way that it can be used to help explain and understand vigilantism.  
In chapter 2 vigilantism was shown to be a contested and ambiguous concept 
requiring extensive elucidation before it is capable of use in the criminal 
justice sphere.  The same may be said of legitimacy.  Legitimacy is frequently 
mentioned in vigilantism literature, but such mention is seldom accompanied 
by an explanation of how the term itself is being used.  This is regrettable, 
since it is not particularly enlightening for a social scientist to declare, for 
instance, that vigilantes “call into question the … legitimacy of the state”1 
without spelling out what they mean by state legitimacy.  South African courts 
are no better; an analysis of case law where the term legitimacy is mentioned 
shows that judges refer to legitimacy in widely disparate senses, making no 
explicit attempt to define it as a legal concept.2  
It is submitted that legitimacy can only be enlisted as a tool to make 
sense of vigilantism once the elements of this “normative dimension of power 
relations” 3  are distinguished and described, and it is recognised that 
legitimacy is a multi-dimensional concept that is “dialogic and relational in 
character”.4  This chapter therefore endeavours to clarify the often ill-defined 
notion of legitimacy, concentrating on identifying and elaborating on aspects 
of it that are particularly relevant to the vigilante context.  It is hoped that a 
theoretical explanation of the significance of legitimacy for understanding 
vigilante violence may serve as a foundation for subsequent chapters’ more 
practically-orientated investigation of the interaction between vigilantism and 
legitimacy.   
                                            
1 Bidaguren & Nina (2004) Social Justice 174. 
2 See § 3 3 1 below. 
3 Beetham Legitimation of Power x. 
4 A Bottoms & J Tankebe “Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal 
Justice” (2012) 102 (1) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 119 129. 
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David Beetham’s exposition of the three central components of 
legitimacy5 forms the framework for the chapter’s in-depth discussion of the 
relationship between vigilantism and legitimacy.  Beetham identifies three 
cumulative and complementary aspects of legitimacy required for the justified 
exercise of power, which will be termed legal legitimacy, normative legitimacy 
and demonstrative legitimacy respectively.  Even though Beetham does not 
explicitly consider phenomena such as vigilantism in his exposition of 
legitimacy, his basic approach has been chosen because of its clear structure 
as well as its powerful explanatory power when making use of legitimacy in 
the context of vigilante violence.  Insights from authors such as Tyler,6 Barker7 
and Bottoms and Tankebe, 8  as well as relevant case law, are useful 
supplementary sources for explaining why being legitimated and having 
legitimacy is so important for those in power – which in the present context 
could include both the state and vigilantes.  The resources mentioned above 
are drawn upon to substantiate an assumption that there is a “vicious circle”-
type link between state performance, legitimacy and a propensity to 
vigilantism9 – a premise that will be explained theoretically later in the chapter, 
and applied practically in the remainder of the study.   
The chapter commences with an account of the significance of 
legitimacy, and explains the benefits to a power-holder of wielding moral – as 
opposed to simply de facto – authority.  Different ways of defining legitimacy 
are then explored, with a threefold conception of legitimacy being settled on 
after considering alternative formulations.  The bulk of the chapter is devoted 
                                            
5 Beetham Legitimation of Power. 
6 E.g. T R Tyler, A Braga, J Fagan, T Meares, R Sampson & C Winship “Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: International Perspectives” in T R Tyler (eds) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: 
International Perspectives (2007); T R Tyler & J Jackson “Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of 
Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement” (2014) 20 (1) Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law 78; T R Tyler Why People Obey the Law (1990); T R Tyler “Procedural 
Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law” (2003) 30 Crime and Justice 283; T R Tyler & Y 
J Huo Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (2002); J 
Sunshine & T R Tyler “The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for 
Policing” (2003) 37 (3) Law & Society Review 513; also R Paternoster, R Brame, R Bachman & L W 
Sherman “Do Fair Procedures Matter?  The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault” (1997) 
31 Law and Society Review 163; B Bradford, A Huq, J Jackson & B Roberts “What Price Fairness 
When Security is at Stake?  Police Legitimacy in South Africa” (2014) 8 Regulation & Governance 
246. 
7 R S Barker Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects (2001). 
8 Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 
9 See flow chart below. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 92 
to better understanding the legal, normative and demonstrative dimensions of 
legitimacy, with particular emphasis on their usefulness for explaining 
vigilantism.  It will become clear that for power to be truly legitimate, rule-
derived validity must be supplemented by a recognition that power-holders 
should be able to justify their subjects’ duty to obey on moral grounds.  This 
normative aspect of legitimacy conceives of state power as needing to be 
exercised in such a manner as to fulfil essential societal functions – most 
notably the duty to guarantee the physical security of its citizens.  It will be 
argued that state failure to promote the common good by administering the 
criminal justice system competently and fairly risks state legitimacy being 
eroded.  Citizens may then manifest their lack of faith in the state by engaging 
in acts that demonstrate their non-co-operation, including vigilantism.  The 
chapter concludes by clarifying the link between state performance, state 
legitimacy and normative compliance, using empirical evidence to 
substantiate the claim that weakened state legitimacy due to ineffectiveness 
and a lack of procedural justice makes citizens less inclined to obey and more 
inclined to violent self-help. 
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Flow chart illustrating the assumed link between vigilantism and 
legitimacy10 
 
 
 
3 2 The significance of legitimacy 
3 2 1 More than mere instrumental compliance 
Before embarking on a more detailed analysis of what makes the 
exercise of power rightful or legitimate, the key question of why power-holders 
would wish to wield legitimate power must be addressed briefly.  Why is moral 
authority important, in addition to mere de facto power?  According to Bottoms 
and Tankebe, power-holders are concerned with “how they can secure the 
establishment of co-operative social relations making possible the pursuit of 
collective goals”. 11   In the absence of normative incentives inducing 
obedience it may well be possible to maintain power by using rewards and 
punishments.  However, this implies that a system of power with insufficient 
coercive tools at its disposal to ensure obedience (such as brute force and/or 
other means of positive inducement) may risk the complete collapse of its 
                                            
10 Adapted from Nel Crime as Punishment. 
11 Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 168. 
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authority.12  Even if such a dire scenario is avoided, and power is successfully 
maintained through force alone, without sufficient levels of normative 
compliance the powerful may have to concentrate all their efforts on simply 
preserving order, and may have no surplus resources to achieve other goals.  
The effectiveness of those in power may be severely undermined given such 
a state of affairs; the degree of their subjects’ co-operation determines the 
quality of performance that the powerful can secure from them; and reluctant 
subjects who feel no moral obligation to obey are unlikely to perform well.  
Thus it is in the best interests of the powerful to ensure that their exercise of 
power is justified, since it will enable them to pursue their own objectives 
better, as well as to promote the common good.   
Thus while it is true that a coercive system of power founded purely on 
incentives and sanctions motivates co-operation to a degree, there is no 
doubt that co-operation will be greatly facilitated if there is a normative 
inducement for subjects to comply, quite apart from instrumental 
considerations of advantage and prudence.  This is where legitimacy fits in; it 
presupposes that “people relate to the powerful as moral agents as well as 
self-interested actors”13 and forms the basis of a normative foundation for 
compliance, encompassing the idea that power-holders have a right to rule.  
Where the exercise of power is legitimate – and perceived to be so – power-
holders have the right to expect obedience from their subordinates, and 
subordinates are correspondingly bound to obey, regardless of their personal 
views about the content of a particular decision or rule.14 
 
  
                                            
12 See Beetham Legitimation of Power 28-29.  Also Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology 213, where he notes that “[p]urely material interests and calculations of 
advantages as the basis of solidarity between the [dominant and subordinate] result … in a relatively 
unstable situation …[and] do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination.” 
13 Beetham Legitimation of Power 27. 
14 26. 
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3 2 2 Legitimacy and state power 
While what has been said above about the legitimate exercise of power 
is generally applicable to all sources of authority, there is no doubt that the 
state’s distinctive power to wield or authorise the use of force in the form of 
physical coercion is “one that both supremely stands in need of legitimation, 
yet is uniquely able to breach all legitimacy.  The legitimation of the state’s 
power is thus both specially urgent and fateful in its consequences.”15  These 
insights regarding the need for state power to be legitimate – and legitimated 
– are certainly valid in the criminal justice context.  Citizens experience state 
coercion regularly in the form of encounters with legal authorities such as the 
police and the courts.  It is definitely preferable for state agents not to have to 
resort to punitive measures to induce obedience, but instead to be able to 
motivate willing deference to the law, irrespective of whether non-compliance 
is rendered punishable.16   
As is elaborated on at §§ 3 7 and 4 2 4 below, the hypothesis that when 
authorities are regarded as legitimate, they are better able to persuade 
citizens to comply with the law17 is borne out by a considerable body of 
empirical research in the criminal justice field.  Ground-breaking research by 
Tyler,18 confirmed by subsequent research,19 shows that people tend to be 
law-abiding for normative rather than instrumental reasons, and also that their 
belief in the rightfulness of legal authorities is crucially dependent on their 
being treated with respect and in a manner conducive to procedural justice.20  
Such studies confirm a link between legitimacy and normative acquiescence 
(compliance, co-operation and even community engagement): if citizens view 
legal authorities as legitimate, they are more likely to defer to them, to trust 
their decisions about how to resolve problems and to regulate their own 
                                            
15 40. 
16 Tyler & Huo Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts xiii. 
17 Tyler & Jackson (2014) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 78. 
18 Tyler Why People Obey the Law. 
19 E.g. Tyler & Huo Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts; 
Tyler (2003) Crime and Justice; Sunshine & Tyler (2003) Law & Society Review; T R Tyler 
“Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule-Breaking” (2006) 62 (2) Journal of 
Social Issues 307; Tyler & Jackson (2014) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 
20 Tyler (2006) Journal of Social Issues 308. 
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behaviour accordingly. 21   The prospect of citizens responding to legal 
authorities in a hostile or defiant manner, or resisting their directives and 
decisions, is also diminished if the police and courts are regarded as 
legitimate.22 
These findings have been influential, and their insights may form the 
basis of a new “procedural justice” model of policing in South Africa.  The aim 
of such a model is to focus not merely on (resource-heavy) enforcement of 
existing sanctions, but rather on treating people fairly, respectfully and in 
accordance with the values of the Constitution.  This was recognised as a 
potential strategy for combating vigilantism in the findings of Khayelitsha 
Commission23 and is considered in more depth in §§ 4 2 6 and 6 2 3 below.  
Legal authorities such as the police are not the only power-holders vying for 
legitimacy in the crime-fighting sphere, however.  The counter-legitimation 
strategies of vigilantes are discussed in detail in chapter 5, and chapter 7 
considers the question of whether vigilante crime-fighting power necessarily 
occurs at the expense of the formal criminal justice system, or whether state 
legitimacy may actually be enhanced by co-opting vigilantes. 
By now it should be apparent that (potential) power-holders overlook 
the significance of the moral rightness of their claims to exercise power24 at 
their peril. What is still unclear, however, is which factors may contribute 
towards creating and sustaining legitimacy.  What follows is an exposition of 
various criteria that may aid in establishing whether power relations are 
legitimate, including an explanation and substantiation of how the term 
legitimacy is used in the rest of this study. 
 
  
                                            
21 See, e.g., Tyler Why People Obey the Law; Tyler & Huo Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public 
Cooperation with the Police and Courts; Sunshine & Tyler (2003) Law & Society Review; Tyler 
(2003) Crime and Justice; Tyler (2006) Journal of Social Issues; Tyler & Jackson (2014) 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 
22 Tyler (2003) Crime and Justice 286. 
23 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 441-443. 
24 Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 164. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 97 
3 3 Defining legitimacy 
3 3 1 Legitimacy and the law 
South African case law was examined to establish how courts use the 
word legitimacy.  Excluding situations where legitimacy is used in the context 
of paternity cases, and a few instances where is it used to mean justifiability,25 
rationality, 26  or legal recognition, 27  the most common usage of the term 
considers legitimacy to be a synonym for conformity to law, or rule-derived 
validity.28  That legal validity and legitimacy are often used interchangeably is 
illustrated in S v Thebus and another, where Moseneke J states:  
“Since the advent of constitutional democracy, all law must 
conform to the command of the supreme law, the Constitution, 
from which all law derives its legitimacy, force and validity.”29 
In this paradigm, power is legitimate provided its acquisition and 
exercise are in accordance with established sources of law.  For instance, in 
Minister of Home Affairs and another v Fourie and another (Doctors for Life 
International and others, amici curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and 
others v Minister of Home Affairs and others, the court holds: 
“The power and duty to protect constitutional rights is conferred 
upon the courts and courts should not shirk from that duty.  The 
legitimacy of an order made by the Court does not flow from the 
                                            
25 See South African Veterinary Council and another v Szymanski 2003 4 SA 42 (SCA), where the idea 
of a “legitimate expectation” and its requirements were canvassed.  Also National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Phillips and others 2002 4 SA 60 (W). 
26 See Affordable Medicines Trust and others v Minister of Health and others 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) para 
22, where legitimacy was used to refer to a legitimate purpose: “The applicants do not dispute the 
stated government purpose, or its legitimacy … That purpose is to increase access to medicines that 
are safe for consumption.  And the legitimacy of this purpose cannot be gainsaid.” 
27 See Bengwenyama-Ya-MaSwazi Community and others v Minister for Mineral Resources and others 
2015 1 SA 197 (SCA) para 32, where the legal recognition or standing of a tribal council was 
referred to as its “legitimacy”. 
28 See, for instance, Freedom Under Law v National Director of Public Prosecutions and others 2014 1 
SACR 111 (GNP) para 25; S v Mabaso 2014 1 SACR 299 (KZP) para 10 & 11; S v SM 2013 2 
SACR 111 (SCA) para 42; and De Klerk v Scheepers and others 2005 1 SACR 475 (T) para 9.  
29 S v Thebus and another 2002 2 SACR 566 (SCA) para 24. 
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status of the institution itself, but from the fact that it gives effect to 
the provisions of our Constitution.”30 
Similarly, Ackermann J in De Lange v Smuts NO and others31 notes: 
“Any normative procedure of a court that does not comply with the rule of law 
loses its legitimacy”.32  While legal validity in this strict sense is certainly a 
necessary condition for rightfulness of power, it is submitted that it is not a 
sufficient one.  In delineating legitimacy, it has been decided not to limit its 
definition to a narrow legal one.  As is elaborated on below,33 insights from the 
domain of social science may be useful in fleshing out the legal concept of 
legitimacy.   
 
3 3 2 Understanding legitimacy: two approaches from social science 
There seem to be two main perspectives in social science literature on 
how to define legitimacy.  The first approach focuses on the responses of 
subordinates to the decisions and rules of those in authority.  Its point of 
departure is the theorisation of sociologist Max Weber, a central figure where 
the study of legitimacy is concerned.  He defines power relationships as being 
legitimate because both those in power and those subject to that power 
believe them to be so.34  According to him: 
“Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily 
limit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as 
                                            
30 Minister of Home Affairs and another v Fourie and another (Doctors for Life International and 
others, amici curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and others v Minister of Home Affairs and 
others 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) para 171 (emphasis added). 
31 De Lange v Smuts NO and others 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) para 137. 
32 For other examples of courts using legitimacy in this narrow sense, see National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 1 SACR 361 (SCA) para 18; Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal 
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others 2009 2 SACR 130 (CC) para 221; 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Rautenbach and others 2005 1 SACR 530 (SCA) para 
42; S v Manamela and another (Director-General of Justice intervening) 2000 1 SACR 414 (CC) 
para 61; S v Coetzee and others 1997 1 SACR 379 (CC) para 86; President of the Republic of South 
Africa and another v Hugo 1997 1 SACR 567 (CC) para 103; S v Zuma and others 1995 1 SACR 
568 (CC) para 19; Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 250; and S v 
Makwanyane and another 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 175 & 198. 
33 At § 3 3 2. 
34 Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 213. 
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a basis for its continuance.  In addition every such system 
attempts to establish and cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.”35   
Many social scientists follow his lead in equating legitimacy with a belief 
in legitimacy.  For instance, Tyler and Huo, in the criminological context, 
define legitimacy as  
“the belief that … authorities are entitled to be obeyed and that 
the individual ought to defer to their judgments … Legitimacy is a 
value in the sense that it is a feeling of obligation or responsibility 
that leads to self-regulatory behavior – that is, voluntarily bringing 
one’s behavior into line with the directives of those authorities 
one feels ought to be obeyed.”36 
In the same vein, Tyler views a legitimate authority as “an authority 
regarded by people as entitled to have their decisions and rules accepted and 
followed by others”.37  Once again, the focus is on the recognition of the 
authority as being legitimate (“regarded by people”), as opposed to the basis 
upon which people choose to afford it legitimacy.  Sunshine and Tyler, too, 
emphasise the consequences of legitimacy rather than the reasons why a 
particular institution is labelled legitimate: “Legitimacy is a property of an 
authority or institution that leads people to feel that authority or institution is 
entitled to be deferred to and obeyed.” 38   The practical and normative 
consequences of believing an authority to be legitimate are a key component 
of Tyler et al’s exposition of legitimacy:  
“When people are influenced by an authority or institution not by 
means of the use of power but because they believe that the 
decisions made and rules enacted by that authority or institution 
                                            
35 212-213. 
36 Tyler & Huo Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts xiv. 
37 Tyler (2003) Crime and Justice 307. 
38 Sunshine & Tyler (2003) Law & Society Review 514. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 100 
are in some way ‘right’ and ‘proper’ and ought to be followed, then 
that authority is perceived as legitimate.”39 
The first approach, then, focuses on citizen belief in legitimacy, as well 
as the practical implications of such a belief – i.e., that citizens are more 
normatively inclined to obey a legitimate authority than one that lacks 
legitimacy. 
A second approach – exemplified by Beetham 40  – criticises this 
conflation of a belief in legitimacy with legitimacy itself.  Beetham’s contention 
is that Weber’s influence on the subject of legitimacy from a social science 
perspective “has been an almost unqualified disaster”, resulting in the issue of 
legitimacy focusing on the beliefs people hold about a system of power, 
instead of its actual characteristics.41  A Weberian definition of legitimacy 
reduces it from a complex of factors which give people good ground for 
compliance, to a single dimension: belief in legitimacy.42  To counter this, 
Beetham proposes what he considers to be a more nuanced alternative 
definition of legitimacy.  He defines it as the rightfulness of power, focusing 
not on belief in legitimacy as such, but on whether feeling obliged to obey is 
justifiable on normative grounds.43  He argues that to establish legitimacy, it is 
necessary to assess whether there is congruence between a given system of 
power and the grounds or reasons providing its justification, rather than simply 
establishing whether subordinates believe it to be legitimate.44  Bottoms and 
Tankebe agree that the fundamental legitimacy question concerns the “right to 
rule”, formulating it as “whether a power-holder is justified in claiming the right 
to hold power over other citizens”.45  They quote with approval Coicuad’s 
definition of legitimacy as “the recognition of the right to govern.  In this 
regard, [legitimacy] tried to offer a solution to the fundamental political 
                                            
39  Tyler, et al. “Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives” in Legitimacy and 
Criminal Justice: International Perspectives 10. 
40 Beetham Legitimation of Power. 
41 9. 
42 See 6-25 for an elaboration on his criticism of Weber. 
43 26. 
44 6-11. 
45 Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 124-125. 
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problem, which consists in justifying simultaneous political power and 
obedience”.46 
In the present context, where the concept of legitimacy is used as a 
framework for the better understanding of vigilantism, this second approach to 
defining legitimacy is preferable: First, it better emphasises legitimacy’s 
normative character, in that the rightful exercise of power is recognised as 
being the basis for a moral obligation to obey.47  Second, by highlighting that 
legitimacy “simultaneously justifies the actions of both the power-holder and 
the obedient subject”,48 it recognises the multi-dimensionality49 of legitimacy, 
and that it involves an ongoing interactive relationship between those in power 
and their subjects.  Third, it acknowledges the contingent nature of legitimacy; 
since the sense of obligation to obey that legitimacy invokes is conditional on 
the rightfulness of the power being exercised, subordinates may withdraw 
recognition of power-holders’ right to rule under certain circumstances.  Thus 
the legitimacy of those in power “is not something given or unalterable”,50 but 
is constantly in flux. 51   As noted by Lund, 52  “[w]hat is legitimate varies 
between and within cultures and over time, and is continuously (re-) 
established through conflict and negotiation.”  This supports Barker’s 
conceptualisation of legitimacy as “an active, contested political process, 
rather than … an abstract political resource.  Since it is an activity, not a 
property, it involves creation, modification, innovation and transformation.”53  
Keeping in mind the normative, 54  relational and dynamic nature of 
legitimacy, it is now necessary to look more closely at its components, using 
Beetham’s framework 55  as a point of departure. What follows is an 
examination of each of Beetham’s legitimacy dimensions – legal, normative 
                                            
46 125. 
47 Beetham Legitimation of Power 26; Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 125. 
48 Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 125. 
49 Beetham Legitimation of Power 15. 
50 258. 
51 Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 152. 
52 Lund (2006) Development and Change 693. 
53 Barker Legitimating Identities 28. 
54 See chapter 1 n 39 for a definition of how the term “normative” is used in this study. 
55 Beetham Legitimation of Power. 
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and demonstrative – including a brief preliminary examination of their 
implications for vigilantism.   
 
3 4 Legal legitimacy 
The first level of legitimacy, that of rule-derived validity, corresponds 
with the legal definition of legitimacy already discussed.  To be prima facie 
legitimate, power must be acquired and exercised in accordance with 
established rules.56  Such “rules of power”57 may be formalised in legal codes 
(such as a supreme Constitution in the case of South Africa) and/or court 
judgments, but may also be unwritten, informal conventions.  Beetham 
distinguishes three different means of power which mutually reinforce each 
other and together provide the basis for relations of dominance and 
subordination: The first is the possession of material resources (the means of 
production and subsistence, as well as the instruments of physical force or 
coercion); the second is the control of socially necessary activities and the 
skills associated with their performance (the division of labour); and the third 
is the occupancy of positions of authority or command.58  It is rules (or laws) 
of access and exclusion that transform these key resources, activities and 
positions into a means of social power, with corresponding relations of 
dominance and subordination.59 According to Beetham, these rules of power 
and exclusion both constitute power and legitimate it, in that they “confer the 
rights on the powerful to require others to respect the exclusiveness which is 
the basis of their power.”60  
Since established rules provide “both the source and protection of their 
power”, power-holders have a vested interest in portraying such rules as the 
“ultimate, rather than merely [the] proximate” source of legitimacy.61  Those in 
                                            
56 See also Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 215, where he identifies 
as one of the “pure types of legitimate domination” “a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the 
right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)”.  Note that 
he focuses on the belief in the rules’ legality as opposed to their rule-derived validity itself. 
57 Beetham Legitimation of Power 16. 
58 47-50. 
59 56. 
60 56. 
61 67. 
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power tend to employ solemn rituals of self-legitimation with the objective of 
reinforcing respect for rules of power by “sanctifying” power-holders’ moral 
authority.  Beetham identifies a number of features inherent in formal legal 
systems that aim to impart an aura of inviolability not just to the abstract idea 
of the law itself, but also to its substance, thus concealing the contingent 
nature of its content. 62   These include the way that everyday language 
distinguishes between what is legally permitted and what is criminal – 
describing the taking of property as “redistribution” or “expropriation” rather 
than “theft”, for example, though the difference in practice may be quite 
arbitrary.  Another manifestation of this presentation of the law as a “morally 
edifying spectacle or theatre” is the “weighty anathemas pronounced against 
those who infringe [the law]”.63  The formalities and traditions associated with 
the courtroom, and the denunciation of those who show disrespect towards 
them64 unquestionably contribute to the state’s depiction of its exercise of 
power as sacrosanct and exalted (and hence legitimate).  As will become 
clear in chapter 5,65  vigilante methods of self-legitimation frequently echo 
those of the state.  Vigilantes also attempt to differentiate their actions from 
“illegitimate” criminal conduct, and mimic the forms and rituals of criminal 
punishment to justify their exercise of power as being comparable, but 
superior, to that of formal law-enforcement. 
The more those who derive their power from the established law 
attribute an exalted status to the law, appealing to it as the “self-sufficient 
justification for their power”,66 the more they must respect it themselves for 
their power to be sustained.  Legitimate power is limited power.67  Most states 
(including South Africa) subscribe to the notion that power-holders should not 
consider themselves to be above the law in the exercise of their functions, but 
                                            
62 In this regard, see also Douglas How Institutions Think 45; 52; 112, who says that a “naturalizing 
principle” is required to “confer the spark of legitimacy” – i.e., that rightness of power requires an 
institution to provide its members with a “set of analogues” that “justify the naturalness and 
reasonableness of the instituted rules”. 
63 Beetham Legitimation of Power 67. 
64 For example, by criminalising contempt of court. 
65 Particularly in §§ 5 2 1 and 5 4 1 1. 
66 Beetham Legitimation of Power 68. 
67 35. 
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bound by it.68  By subjecting themselves to the constraining mechanism of this 
“rule of law”, power-holders are demonstrating their commitment to preventing 
the arbitrary exercise of power, which in turn validates their right to rule.  The 
rule of law is thus a factor simultaneously limiting and guaranteeing their 
power.69  It is unsurprising, then, that empirical studies have found a strong 
link between procedural justice (which would include respect for the principle 
of legality) and perceptions of state legitimacy.70  Where power-holders fail to 
respect the rule of law – that is, by acquiring power in contravention of the 
established rules of power, or by exercising their power by breaching or 
exceeding those rules – legal validity is absent and subsequent exercise of 
power is illegitimate.71   
Legal legitimacy in the sense of rule-derived validity elucidated above is 
thus a necessary condition for the justified exercise of power – although, as 
will be demonstrated in due course, not a sufficient one. 
 
3 4 1 Do acts of vigilantism impact on legal legitimacy? 
Now that legal legitimacy has been explained, it must be considered 
whether vigilantism itself poses a threat to such rule-based validity.  Some 
writers seem to imply that vigilantes’ lack of respect for the law does indeed 
undermine legal legitimacy, suggesting that vigilante movements “hav[e] 
turned partly into promoters of sedition against the state”.72  Is it accurate to 
describe vigilante groups as being seditious – having the intention to “[impair] 
the authority of the state by defying or subverting the authority of its 
government”? 73   To arrive at an answer, it must be determined whether 
                                            
68 This idea of the rule of law, which incorporates such mechanisms as the separation of powers, is 
known as the principle of legality in the criminal justice context.  The crux of the principle of legality 
is nullum crimen sine lege, or “no crime without a law”. For more on the principle of legality, see 
Snyman Criminal Law 35-49 and Burchell Principles 33-44. 
69 Beetham Legitimation of Power 68. 
70 For more, see particularly §§ 3 2 1, 3 7 and 4 2 6, as well as the empirical studies cited there. 
71 See Beetham Legitimation of Power 206-207. 
72 Bidaguren & Nina (2004) Social Justice 174. 
73 This is the definition of sedition in Burchell Principles 825.  There is some dispute about whether 
violence, or the threat of violence, is an element of this crime.  According to Roman Dutch 
authorities “oproer” – which implies a tumult or a stirring-up – was a requirement.  More recent case 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 105 
vigilantes really do intend to challenge or impair the authority of the state, and 
what defiance of governmental authority means in this context.  
The case of S v Zwane,74 an apartheid-era vigilante-type scenario, is 
instructive in this regard.  A number of accused were charged with sedition for 
having participated in the holding of People’s Courts, where alleged 
wrongdoers were summoned or intimidated to appear, summarily tried, a 
decision reached, and punishment imposed and immediately administered, 
usually in the form of lashes with a sjambok. Furthermore, it was alleged that 
they had prevented and discouraged residents of Alexandra from taking their 
complaints to the police instead of the People’s Court, and had punished them 
for doing so.75  An objection was raised in S v Zwane (1) that the holding of a 
People’s Court did not amount to challenging the authority of the state, since 
state authority refers to state majestas, or the executive arm of government, 
while the accused’s holding a People’s Court had merely defied the judicial 
organs of state.76  This contention was rejected, with the court finding that 
subjecting people to an “unlawful judicial system” was indeed in defiance of 
state majestas.  As authority, the court cited R v Christian,77 where Innes CJ 
described a state’s “internal” majestas, holding that the power of making and 
enforcing laws “is essential to the very existence of the State”.78  This was 
confirmed in S v Zwane (3), where, when the case finally came to court, the 
accused were charged not only with sedition (i.e., with challenging the state’s 
authority) but also with high treason.79  Grosskopf J held:  
                                                                                                                             
law – specifically S v Zwane (1) 1987 4 SA 369 (W) 374F-I held that an unlawful gathering “in 
defiance of the authorities and for an unlawful purpose” amounted to sedition, even if not 
accompanied by violence or threats thereof.  Snyman Criminal Law 310 rejects this approach on the 
grounds that peaceful gatherings would then be transformed into sedition merely because they were 
unlawful or aimed against the government.  A “reasonable interpretation” of our authorities, he 
contends, is that real or threatened violence is a requirement.  Burchell Principles 827 agrees that the 
finding in Zwane (1) contradicts the traditional understanding of sedition.  However, since 
vigilantism as defined for present purposes implies violence or the threat of violence, this debate 
need not detain us.  
74 S v Zwane (1); S v Zwane (3) 1989 3 SA 253 (W). 
75 S v Zwane (1) 373D; S v Zwane (3) 255B-C. 
76 S v Zwane (1) 375B-D. 
77 R v Christian 1924 AD 101 at 106. 
78 S v Zwane (1) 375G-376D. 
79 High treason is committed by a person who owes allegiance to a state unlawfully engaging in any 
overt act “with intent to overthrow, impair, violate, threaten or endanger the existence, independence 
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“[U]nlawful acts which are aimed at endangering or coercing the 
judicial authority of the State in particular may very well be 
treasonable acts, provided they are committed with the necessary 
intent to impair the majestas of the State.”80   
However, the accused were acquitted of high treason, since the 
prosecution was unable to prove the required “hostile intent” – intent to 
overthrow or coerce the government, in other words.  The court held that 
subversion of the state had not been contemplated by the accused; nor was 
their object to “compel the Government to obey their behests”, and instead 
they were convicted of the lesser charge of sedition.81 
What may be inferred from this case regarding legal legitimacy (or lack 
thereof) and vigilantism?  It is submitted that only if the actions of vigilantes 
amount to high treason may vigilantism be regarded as posing a threat to 
legal legitimacy per se.  Undermining a state’s legal legitimacy (the right to 
rule in the narrow sense of rule-derived validity) would indeed be tantamount 
to questioning the very right to existence of the state itself, which is at the 
heart of the crime of high treason.  The contention that vigilantes do not 
recognise the authority of the government is made tangentially in Chief 
Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and another, where Mokgoro J 
declared: “The right of access to court is a bulwark against vigilantism, and 
the chaos and anarchy which it causes.”82  Vigilantes are not truly anarchists 
or traitors, however.  Abrahams argues persuasively that, while vigilantism 
has the potential for subversion, “it commonly displays a non-revolutionary 
and even a reactionary character”. 83   Indeed, it may be contended that 
engaging in acts of vigilantism presumes the existence of the state, and that 
state legitimacy in this first sense of legal legitimacy is a necessary 
prerequisite for vigilantism.  In a similar vein, Buur describes the vigilante 
challenge to the state as confirming the state’s existence, rather than having 
                                                                                                                             
or security of the state, or to overthrow it or to coerce the government of the state or change the 
constitutional structure of the state” (Burchell Principles 814; also Snyman Criminal Law 299).   
80 S v Zwane (3) 260A.  
81 317J-318A. 
82 Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank para 22 (emphasis added). 
83 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 4. 
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the objective of undoing the state or establishing a different state.  Vigilantes’ 
undermining of the state is instead “directed at rectifying state practices and 
modes of being” with the aim being that there should be “more state, not less 
state.” 84   He opines that “when vigilante groups do emerge this seldom 
represents a rejection of the idea of a state or political order; rather, it 
represents an attempt to reconstitute or redefine a political order in a ‘purer’ 
form.”85  As is detailed below, vigilantes appear to be in the paradoxical 
position of respecting the law both too much and not enough.  On the one 
hand, they demand efficient enforcement of the law, implying that they 
acknowledge its authority, while on the other, they are prepared to flout the 
law by acting as state substitutes to compel others to comply not only with 
formal law, but also with their own political, religious, cultural or moral 
beliefs.86   
The contention that vigilante conduct is not treasonous is bolstered if 
vigilante activities are compared to those of guerrillas or resistance 
movements, the latter being radical critics of the state who do indeed contest 
the right of a particular regime to exist, and whose primary objective is to 
mount a subversive political offensive against those currently in power.87  In 
contrast, despite the fact that vigilantes are critical of state performance and 
seek to appropriate certain government functions relating to the enforcement 
of certain institutionalised norms, albeit on a limited and temporary basis, the 
agenda of vigilantism is not first and foremost political or revolutionary.  
Vigilantes focus on (re-)establishing and maintaining social order and 
collective security, rather than on overthrowing those in power or challenging 
the regime or rulers in their entirety.88  The absence of an explicit political 
motive is also one of the features that distinguish vigilantism from terrorism.89   
                                            
84 Buur (2006) Development and Change 750. 
85 Buur “Domesticating Sovereigns” in Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa 46. 
86 Barker Legitimating Identities 89. 
87 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 168. 
88 See Barker Legitimating Identities 102; C B Little & C P Sheffield “Frontiers and Criminal Justice: 
English Private Prosecution Societies and American Vigilantism in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries” (1983) 48 American Sociological Review 796. 
89 See Monaghan (2004) Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement for a discussion distinguishing 
vigilantism from terrorism, and her assessment of whether the vigilante organisation PAGAD has 
made the shift from the former to the latter. 
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However, the implication of the court in Zwane (3) characterising the 
vigilante act of holding People’s Courts as a form of sedition, even if not high 
treason, is that vigilantes do undermine or challenge certain aspects of state 
legitimacy to a significant degree, even while acknowledging the state’s legal 
legitimacy.  As is explained further when the remaining dimensions of 
legitimacy are examined, legitimacy also entails that any exercise of power 
should promote the common good, including (most salient for present 
purposes) the state ensuring the physical security of its inhabitants.  In this 
paradigm, vigilante violence may be understood as the conduct of a 
“conservative mob” that “[thrives] on the idea that the state’s legitimacy at any 
point in time depends on its ability to provide citizens with the levels of law 
and order they demand”.90  While engaging in vigilantism cannot be said to 
signify rejection of the concept of the state itself as illegitimate, vigilantes 
clearly regard the duty to respect the law not as absolute, but merely 
contingent on the state fulfilling its duties in respect of securing personal 
safety.  Herein lies their challenge to state legitimacy and their “seditious” 
usurpation of state power: 91 they defy the state’s would-be exclusive authority 
to enforce its laws (by means of the official, lawful judiciary, police, 
prosecuting and other authorities)92 and instead impose their own violent form 
of social control, thus laying temporary claim to the “state’s own mantle of 
authority”93 in the criminal justice sphere.   
Despite the findings in Zwane 3, whether this kind of vigilante 
undermining of state legitimacy is serious enough to be viewed as sedition is 
highly debatable.  It must be remembered that Zwane 3 was decided in the 
height of the apartheid era, when any opposition to state authority tended to 
be viewed in an extremely serious light.94  As explained in chapter 1, the aim 
                                            
90 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 4. 
91 A Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism in Post-April 1994 South Africa: Searching for Explanations” in 
D Feenan (eds) Informal Criminal Justice (2002) 129.  It must be emphasised that even if one 
acknowledges the authority of the Zwane perspective that most vigilantism technically amounts to 
sedition, it is submitted that it does not necessarily follow that (all) vigilantism ought to be regarded 
as sedition, especially considering that vigilantes justify their conduct as a necessary reaction to state 
failure to provide satisfactory assurances of collective security and social order. 
92 Snyman Criminal Law 310. 
93 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 9. 
94 For an enlightening analysis of the treason trial of members of a People’s Court (the Alexandra 
Action Committee), see R L Abel Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid 
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of People’s Courts in the 1980’s was in any event not primarily to advance 
order and physical security, but rather to suppress by violence those 
perceived to be in league with apartheid authorities.  It is submitted that the 
Zwane 3 reasoning about vigilantism as seditious is thus unconvincing in the 
context of the present era of constitutionalism: the accused’s chiefly political 
motivations make it doubtful whether their conduct falls within the purview of 
the definition of vigilantism proposed here.  Significantly, as far as could be 
ascertained there are no post-1994 incidences in South Africa where those 
involved in vigilante-type activities were charged with sedition. 
If it does not amount to sedition, in what way does vigilantes’ 
appropriation of an important aspect of the state’s power (that of “law-
enforcement”) undermine state legitimacy, despite vigilantes recognising the 
state as legitimate in the strict legal sense?  To grasp how a state can 
possess legal legitimacy yet still exercise power in a less than legitimate 
fashion, it must be recognised that legal legitimacy cannot be an exclusive 
criterion for legitimacy.  To understand why legal legitimacy is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for the valid exercise of authority, it is necessary to 
return to an aspect mentioned in passing earlier, namely the contingent, 
arbitrary nature of many legal rules.  While established rules are a necessary 
first step for the rightfulness of power, they “cannot justify themselves simply 
by being rules”,95 but are in need of justification with reference to norms or 
sources that lie beyond them.96  Fundamental underlying issues include the 
following: Why are these particular laws or rules, and not others, used to 
govern the social order?  What gives them their legitimacy?  And how may 
their legitimacy be eroded? These considerations, including their implications 
for vigilantism, are explored next. 
  
                                                                                                                             
(1995) 311-383, where the factual background and details that were at issue in S v Mayekiso and 
others 1988 4 SA 738 (W) are considered. 
95 Beetham Legitimation of Power 69. 
96 See also Douglas How Institutions Think. 
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3 5 Normative legitimacy 
As already noted, Beetham argues that the de facto power flowing from 
legal validity, and the corresponding generalised duty to respect the law, is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for legitimacy: the differential and 
inherently coercive exercise of authority that characterises all power 
relationships – its implied exclusion, restriction and compulsion – must also be 
morally justifiable.97  The various aspects of normative legitimacy, as well as 
the negative features of the dominant-subordinate relationship justified by 
each, are discussed below.   
 
3 5 1 Legitimacy and authoritative sources of power 
For power rules to be justifiable, they need to be derived from an 
“ultimate source which validates society’s rules and system of law”.98  This 
authoritative source (which may be popular will, tradition, a written 
constitution, etc.) has a special significance for the legitimacy of political 
power, since there is no positive law beyond it to which it can appeal for its 
own validation. 99   Where there is divergence between the existing 
constitutional order and accepted beliefs about the proper source of its 
political authority, a legitimacy deficit may result.  Such a “legitimacy gap” 
occurs, then, where there is a discrepancy between the constitutional rules 
imposed and the beliefs providing their justification, such that the rules of 
power are left unsupported due to a lack of appropriate beliefs.  Beetham 
notes that beliefs underpinning sources of authority deemed to be valid tend 
to decay when changes within a society reveal “that what had previously been 
assumed to be a ‘natural’ form of social organisation … is in fact socially 
constructed.”100  He also observes that the particular legitimating ideas and 
justificatory principles underpinning each institution of power “define which 
                                            
97 Beetham Legitimation of Power 57-59. 
98 70. 
99 70. 
100 109. 
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challenges the ruler has to take most seriously, because they strike at the 
basis of the system of rule itself”.101  
These insights about the justifiability of power rules based on their 
having an authoritative source already reveal the potential for a state 
legitimacy deficit in the vigilante context.  It is unlikely to be coincidental that 
rapid and profound societal transition should provide an atmosphere 
conducive to the appearance or expansion of vigilantism.102  Buur notes that 
“vigilantism seems to gain prevalence and to emerge or radicalise in times of 
great social upheaval, when an anticipated future has been abruptly yanked 
away or is under threat.”103  As was mentioned above, Beetham suggests that 
a state must protect most fiercely from challenge the values underlying its 
ultimate source of law.  In a country like South Africa, which has had a 
profound shift in valid source of authority from effectively being an oligarchy to 
being a democracy with a justiciable and supreme Constitution, the state’s 
primary duty would now be to uphold and enforce those values and interests 
underlying the new constitutional democracy, namely human rights. Ironically, 
it may well be a newly democratic state’s change from draconian, repressive 
and heavy-handed law-enforcement towards more accountable, transparent 
and human-rights-friendly policing that triggers vigilantes to take the law into 
their own hands.  There are various explanations for this, which are 
considered in detail in chapter 4.   
A key theme in accounts explaining the link between political transition 
to democracy and vigilantism is that vigilantism is justified as “a divergence 
from, and a disagreement with, a human rights framework”.104  The sluggish 
progression of cases through the criminal justice system, the too-easy 
granting of bail and the abolition of the death penalty are just a few of the 
grievances mentioned by vigilantes and their sympathisers, illustrating the 
incompatibility of their mindset with that of a state committed to the promotion 
                                            
101 36. 
102 M Kucera & M Mares “Vigilantism During Democratic Transition” (2015) 25 (2) Policing and 
Society 170 182; Little & Sheffield (1983) American Sociological Review 797; M Supancic & C L 
Willis “Extralegal Justice and Crime Control” (1998) 21 (2) Journal of Crime and Justice 191 195. 
103  L Buur “Democracy and its Discontents: Vigilantism, Sovereignty & Human Rights in South 
Africa” (2008) 35 (118) Review of African Political Economy 571 582. 
104 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 37. 
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of human rights.  In South Africa, the vigilantes’ alternative narrative is based 
on “tradition”, “culture” and “custom”.  These are presented as being hostile – 
and superior – to the “criminal-friendly” “western” system of justice, and are 
used to justify the violent punishment methods that are labelled as vigilantism 
from South Africa’s constitutional perspective.  To use Beetham’s terminology, 
the source of these vigilantes’ criminal justice authority is society in the past 
(what he terms the “sanctification of tradition”),105 while the South African 
state regards society in the present (“the people”, whose wishes are 
purportedly embodied in a supreme Constitution) as the authoritative source 
of criminal justice rules.  It may well be that the South African state’s attempt 
to “impose new rules of [criminal justice] power in a context where the 
appropriate beliefs are lacking”106 is one of the reasons for the legitimacy gap 
which vigilante crime-fighters are so willing to fill.  The implications of 
incompatible state and citizen crime-fighting sources of authority for state 
legitimacy, as well as possible ways for the state to enhance the congruency 
between its legal rules and the popular beliefs sustaining them, are detailed 
below in chapters 4, 6 and 7. 
Interestingly, while there may be a legitimacy gap between the criminal 
justice beliefs of vigilantes and those of the state, the apparent increase in 
vigilantism may conversely also be a product of new labelling due to more 
positive perceptions about state legitimacy brought on by political transition. 
Conduct which under an illegitimate regime was described as “crime-fighting” 
is now pejoratively branded as “vigilantism” in the setting of a newly-
legitimate107 political regime.  According to Harris, “vigilantism occurs in a 
legitimate political climate, while ‘crime-fighting’ originates under an 
illegitimate order”.108  This is well illustrated by a passage from her research 
into vigilante violence in South Africa: 
  
                                            
105 Beetham Legitimation of Power 74. 
106 75. 
107 In the sense of legal legitimacy explained above. 
108 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 5. 
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“[Interviewer]: Is [vigilantism] a new phenomenon in Mamelodi? 
[Respondent]: Yes, it is a new phenomenon, though the history of 
Mamelodi tells us something, for instance, the period before the 
elections, the democratic elections, Mamelodi at some stage was 
a no-go area for the police.  People were dealing with crime 
themselves, so, as a result, people have it in their mind that if they 
themselves can deal with crime privately, they can bring the crime 
level to zero level. 
[Interviewer]: So has there been any change regarding the nature 
of vigilantism since around the elections? 
[Respondent]: What actually, I’ve mentioned before is that at that 
point in time, one cannot call that vigilantism, before the elections.  
It was just a community dealing with crime.  But at this stage, 
what has happened with this kangaroo court, that is the 
phenomenon today.”109 
This excerpt shows what seems to be an inverse relationship between 
the apparent legitimacy of the political order and vigilantism.  What is being 
described is not merely a semantic shift.  In the opinion of this interviewee, the 
new regime’s being legitimated by popular will (the state having shifted to a 
source of legitimacy perceived as authoritative, in other words) has actually 
transformed what was (justified) crime-fighting to (unjustified) vigilantism.  
This insight may have significant implications for the state’s efforts to curb 
vigilantism.  If the community no longer buys into the vigilante rhetoric of 
“heroic crime-fighting” due to greater perceived state legitimacy, community 
members may be less inclined to legitimate vigilante violence at the expense 
of the legitimacy of the state.  Ways in which the state might counter the 
impact of vigilantes’ symbolic power are considered at § 6 3 1 below. 
 
                                            
109 30-31. 
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3 5 2 Legitimacy as justifiable rule-content 
Now that the importance for normative legitimacy of demonstrating an 
authoritative source for the rules of power has been discussed, the key 
question raised above, namely, “why these rules?”, needs addressing.  
Beetham110 answers this question by focusing on two distinct elements.  First, 
the inequality of circumstance between those in power and those subject to it 
needs to be explained in terms of a principle of differentiation that justifies the 
distinctions between the dominant and the subordinate.  Second, there needs 
to be a principle of community or common interest linking the dominant and 
the subordinate, demonstrating that the subordinate as well as the power-
holder derive advantage from the rules of power.  According to Beetham, and 
as is explained further below, the primary purpose of the principle of 
differentiation is to justify their power to the power-holders themselves, while 
the principle of common interest serves to justify power-holders’ power to their 
subordinates. 
 
3 5 2 1 Principles of differentiation and self-justification 
Max Weber noted that “the continued exercise of every domination 
always has the strongest need of self-justification through appealing to the 
principles of its legitimation”.111  For power to be legitimate, it is necessary 
that the rules of power demonstrate that the subordinates’ exclusion from 
essential resources, activities and positions is “not arbitrary or fortuitous, but 
is based on a normative distinction of superiority and inferiority”.112  Barker’s 
analysis of legitimacy focuses predominantly on this issue: how those who 
exercise power are able to persuade (primarily) themselves that they are 
“special, marked by particular qualities, set apart from other people”. 113  
Barker distinguishes between the idea of legitimacy as an ascribed attribute, 
                                            
110 Beetham Legitimation of Power 76-77. 
111 M Weber Economy and Society (1978) quoted in Beetham Legitimation of Power 225. 
112 Beetham Legitimation of Power 59. 
113 Barker Legitimating Identities 35. 
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on the one hand, and legitimation as the act that ascribes such legitimacy, on 
the other.  According to him:  
“[Legitimation] is a claim or expression made by or on behalf of 
that person to assert the special or distinctive identity which that 
person possesses, which identity justifies or authorises or 
legitimates the command by legitimating the person issuing it.  It 
is in the first place persons not systems, rulers not regimes, who 
are legitimated.”114 
Barker suggests that social science research on the rightfulness of 
power would benefit from emphasising legitimation rather than legitimacy; 
investigating the ways in which legitimation takes place in a society rather 
than asking whether that society is legitimate per se.115  Beetham does not 
dispute that investigating claims to legitimacy forms the starting-point of any 
enquiry, but – correctly it is submitted – he argues that these legitimations 
must also be acknowledged or accepted by subordinates for the exercise of 
power to be legitimate.116   
On what basis do power-holders cultivate a self-identity confirming the 
“deservedness” of their power that legitimates their “distinguishing, specific 
monopoly of the right to rule”?117  To answer this, the principles relied on to 
justify the differentiation between dominant and subordinate must be 
scrutinised.  As has already been noted, such principles aim to demonstrate 
that those in power possess qualities lacking in their subordinates, and 
moreover, that these qualities “are appropriate to the particular form of power 
that is exercised” and render the inequality of powers and life-choices morally 
acceptable. 118   Beetham distinguishes between two groups of justifying 
principles demonstrating “rightful authorisation”:119  Ascription theories, which 
assume that the qualities appropriate for the exercise of power are assigned 
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118 Beetham Legitimation of Power 77; 60. 
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at birth; and meritocratic theories, which hold that such qualities may be 
demonstrated only through performance and achievement.120 
With regard to ascription, power rules relating to heredity and 
aristocracy, as well as gender and race, have been influential throughout 
history in justifying the differentiation of influence and circumstance.  Tellingly, 
Beetham remarks that the legitimation of power rules not only assists in 
developing and disseminating an appropriate ideology (the idea that someone 
is “born to rule”, for instance, or the view of women as the “weaker sex”), but 
also aims to construct a “social identity by a complex set of often unconscious 
processes, which make that identity seem ‘natural’, and give the justifying 
ideas their plausibility”.121  That this so-called “naturalness” is actually socially 
constructed is starkly demonstrated by infamous attempt of the apartheid 
government’s Hendrik Verwoerd to legitimise the limiting of black students’ 
academic curriculum to basic literacy and numeracy, on the grounds that 
Africans were meant to be “hewers of wood and drawers of water”.122 
An alternative to utilising ascriptive theories to justify power differentials 
is to employ the principle of meritocracy, which assumes that those who gain 
access to power are indeed the most worthy it, and have demonstrated 
achievement in order to attain it.123  An underlying prerequisite for an effective 
meritocracy is equality of opportunity, as well as a basic presumption of non-
discrimination on irrelevant grounds (i.e., a presumption of equality).124  While 
meritocratic rules appear to be superior to ascriptive ones in theory, and lip-
service is commonly paid to meritocratic principles to justify the acquisition of 
power (e.g., “he is the best man for the job”), Beetham warns that in practice it 
is almost impossible to “break out of the self-fulfilling cycle of legitimation, 
characteristic of ascriptive societies, whereby natural-seeming qualities are 
socially created”.125  Indeed, even if a pure meritocracy could be realised, it 
would only serve to justify why a particular kind of individual should have 
                                            
120 77. 
121 78. 
122  Anonymous “Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd” (2012-07-12) South African History Online 
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123 Beetham Legitimation of Power 80. 
124 80. 
125 81. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 117 
access to power or be excluded from it, not why this particular division of 
power was necessary in the first place.  As will be elaborated on presently,126 
explaining why the division itself should exist requires a further normative 
argument based on social utility. 
As to vigilantism and principles of differentiation, it will be shown in 
chapter 5 that vigilantes, too, engage in self-legitimation.  They cannot 
effectively appropriate an aspect of state authority (the power to punish) 
without sustaining a genuine belief in the rightfulness of their power, and 
being able to convince others of its rightfulness too.  In his discussion on 
legitimate domination Weber notes that in order to secure obedience, all 
(potential) power-holders “[attempt] to establish and to cultivate a belief in 
[their] legitimacy”.127  As Bottoms and Tankebe astutely observe, this implies 
that not only do power-holders’ assertions of legitimacy address multiple 
audiences, but also that all claims to legitimacy are ongoing, entailing “some 
kind of continuing relationship between the power-holder and the 
audience(s)”. 128   Vigilantes, no less than the state, aspire to develop a 
distinctive identity that depicts (to others) and justifies (to themselves)129 their 
exercise of power in the crime-fighting sphere.  As will become apparent, 
vigilantes “challenge the authority of the state from within and from outside, 
using its own language of authority, and at the same time draw on, if not 
directly mimic, its procedural and symbolic forms of legitimacy”. 130   The 
elaborate counter-legitimation rituals and ideologies they employ both to 
justify their prima facie criminal acts to themselves and others and to mobilise 
popular support, are scrutinised at length in chapter 5 and Appendix A.  
Corresponding state relegitimation strategies are examined further in chapters 
6 and 7. 
 
                                            
126 See § 3 5 2 2 below. 
127 Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 213. 
128 Bottoms & Tankebe (2012) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 128-129.  See also  
§ 3 3 2 above for more on the dynamic nature of legitimacy. 
129 Barker Legitimating Identities 136. 
130 Buur (2006) Development and Change at 750. 
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3 5 2 2 Principles of common interest and social contract 
Now that the self-legitimation strategies of those in power have been 
considered, it is necessary to concentrate on how power-holders justify their 
power to those subject to it.  Any expansion of power by the dominant is 
necessarily dependent on a corresponding limitation of the subordinate’s 
power, and is achieved at their expense.  The systematic transfer of powers 
(of resources and opportunities) from subordinate to dominant is inherently 
exploitative – even parasitic – and is clearly in need of justification.131  The 
type of normative legitimacy discussed here therefore aims not to show 
power-holders’ “sense of justified superiority”132 and separateness from those 
they rule, as was the intention of the principles of differentiation outlined 
above, but rather expresses their solidarity with their subordinates by 
demonstrating shared interests.  For there to be legitimacy, the concentration 
of moral authority in the hands of the powerful must be shown to be justifiable 
to the subordinate in terms of a common framework of belief.  Normatively 
justifiable exercise of power should promote not merely the well-being of the 
powerful themselves, but also serve and satisfy the interests of the 
subordinate, including larger social purposes that advance the common good.  
This “due performance” criterion 133  – entailing the powerful successfully 
carrying out functions that advance the general interest – both contributes to, 
and forms a vital component of, the legitimacy of power-holders.134 
As regards the state-citizen power relationship specifically, what are the 
essential societal functions that the state exists to fulfil (and which may justify 
its intrusive and coercive power to its citizens)?  While one of the core 
justifications for the existence of the state is undoubtedly its duty to create the 
conditions necessary to ensure the material welfare of its citizens, the 
fundamental state function most relevant for present purposes is its purported 
ability to safeguard the physical security of its inhabitants.135  
                                            
131 Beetham Legitimation of Power 58-60. 
132 82. 
133 xiii. 
134 137. 
135 See 138.  See also G Agamben Means Without End: Notes on Politics (2000) 5-6, where he argues 
that “power no longer has today any form of legitimization other than emergency” – i.e., it is only 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 119 
Perhaps the definitive statement of the view that the sovereign state 
exists to guarantee the physical security of its people is contained in Thomas 
Hobbes’s social contract theory.  In Leviathan, Hobbes outlines in detail how 
state coercion comes into being.  Before the existence of government, says 
Hobbes, all men are entirely individualistic, naturally equal, and all desire not 
only to preserve their own life and liberty, but also to acquire dominion over 
others, owing to the basic impulse to self-preservation.  This natural condition 
of mankind he calls the “state of nature” and it inevitably entails war of all 
against all.  Hobbes depicts this pre-government state as “… a time of Warre, 
where every man is Enemy to every man … continuall feare, and danger of 
violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”136  
Needless to say, this state of affairs is undesirable; indeed, Hobbes views 
almost anything else as preferable to it.  Hobbes states, therefore, that in 
order to preserve their lives, men must seek peace.  However, self-
preservation and an escape from the natural state of war are only possible if 
all agree to waive their natural rights to personal self-protection:  
“That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for 
Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay 
down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty 
against other men, as he would allow other men against 
himselfe.”137 
Unfortunately, the existence of this contract is constantly threatened by 
the natural human hunger for power.  Hobbes concludes that a central 
sovereign authority is required to force people to uphold the contract.  This 
gives rise to the “explanatory myth” of the social contract, which entails people 
coming together as a commonwealth (state) and making a covenant to 
                                                                                                                             
protecting citizens from continuous threats to their lives that gives a sovereign the justification to 
exercise power.  Research undertaken in South Africa about the antecedents of police legitimacy by 
Bradford et al ((2014) Regulation & Governance 259) found, interestingly, that there is also a 
statistically significant association between satisfaction with basic service provision (i.e., the state 
ensuring the material welfare of its citizens) and a perceived duty to obey the police.  They speculate 
that this may be because “satisfaction with service provision … may generate a belief that the state is 
fulfilling its side of the social contract, activating a reciprocal duty to defer to its representatives”, 
which definitely seems plausible. 
136 T Hobbes Leviathan (1973) chapter 13 at 64-65. 
137 Chapter 14 at 67. 
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choose a sovereign (or sovereign body) to exercise authority over them, thus 
putting an end to universal war. 138   This sovereign (Leviathan) operates 
through fear, and the subjects’ duty to submit is absolute; all rights of the 
individual139 must be transferred to the sovereign in order for this protection to 
be effective.  The sovereign has the right both to create and to enforce social 
norms.140  The sovereign’s right to punish anyone who breaks the covenant 
flows from those who have authorised it by abandoning their own right to 
punish: “[I]n laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he should 
think fit, for the preservation of them all.”141  In this way the threat of state 
punishment (coercion) ensures the continued operation of the social contract 
and enhances the prospect of peace for all. 
According to Hobbes, the social contract means that only the state has 
the right to punish, and the aim of using such physical force is to provide 
security and order in society.  By definition, the state monopolises “‘legitimate 
coercion’ in a civilization”.142  This “normative prescription”143 that it is the 
state that monopolises coercion is endorsed by Weber, who writes: 
“A state is a human community that (successfully) claims 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.  Note that ‘territory’ is one of the characteristics of the 
state.  Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical 
force is ascribed to other institutions only to the extent which the 
state permits it.  The state is considered the sole source of the 
‘right’ to use violence.”144 
It is certainly debatable whether this description of state sovereignty 
rings true in an African context.  Baker flatly denies that African states have 
ever had a monopoly of coercion, claiming they lack the capacity to secure 
                                            
138  B Russell History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social 
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139 Bar one important exception that is discussed below. 
140 T Campbell Seven Theories of Human Society (1981) 79. 
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143 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 12. 
144 M Weber From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (1948) 78. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 121 
such a monopoly.145  However, it must also be acknowledged that regardless 
of whether or not African states were ever in reality “states” in this sense, they 
nevertheless aspire to the ideal of statehood, with all the power and privileges 
that being recognised as the sole authoriser of violence entails.  For this 
reason they desire legitimacy, and it would therefore be unwise simply to 
dismiss the social contract idea as an irrelevance.146 
The social contract between a state and its citizens would prevent the 
state from renouncing its responsibility to provide security and order in 
society,147 but this, Rhead Enion argues, does not necessarily imply that the 
state must supply all the legitimate force itself.  Rather, an essential 
characteristic of the state is that it has the power to allocate the use of such 
force (whether by itself or by others authorised by it),148 since a quality of 
sovereignty is  “the power to define what ‘normal’ is (and consequently isn’t) 
… for when law is valid and what it applies to.”149    
As has been explained, the original reason posited for establishing 
Leviathan was for it to exercise the right to self-preservation on its subjects’ 
behalf.  This implies that “[t]he legitimacy and the very existence of the state 
(and the government) depend ultimately on the effective protection by the 
state – the effective protector – of individual natural rights”.150   The converse 
is also true: state claims to wield a monopoly of legitimate force will lack moral 
weight if the state is unable to deal effectively with threats to social stability 
and established order: “a persistent failure to guarantee physical security will 
                                            
145 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 12-13.  See also J Herbst “Responding to State Failure in 
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undermine confidence in the system of government, since it will be seen to be 
failing in its most essential purpose”.151 
This aspect of legitimacy seems to provide the most convincing 
rationale for the vigilante belief that their conduct is justified – and the judiciary 
appears to accept such reasoning too.  In S v Makwanyane Ackermann J 
explicitly recognises the danger of vigilantism ensuing if the state does not 
uphold its side of the social contract:152 
“[I]n a constitutional state individuals agree (in principle at least) to 
abandon their right to self-help in the protection of their rights only 
because the State, in the constitutional state compact, assumes 
the obligation to protect these rights.  If the State fails to 
discharge this duty adequately, there is a danger that individuals 
might feel justified in using self-help to protect their rights.  This is 
not a fanciful possibility in South Africa.” 
Hobbes’s view is that the natural right to self-protection is the only right 
that is inalienable153 and its exercise by individuals is merely suspended on 
condition that Leviathan effectively discharges its protective responsibilities 
and duties: 
“The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last 
as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is 
able to protect them.  For the right men have by Nature to protect 
themselves when none else can protect them, can by no 
Covenant be relinquished.”154 
                                            
151  Beetham Legitimation of Power 138.  Having this exclusive power to enact legal rules that 
adjudicate on the legitimacy of any coercive force used in its society entails that the sovereign state 
may delegate the provision of law and order to others, including private citizens.  The important 
question of how the state distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate force, and more 
specifically, on what grounds the state refuses to accord legitimacy to the self-help practised by 
vigilantes, but does permit citizens to take the law into their own hands in other instances, such as in 
private defence, is considered above at § 2 5 1. 
152 S v Makwanyane para 168. 
153 P Riley Will and Political Legitimacy: A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, 
Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel (1982) 30-31. 
154 Hobbes Leviathan chapter 21 at 116. 
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In terms of the Hobbesian theory, what vigilantes are doing is merely 
reclaiming their right to self-help.  Malan argues that the natural conclusion of 
Hobbes’s argument is that where the state is incapable of effectively 
discharging its responsibilities by protecting inherent rights to life, bodily 
integrity and property, “the individual’s dormant right to self-help revives” and 
is operational for as long as the state is incapable of restoring and keeping the 
peace, and securing freedom from violence.155  It is trite law that the inherent 
right156 to private defence – to “temporarily act on behalf of the state authority 
in order to uphold the law”157 – automatically accrues to anyone who is in a 
situation where the state cannot protect them from an imminent unlawful 
attack,158 but vigilantes take it one step further.  Rightly or wrongly, vigilantes 
regard the state as not having fulfilled its side of what Wood,159 quoting Elias, 
terms the “civilizing bargain” due to inadequate law and order maintenance, 
and they respond by challenging the social contract and co-opting the 
responsibilities and authority of the formal criminal justice system to punish 
deviants themselves.160 
In S v Schrich, which concerned an accused who committed various 
serious offences while on a mission as part of a PAGAD “G-Force” to rid 
Kraaifontein of drug-dealers and gangsters, Hoffman AJ makes some telling 
comments about the connection between vigilantism, legitimacy and the 
criminal justice system:  
“Only an obscure and infinitesimal minority on the extreme fringes 
of society questions the legitimacy of the current constitutional 
order in the new South Africa.  If our constitutional State compact 
enjoys a high degree of acceptance in the population, an 
explanation for the recent vigilante action cannot be attributed (as 
it was in the old South Africa) to the illegitimacy of the government 
                                            
155 Malan (2007) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 650. 
156 Burchell Principles 117. 
157 Snyman Criminal Law 103. 
158 See § 2 5 1 above. 
159 J C Wood “Self-Policing and the Policing of the Self: Violence, Protection and the Civilizing 
Bargain in Britain” (2003) 7 (1) Crime, History and Societies 2 13. 
160 Yanay (1993) Journal of Public Policy 383; A Silke “Dealing with Vigilantism: Issues and Lessons 
for the Police” (2001) 74 The Police Journal 120 126. 
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of the day.  The current wave of vigilantism would appear to be 
more focused on the perceived failure of the State properly to 
discharge its duty through the efficient administration of the 
criminal justice system to ensure that criminals are apprehended 
and convicted as necessary conditions precedent to their 
punishment.”161  
This quote is significant in that it contains references to both of the 
legitimacy dimensions already discussed. The term legitimacy itself is 
evidently used in the sense of legal legitimacy, and confirms the conclusion 
reached in § 3 4 1 above that engaging in vigilantism does not imply that 
vigilantes totally reject as illegitimate the government and the constitutional 
rules upon which its power is based.  This is juxtaposed with the last 
sentence, which homes in on the normative legitimacy deficit that, it is 
submitted, is at the heart of vigilantes’ grievances against the state: the 
perceived failure of the criminal justice system to promote the common good 
by performing its duties in such a way as to “justify its enormous concentration 
of power”.162  As is argued further in chapter 4 below, vigilantes’ radical form 
of reactivating “the right to fend off violence personally”163 is precipitated to a 
large extent by their lack of confidence in the state’s ability to serve its 
fundamental social function of preserving the established order against 
internal or external threat,164 either in a manner that respects the values of 
procedural justice, or at all. 
 
3 6 Demonstrative legitimacy 
Now that the rule conformity and normative validity components of 
legitimacy have been considered, Beetham’s third dimension, namely 
“performative acts” that afford public acknowledgement of the authority of 
power holders, 165  reinforcing their right to rule, merits further exploration.  
                                            
161 S v Schrich 367B-C. 
162 Beetham Legitimation of Power 137. 
163 Malan (2007) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 653. 
164 Shearing (1992) Crime and Justice 400. 
165 Beetham Legitimation of Power xiv. 
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Beetham argues that public actions demonstrating recognition of a power 
relationship serve not merely as expressions of the subordinates’ belief in the 
legitimacy of the power-holder, but that they actually confer – and contribute 
to enhancing – the dominant’s legitimacy.166  Beetham distinguishes between 
two modes of demonstrative legitimacy: acts that are contractual in nature, 
such as participating in elections or swearing an oath of allegiance; and those 
that are expressive, for instance mass mobilisation or public acclamation.  He 
is of the view that the former mode is forward-looking, since it “carries 
obligatory force and legitimating effect” through the “normative force of 
promising” that is binding into the future, regardless of the motive of the 
promise-maker.167  The latter mode, which focuses on demonstrative acts in 
support of a power-holder, is not obligatory in this sense since it “involves no 
undertaking in respect of the future”.168  Expressive modes of legitimation 
must therefore be continually demonstrated, and the motive with which they 
are performed will determine their normative impact. 
Public demonstrations of legitimation contribute to power-holders’ 
legitimacy by reinforcing subordinates’ normative obligation, creating a moral 
duty on the part of those who engage in them to defer to the dominant.  They 
also have a symbolic or declaratory force for the power-holder, since public 
acclamation by subordinates expresses and confirms the legitimacy of the 
powerful to a wider audience.  Whereas the process of self-legitimation 
referred to in § 3 5 2 1 above signifies the desire of those in power to justify 
the normative “rightness” of their authority both to themselves and to their 
subordinates, legitimation of the powerful by those subject to such power 
symbolically communicates their willingness to submit to the moral authority of 
the powerful.   
What is the opposite of such legitimation, and what may precipitate an 
active withdrawal of consent, a delegitimation of power?  Beetham argues that 
where a system of power is unable to enforce respect for its rules, or 
becomes chronically unable to justify its existence in terms of shared beliefs 
                                            
166 12. 
167 95. 
168 95. 
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by satisfying the interests of the subordinate, the negative aspects of power 
relations, which may have been obscured or redefined through the 
legitimation process, “are starkly exposed, and experienced for what they 
are”. 169   The disillusionment triggered by a legitimacy deficit tends to 
exacerbate subordinates’ frustration and resentment, and make them less 
normatively inclined to co-operate willingly with, and actively support, those in 
power.  This “negative awareness” may simply cause subordinates to display 
passive resentment, the eroded goodwill between themselves and power-
holders leading them to resigning themselves to fulfilling their obligations as 
subordinates reluctantly and grudgingly, with little or no moral incentive.170  
This is certainly undesirable from the perspective of the power-holder; 
however, it is not as extreme as the crisis that is precipitated should 
subordinates choose to withdraw their consent, actively engaging in the 
delegitimation of those in power and undermining their moral standing and 
capacity to rule to a far greater extent.  According to Beetham, whether 
opposition to government has the potential for delegitimation depends on 
whether its aim is to “make the policies of government unworkable, or actively 
bring it down, or to demonstrate allegiance to a different political order”171 – 
i.e., whether the delegitimation challenge is aimed at the claims of the 
powerful that they exercise their authority with the subordinates’ consent.172  
The ultimate demonstration of delegitimation entails subordinates collectively 
laying claim to the moral authority of the powerful by presenting themselves 
as an alternative source of legitimate power.173  
While it is obvious that an all-out rebellion culminating in a revolution or 
coup d’état is a powerful expression of delegitimation, does vigilantes’ 
temporary and less extreme usurpation of state power to fill the policing 
vacuum left by the state’s seeming inability to preserve a satisfactory level of 
                                            
169 109. 
170 109. 
171 209. 
172 It must be noted that where a political order is insecure, authorities may perceive even relatively 
minor challenges to state power as potential demonstrations of delegitimation. 
173 Beetham Legitimation of Power 109 adds that before existing relations of power have the potential 
to be transformed by counter-legitimation, there must be the possibility for subordinates to 
communicate with others in a space relatively protected from the influence of the powerful, and they 
should possess the “imagination to conceive of a different set of rules and relations for the fulfilment 
of basic social needs from the existing ones”. 
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social order and collective security also amount to an act of state 
delegitimation?  To test this, it is helpful to attempt to apply the theoretical 
insights already gained about legitimacy to a hypothetical vigilante scenario to 
establish whether the steps in the delegitimation process are indeed present.   
Delegitimation is preceded by a legitimacy deficit.  The potential 
legitimacy erosion applicable in the vigilante context would be that caused by 
the state’s incapacity to secure the general interest owing to its failure to fulfil 
its essential task of protecting its citizens by means of an effective and 
procedurally fair criminal justice system.  This could well cause citizens to 
have less moral incentive to support the law as an institution, resulting in their 
not feeling a particularly strong normative obligation to uphold the law.  The 
next stage would be for these citizens to make the transition from feeling 
perpetually dissatisfied with and mistrustful of state law-enforcement, but 
powerless to imagine alternatives to deal with crime and disorder, to them 
withdrawing their consent to be subjected to formal law-enforcement.  This 
could come in the passive form of citizens simply not reporting crime to the 
police, for instance, but active delegitimation – citizens feeling empowered to 
transform themselves into an alternative source of authority in the criminal 
justice domain – entails something more.  Potential vigilantes (who would 
probably be ordinary members of communities with high levels of crime and 
social disorder, where the state had shown itself to be unwilling or unable to 
enforce their criminal justice-related interests on their behalf) would need to 
create a space to come together and envisage an alternate (informal) system 
of law with new rules of power, with personnel, prohibitions and sanctions that 
were comparable to those of the existing formal criminal justice system, but 
based on, and upholding, a different set of values.174  Lastly, these alternative 
(vigilante) “law-enforcement” agents would need to demonstrate their counter-
legitimate criminal justice power by performing the policing and legal 
adjudication functions of “arresting”, “trying” and “punishing” perceived 
wrongdoers.  These functions would have to be performed in such a way as to 
command a significant degree of popular support, denoting that expressive 
                                            
174 See chapter 5 for more on ways in which vigilantes engage in such counter-legitimation strategies. 
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legitimation had been demonstrated both for the actions themselves as well 
as for their underlying criminal justice values and rules.   
Based on what has been said about demonstrative legitimacy above, it 
seems clear that acts of vigilantism may indeed be characterised as a 
manifestation of significant state delegitimation, albeit confined to the criminal 
justice sphere.   
 
3 7  Using legitimacy attribution to better understand legitimacy 
itself 
The assumed correlation between eroded legitimacy and increased 
vigilantism has thus far been explored briefly in the specific context of 
demonstrative legitimacy and state delegitimation.  However, even if one 
accepts that state legitimacy is weakened by the (perceived or actual) 
inadequacies of the criminal justice system,175 before the factors contributing 
to state delegitimation can be investigated further, the premise that a 
legitimacy deficit leads to vigilantism needs to be somewhat enlarged upon.  
To this end, the assumed link between poor state performance, state 
legitimacy and citizens’ normative willingness to comply must be clarified and 
substantiated.  It is necessary to return to the research conducted by Tom 
Tyler and his associates that was briefly referred to in § 3 2 2 above.  This 
research focuses upon the grounds on which citizens choose to ascribe 
legitimacy to the state176 rather than specifically using Beetham’s paradigm of 
whether the state is truly legitimate in terms of the legal, normative and 
demonstrative dimensions explored above, but it may nevertheless provide 
useful insight into the mechanisms underlying legitimacy attribution.  The 
findings and implications of the research on the relevance of legitimacy in the 
criminal justice sphere will be outlined briefly, and case law indicating legal 
support for these conclusions is also cited where applicable.  Intriguingly, in 
more recent decisions South African judges tend to resort to decidedly 
Tylerian language to express sentiments about legitimacy.   
                                            
175 As was theorised above at § 3 5 2 2 and is elaborated on at § 4 2 5 below. 
176 E.g. Paternoster, et al. (1997) Law and Society Review 167. 
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A series of empirical studies by Tyler and others177 isolated various 
antecedents of legitimacy (concisely defined as “the belief that legal 
authorities are entitled to be obeyed”).178  It was found that whether citizens 
feel themselves obliged to defer to authorities is strongly influenced by various 
factors, the most significant of which is procedural justice.  As recognised by 
the Constitutional Court per O’ Regan J,179 “[f]air process improves the quality 
of decisions and establishes their legitimacy.” 
Procedural justice in turn is conceptualised as having two components, 
namely the quality of legal decision-making and fair interpersonal treatment.  
As regards the first component, namely the quality of legal decision-making 
itself, considerations such as whether authorities act in a manner that is 
neutral, independent, objective and unbiased, whether decisions are 
consistent, competent and rule-based, and whether authorities are open and 
transparent and give reasons for their decisions, have been found to be 
crucial in determining the perceived fairness of decision-making.  Our courts 
readily acknowledge the importance of fair decision-making for the legitimacy 
of the judiciary.  As regards the crucial role played by judicial impartiality, in 
South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and others v 
Irvin & Johnson Ltd (Seafoods Division Fish Processing) Cameron J holds as 
follows:  
“In South Africa … the administration of justice, emerging as it has 
from ‘the evils and immorality of the old order’ remains vulnerable 
to attacks on its legitimacy and integrity.  Courts considering 
recusal applications asserting a reasonable apprehension of bias 
must accordingly give consideration to two contending factors.  
On the one hand, it is vital to the integrity of our courts and the 
independence of Judges and magistrates that ill-founded and 
                                            
177 Including Tyler Why People Obey the Law; Paternoster, et al. (1997) Law and Society Review; Tyler 
& Huo Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts; Sunshine & 
Tyler (2003) Law & Society Review; Tyler (2003) Crime and Justice; Tyler (2006) Journal of Social 
Issues; T R Tyler Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives (2007); Tyler & 
Jackson (2014) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 
178 Tyler (2003) Crime and Justice 306. 
179 In Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and others (Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions and another, amici curiae) 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 296.  
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misdirected challenges to the composition of a Bench be 
discouraged.  On the other, the courts’ very vulnerability serves to 
underscore the pre-eminent value to be placed on public 
confidence in impartial adjudication”.180 
In respect of the importance of judicial independence, in City of Cape 
Town v Premier, Western Cape, and others the court quotes the Canadian 
case of Ell v Alberta,181 where it was held:  
“A separate, but related, basis for independence is the need to 
uphold public confidence in the administration of justice.  
Confidence in our system of justice requires a healthy perception 
of judicial independence to be maintained amongst the citizenry.  
Without the perception of independence, the judiciary is unable to 
‘claim any legitimacy or command the respect and acceptance 
that are essential to it’.”182 
Openness – justice not only being done, but being seen to be done – is 
a cornerstone of the law.  In Shinga v The State and another (Society of 
Advocates (Pietermaritzburg Bar) intervening as amicus curiae) S v O’Connell 
and others, Yacoob J states: 
“Seeing justice done in court enhances public confidence in the 
criminal-justice process and assists victims, the accused and the 
broader community to accept the legitimacy of that process.  
Open courtrooms foster Judicial excellence, thus rendering courts 
accountable and legitimate.  Were criminal appeals to be dealt 
with behind closed doors, faith in the criminal-justice system may 
be lost. No democratic society can risk losing that faith.”183 
                                            
180 South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and others v Irvin & Johnson Ltd 
(Seafoods Division Fish Processing) 2000 3 SA 705 (CC) para 17 (emphasis added). 
181 Ell v Alberta 2003 SCC 35 ([2003] 1 SCR 857) (emphasis added). 
182 City of Cape Town v Premier, Western Cape, and others 2008 6 SA 345 (C) para 174. 
183 Shinga v The State and another (Society of Advocates (Pietermaritzburg Bar) intervening as amicus 
curiae); S v O'Connell and others 2007 2 SACR 28 (CC) para 26 (emphasis added). 
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Tellingly, Sachs J opines 184  that “[i]n our constitutional order, the 
legitimacy of laws made by Parliament comes not from awe, but from 
openness”.  Transparency and openness are linked to having access to the 
reasons for decision-making by legal authorities.  This is confirmed in FM v 
Minister of Home Affairs:  
“[T]he duty to give reasons serves a dual purpose: on the one 
hand, it provides benefits and protections for a person who is 
adversely affected by a decision; and on the other hand, it is a 
fundamental requirement of good governance in and of itself in 
that it advances the goal of transparency, and enhances public 
confidence in, and the legitimacy of, the administrative 
process.”185 
It is not only the quality of the decision-making that plays a role in 
citizens’ judgments about procedural justice, and hence assessments of 
legitimacy, however.  The second component of procedural justice, namely 
fair interpersonal treatment, is crucial for perceptions of procedural fairness 
and legitimacy.186  Citizens value being treated with dignity and respect, as 
well as having their rights acknowledged and being given an opportunity to 
participate in procedures that concern them.  Human dignity’s centrality to 
state legitimacy is highlighted in the minority judgment of The Citizen 1978 
(Pty) Ltd and others v McBridge (Johnstone and others, amici curiae):  
“[T]he Constitution holds human dignity up as not only a human 
right that is given constitutional recognition, as with freedom of 
expression, but also as a fundamental value upon which 
the legitimacy of the sovereign State is based.  The Republic was 
‘founded on’ the value of human dignity, and failure to uphold that 
                                            
184 Matatiele Municipality and others v President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2006 5 SA 
47 (CC) para 110.  For more on the link between openness and legitimacy, see King and others v 
Attorney's Fidelity Fund Board of Control and another 2006 1 SA 474 (SCA) para 20-21; Inkatha 
Freedom Party v Electoral Commission 2006 3 SA 396 (EC) para 8; Coetzee v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa; Matiso and others v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, and 
others 1995 4 SA 631 (CC) para 46. 
185 FM v Minister of Home Affairs 2014 JDR 1732 (GP) para 121. 
186 Tyler & Jackson (2014) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 89. 
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value is both a violation of a constitutional right and a threat to a 
bedrock principle that underpins the legitimacy of the State.”187 
The need to recognise human rights is frequently mentioned in the 
criminal justice context with reference to due process and fair trial rights.  In S 
v Molimi,188 for instance, Nkabinde J held that “proceedings in which little or 
no respect is accorded to the fair trial rights of the accused have the potential 
to undermine the fundamental adversarial nature of judicial proceedings and 
may threaten their legitimacy.”  Similarly, Tshabalala JP stated as follows in S 
v Khumalo and others:189 “[T]he right to a fair trial is integral to a democratic 
country intent on developing a culture of respect and legitimacy for the 
criminal justice system.”  The Constitutional Court (per Mokgoro J) also 
pertinently linked the denial of the right to access to court to an increased 
likelihood of vigilantism: 
“The right of access to court is indeed foundational to the stability 
of an orderly society. It ensures the peaceful, regulated and 
institutionalised mechanisms to resolve disputes, without resorting 
to self help.  The right of access to court is a bulwark against 
vigilantism, and the chaos and anarchy which it causes.  
Construed in this context of the rule of law and the principle 
against self help in particular, access to court is indeed of cardinal 
importance.”190 
As regards the opportunity to participate in decision-making, Skweyiya 
J (quoting Hoexter) declares as follows: 
“Procedural fairness … is concerned with giving people an 
opportunity to participate in the decisions that will affect them, and 
– crucially – a chance of influencing the outcome of those 
decisions.  Such participation is a safeguard that not only signals 
respect for the dignity and worth of the participants, but is also 
                                            
187 The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd and others v McBride (Johnstone and others, amici curiae) 2011 4 SA 
191 (CC) para 143 (emphasis added). 
188 S v Molimi 2008 2 SACR 76 (CC) para 42. 
189 S v Khumalo and others 2006 1 SACR 447 (N) 459C. 
190 Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank para 22 (emphasis added). 
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likely to improve the quality and rationality of administrative 
decision-making and to enhance its legitimacy.”191  
 The need for citizen participation in the legislative process was 
pertinently addressed in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the 
National Assembly and others, where Ncgobo J states:  
“The objective in involving the public in the law-making process is 
to ensure that the legislators are aware of the concerns of the 
public.  And if legislators are aware of those concerns, this will 
promote the legitimacy, and thus the acceptance, of the 
legislation.  This not only improves the quality of the law-making 
process, but it also serves as an important principle that 
government should be open, accessible, accountable and 
responsive.  And this enhances our democracy.”192 
Responsiveness to the needs of citizens, including their changing 
values and the boni mores, is related to the fair treatment idea that legal 
authorities need to be in touch with citizen priorities.  In Herholdt v Wills this is 
acknowledged, and this judgment makes explicit the Tylerian link between 
legitimacy and obedience to the law:  
“The law has to take into account changing realities, not only 
technologically, but also socially, or else it will lose credibility in 
the eyes of the people.  Without credibility, law loses legitimacy.  
If law loses legitimacy, it loses acceptance.  If it loses acceptance, 
it loses obedience.”193 
Lastly, citizens are more likely align themselves normatively with legal 
authorities if they trust in their motives or character.194  Such “motive-based 
                                            
191 Joseph and others v City of Johannesburg and others 2010 4 SA 55 (CC) para 42. 
192 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and others 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) 
para 205. 
193 Heroldt v Wills 2013 2 SA 530 (GSJ) para 31. 
194 Tyler & Huo Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts 58. 
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trust” is present when citizens believe legal authorities to be benevolent, 
acting bona fide and sincerely trying to do what is best.195  
The above discussion showing the importance of procedural justice for 
legitimacy does not mean that considerations of distributive justice and 
effectiveness are irrelevant in determining citizens’ belief that legal authorities 
are entitled to be obeyed: on the contrary. While studies in societies that are 
relatively wealthy and have stable and well-established police services have 
consistently found that motives related to effective performance are less 
significantly correlated to perceptions of legitimacy than the procedural justice 
components referred to above,196  these findings are not supported by an 
empirical study of the legitimacy of the police in South Africa conducted by 
Bradford et al.  Their research assessed legitimacy as both a duty to obey and 
a sense of moral alignment with the police.  Focusing on the moral alignment 
dimension of legitimacy, as opposed to merely considering legal compliance, 
the study purposely taps into Beetham’s insight regarding the importance of 
those in power and their subordinates sharing a set of general values and 
principles.197  Legitimacy in this wider sense points to shared goals, purposes 
and values between dominant and subordinate, and studies have linked it to 
identification with a group and a broader willingness to work together actively 
and willingly to address collective issues. 198   Bradford et al found that 
although there was a statistically significant association between trust in the 
fairness of police and a sense of moral alignment with them, procedural 
fairness was not associated with a sense of duty to obey. 199   Similarly, 
generalised trust in government was linked to a sense of moral alignment with 
the police, but not with a perceived duty to obey officers.200  While procedural 
justice did explain some variation in legitimacy perceptions, and, significantly, 
“personal experiences of police and perceptions of corruption were associated 
                                            
195 Tyler & Jackson (2014) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 82.  The link between a lack of citizen 
trust and vigilantism is explored in chapter 4.   
196 Tyler Why People Obey the Law; Tyler (2003) Crime and Justice; Tyler & Huo Trust in the Law: 
Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts; Sunshine & Tyler (2003) Law & 
Society Review.  
197 Bradford, et al. (2014) Regulation & Governance 254.   
198 Tyler & Jackson (2014) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 80. 
199 Bradford, et al. (2014) Regulation & Governance particularly at 258. 
200 259. 
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with trust in procedural justice and legitimacy”,201 Bradford et al found that 
trust in police effectiveness was a stronger predictor of both legitimacy 
components.  Bradford et al conclude that, to a greater extent than in first-
world settings, “the legitimacy of the police is seriously undermined by 
perceptions that it is ineffective in the ‘fight against crime’”. 202   They 
hypothesise that this is due to the fact that in South Africa, the basic social 
utility of the police is not regarded as a given; nor is there “a baseline 
assumption of police efficacy” that may open up a greater space for legitimacy 
judgments based on procedural justice considerations. 203   A significant 
question-mark hangs over the ability of the police to provide security, which is 
evidenced by the widespread resort to informal justice solutions.  This may be 
why South Africans place more emphasis on crime concerns and 
effectiveness when forming legitimacy judgments.  South African courts have 
also acknowledged the link between legitimacy erosion and a poorly-
functioning criminal justice system.  Olivier JA in Govender v Minister of 
Safety and Security stated: 
“The State has the duty to preserve the criminal justice system’s 
effectiveness as a deterrent to crime … A failure by the State to 
preserve the effectiveness of the criminal justice system will end 
in lawlessness and a loss of the legitimacy of the State itself.”204 
Various practical implications for the state of the research by Tyler and 
his associates and Bradford et al are considered further in § 6 2 3.  Suffice it 
to sum up at this point that empirical findings about legitimacy show that if 
legal authorities act in ways that are biased, inconsistent, incompetent, 
ineffective or non-transparent, or treat citizens in a manner that is 
disrespectful of their human dignity or of their right to participate in decision-
making, this may have dire consequences for criminal justice power-holders.  
To explain in terms of the Beetham legitimacy paradigm, where effective law-
                                            
201 260. 
202 261. 
203 260. 
204 Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 273 (SCA) para 12.  This was cited with 
approval in Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and others: In re S v Walters 2002 2 SACR 105 
(CC) para 36. 
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enforcement or procedural justice is lacking, citizen confidence in the overall 
abilities of the criminal justice system may erode, making citizens less likely to 
ascribe normative legitimacy to legal authorities, which in turn has 
repercussions for demonstrative legitimacy.  The research of Tyler and his 
associates confirms that where citizens do not view legal authorities as 
legitimate they are less inclined to obey them, to co-operate with them, to 
empower them to take decisions on their behalf and to engage with them to 
address collective issues.205  
Viewed from this perspective, vigilantism appears to be an extreme 
symptom of unfavourable perceptions of state performance in the broad 
sense.  Such perceptions cause citizens’ willingness to legitimate the state to 
erode, and may result in their having little or no compunction about actively 
defying the state by taking the law into their own hands.  Linking this more 
clearly to the Beetham-style legitimacy dimensions: where due performance is 
lacking in that criminal justice agents do not realise the purposes expected of 
them as a condition for their position of power, or conform to socially accepted 
standards in exercising such power,206 a normative legitimacy deficit results 
which alienates citizens from the state.  This makes them reluctant to trust the 
legal authorities or to attribute legitimacy to them, and in extreme cases 
results in citizens actively demonstrating non-compliance, including resorting 
to self-help, thus effectively delegitimating the formal criminal justice process.  
 
3 8 Conclusion 
The arguments advanced and conclusions reached in this chapter 
appear to support the assumption that state efficiency and procedural justice, 
legitimacy and a propensity to vigilantism are closely intertwined in a “vicious 
circle”-type link.207  While vigilantism does not challenge legal legitimacy per 
se, apparent or actual state inability to offer credible guarantees of order and 
security, and/or the state’s inability to be responsive to social priorities in this 
                                            
205 Tyler (2003) Crime and Justice; Tyler & Jackson (2014) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. 
206 Beetham Legitimation of Power 259. 
207 These conclusions are in line with the assumed link proposed in the flow chart in § 3 1 above. 
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regard, are both a cause and a consequence of a legitimacy deficit: 
inadequate state collective security guarantees weaken normative legitimacy 
by diminishing citizens’ trust in the criminal justice system, hence eroding 
feelings of moral obligation to obey, and increasing the likelihood of citizens 
taking the law into their own hands.  In this paradigm, an upsurge in 
vigilantism may be understood as an expression of state delegitimation, 
undermining demonstrative legitimacy, which in turn fosters further 
perceptions of ineffectiveness and more disorder and instability.  Vigilante 
violence patently signals citizen reluctance to acquiesce to the state claim of 
the exclusive monopoly on the allocation of force and sends legal authorities a 
powerful message of criticism: Do your job properly or risk having your 
authority undermined still further.   
As will become apparent in the rest of this thesis, there is no doubt that 
this underlying dynamic of (state) legitimacy erosion and delegitimation 
followed by (vigilante) counter-legitimation is a very useful explanatory 
framework for understanding the processes involved in the conduct of 
vigilantes.  The various conclusions underlying the legitimacy-vigilantism 
paradigm arrived at in this chapter are revisited later in the study.  The 
approach followed in chapter 4 is based on the assumption that the state 
bears considerable responsibility in fostering vigilante-proneness.  In 
discussing the role of legitimacy erosion and legitimacy “gaps” in promoting 
vigilantism, it highlights particular instances where the state has failed to 
achieve normative legitimacy.  In chapter 5, vigilantism is conceptualised as a 
counter-legitimate force that is a manifestation of state delegitimation.  
Vigilante practices and rituals are understood as being a way for vigilantes to 
boost their power by addressing the “law-enforcement” concerns of the 
communities they serve and in so doing, to attain a form of legal, normative 
and demonstrative legitimacy.  Chapters 6 and 7 conceive of the state as 
being able – at least in some respects – to remedy its legitimacy deficit and 
neutralise vigilantes’ legitimation efforts by relegitimating itself.  This 
relegitimation exercise would require that the state convincingly demonstrate 
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its capacity to justify its power in terms of a common framework of belief.208  If 
the state were able to do so, it would increase the likelihood that citizens 
would be willing to legitimate its crime-fighting authority rather than 
undermining it through acts of self-help.  Specific approaches that the state 
might consider to enlist the active co-operation and assistance of citizens in 
its efforts to achieve a measure of legitimacy in the criminal justice arena will 
be canvassed.  First, however, it is necessary to concentrate on why and how 
the state’s legitimacy deriving from its (in)ability to maintain order and security 
has been undermined from a citizen perspective.  That is the focus of the 
following chapter.   
 
                                            
208 Normative legitimacy, as discussed in § 3 5 above. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: STATE DELEGITIMATION 
 
4 1 Linking state normative legitimacy deficit and vigilantism 
As was clarified in chapter 3, the exercise of state power must be both 
legally valid and morally justifiable for it to be truly legitimate.  It was argued 
that a normative legitimacy deficit, and thus also a heightened propensity for 
vigilantism, is closely related to a state’s inability to justify its power in terms of 
a common framework of belief.1  Two main grounds were posited for how the 
failure of the state to achieve widespread normative legitimacy could give rise 
to vigilantism, namely, state failure to perform the essential state function of 
safeguarding the physical security of its inhabitants effectively and fairly;2 and 
the legitimacy gap caused by the values underpinning the legal rules of the 
formal criminal justice system being seemingly incongruent with the popular 
beliefs (that ought to be) sustaining them.3  In order to understand properly 
the role that deficient state legitimacy plays in fostering vigilantism4 – and 
concomitantly, how the state might remedy such shortcomings5 – the chapter 
                                            
1  See discussion of this aspect of normative legitimacy in the context of Beetham’s writings at  
§ 3 5 2 2.  In addition, E Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society (1984) 42 observes that 
“wherever an authority with power to govern is established its first and foremost function is to ensure 
respect for beliefs, traditions and collective practices – namely to defend the common [collective] 
consciousness from all its enemies, from within as well as without”. 
2 Identified in § 3 5 2 2. 
3 See § 3 5 1 for more. 
4 The focus of the present chapter. 
5 The subject of chapters 6 and 7. 
“The kitchen has to be clean.  If the owner leaves it dirty, it gets 
cockroaches.  Are the cockroaches at fault?  No, the owner is 
at fault.  The government does not clean up its own 
[communities] and so cockroaches pop up.  The government is 
at fault.” 
– Head of vigilante group Mapogo A Mathamaga, Monthle John Magolego, 
talking about the ascendancy of crime in Von Schnitzler et al Guardian or 
Gangster? 20.  He could just as well have been explaining the origins of 
vigilantism! 
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is divided into two sections: The first focuses on the effect of inadequate state 
performance on legitimacy (and consequent proneness to vigilantism), and 
the second highlights how the differing “crime-fighting” and “law-enforcement” 
values of the state and of vigilantes may play a role in precipitating 
vigilantism.   
The first part of the chapter explores deficiencies in the state response 
to community security concerns.  The aim is to test the validity of the 
contention that the breakdown in the criminal justice system’s ability to 
guarantee collective security and social order is one of the root causes of 
vigilantism.  As will become evident, to characterise vigilantism as a response 
to inadequate formal crime-fighting initiatives is only to tell part of the story; 
vigilantism is more prevalent in “communities in crisis – and that crisis is about 
more than crime”.6  Endemic poverty, inequality and discrimination are also 
important recurring narratives in violence-plagued and vigilante-prone 
settings.  Where the state is failing to provide acceptable levels of either 
security or economic opportunity – a dual failure that “reveals the limits of 
government power”7 – this reinforces the belief that the community must be 
prepared to help itself.  It may well be, as is argued by Nolte, that vigilantism 
signifies a real critique of state withdrawal – a demand for “greater, not less, 
state presence and responsibility” 8 not merely in the sphere of crime-fighting 
and security, but also aimed at improving the quality of life of all its citizens.  
Considering its resource constraints, the state may be able to do little to 
remedy some of the practical obstacles identified below as contributing to a 
state legitimacy deficit; there may indeed be solutions to others that do not 
require huge financial investment to implement and that may be promising 
options for the state to explore in its quest to relegitimate itself.9  
Once the relationship between the state’s (unsuccessful) attempts to 
serve the common good and vigilantism has been expounded, the second 
                                            
6 A Snodgrass Godoy “When 'Justice' is Criminal: Lynchings in Contemporary Latin America” (2004) 
33 (6) Theory and Society 621 630. 
7 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 59. 
8 I Nolte “Ethnic Vigilantes and the State: The Oodua People's Congress in South-Western Nigeria” 
(2007) 21 (1) International Relations 217 230-231. 
9 See, e.g., § 6 2 below. 
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part of the chapter considers the need for power rules to be derived from an 
authoritative source, and the application and implications of this aspect of 
normative legitimacy 10  in the context of vigilantism.  This second section 
argues that vigilantism is an almost inevitable symptom of incongruent state 
and citizen “law-enforcement” beliefs relating both to the prohibitions to be 
enforced, and by whom and how best such enforcement should be 
undertaken.  It will be made apparent that the tensions between formal and 
informal modes of justice and “crime-fighting” pose a huge challenge to state 
attempts to achieve full legitimacy in the criminal justice sphere, since many 
vigilante beliefs relating to “criminalisation” and “penalties” are anathema to 
the values of a constitutional state, which are based on human rights. 
 
4 2 Obstacles to serving the common good: structural violence 
and (lack of) due process  
In this section, some of the characteristics and conditions predisposing 
particular communities to vigilantism are highlighted.  They relate both to 
objective social conditions and to the manner in which state agents respond to 
them.   
When it comes to exploring conditions that lead to the erosion of state 
legitimacy in general, and particularly in the crime-fighting domain, structural 
violence is a useful concept for “render[ing] visible the social machinery of 
oppression”.11  If violence is conceptualised as operating along a continuum 
from direct physical assault to symbolic violence and “routinised” everyday 
violence, 12  a significant component of the latter is “chronic, historically 
embedded structural violence”. 13  Instead of understanding violence solely in 
                                            
10 See § 3 5 1 for more. 
11 L Green, commenting on P Farmer “An Anthropology of Structural Violence” (2004) 45 (3) Current 
Anthropology 305 319. 
12 N Scheper-Hughes & P Bourgois Violence in War and Peace (2004) 1. 
13 Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes comment in Farmer (2004) Current Anthropology 318.  Structural 
violence is defined by P Farmer Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights and the New War on 
the Poor (2005) as “one way of describing social arrangements that put individuals and populations 
in harm’s way… The arrangements are structural because they are embedded in the political and 
economic organization of our social world; they are violent because they cause injury to people … 
neither culture nor pure individual will is at fault; rather, historically given (and often economically 
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terms of its capacity to inflict physical pain, it is crucial to recognise that the 
violence of “poverty, hunger, social exclusion and humiliation” 14  is as 
significant as – and indeed, more prevalent in society than – harm to bodily 
integrity.  Farmer uses the term structural violence as a broad rubric for a host 
of historically-embedded destructive forces that violate human dignity, which 
include absolute and relative poverty and social inequalities based on race or 
ethnicity, gender, religion and social class, particularly those that result in a 
deficit of social and economic power. 15   According to Farmer, such 
infringements of human rights are not accidents, or random in distribution or 
effect, but are actually “symptoms of deeper pathologies of power and are 
linked intimately to the social conditions that so often determine who will suffer 
abuse and who will be shielded from harm.”16  Crucially, whereas viewing 
human rights from a purely legal perspective tends to obscure the dynamics 
underlying human rights violations, keeping the idea of structural violence in 
mind allows a move away from “a moral economy … geared to pinning praise 
or blame on individual actors” towards the conception that “violence [is] 
exerted systematically – that is, indirectly – by everyone who belongs to a 
certain social order”. 17   Inevitably, the historically disadvantaged bear the 
brunt of the “unfreedoms” 18  engendered by oppression and structural 
violence.  And while state machinery may not be the only source of such 
structural violence, it is a hugely significant one.   
As regards the link between vigilantism and structural violence, 
intriguingly, Farmer also classifies as structural violence those “more 
spectacular forms of violence that are uncontestably human rights abuses, 
some of them punishment for efforts to escape structural violence”.19  In line 
with this analysis, it is submitted that vigilantism may be characterised as one 
                                                                                                                             
driven) processes and forces conspire to constrain individual agency.  Structural violence is visited 
upon all those whose social status denies them access to the fruits of scientific and social progress”.  
See also P Farmer, B Nizeye, S Stulac & S Keshavjee “Structural Violence and Clinical Medicine” 
(2006) 3 (10) PLoS Medicine 1686 for a definition of structural violence. 
14 Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois Violence in War and Peace 1. 
15 P Farmer “Pathologies of Power: Rethinking Health and Human Rights” (1999) 89 (10) American 
Journal of Public Health 1486 1488; Farmer Pathologies of Power 8; 16-17. 
16 Farmer Pathologies of Power 7. 
17 Farmer (2004) Current Anthropology 307. 
18 Farmer Pathologies of Power 8. 
19 8. 
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such effort to escape from structural violence, with the state often responding 
to vigilantism – and crime in general – in ways that “spectacularly” violate 
human dignity.  During the course of this chapter it will become clear that 
vigilantism is indeed more prevalent among those subject to structural 
violence and oppression.  Poverty, marginalisation, unfair and unequal 
treatment and the lack of means and/or the opportunity to access formal 
justice almost inexorably translate into private violence,20 including violent 
self-help.  
When identifying particular forms of state (in)action in the criminal 
justice sphere that may perpetuate structural violence, thus leading to state 
delegitimation and increasing the likelihood of vigilantism, the most significant 
state agent is the police officer.  In the words of Agamben, the police are 
“perhaps the place where the proximity and the almost constitutive exchange 
between violence and right that characterizes the figure of the sovereign is 
shown more nakedly and clearly than anywhere else”.21  It will be argued that 
state policing responses to community issues – both those that are potentially 
positive but misunderstood or misapplied, as well as those that are purely 
negative, misguided or even criminal – do indeed play a role in triggering 
and/or exacerbating vigilante violence.  
                                            
20 Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois Violence in War and Peace 1. 
21 Agamben Means Without End 104. 
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4 2 1 Violence as universal societal language 
 
Levels of (particularly violent) crime, people’s perceptions of crime and 
fear of crime, and the police response to crime are important determinants of 
state legitimacy.  Bradford et al’s research on factors that contribute to police 
legitimacy in South Africa found that higher levels of worry about crime and 
personal experiences of victimisation were associated with lower levels of 
trust in both the effectiveness and fairness of the police, and, through these, 
with lower levels of legitimacy.22  It may seem trite to observe that vigilantism 
tends to take place in response to crime – after all, the premise of this study is 
that vigilante acts are not merely a private criminal activity, but a reaction to 
real and/or perceived deviance.  However, it is necessary to emphasise that 
vigilantism can only properly be understood if one bears in mind that it does 
not occur in a vacuum, but is fundamentally a “localised, non-state response 
to a particular problem or set of problems that arise in a specific place and 
point in time”. 23   It should come as no surprise that vigilantism is most 
prevalent where (violent) criminal activity is rampant.24  As was argued before 
                                            
22 Bradford, et al. (2014) Regulation & Governance 258-259. 
23  M Sekhonyane & A Louw Violent Justice: Vigilantism and the State’s Response (2002) 27 
(emphasis added). 
24 According to SAPS, a total of 17 805 murders were committed in South Africa between April 2014 
and March 2015, an increase of 4,6% (782 deaths) on the previous year.  In addition to 49 people 
being murdered every day, other violent crimes are also on the increase, for example armed robberies 
(up 8,5% to 129 045), attempted murder (up 3,2% to 17 537), common robbery (up 2,7% to 54 927) 
and house robberies (up 5,2% to 20 281).  As regards other violent offences, sexual offences (down 
“To those people who feel [vigilantism] is barbaric and against 
the law, I say: You people stay in safe houses protected by 
walls, electric fences and big dogs.  You don’t know how it is to 
be helpless in front of the children while being bullied by 
criminals in your house … Now I have put all my trust in the 
[vigilantes].  I’m convinced that they will help me.  To me, the 
police are useless, I have no trust in them”. 
–  Vigilante supporter quoted in Cape Times 1998-08-24; adapted from Lee and 
Seekings “Vigilantism and Popular Justice After Apartheid” in Feenan (ed) Informal 
Criminal Justice (2003) 110. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 145 
the Khayelitsha Commission, vigilantism is at heart precipitated by oppressive 
and pervasive levels of criminal activity;25 it is a consequence of the appalling 
lived reality of those who would otherwise feel powerless in the face of 
escalating and widespread violent crime.26  
The failure of the criminal justice system to protect communities from 
criminals is starkly illustrated by the SAPS’ so-called “Bundu Courts Report”, 
which showed that a significant proportion27 of the 78 victims of vigilante 
killings reported in Khayelitsha between April 2011 and June 2012 who were 
positively identified had criminal records for crimes ranging from burglary and 
possession of stolen property to drug-related offences and murder.  Tellingly, 
those killed by vigilantes had frequently been charged with many more 
offences than those of which they had been convicted, but the charges had 
later been withdrawn.28  This perhaps speaks to the community’s frustration, 
their fear and hopelessness, and their sense that taking the law into their own 
hands is the only feasible option when confronted with the, to them, 
inexplicable niceties and inefficiencies of the formal criminal justice system.29   
Furthermore, police officers investigating the vigilante incidents where 
witnesses were prepared to assist the police30 most often reported that the 
                                                                                                                             
5,4% to 53 617) and common assault (down 2,8% to 161 486) showed slight downward trends, but 
were nevertheless still at high levels (SAPS “Crime Statistics: April 2014-March 2015” (2015-09-29) 
South African Police Service 
<http://www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/statistics/crimestats/2015/crime_stats.php> 
(2015-11-17)). 
25 P Hathorn, N Mayosi & M Bishop “Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in 
Khayelitsha and a Breakdown in Relations Between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha: 
Complainant Organisations' Heads of Argument” Khayelitsha Commission 
<http://www.khayelitshacommission.org.za/2013-11-10-19-36-33/2013-11-25-08-05-56/documents-
to-be-relied-on-by-the-complainant-organisations.html> (20-04-2015). 
26 For example, the Mthente survey, cited in the Khayelitsha Commission report, found that 41.3% of 
all respondents in the survey had personally been a victim of crime in the last year in Khayelitsha, 
and 8 out of 10 respondents reported not feeling safe in their own community (O’Regan & Pikoli 
Khayelitsha Commission Report 131-132). 
27 Thirteen of the deceased had pending or finalised criminal matters against them, several had been 
convicted of crimes, and many had had charges withdrawn against them (see O’Regan & Pikoli 
Khayelitsha Commission Report 216). 
28 See § 4 2 5 2 3 below for more on why cases might be withdrawn. 
29 See Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 199-120; also A Minnaar (1999) 
Criminological Society of South Africa International Conerence: Crime Prevention in the New 
Millenium “The New Vigilantism and Post-April 1994 South Africa: Crime Prevention or an 
Expression of Lawlessness?” 4.  See also §§ 4 3 2 and 4 3 2 5 below for why the state due process 
model of criminal justice is found wanting by vigilantes and the communities that support them. 
30 These were in the minority.  The more common scenario was one where no witnesses could be 
identified, although there were many persons near the scene.  A typical extract from the case 
information reads as follows: “[SAPS members] noticed a group of community members that were 
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catalyst for the fatal attacks was that the vigilante victim was caught 
housebreaking or stealing.  In one instance, where the target of the vigilantism 
had also been arrested for armed robbery previously, a constable on the 
scene chillingly describes the “blood trail from the house (where he apparently 
tried to break in) to the street where the body was found”. 31   Feeling 
vulnerable and threatened, particularly by crimes where perpetrators 
penetrate the inner sanctum – the home – of their victims, “crystallize[s] 
people’s collective sense of insecurity”.32  Anxious community members in 
townships and squatter camps attempt to wrest back some semblance of 
control by mobilising against such threats.  Resorting to vigilantism may in 
some instances indeed be a necessary, desperate last resort by citizens 
driven to despair by the state’s inability to respond adequately (or at all) to 
escalating crime rates.   
This form of crime-control vigilantism is the easiest for vigilantes to 
justify, and may evoke considerable sympathy, even from the judiciary, since 
vigilantes’ desire to step in as state substitutes by administering justice where 
the long arm of the law cannot reach is eminently understandable.33  An 
explicit link between high crime levels coupled with inadequate state 
protection, dearth of legitimacy and an increased likelihood of vigilantism is 
made in the English case of R v Connor and another; R v Mirza:34 
“A failure to convict a defendant whose guilt has been proved is a 
breach of the social contract between the state and its citizens.  It 
is a failure of the state to provide to citizens the protection to 
which they are entitled against the criminal activities of others.  It 
leads to a failure of public confidence in the justice system and the 
                                                                                                                             
standing not far from the victim’s body [who was lying on the ground with multiple lacerations and 
injuries], but none of them would give information as to what transpired.” (SAPS Bundu Courts 
Report (2012) 15).  See also the research cited in O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 
403, where 90% of Khayelitsha residents said they would not feel safe reporting to the police that 
they had witnessed a crime. 
31 SAPS Bundu Courts Report 4. 
32 Smith A Culture of Corruption 171. 
33 See also Knox & Monaghan Informal Justice in Divided Societies. 
34 R v Connor and another; R v Mirza [2004] 1 All ER 925 para 132. 
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ability of the state to maintain [the peace].  It encourages 
vigilantes.”35 
As regards the need for the criminal justice system to deal appropriately 
with dangerous criminals in order to preclude people resorting to self-help, 
Gamble J in S v Lunga states: 
“Ordinary members of the public, whether they reside in informal 
settlements, townships or leafy suburbs are all exposed to violent 
crimes of various descriptions on a regular basis.  They look to the 
courts for protection against ruthless thugs like the accused and 
they are entitled to be protected from them. A failure by the courts 
to respond appropriately could result in vigilantism.”36 
Taking the above into account, it is unsurprising that the Khayelitsha 
Commission report endorsed the views of Prof Godobo-Madikizela, who 
testified that a “shared sense of grievance and anger amongst the community 
at the high levels of crime … is one of the factors that makes vengeance 
attacks more likely”.37   
While fear of violent crime definitely plays a role in community 
members feeling justified in resorting to self-help, the degree and ubiquity of 
violence to which vigilante-prone communities are exposed goes beyond 
merely the fear of physical assault.   Vigilante violence may not simply be a 
response to crime, but may indeed be a symptom of generally high levels of 
aggression in communities that condone violent behaviour as a justifiable and 
“normal” response” to frustration. Harris argues convincingly that the 
pervasiveness of violence as a “legitimate and primary form of interaction” is a 
powerful explanation both for vigilantism and for the widespread endorsement 
and tolerance of the conduct of those who regard violent self-help as an 
acceptable solution to the crime problem.38   Likewise, Professor Kaminer 
testified before the Khayelitsha Commission to the effect that repeated 
exposure to violence leads to the normalisation of violence as a “socially and 
                                            
35 Para 132. 
36 S v Lunga 2012 JDR 0236 (WCC) para 35. 
37 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 337. 
38 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 38. 
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morally acceptable, appropriate and even honourable way of resolving 
conflicts and achieving goals”.39  In truth, prevalent societal violence may be 
one of the effects of shared community trauma that is passed on from 
generation to generation.  Prof Godobo-Madikizela testified before the 
Khayelitsha Commission as follows: 
“[T]he culture of violence has been transmitted from the past, and 
continues to transform identities and to play out both as cultural 
memory and collectively shared traumatic memory … [t]he feeling 
of exclusion, of being discarded members of society evokes the 
‘memory’ of repression under apartheid – little or nothing has 
changed.  The clarion call made whenever a thief is caught in 
action – Nal’isela (here is a thief!) – is reminiscent of the days 
when fingering a person as a police informer … gave a 
community the mandate to ‘necklace’ the culprit”.40  
The probable link between structural violence and the likelihood of 
private resort to violent self-help in a setting where historical factors such as 
extreme poverty and social inequality make institutionalised oppression an 
everyday reality has already been alluded to.41  In a society where people 
become “ensnared in a cycle of violence and counterviolence”,42 and violence 
is sanctioned and utilised as an expressive response by state and citizen 
alike, it is to be expected that people would be more inclined to take the law 
into their own hands instead of resorting to official channels to address their 
grievances. 
 The likelihood of violent problem-solving occurring is increased where 
high levels of aggression in the past incline the state to deal more harshly with 
“normal” crime. 43   Excessive state force itself may be instrumental in 
establishing a society prone to violence.  If the state is seen to devalue human 
life, dignity and physical integrity by condoning harsh investigative methods 
                                            
39 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 135. 
40 344. 
41 See § 4 2 above. 
42 Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society 643. 
43 Knox & Monaghan Informal Justice in Divided Societies. 
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and imposing expressive and retributive sanctions such as capital and 
corporal punishment, it serves as a negative role model for the rest of society.  
State punitiveness may lead to increased tolerance levels for the severe 
treatment of alleged offenders, and may ultimately also foster citizen 
willingness to incorporate such extreme violence into informal “justice-
making”.44 
Once citizens have been thus desensitised, even if the state clamps 
down on police brutality and abolishes violent forms of punishment, public 
opinion may lag behind.  Citizens’ punitive sentiments may persist despite the 
state extolling a human rights-based approach to dealing with disputes.45  
Indeed, communities where private violence is popularly endorsed may 
(consciously or unconsciously) socialise their youth into believing that taking 
the law into their own hands is a legitimate solution to problems.46  Societies 
that have in the past successfully legitimated their recourse to violent 
punishment by appealing to ideological justifications such as the desire to 
maintain a sense of tradition, culture or custom, 47  the need for self-
preservation, the right to revolution or the value of popular sovereignty48 may 
be more prone to vigilantism at a later stage too.49  It is thus clear that a 
societal “history of self-reliance, immediacy of response and punitive 
retribution” may have a considerable influence on contemporary attitudes to 
communal forms of violence such as vigilantism.50  
While these insights are useful for understanding why certain societies 
may be more prone to vigilantism than others, on its own the “culture of 
violence” conceptualisation of vigilantism provides too broad and all-
encompassing a framework to explain vigilantism adequately.  From this 
perspective, vigilantism is understood simply as one of many manifestations 
                                            
44 M Benevides & R Fischer Ferreira “Popular Responses and Urban Violence: Lynching in Brazil” in 
M K Huggins (eds) Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America (1991). 
45 See § 4 3 2 4 below for more on such second-order dissonance. 
46  D Kowalewski “Countermovement Vigilantism and Human Rights: A Propositional Inventory” 
(1996) 25 Crime, Law and Social Change 6364. 
47 See Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 37. 
48 See § 5 1 below. 
49 See Brown “The American Vigilante Tradition” in The History of Violence in America; Brown “The 
History of Vigilantism in America” in Vigilante Politics; and Little & Sheffield (1983) American 
Sociological Review for a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the USA. 
50 Knox & Monaghan Informal Justice in Divided Societies 50. 
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of the pervasive use of force that is characteristic of a society where “violence 
remains the universal language”51 without considering vigilantes’ specific and 
nuanced justifications and motivations for resorting to violence.  It therefore 
needs to be supplemented with other explanations of vigilantism that are more 
motive-driven so as to distinguish vigilantism from other forms of violence 
such as revenge killings, xenophobia and the violence engaged in by public 
protesters.  
 
4 2 2 Vigilantism as a “frontier” phenomenon 
Another explanation of vigilantism that relates to structural violence is 
the view that communities who take the law into their own hands do so chiefly 
in locales where the law’s enforcement capacity is for a variety of reasons 
“significantly diluted or resisted”.52  According to this paradigm vigilantism is a 
“frontier” phenomenon, tending to emerge where the state’s authority is less 
clearly recognised and adhered to by law-abiding citizens, criminals and 
vigilantes alike.  The frontier may be spatial, with vigilantism being a response 
to the social chaos in regions at the periphery of the state’s power base,53 or it 
may be a figurative “no go area”, where the effectiveness of state power in 
controlling crime is diluted due to difficulty of access combined with 
community alienation, tension and hostility.  The following extract contains a 
good example of the latter scenario: 
“We arrived to a large circle of people standing in the dark.  Inside 
the circle was a middle-aged woman holding a sjambok; a young 
man, bleeding quite heavily, kneeled in front of her.  The crowd 
parted for the two police officers.  They picked the beaten man off 
the ground and put him in the back of their van.  The crowd 
showed no dissatisfaction.  Clearly, the police had only been 
called in the first place because the crowd was happy that 
                                            
51 Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society 643. 
52 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 24. 
53  E.g. 19th century vigilantism on American western frontier (Brown “The American Vigilante 
Tradition” in The History of Violence in America; Brown “The History of Vigilantism in America” in 
Vigilante Politics). 
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sufficient ‘community justice’ had already been meted out … The 
Reiger Park police had little desire to police Jerusalem.  Its roads 
were impassable, its people volatile, and, in the absence of 
electricity, it was positively dangerous after dark. They were thus 
quite happy for Obese [the Community Policing Forum 
representative wielding the sjambok] to police the settlement for 
them.  Obese, in turn, acquired protection from the police.”54  
This vignette depicts the state agents involved as being perfectly 
content to cede their security-providing functions to members of this 
marginalised community, and there appears to be a quid pro quo relationship 
between the police and the vigilantes as regards security provision. 
The inaccessibility of formal justice – spatially, financially, symbolically 
– is a common refrain in literature on why people resort to vigilantism.  It is not 
only practical considerations such as poor lighting and lack of proper roads 
and maintained pathways 55  that isolate these “forgotten” 56  and neglected 
communities from proper police protection.  According to Steinberg, the little 
formal crime-prevention policing that does take place in South African 
townships still bears “ominous resemblance to apartheid policing”. 57   The 
police focus does not appear to be to fulfil the two vital functions that “nobody 
else in the field of crowded urban security” can serve, namely investigating 
crimes professionally and efficiently, and providing rapid and fair interventions 
for citizens in emergency situations.58  Instead, the SAPS’s paramilitary-style59 
“policing for risk” strategy entails “taking to the streets with aggression” in 
order to get guns off the streets, and policing the consumption of alcohol.  
Steinberg concludes: 
                                            
54  J Steinberg “Perpetually Half-Formed?  State and Non-State Security in the Work of Wilfried 
Schärf” (2009) 22 (2) Soth African Journal of Criminal Justice 162 172-173 (emphasis added). 
55 See Hathorn, et al. “Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha 
and a Breakdown in Relations Between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha: Complainant 
Organisations' Heads of Argument” Khayelitsha Commission 372. 
56 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 61. 
57 J Steinberg “Establishing Police Authority and Civilian Compliance in Post-Apartheid Johannesburg: 
An Argument from the Work of Egon Bittner” (2012) 22 (4) Policing and Society 481 491. 
58 490. 
59 See also Steinberg’s evidence about policing to the Khayelitsha Commission (O’Regan & Pikoli 
Khayelitsha Commission Report 298-299). 
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 “[F]or black urban South Africans, too little [has] changed.  The 
vital functions of keeping peace among strangers [are] still 
radically underprovided [by the formal criminal justice system].  
People thus [have] little reason to abandon private sources of 
security for the police.”60    
While this perspective may be over-pessimistic, it does point to the 
considerable hurdles that the police need to overcome in order to be 
perceived as legitimate justice providers to those on the margins. 
In accordance with the notion of structural violence posited earlier, the 
“social web of exploitation”61 engendered by poverty and inequality is borne 
out in the criminal justice sphere too.  Vigilante-prone “frontier zones” may not 
simply be at the geographical periphery, but may in fact emerge as a result of 
a calculated and/or historically entrenched criminal justice policy to expend 
scarce law-enforcement resources in manner that is biased in favour of the 
wealthier sections of society.  For instance, the Khayelitsha Commission 
heard that according to a 2011 Barometer survey, 69,2% of respondents in 
Khayelitsha Site B and 66,2% of respondents in Harare said that it was 
difficult or very difficult to access the police.62  There can be no doubt that 
Schönteich et al are correct in their view that the density of police personnel – 
and their willingness to intervene in violent situations – is lower in 
economically poor areas and in areas inhabited by ethnic and racial groups 
with little economic power, than in more affluent areas.63  Benevides and 
Fischer Ferreira concur that vigilante violence is “part and parcel of economic 
marginalization”.64   
Community members’ mistrust of the police is thus exacerbated by 
their lived experience that there is one law for the poor and one for the rich, 
                                            
60 It is necessary to supplement this negative perspective of township policing with a consideration of 
initiatives where the police have indeed tried to engage positively with marginalised communities.  
For more in this regard, see §§ 7 4 3 and 6 2 3.  
61 Farmer (2004) Current Anthropology 317. 
62 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 403. 
63 M Schönteich, A Minnaar, D Mistry & K Goyer Private Muscle: Outsourcing the Provision of 
Criminal Justice Services (2004) 23. 
64 Benevides & Fischer Ferreira “Popular Responses and Urban Violence: Lynching in Brazil” in 
Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America 41. 
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and this heightens their sense of having been forsaken by the formal criminal 
justice system.65  A perception that the criminal justice system is the exclusive 
preserve of the privileged may prejudice the economically marginalised 
against using official channels to deal with crime, and lead to a state of affairs 
where there is a “popular desire to rectify radical inequalities in the application 
of law”66 through the use of self-help.  Black opines that self-help may be a 
mechanism to mobilise the law among those who might otherwise be ignored 
– that it may “serve as a cry for help from people who are less capable of 
attracting legal attention without it”. 67   Similarly, Kriegler J warns lawyers 
against “throw[ing] their hands up in horror at ‘people’s courts’, as they 
represented a form of self-help by people who had been deserted by the 
law”.68  
Neglected by public security providers and unable to afford the 
expensive, customised protection on offer from the commercial private 
security sector, what option is there for community members but to resort to 
less savoury means of non-state policing?  Township dwellers do not have the 
luxury of “build[ing] a ‘protective cocoon’ around themselves”69 by paying for 
burglar alarms or armed response.  Having more time on their hands than 
money, and faced with a dearth of formal policing, the poor and marginalised 
have little choice but to police themselves 70  – with potentially fatal 
consequences for the targets of their policing endeavours.  For those living on 
the periphery of the formal state apparatus, there is only one ubiquitous and 
                                            
65 See also Minnaar The New Vigilantism and Post-April 1994 South Africa: Crime Prevention or an 
Expression of Lawlessness? 5, who opines that people are prejudiced against using formal channels 
for reporting crime due to the perception that the established legal system is for “whites only”, since 
it was previously used as a tool for state repression. 
66 Benevides & Fischer Ferreira “Popular Responses and Urban Violence: Lynching in Brazil” in 
Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America 41. 
67 Black “Crime as Social Control” in Towards a General Theory of Social Control Volume 2: Selected 
Problems 18. 
68 Extracts from S v Booi and others; S v Sepati and others, George Regional Court cases 404/91 and 
405/91, quoted in J Seekings “The Revival of 'People's Courts': Informal Justice in Transitional 
South Africa” (1992) 6 South African Review of Sociology 186 193. 
69 I Loader “Consumer Culture and the Commodification of Policing and Security” (1999) 33 (2) 
Sociology 373 381. 
70 See also K Gottschalk 2005 Vigilantism v. the State: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of Pagad, 
1996-2000 Institute for Security Studies  2. 
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viable option for accessing justice and addressing issues of security and 
moral order: the vigilante.71   
Buur goes so far as to say that townships have become “spaces of 
exception; spaces in which the law is, if not completely suspended, then, at 
least, enforced primarily by local justice structures that are governed by 
values and practices other than human rights and due process”.72  Buur’s 
perspective touches on an important aspect of the “frontier” quality of 
vigilantism that will be discussed in depth when the incompatibility of state 
and citizen law-enforcement beliefs is elaborated on in § 4 3 below, namely 
Abrahams’ insight that a frontier does not need to be spatial, but may be 
internal, with the problem being “one of reaching hearts and minds rather than 
actual places”.73 
The narrative sketched above portrays the state as having left “frontier” 
communities to their own crime-control devices by having failed to provide 
them with adequate security guarantees.  However, as will now be explained 
further, by simultaneously encouraging community members to police 
themselves, the state may – by design or default 74  – have ended up 
legitimating claims by community members to fight crime informally in the 
interests of the community.75   
 
  
                                            
71 Buur (2008) Review of African Political Economy 583; Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 61. 
72 Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 35. 
73 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 169. 
74 Lund (2006) Development and Change 692. 
75  Comaroff & Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: International Perspectives 217. 
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4 2 3 “Police yourselves” 
Ironically, the perception of poor and marginalised communities that 
they alone are responsible for their own security has unwittingly been given 
impetus by state policing trends.  This has occurred mainly by way of the late 
modern state’s “responsibilisation” strategy.76  It is based on a neoliberal77 
economic model of “governing-at-a-distance”78 that emphasises the need for 
the state to outsource public goods and services 79  – security and law 
enforcement among them80 – to agencies, organisations and individuals that 
operate outside of the state.81  In respect of law enforcement this entails the 
“criminal justice state … shedding its ‘sovereign’ style of governing” and 
enlisting the “governmental” powers of private sector actors in its quest to 
control crime.82  This governance strategy is sold to communities as a means 
of empowering them to regain control over their direct environment, and 
imposes on them the duty to participate actively in the provision of their own 
security.83  Rather than citizens being mere passive consumers of what is on 
offer from the police, responsibilisation reimagines them as “self-calculating, 
risk-monitoring consumers of security technology and services”.84  They are 
encouraged to engage in a variety of productive security activities 85  to 
manage their own crime risks86 themselves, which may include participating in 
Community Policing Forums (“CPFs”), neighbourhood watches (“NWs”) and 
citizen street patrols.  
Although it is arguably laudable for the state to have recognised the 
limits of its sovereign monopoly on the use of force in favour of an outlook that 
recognises the “dispersed, pluralistic nature of effective social control”,87 in the 
                                            
76 Garland Culture of Control 124. 
77 See chapter 2 n 195 for more on neoliberal strategies in this context. 
78 Garland Culture of Control 127. 
79 Pratten (2008) Africa 4. 
80  Comaroff & Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: International Perspectives 217. 
81 See also Schönteich, et al. Private Muscle: Outsourcing the Provision of Criminal Justice Services 8. 
82 Garland Culture of Control 124; 125. 
83 Bénit-Gbaffou (2006) Urban Forum 310-311; R Abrahamsen & M C Williams “Introduction: The 
Privatisation and Globalisation of Security in Africa” (2007) 21 (2) International Relations 131 135. 
84 Loader (2000) Social and Legal Studies 331. 
85 Johnston (2001) Urban Studies 965. 
86 Loader (1999) Sociology 377. 
87 Garland Culture of Control 126. 
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context of already vigilante-prone communities this strategy of “outsourcing 
security”88 has the potential to backfire very badly.89  Johnston’s distinction 
between “responsible” citizenship, which is sanctioned – “responsibilised” – by 
the state, and “autonomous” citizenship, where there is no such state support, 
is relevant once more.90  Johnston correctly identifies a risk inherent in the 
state mobilisation of the public to engage in acts of responsible citizenship, 
namely that this might inadvertently promote alternative modes of 
autonomous citizenship too, of which vigilantism is one.91    
The “community policing” model that is sometimes extolled as being 
the new “one-size-fits-all” strategy for addressing the ills of the police service 
has its own difficulties when imported into an African context.92  As will be 
shown in chapter 7, initiatives such as CPFs, intended to deal with the 
delegitimation gap by enhancing the project of community policing and 
building good relations between the police and the community, have largely 
not fulfilled their promise.93  Also, prima facie, community policing denotes 
policing by the community, with the precise meaning of ‘community’ being left 
undefined.94   It would be eminently understandable for community members, 
abandoned by state law-enforcement agents and already steeped in a 
tradition of self-help, to equate community policing with (bottom-up) 
                                            
88 Pratten (2008) Africa 4. 
89 See also Sundar (2010) Critique of Anthropology, who draws a link between the outsourcing of 
security and a resurgence in vigilantism in  India. 
90 See also § 2 5 2 above. 
91 Johnston (2001) Urban Studies 967. 
92 See, e.g. M Brogden “Implanting Community Policing in South Africa: A Failure of History, of 
Context and of Theory” (2002) 24 Liverpool Law Review 157; M Brogden “Commentary: 
Community Policing: A Panacea from the West” (2004) 103 (413) African Affairs 635; M Brogden 
“"Horses for Courses" and "Thin Blue Lines": Community Policing in Transitional Society” (2005) 8 
(1) Police Quarterly 64.  See chapter 7 for an in-depth discussion of community policing initiatives 
and their potential to harness vigilante crime-fighting energies. 
93  See O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 411-412; also L Buur “Sovereignty & 
Democratic Exclusion in the New South Africa” (2005) 32 (104/105) Review of African Political 
Economy 253 for a critique of the democratic model embodied by CPFs in practice.  There is a 
critical discussion of the practical application of CPFs at § 7 4 2, so this topic is not considered in 
depth here. 
94  Comaroff & Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: International Perspectives 217.  See Buur (2005) Review of African Political Economy 259-
261 for more on the ambivalent nature of the concept of “the people” in the context of community 
policing.  
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vigilantism, with the state appeal for more (top-down) community policing 
providing a measure of legitimation for their violent self-help activities.95    
Numerous authors are of the view that the excessive degree of 
privatisation of security has indeed given license for “irresponsible” forms of 
citizenship such as vigilantism to flourish.96  These include Lund, who notes 
that this outsourcing strategy may account significantly for the “blurring of the 
boundary between public and private”, 97  and Evans, who regards 
responsibilisation as potentially precipitating a “collapse of a meaningful 
distinction between vigilance and vigilantism”.98  Buur also opines that the 
state implicitly incorporates vigilante groups into its security provision by its de 
facto outsourcing of popular sovereignty to the community,99  while Kirsch 
views vigilantism as a “side-effect” of applying democratic principles in semi-
private crime-prevention associations. 100   Most articulate in this regard is 
Bénit-Gbaffou.  In her analysis of the South African state’s promotion of 
community policing, she identifies as worrisome the confusion occasioned by 
contradictory public discourse about responsibilisation: the state appeals to 
the public to patrol the streets, whilst simultaneously appearing to condemn 
vigilantism.  This, she says, legitimises the contestation of the Bill of Rights at 
grassroots level: “Constitutional principles have little meaning in situations 
where communities have been granted rights to apprehend the ‘criminal’”.101  
According to her, there is also a lack of satisfactory engagement with public 
authorities regarding how to solve the local security problems that 
communities have been encouraged to identify during the course of CPF 
initiatives.102  This not infrequently results in people taking the law into their 
                                            
95 See also D Wisler & I D Onwudiwe “Community Policing in Comparison” (2008) 11 (4) Police 
Quarterly 427 for more on “bottom-up” as opposed to “top-down” community policing. 
96 See Bidaguren & Nina (2004) Social Justice 173. 
97 Lund (2006) Development and Change 692. 
98  J Evans “Vigilance and Vigilantes: Thinking Psychoanalytically about Anti-Paedophile Action” 
(2003) 7 (2) Theoretical Criminology 163 165. 
99 L Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced: Local Justice and Violence in Port Elizabeth” in T B Hansen 
and F Stepputat (eds) Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World 
(2005) 211. 
100 T G Kirsch “Violence in the Name of Democracy: Community Policing, Vigilante Action & Nation-
Building in South Africa” in T G Kirsch and T Grätz (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa 
(2010) 142. 
101 C Bénit-Gbaffou “Community Policing and Disputed Norms for Local Social Control in Post-
Apartheid Johannesburg” (2008) 34 (1) Journal of Southern African Studies 93 101; 108. 
102 For more on CPFs, see from § 7 4 1 below. 
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own hands “using whatever means within their reach – vigilantism for the 
poorer or security villages for the wealthier”.103   
With reference to case law, Mkhize v S104 is a classic illustration of the 
manner in which what appears to be an instance of the outsourcing of state 
responsibility can go terribly wrong.  The accused, the chairperson of the local 
CPF, was convicted of the murder, attempted murder, kidnapping and assault 
of two men who were suspected of robbing and raping two female teachers.  
According to his testimony, having been told who the suspects were, police 
instructed the CPF members “to go and look for the suspects themselves”, by 
which Mkhize inferred that what was expected of him was to “get” them and 
take them to the police station.  After being “arrested”, the suspects were 
questioned to obtain information about their involvement in the crime, during 
the course of which CPF members beat them so severely that one died of his 
wounds.  When testifying about why they did not take the suspects to the 
police station immediately after “arresting” them, a fellow CPF member said 
that he only wanted to call the police when he was sure about whether they 
had the:  
“wrong people or right people … [T]he police said they can't arrest 
people if they have no physical evidence so that is why we didn't 
call the police by that time we wanted to take them to the place 
where the goods were kept, the stolen goods were kept, then call 
the police in order to tell them that here are the suspects and the 
stolen goods.”105   
Whether or not their perception was correct, these “responsibilised” 
CPF members had clearly formed the impression that the police would only 
act against the wrongdoers once the CPF had done a complete criminal 
investigation themselves, and that it was their duty to obtain the necessary 
evidence for conviction no matter what the human cost. 
                                            
103 Bénit-Gbaffou (2006) Urban Forum 320. 
104 Mkhize v S [2009] JOL 24118 (KZP), especially paras 11-13. 
105 Para 13.  
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The dangers of responsibilisation are fully acknowledged in S v Hena 
and another 106  where on the facts, an investigating officer advised the 
complainant to approach a (vigilante) anti-crime committee to deal with her 
issue, which concerned the theft of a cell phone.  Anti-crime committee 
members ended up interrogating and assaulting one of the accused until he 
produced the stolen cell phone.  Plasket J pointedly criticised this “abdication 
of responsibility on the part of the police”, holding that this “privatising” of their 
investigative functions was in violation of s 205(3) of the Constitution, which 
places the duty on the police service to “prevent, combat and investigate 
crime”.  He concluded that by “sub-contracting” their investigative role, the 
police were complicit in the subsequent fundamental rights violation 
perpetrated by the anti-crime committee, and declared that the evidence 
obtained by the vigilantes should be excluded on the grounds that it was 
unconstitutionally obtained.107 
 To conclude, in many instances the South African state’s policy of 
responsibilisation seems irresponsible and ill-conceived, especially 
considering the social circumstances in which it is taking place.  As Bénit-
Gbaffou puts it, “can one give residents the duty to ensure their own 
neighbourhood’s security, and refuse them the right to exclude [potentially by 
violent means] whomever they consider a threat (or even a risk) to their own 
local social order?” 108   However, this pessimistic conclusion regarding 
responsibilisation does not imply that the potential crime-fighting authority of 
“autonomous” citizens should not – and cannot – be co-opted by the state.  
Possible means of doing so in a more context-sensitive way are explored 
further from § 7 4 below. 
 
                                            
106 S v Hena 37H. 
107 40E-H; 41G-I; 42A-B. 
108 Bénit-Gbaffou (2006) Urban Forum 310. 
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4 2 4 Understanding the link between lack of due performance, 
delegitimation and support for vigilantism 
Social conditions that are conducive to vigilantism – among them high 
levels of violence, poverty, inequality and marginalisation – have been 
considered above, as has the impact of the state strategy of outsourcing its 
policing and security provision to the community.  The focus now shifts to 
conduct engaged in by state agents – most particularly the police as the “most 
high-profile representative of the criminal justice system”, 109  but also the 
judiciary – that may foster or facilitate vigilantism (or, conversely, discourage 
it).  Baker strikingly describes Africans as being compelled to police 
themselves when confronted by what he terms the “predatory state”, which is 
characterised by inefficiency, bias, corruption, exploitation, criminality and 
violence.110  The present examination of the state inability to comply with the 
“due performance” component of legitimacy in the criminal justice sphere is 
threefold, focusing on ineffectiveness, procedural injustice and deliberate 
wrongdoing.  The underlying premise is still that vigilantism is to a great extent 
a symptom of a state normative legitimacy deficit, particularly owing to the 
inadequate security guarantees that the state provides to its citizens.   
There is empirical evidence supporting this premise, with research 
corroborating the assumption that perceptions of state legitimacy are linked 
with levels of procedural justice, as well as evidence that police effectiveness 
plays an important role in determining whether citizens view the state as being 
legitimate.111  Tankebe’s Ghanaian study on public support for vigilante self-
help concluded that normative assessments relating to trustworthiness of the 
police, as opposed to instrumental assessments concerned with police 
effectiveness, were “fundamentally linked” with support for vigilantism.112  A 
                                            
109 J Jackson, A Z Huq, B Bradford & T R Tyler “Monopolizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public 
Attitudes toward the Acceptability of Violence” (2013) 19 (4) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 
479 490. 
110 Baker Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa 40. 
111  It must be noted that, for the most part, these studies use legitimacy measures that focus on 
establishing belief in legitimacy, à la Tyler, as opposed to normative legitimacy itself in Beetham’s 
sense.  Nevertheless, there is no reason why their conclusions should not be regarded as an indication 
of the extent to which the “due performance” criterion of normative legitimacy is (or is not) complied 
with. 
112 J Tankebe “Self-Help, Policing and Procedural Justice: Ghanaian Vigilantism and the Rule of Law” 
(2009) 43 (2) Law and Society Review 245 259-260. 
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Dutch study by Haas et al found that the greater the confidence in the police, 
both as regards police results (effectiveness) and their degree of 
responsiveness, the less support there was for vigilantism (although in this 
first world context, there was very little overall support for vigilantism in any 
event).113  A core finding of the study of Jackson et al concerning the attitudes 
of London youth to the use of violence to achieve social change and social 
control was that judgments about police legitimacy – with procedural justice 
being a crucial component – were negatively correlated with individual 
attitudes towards private violence for social control and social change.114  
Citing an IDASA study about support for vigilante group PAGAD, Sekhonyane 
and Louw note that those who voiced disapproval of overall and specific 
performance of South African law enforcement institutions were more willing 
to engage in violent collective action.  The same applied to people who felt 
that they had been treated unequally by the police or courts and to those who 
felt less safe at home or in their neighbourhood.115  A more recent study by 
Bradford et al explicitly omits including the take-up of private security options 
from the study of factors influencing police legitimacy in South Africa, although 
the authors speculate that resorting to private security measures – including 
vigilantism – may be a result of low police legitimacy rather than its cause.116  
As has already been noted,117 they found that trust in both procedural justice 
and efficacy is correlated to police legitimacy, with “perceived effectiveness of 
the police, rooted in anxieties and experiences of crime” seemingly playing 
the more significant role.118   
 It is clear from the above research that a state’s inability to secure 
basic levels of protection for all members of the community – to give everyone 
a “fair share of scarce security resources”, 119 and to do so in an equitable and 
trustworthy manner – may undermine state legitimacy and make communities 
                                            
113 N E Haas, J W De Keijser & G J Bruinsma “Public Support for Vigilantism, Confidence in Police 
and Police Responsiveness” (2014) 24 (2) Policing and Society 224 235. 
114 Jackson, et al. (2013) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 490. 
115 Sekhonyane & Louw Violent Justice 11-12. 
116 Bradford, et al. (2014) Regulation & Governance 253. 
117 See §§ 3 2 2 and 3 7 above. 
118 Bradford, et al. (2014) Regulation & Governance 259-260. 
119 I Loader “Thinking Normatively About Private Security” (1997) 24 (3) Journal of Law and Society 
377 383. 
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more prone to vigilantism.  What follows is a more detailed exposition of 
various ways in which the criminal justice system has failed to meet citizen 
expectations relating to security provision and protection.  It also contains 
some speculation as to how such failure may spark a tendency towards 
violent self-help.  The aim is not to discuss all instances of state failure in 
exhaustive empirical detail, but rather to give an overview of prevalent 
shortcomings and difficulties, as well as some real-life examples of the types 
of problems marginalised people face, so as to better understand why they 
might feel justified in resorting to vigilantism. 
 
4 2 5 State inefficiencies contributing to state delegitimation 
 
These quotes underscore a discourse that depicts vigilantism as being 
a necessary response to a “policing gap” left by failing authorities, with the 
community’s trust in the police being eroded to such an extent that they feel 
compelled to resort to self-help.  There are various factors contributing to this 
sense that vigilantism is due to inadequate criminal justice service provision, 
each of which is discussed separately below. 
 
  
“The police are useless.  Our faith in them is gone.” 
– Khayelitsha resident quoted in O’Regan and Pikoli Khayelitsha 
Commission Report 343. 
 
“If only the police would do their job the people in the 
community wouldn’t have to take the law into their own hands.  
I mean they are not doing anything from what I can see.” 
– Zandspruit resident quoted in Martin (2012) State Crime 229. 
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4 2 5 1 Resource constraints 
 
Insufficient resources, both human and financial, may obstruct the 
state’s ability to fulfil citizens’ law-enforcement expectations that the police 
should deal competently with ubiquitous violent crime.  For instance, factors 
such as a lack of police vehicles to respond to crime calls, officers ill-equipped 
for performing functions such as crime-scene management120 and/or officers 
who lack the necessary professional skills and competencies121 due to poor 
training, may hinder service provision and diminish the likelihood of effective 
crime-detection and visible pro-active policing.  The Khayelitsha Commission 
report notes that in many of the most crime-ridden areas there is simply 
insufficient manpower to perform adequately such crucial tasks as the 
patrolling of informal neighbourhoods and basic detection. 122   Resource-
related constraints may be especially acute in deep rural “frontier zones”, 
where police-citizen contact is further impeded by a lack of infrastructure, 
logistical problems, geographical isolation and inaccessible topography.  If 
cases are indeed investigated and come to trial, courts have difficulty in 
processing cases due to factors such as the failure of police to take dockets to 
court,123 with delays being frequent and a low proportion of the number of 
                                            
120 See O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 377-379, where the problem of inadequate 
crime scene management is discussed.  Some of the resource-related issues identified were the failure 
to provide all patrol vehicles with basic low-cost crime scene equipment such as barrier tape, 
protective garments and gloves; that SAPS members are not properly trained in crime scene 
management; environmental challenges to cordoning off crime scenes; and the absence of adequate 
lighting at crime scenes, which could be remedied by providing halogen lights and small generators 
to crime scene teams.  
121 Martin (2012) State Crime 223. 
122 See O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report chapter 13 for more details. 
123 368-370; see also 164-165.  The reasons given by the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) for 
not bringing dockets to court timeously were all ostensibly resource-related – e.g., that the dockets 
are locked in an office, that the investigator is not on duty to bring them to court after working a 
night shift, and that there is no vehicle to transport the dockets to court.  The DPP dismissed the 
“[T]he reality is there is not enough hours in a day, there is not 
enough days in a week, there is not enough investigators”. 
 Colonel Marais, Detective Commander of the Khayelitsha Site B police station, 
quoted in O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 365. 
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cases recorded being successfully prosecuted.  The Khayelitsha Commission 
report observes that a successful conviction is achieved in only a tiny 
proportion of cases reported to the SAPS – a shocking 0.5% of the cases 
reported to the Harare police station, for instance.124  This state of affairs is 
compounded where citizens feel unable to access the services of the judicial 
system due to poverty and a feeling of being alienated from an over-formal 
and complicated formal justice system.125  
Binns-Ward J eloquently acknowledges that a lack of resources and a 
poorly functioning criminal justice system could precipitate self-help. In S v 
Dikqacwi, while sentencing the accused for vigilantism-related offences, he 
remarks: 
“It is evident that the crimes were committed in a peculiar social 
context. The commission of the crimes is a manifestation of a 
broad problem affecting a large section of South African society, 
notably those living in the widely impoverished, densely populated 
and under-resourced townships in our cities like Khayelitsha and 
Philippi, that is of persons in communities taking over and 
carrying out themselves the functions that in a properly 
functioning society would be discharged by the criminal justice 
system – the police and the courts … [V]igilantes are seen by 
many in the communities in which the phenomenon of vigilantism 
and mob justice occurs as upstanding and respectable members 
of the community, and indeed see themselves as serving the 
interests of their community.  On reflection, even if wholly 
unacceptable, this much is understandable in the context of a 
perception by a community that the formal and constitutionally 
established criminal justice system is not functioning.”126 
                                                                                                                             
option of securing dockets in a “strong room” or implementing an electronic docket system as 
unfeasible. 
124 364. 
125 See Bidaguren & Nina (2004) Social Justice; Sekhonyane & Louw Violent Justice; and para 6 2 1 
below. 
126 S v Dikqacwi and others Case no. SS49/2012; decided 2013-04-15 (WCC) para 4; 6 (emphasis 
added). 
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By recognising the role that the failing formal criminal justice system 
plays in precipitating vigilantism, Binns-Ward J finds himself in the 
uncomfortable position of viewing vigilantism as both “wholly unacceptable” 
and “understandable” – a dilemma that is all too familiar to anyone engaged in 
a more than superficial scrutiny of vigilantism. 
 
4 2 5 2 State lethargy  
It is justifiably difficult for an overburdened and cash-strapped criminal 
justice system to deliver a service to the public that will promote confidence in 
the legal process and counteract the fears and frustrations resulting from 
rising crime levels.  However, where the performance of police or judicial 
officers is ineffective due to their own blameworthy conduct, not factors 
beyond their control, state failure to maintain order and security may be 
particularly likely to cause loss of faith in formal justice and to incite citizen 
opposition, including vigilantism.  
Vigilantism is sometimes justified as being a “necessary and inevitable 
reaction to police lethargy”127 – an attempt to awaken the police “sleeping on 
the job”,128 as it were.  76% of the 170 complaints against police that the 
Khayelitsha Commission admitted to the record related to “poor service”, so it 
seems that police indolence and neglect is clearly a pressing issue.129  Such 
police negligence can manifest itself in a variety of ways, some of which will 
now be detailed.   
 
  
                                            
127 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 22. 
128 L Johns (1999) SASA Congress: Securing South Africa's Future “Vigilantism: The Future of South 
Africa's Security?”. 
129 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 103-104. 
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4 2 5 2 1 Slow response times 
 
A common complaint is the failure of police to respond to citizens’ 
requests for assistance and service within a reasonable time, with poor 
response times also being highlighted as an issue by the Khayelitsha 
Commission report.130  In S v Mvabaza,131 for example, the court details a 
vigilante scenario where the police were telephoned on three occasions by 
one of the accused, whose friend also reported the incident in person at the 
Khayelitsha police station.  The police arrived on two occasions; on the first, 
they simply left when they found a crowd of bystanders, and by the time they 
arrived a second time it was too late to save the victim.132  In imposing 
sentences for kidnapping and assault with the intent to do grievous bodily 
harm, Nyman AJ evidently considered the police failure “to carry out one of its 
primary constitutional duties of crime prevention”133 as a relevant factor in 
mitigation of punishment.  Taking into account “that poor policing has caused 
the accused to lose faith in the criminal justice system and impose justice in 
                                            
130  360; see also Hathorn, et al. “Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in 
Khayelitsha and a Breakdown in Relations Between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha: 
Complainant Organisations' Heads of Argument” Khayelitsha Commission 355.  Of the 170 
complaints admitted to the record of the Khayelitsha Commission, 18% related to SAPS’s failure to 
respond promptly to calls for help (O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 103-104. 
131 S v Mvabaza and others Case no. SS62/2012; decided 2013-06-07 (WCC). 
132 Para 8. 
133 Para 8. 
“They came here and they stole everything in my house … but 
the police took time to come.  So I just lost my temper.  I was 
angry and that’s when I called the people and we attacked 
them [the suspected offenders].  But maybe if the police had 
come in time maybe we wouldn’t have beaten those people 
up.” 
– Zandspruit resident quoted in Martin (2012) State Crime 228-229.  
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their own way”,134 he imposed wholly suspended sentences, combined with 
correctional supervision. 
 
4 2 5 2 2 Lack of police action and initiative 
 
Another frequent community grievance that may give rise to vigilantism 
relates to police failure to take action, to open dockets or to investigate cases 
brought to them, and that such investigation as is undertaken is of a very poor 
quality.135  Instances of non-investigation accounted for 43% of the complaints 
before the Khayelitsha Commission.136  For example, the Commission refers 
to the evidence of one Ms DG, who was accosted and assaulted by a man 
who attempted to strangle her and beat her repeatedly.  She was assisted by 
two bystanders, who themselves began to beat the perpetrator.  A police van 
that was driving past was stopped, and the officers transported her and her 
assailant to the hospital (in separate vans).  When she eventually recovered 
from her injuries and inquired at the police station about what had become of 
the perpetrator, Ms DG discovered that no case had been opened and that 
the police had only been sent to the scene to break up a fight.  She was also 
not informed that she could lay a charge against him.  As a result of this 
treatment, she declared, “I am very angry at the police for the way my assault 
was handled. I feel unsafe all the time in Khayelitsha and the man who 
                                            
134 Para 9. 
135 The Khayelitsha Commission’s analysis of a random sample of 25 complaint dockets confirmed that 
the quality of detective work was very poor (O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report219). 
136 103-104. 
“I think if the police could take people’s grievances seriously, 
report their case and the police would make sure that the case 
was handled properly then there wouldn’t be a need for mob 
justice.” 
– Zandspruit resident quoted in Martin (2012) State Crime 223.  
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assaulted me nearly beat me to death, and he has not been punished.”  She 
also stated that, “I do not see what the purpose of the police in Khayelitsha is, 
if they cannot even deal with a case like this, where the perpetrator was in 
their custody and there were two witnesses.”137  
This account is instructive: the police perceived their role simply to be 
to deal with an affray, rather than to obtain evidence to open a criminal case 
either against the initial assailant, or against those who assaulted him.  It also 
illustrates the pervasiveness and routine nature of the violent vigilante 
response: Ms DG glosses over the bystanders’ beating up of the perpetrator 
as being unremarkable “assistance”.  Lastly, it exposes the police’s 
exacerbation of their initial lethargy in that they did not even inform Ms DG 
that she could lay a criminal complaint against her assailant. 
Another Khayelitsha Commission narrative that powerfully articulates 
the seeming unwillingness of police to do their job is that of Ms Vuyiswa 
Mpekweni.  Her niece and three children had died in an informal shack fire 
that was deliberately set by her niece’s husband, who went to the police and 
confessed his involvement.  He appeared in court once, but was released 
because the docket had been mislaid; he subsequently moved to 
Johannesburg.  Ms Mpekweni went to the police station to inform them of this, 
and took along a photograph of the perpetrator to assist the police.  She 
testified: 
“I then met that detective and gave him this picture. I told him that 
I had not heard anything about this case.  The detective then 
asked me if I knew where in Johannesburg [the perpetrator] was.  
I told him that I didn’t know exactly where but I heard that he was 
in Johannesburg, and the detective said to me that I should try 
and investigate exactly where in Johannesburg he was, because 
Johannesburg is big.  That day I left just like that, but my heart 
was broken, because at this time he was making me do the work 
of the police … ever since they asked me to investigate exactly 
                                            
137 102-103. 
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where he was in Johannesburg, that is where I lost trust in the 
police and told myself that I was leaving it.”138    
A suspect was finally arrested and appeared in court in July 2014, 
seven years after the initial incident.  A cynical – but not unjustified – 
inference is that the impetus behind the renewed investigation was the 
Khayelitsha Commission’s asking SAPS to make the docket available in 
January 2014. 
 
4 2 5 2 3 Missing dockets  
 
A final instance of ineptitude highlighted by the Khayelitsha 
Commission that is attributable at least partially to police lethargy is that 
dockets are not brought to court.  This is either because the dockets 
themselves are missing, or simply due to police failure to get them to court on 
time,139 a concern for 7% of complainants.140  While this issue has already 
been mentioned in connection with a lack of resources, the reasons proffered 
by the DPP for the proliferation of missing dockets141 may merely be an 
attempt to deflect blame away from police failings.  That it is within the power 
of the police to improve their efficiency, but that they choose not to, is borne 
                                            
138 95-96. 
139 The Detective Commander of the Khayelitsha Site B police station, Colonel Marais, admitted that 
“plain negligence” often accounted for dockets not arriving at court (O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha 
Commission Report 231). 
140 103-104. 
141 See chapter 4 n 123 for more details. 
“Because the people are tired of the services they are getting 
from the police they end up taking the law into their own 
hands.  There is a guy who killed a lot of people last year… he 
was handed over to the police.  Later the docket went 
missing.” 
– Zandspruit resident quoted in Martin (2012) State Crime 223.  
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out by the testimony of the senior prosecutor at the Khayelitsha Magistrates’ 
Court.  She noted that sometimes there would be a temporary improvement in 
the delivery of dockets after the issue had (yet again) been drawn to SAPS’s 
attention in their monthly meetings, but then things “tend to go back to the 
way it was before”.142 
The Khayelitsha Commission found that between 16% and 36% of 
serious cases 143  are withdrawn or struck off the roll simply because of 
incomplete police investigation or the repeated failure to bring dockets to court 
– this only occurring after multiple postponements.  Such cases are deemed 
ready for prosecution, with perpetrators having been identified, apprehended 
and having a case to answer, but convictions are not obtained due to police 
inefficiency.144  The unavailability of dockets results in cases being withdrawn 
or postponed,145 or suspects being released and absconding, as was the case 
with the accused in Ms Mpekweni’s case detailed above.  The finding of the 
Khayelitsha Commission that striking cases off the roll due to dockets not 
being brought to court is a “serious inefficiency” with “burdensome and 
serious consequences for …  the pursuit of justice” as well as for victims’ 
confidence in police competence,146 must be wholeheartedly endorsed. 
Considering examples like the ones detailed above it is understandable 
why the state’s claim to be viewed as a “credible guarantor of personal 
security” 147  might be treated with scepticism.  Not only does policing 
inadequacy leave the direct victims of crime feeling betrayed and abandoned, 
but it also leaves society in general disillusioned about the state’s crime-
fighting capacity.  Where there is an absence of visible and prompt state 
policing, with police neglecting to take action against wrongdoers or 
jeopardising their conviction by not ensuring that dockets are in court, law-
enforcement (and justice!) is not palpably being seen to be done. This may 
                                            
142 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 166. 
143 E.g. murder or attempted murder, rape, robbery with aggravating circumstances, kidnapping, child 
abuse and assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm. 
144 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 162-163. 
145 See at 123 for an example. 
146 370. 
147 Baker Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa 169. 
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well lead to a culture of impunity, 148  emboldening criminals and potential 
vigilantes alike to flout the law.  
 
4 2 6 Procedural justice-related factors that contribute to state 
delegitimation 
 
In referring to lack of trust in the police and to the notion that the police 
do not “take care” of the interests of those they serve, the words of this 
Khayelitsha community activist denote more than a dissatisfaction with the 
crime-fighting abilities of the police: their treatment of citizens and their bona 
fides in carrying out their duties are also questioned.  
While citizens’ perception of their ineffectiveness in the fight against 
crime may well undermine the legitimacy of the police,149 it is important to 
recognise that state legitimacy is eroded by factors other than weak 
substantive performance.  As has already been mentioned, there is a 
substantial body of research on procedural fairness showing that people are 
not merely concerned with instrumental considerations: they are moral beings, 
concerned with procedural correctness, and the fairness and trustworthiness 
of legal authorities. 150   It is necessary, then, to consider the normative 
                                            
148 Hathorn, et al. “Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a 
Breakdown in Relations Between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha: Complainant 
Organisations' Heads of Argument” Khayelitsha Commission para 362. 
149 See the conclusion of Bradford, et al. (2014) Regulation & Governance 261. 
150 See, e.g., Tankebe (2009) Law and Society Review 247, Tyler Why People Obey the Law; Tyler 
(2003) Crime and Justice; Tyler & Huo Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the 
Police and Courts; and Sunshine & Tyler (2003) Law & Society Review. 
“[I]n our areas no-one trusts the police … a lot of people … get 
injured or … robbed and they don’t report cases because they 
know the police will not take care of their cases and they will not 
be solved.  Nothing will happen to them.” 
– Khayelitsha resident quoted in O’Regan and Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission 
Report 109.  
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considerations impacting state legitimacy and to recognise that the state’s 
duty towards its citizens extends beyond simply protecting them against 
victimisation.  What procedural fairness entails, some examples illustrating the 
public perception that police have violated their normative obligation to treat 
people in a procedurally fair manner, and the effect of such unfair treatment 
on citizens’ propensity to support violent self-help, are now outlined. 
According to Tyler’s process-based model, the “key antecedents”151 for 
people being willing to internalise the obligation to obey legal authorities152 
and to co-operate with them – both immediately and in the long term – are 
whether they perceive such authorities to be exercising their authority in fair 
ways, and whether they trust their motives.153 Whether a procedure is viewed 
as fair depends, inter alia on whether decision-making is regarded as being 
“neutral, consistent, rule-based and without bias”; whether authorities treat 
people with dignity and respect, and acknowledge their rights; and whether 
people have an opportunity to participate in decision-making by stating their 
perspective and having authorities consider their views about how problems 
should be resolved.154  
As far as trust in general is concerned, there is no doubt that in South 
Africa there are historical reasons for levels of community mistrust of police 
being very high.  During the apartheid era police were seen as the enemy, 
with people preferring to take the law into their own hands rather than work 
with the police.  This legacy is perceived to be continuing.  As one of Harris’s 
respondents put it, “One can see from the relationship that [the police] have 
with the community that they haven't changed from the past police, meaning 
that they are not friendly enough, the communication level is not there.”155  It 
appears that the police have not managed to “win the hearts and minds” of 
                                            
151 Tyler (2003) Crime and Justice 350. 
152 Tyler ((2003) Crime and Justice 310) regards this perceived obligation to obey as “the most direct 
extension of the concept of legitimacy”. 
153 Tyler (2003) Crime and Justice 294. 
154 300.  See also § 3 7 above. 
155 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 29. 
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the marginalised and disadvantaged even though, given the legacy of policing 
under apartheid, it may be argued that they have a special duty to do so.156   
In their heads of argument before the Khayelitsha Commission, the 
complainant organisations accused the SAPS of dehumanising, disrespectful 
treatment, bias, capriciousness, contempt, discourtesy and having a 
dismissive attitude that denied people a chance to state their point of view.157  
Unfortunately, there is ample corroboration for these accusations.  According 
to the Mthente survey conducted in December 2013 and January 2014, 
55.3% of survey respondents disagreed with the statement that police in 
Khayelitsha are polite, and post-survey focus groups characterised SAPS in 
Khayelitsha as “very unprofessional and disrespectful” and “apathetic”. 158  
Many individual complainants, too, suggested that SAPS members do not 
treat members of the community with respect or concern.159   
A common grievance, accounting for 44% of complaints admitted to the 
record before the Khayelitsha Commission, concerned the failure of police to 
keep crime victims and bereaved family members abreast of the process of 
investigations and criminal trials. 160   The Commission condemned as 
“unacceptable” an apparent police attitude that it is unnecessary to inform 
bereaved family members of a criminal investigation’s progress.161  
The Commission also denounced the police for their absence of an 
“ethic of courtesy and respect”, finding that minority groups such as LGBTI162 
individuals and foreign nationals are the particular targets of discriminatory 
treatment, and are not regarded as worthy of “equal respect and concern”.163 
Overall lack of courtesy is particularly widespread among junior SAPS 
                                            
156 See O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 275. 
157 Hathorn, et al. “Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a 
Breakdown in Relations Between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha: Complainant 
Organisations' Heads of Argument” Khayelitsha Commission para 389. 
158 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 133. 
159 128. 
160 103. 
161 85. 
162 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender/Transsexual and Intersexed. 
163 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 425. 
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members.164  Community members experience such treatment as “humiliating 
and an affront to their dignity”.165 
Another finding was that the police do not address complaints against 
themselves satisfactorily, with grievances not being assuaged and complaints 
not being dealt with equitably, speedily and in a non-biased, transparent 
manner.  More than 80% of the complaints about Khayelitsha SAPS members 
made to police stations, the Provincial Inspectorate or the Independent Police 
Investigative Directorate (“IPID”) were deemed to be “unfounded” or 
“unsubstantiated”, and were dismissed.  While the Commission conceded that 
some of the complaints could indeed have been vexatious, they held that it 
was unlikely that such a large proportion of them were completely groundless.  
They concluded that a failure to treat complaints seriously and fairly destroys 
confidence in the police, and is a factor contributing to the breakdown of 
relations between SAPS and community members.166 
As regards the connection between vigilantism and (a lack of) 
procedural justice, there is good reason to believe that a widespread 
perception of police untrustworthiness brought on by unfair and disrespectful 
treatment of citizens may indeed undermine the criminal justice system’s 
claim to exercise exclusive legitimate power in the crime-fighting sphere.167  
Research has shown that personal experiences of policing are associated 
with trust and legitimacy, and that unsatisfactory contact with police has a 
strong negative effect on trust in police fairness and effectiveness.  What the 
police do – particularly when interacting with members of the public – 
determines whether they are deemed trustworthy, and thus accorded 
legitimacy.168  Furthermore, there is empirical evidence of a link between 
support for vigilantism and people’s judgments about the trustworthiness of 
the police.  Sekhonyane and Louw’s finding169 that those who feel they are 
                                            
164 128. 
165 Hathorn, et al. “Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a 
Breakdown in Relations Between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha: Complainant 
Organisations' Heads of Argument” Khayelitsha Commission 389. 
166 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 416; 419-420. 
167 Tankebe (2009) Law and Society Review 260. 
168 See Bradford, et al. (2014) Regulation & Governance and the authorities cited there. 
169 Sekhonyane & Louw Violent Justice 16. 
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treated unfairly and unequally by the criminal justice system are more willing 
to support or join violent collective action against criminals has already been 
noted, as has Tankebe’s Ghanaian research170 confirming the nexus between 
perceptions of police trustworthiness and public support for vigilante self-
help.171  31.5% of victims of crime in the Mthente survey said they do not 
report crimes to the police because they do not trust them – the most common 
reason cited for non-reporting.172  This is stark evidence that poor police 
treatment of community members does make citizens doubt the bona fides of 
the police to the extent that they are unwilling to entrust them with the sole 
responsibility to exercise force in order to ensure community safety and 
security.  Citizens’ moral identification with police institutions is undoubtedly 
weakened when they are treated badly,173 and the ensuing mistrust opens up 
a space for them to take the law into their own hands.174  Tankebe is correct 
in his view that violent self-help becomes in effect “an attempt to compel the 
police to bridge the gap between what people might consider to be their 
socially established entitlement to procedurally fair treatment, and the abusive 
and/or neglectful treatment that characterizes their encounters with the 
police”175 – an despairing “cry for help”.176 
 
4 2 7 Intentional177 state shortcomings 
So far only inadvertent or negligent police failings that could tend to 
delegitimate the formal criminal justice system and trigger vigilantism have 
been outlined.  More extreme instances of state failure – where criminal 
                                            
170 Tankebe (2009) Law and Society Review 259-260. 
171 See § 4 2 4 above. 
172 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 131.  Other reasons frequently mentioned for 
non-reporting were fear of being victimised by perpetrators (35.6%) and that the perpetrators are 
back on the street (18.4%), which likewise imply lack of trust in the police’s ability to protect 
community members from further victimisation. 
173 Tankebe (2009) Law and Society Review 261. 
174 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 23. 
175 Tankebe (2009) Law and Society Review 251. 
176 See the title of Haffajee “Necklacing is a Cry for Help From Etwatwa” News24. 
177 “Intentional” is used here in the criminal law sense of the word explained in § 2 6 1 above: i.e., state 
agents’ main aim and objective is to commit the wrongdoings in question (dolus directus), or at the 
very least, they foresee that in order to achieve their main aim and objective, unlawful circumstances 
may exist or consequences occur, and they reconcile themselves with this possibility in the sense that 
they carry on doing what they have chosen to do anyway (dolus eventualis). 
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justice agents are guilty not merely of undermining the realisation of justice 
due to negligence, but of actively and intentionally defying it – are now 
considered.  These types of abuse of police power are particularly 
blameworthy, and any vigilante alternative resorted to in response to them is 
likely to be fuelled by an acute sense of moral “righteousness” in contrast.  If 
police actually contribute to high crime levels instead of protecting citizens 
from crime, this poses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system.  Since legal legitimacy178 requires that power should not only be 
attained, but also exercised, in accordance with established rules, it may be 
argued that perceived and actual police criminality and misconduct have an 
impact on the state’s legal legitimacy as well as its normative legitimacy.  
When those in power act unlawfully when representing and enforcing the 
law,179 it strengthens vigilantes’ claim to be the only viable alternative for 
fighting an incessant wave of crime that emanates both from within the police 
service and outside it.180 
 
4 2 7 1 Corruption 
 
A first way in which the police may be perceived as an active element 
in the crime “problem”, thus eroding their own legitimacy as crime-fighters, is 
where they are involved in corrupt activities.  In South Africa corruption is 
criminalised in terms of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
                                            
178 As defined in § 3 4 above. 
179 A Nivette 2015 Institutional Ineffectiveness, Illegitimacy, and Public Support for Vigilantism in 
Latin America 10. 
180 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 28. 
“I would prefer the police, but since they are corrupt and receive 
bribery, such as buying them alcohol, then the docket just 
disappears.” 
– Zandspruit resident quoted in Martin State Crime 225.  
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Act181 (the “Corruption Act”).  This legislation provides for a general offence of 
corruption182 as well as for specific crimes of corruption, including one relating 
to public officers (including police officers) in particular.183  The crux of the 
offence is the unlawful giving or accepting of “gratification” (which may be 
payment or some other benefit) so as to induce the recipient to act in a certain 
way.184  Police corruption takes many forms, including police accepting bribes 
for not following through a criminal violation (i.e. not making an arrest, filing a 
complaint or impounding property) 185  or when police dockets are not 
negligently mislaid, but deliberately “lost” or disposed of. 
The perception that the police are corrupt is dismayingly widespread. 
While the extent of corruption is hard to estimate, Transparency 
International’s 2013 Global Corruption Barometer found that 83% of South 
African survey respondents felt that the police were corrupt, or extremely 
corrupt – the highest score of perceived corruption of any public agency in 
South Africa.  36% of respondents reported paying a bribe to the police in the 
12 months prior, with 30% reporting that they had bribed a member of the 
judiciary.186  Over half of respondents were also of the view that the level of 
overall corruption had increased “a lot” in the previous two years.  The 
Mthente survey carried out in Khayelitsha found that 10% of crime victims 
who had not reported the offences cited police corruption as the reason for 
non-reporting.187  The Commission tasked the Centre for Justice and Crime 
Prevention to carry out focus group research among young people on 
corruption.  Many interviewees cited examples of corruption and bribery, 
“primarily between police and taxi drivers, and police and shebeen owners, 
but pervasive to the general community as well”, sufficient for the study to 
                                            
181 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
182 See s 3. 
183 See s 4. 
184 See S v Selebi 2012 1 SACR 209 (SCA) para 8. 
185 See A Faul “Corruption and the South African Police Service: A Review and its Implications” 
(2007) ISS Paper 150 Institute for Security Studies 1 4 for more examples of corrupt practices. 
186 See Anonymous “Global Corruption Barometer” Transparency International 
<http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=south_africa> (2015-05-26).  While the 
courts were ranked much lower at 50%, this is still a worrying percentage. 
187 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 430. 
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conclude that corruption is “a major impediment to both police efficiency and 
trust in the police”.188   
 While the police tend to downplay instances of corruption in their ranks 
as an aberration committed by a few “bad apples”, police corruption is 
endemic in virtually all police agencies, and is not simply a problem of a small 
number of errant individuals.  The power that police have to interfere with 
citizens’ rights, coupled with a wide discretion to do so and low levels of 
oversight, creates an environment conducive to police misconduct and 
corruption, and organisational reform is needed to address it. 189  
Unfortunately, there appears to be a lack of political will on the part of SAPS 
and government as a whole in taking steps to counter police corruption.190  
The Commission concluded that the absence of effective systems to limit 
corruption within SAPS is one of the factors contributing to a breakdown in 
relations between the police and community members. 
As far as the impact of corruption on state legitimacy is concerned, the 
unsurprising finding in the study of Bradford et al was that perceptions of 
police corruption have a “strong, negative effect on judgments about fairness 
and effectiveness, and, through these, legitimacy”.  People who thought police 
took bribes were less likely to obey the police or identify with them morally191 
– and, presumably, were more inclined towards self-help.  Counterintuitively, 
Tankebe’s Ghanaian study found that people’s experiences of corruption was 
not a significant predictor of support for vigilantism, with normative rather than 
instrumental assessments of policing being decisive in determining vigilante 
support; however, those who were satisfied with police reforms in tackling 
corruption were less likely to condone vigilante violence.192  This suggests 
that where authorities are perceived to be taking police misbehaviour 
                                            
188 430. 
189 Testimony of Mr Newham of the Institute for Security Studies (“ISS”) (292-293). 
190 Faul (2007) Institute for Security Studies 17. 
191 Bradford, et al. (2014) Regulation & Governance 258. 
192 Tankebe (2009) Law and Society Review 260. 
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seriously and attending to it, it is not inevitable that their normative legitimacy 
will be seriously undermined by corruption per se.193 
 
4 2 7 2 Police criminality 
Various forms of police criminality, where the police either exceed their 
legitimate powers or act in criminal ways, will now be considered.  A first type 
of deliberate police misconduct that could impact on the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system is police brutality involving the improper use of force.  
Police coercion is of course legitimate under certain circumstances, and their 
using force in the execution of their duties – primarily when effecting an arrest 
– is justified in terms of the ground of justification of official capacity or public 
authority.  This capacity to use force must be exercised in terms of the limits 
set down in section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act (the “CPA”), 194 but 
police appear to flout this provision frequently.195  Provision is made for the 
separate criminalisation of the most extreme form of police brutality – namely 
the torture of those in their custody – in terms of the Prevention and 
Combating of Torture of Persons Act196 (the “Torture Act”).  This legislation 
criminalises the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering for purposes 
                                            
193 However, note that Bradford et al’s study found that perceptions of police effectiveness were a 
strong predictor of legitimacy in South Africa.  See also § 6 2 3 for more implications for potential 
state relegitimation of this chapter’s conclusions on state delegitimation. 
194S 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides for the use of force – even deadly force – 
while effecting an arrest in circumstances where such forceful measures are the only way to effect 
the arrest, where the nature and degree of harm done is proportional to the seriousness of the 
suspect’s crime and the degree of danger the suspect poses to the police officer and others.  In terms 
of s 49(2), force resulting in death may only be resorted to where the suspect’s behaviour poses a 
threat of serious violence to the arresting officer or others, or the police officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect has committed a crime involving serious bodily harm in the past (see 
Burchell Principles 142-159 and Snyman Criminal Law 129-134 for a complete discussion of this 
defence).  
195 A recent incident where policemen were found guilty of murder and sentenced to 15 years each for 
exceeding their public authority to use force to effect an arrest involved eight “rogue policemen” 
arresting a Mozambican taxi driver for parking on the wrong side of the road, handcuffing him to the 
back of a police van and dragging him hundreds of metres behind the vehicle.  He was later found 
dead in a pool of blood in a police holding cell (Agence_France-Presse “Eight South African 
Policemen Guilty of Murdering Taxi Driver” (2015-08-25) The Guardian 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/25/eight-south-african-policemen-guilty-of-
murdering-taxi-driver> (2015-11-24); M Rahlaga “8 Ex-Cops Get 15 Years Each For Killing Mido 
Macia” (2015-11-11) EWN <http://ewn.co.za/2015/11/11/Macia-trial-Eight-accused-sentenced-to-
15-years> (2015-11-24)). 
196 Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013. 
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such as coercing confessions197 or obtaining co-operation.198  The Torture Act 
specifies that to constitute torture, the conduct in question must be inflicted 
“by or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity”,199 which places rogue 
police officers firmly within its remit. 
The Khayelitsha Commission heard evidence citing a study finding that 
35% of South Africans admitted to being “scared of the police”200 – no doubt a 
legacy of the apartheid paramilitary policing style.  Improper use of force by 
police was an issue for 8% of the complainants before the Khayelitsha 
Commission.201  While observing that the actual or perceived improper use of 
force may be deeply damaging to attempts to improve SAPS’ relationship with 
the community, as well as being a violation of citizens’ rights, the 
Commission’s condemnation centres on the response of authorities to these 
allegations.  Evidence showed that SAPS leadership did not treat such 
incidents “with appropriate gravity” or take steps to guard against repeat 
occurrences.202  This approach seems to accord with Tankebe’s hypothesis 
that it is not simply police wrongdoing that incites vigilantism, but rather the 
failure of those in authority to respond appropriately when such wrongdoing 
occurs.  
 
Furthermore, as regards police being implicated in crime, vigilantes 
sometimes justify their actions by arguing that police conduct is synonymous 
                                            
197 S 3(a) (ii). 
198 S 3(a)(iii). 
199 S 3. 
200 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 292. 
201 104. 
202 432. 
“We are the ones who don't work with the police because the 
police think that some of us in the township are very stupid, they 
are the clever ones because they go along with the criminals.” 
– Interview respondent quoted in Harris As For Violent Crime That’s Our Daily 
Bread 27.  
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with criminality.  The police are seen to be involved in a wide range of criminal 
activities 203  beyond simply corruption or brutality while carrying out their 
duties.  In support of this contention, a 2013 SAPS audit revealed that 1 448 
serving police officers – some of very high rank – were in fact criminals, many 
having been convicted of serious offences ranging from murder and 
attempted murder to rape, assault, theft, robbery, house-breaking, drug 
trafficking, domestic violence and aiding escapees.  568 had been convicted 
of multiple offences, and 1142 of the 1 448 were charged after enlisting in 
SAPS.204  There were a further 8 846 pending charges against police officers.  
While police leadership assured parliament that “unwanted elements” would 
be removed from police ranks, a year later all 1 148 were still on active 
duty.205   
Even where police do not themselves actively commit crimes, they may 
abuse their power by condoning crime.  Police collusion with illegal activities 
such as prostitution and drug-dealing enables such “businesses” to continue 
operating.  In the same way, they may assist criminals to evade justice by 
deliberately “misplacing” police dockets.206  Worryingly, Gareth Newham of 
the ISS is quoted as saying that most officers involved in crime are not being 
held accountable, and he speculates that the numbers of police involved or 
implicated in crime is much higher than the SAPS audit indicates.207 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
203 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 28. 
204 SAPS “Criminal Audit Analysis” (2013) . 
205 J Rademeyer & K Wilkinson “South Africa's Criminal Cops: Is the Rot Far Worse than We Have 
Been Told?” (2013-08-27; updated 2014-07-23) Africa Check <http://africacheck.org/reports/south-
africas-criminal-cops-is-the-rot-far-worse-than-we-have-been-told/> (2015-05-27).  
206 These practices also amount to corruption, of course: see Faul (2007) Institute for Security Studies 4. 
207 Rademeyer & Wilkinson “South Africa's Criminal Cops: Is the Rot Far Worse than We Have Been 
Told?” Africa Check. 
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In addition to committing or condoning “ordinary” crime, police may 
also be conceived of as being illegitimate in another sense: they may be 
involved in vigilante activities themselves, or may provide vigilantes with 
material or moral support.208   
There was testimony about police complicity in vigilante activity – both 
active and passive – before the Khayelitsha Commission.  As far as active 
involvement is concerned, in an affidavit before the Commission, a man 
reported being accused of stealing from a shebeen owner and consequently 
attacked by community members in an attempt to force him to return the 
money that he had allegedly stolen.  When the police arrived, the complainant 
stated that rather than stopping the attack, they “also began asking where the 
money was and started hitting me as well”.209   An example of active police 
vigilantism from case law is S v Sisilana and another:210  While sentencing 
two police officers for a vigilante-style murder, Ebrahim J held:   
“[I]rrespective of what the deceased may have done and no 
matter how frustrated you were because of the failure of the 
police to arrest him it did not give you the right to take the law into 
your own hands by resorting to vigilante justice and inflicting 
unlawful and sustained assault on the deceased in order to exact 
retribution.  As law enforcement officers the two of you were far 
more aware than others that the function of dispensing justice is 
vested with the courts.”211 
                                            
208 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 28. 
209 See Hathorn, et al. “Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha 
and a Breakdown in Relations Between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha: Complainant 
Organisations' Heads of Argument” Khayelitsha Commission para 386. 
210 S v Sisilana and another [2009] JOL 23415 (ECB). 
211 Para 8. 
“[The vigilantes] and the police are in cahoots.  What they do 
there, the police are also involved.” 
– Interview respondent quoted in Harris As For Violent Crime That’s Our Daily 
Bread 28.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 183 
The failure of police to prevent acts of vigilantism seems to be even 
more common.  The Khayelitsha Commission testimony of a witness to a 
violent and protracted vigilante attack, during which two police officers simply 
carried on having their restaurant lunch only metres away without intervening, 
was mentioned in § 2 4 1 2.  This example of passivity could well simply 
amount to police lethargy, but there may be other possible motives for police 
to tacitly permit vigilantism to continue.  Martin is of the view that the failure of 
police to stop vigilantes may amount to an implicit condonation of their 
activities. 212   Buur 213  uses the term “strategic ignorance” to describe the 
attitude of the police to vigilantism.  He opines that police do not merely turn a 
blind eye to acts of vigilantism; in fact, they know about and rely on vigilantes 
breaking the law by using corporal punishment to “discipline” people and 
extract information about crimes.  Vigilantes’ illegal methods ensure that more 
criminals are apprehended, and police are happy to give vigilantes carte 
blanche to continue their “good work”, and even to offer them protection from 
prosecution for doing so.214   
Case law appears to confirm that there is indeed sometimes an 
intimate and symbiotic relationship between vigilantes and formal law 
enforcement.  For example, S v Hena 215  refers to a scenario where the 
investigating officer in a theft case advised the complainant to approach a 
(vigilante) anti-crime committee to deal with her issue instead.  The 
investigating officer testified in court that there was a close working 
relationship between SAPS and the anti-crime committees, and that it was 
police practice to involve them in the investigation of crimes.  Similarly, in 
Mkhize v S216 the appellant (the chairperson of the local CPF) testified that 
when they told the police who the suspects in a robbery and rape case were, 
the police told CPF members “to go and look for the suspects themselves” – 
to “get” the suspects and take them to the police station, and to ensure that 
there was sufficient evidence for a case to be laid.  The scenario referred to 
by Steinberg quoted in § 4 2 2 above likewise makes it clear that there may 
                                            
212 Martin (2012) State Crime 230. 
213 Buur “Domesticating Sovereigns” in Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa 34. 
214 For more on this phenomenon of unofficial state approval of vigilante conduct, see § 7 3 2 below. 
215 S v Hena 38D-F, also referred to above in § 4 2 3. 
216 Mkhize v S para 11, also referred to in § 4 2 3 above. 
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be instances where vigilantes are tacitly co-opted to do the police’s work for 
them, especially in “frontier” areas, linking with the idea of “responsibilisation” 
or “outsourcing” of police functions discussed at § 4 2 3 above.   
Police participation in vigilante-type activities, either actively or by 
knowingly permitting vigilantism by others, may be understood to be 
illegitimate in more than one sense.  First, if vigilantism is conceptualised as 
criminal conduct, then police who engage in acts of private vigilantism, or 
procure others to do so on their behalf, are guilty of committing a crime.217  
Where police simply turn a blind eye to vigilantism their conduct is similarly 
unlawful, since they have a legal duty, by virtue of their public office and their 
protective relationship to the general public, to prevent harm218 being caused 
to victims of vigilante violence.  Whether police could be held criminally liable 
as perpetrators219 merely for failing to prevent acts of vigilantism is an open 
question, and depends on whether the legal convictions of the community 
would deem this desirable, taking into consideration relevant constitutionally-
protected values and rights.220  Burchell argues convincingly that criminal 
liability ought to be imposed in instances where police have failed to warn 
specific victims within a class of vulnerable victims of a risk of injury or death 
that is known or reasonably foreseeable.221  If this approach is followed, an 
awareness that a vigilante attack is imminent, combined with knowledge of 
the identity of the prospective victim(s) of the attack, would appear to be 
sufficient to hold a police officer criminally liable for an omission to safeguard 
such vigilante victim(s).  Whether it would be in accordance with public policy 
to deem the officer a perpetrator of vigilantism (or murder, assault, etc.) is 
debatable.  It is submitted that accomplice 222  liability might be a more 
appropriate finding, since non-compliance with a recognised legal duty to act 
                                            
217 Where a person procures another to commit a crime, the crime is attributed to the person who uses 
such agent to commit the crime on their behalf, and the person is therefore classified as a perpetrator 
in accordance with the qui facit per alium, facit per se principle (Burchell Principles 465-466). 
218 See Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A). 
219 A perpetrator is a participant in a crime who satisfies the requirements for liability contained in the 
definition of the crime in question (Snyman Criminal Law 252). 
220 See Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security para 62. 
221 Burchell Principles 85. 
222 An accomplice is a participant in a crime who furthers or assists the commission of a crime by 
somebody else (the perpetrator) and so does not satisfy all the requirements for liability contained in 
the definition of the crime in question (Snyman Criminal Law 266). 
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furthers the commission of the crime of the actual perpetrator of the 
vigilantism.  Liability as an accomplice would assume that the police officer 
has the necessary mens rea, in that they knowingly further the commission of 
the crime and that they at least foresee the possibility of the unlawful vigilante 
violence resulting in harm to another223 (although specific knowledge of the 
identity of the vigilante victim(s) would probably not be a prerequisite).  If a 
police officer acquires knowledge of a vigilantism incident after it has been 
committed and fails to report it with the intention of assisting the main 
perpetrator(s) to evade justice, this may also render the officer liable as 
accessory after the fact to the vigilante violence.224 
Second, the fact that police are involved with vigilantes not only makes 
them (criminal) perpetrators of vigilante violence, with vigilantism seen as a 
form of crime that contributes to the criminality of the police; police 
involvement with vigilante groups may also be understood as a display of 
dereliction of duty on their part as agents of the formal criminal justice system.  
This perspective on the illegitimacy of police involvement in vigilantism was 
emphasised in S v Hena, where Plasket J berated police officers for allowing 
an anti-crime committee to assume policing functions,225 and “punished” them 
by excluding the evidence so obtained.  He admonished the police to engage 
in “proper, thorough and lawful police work” instead of “sub-contracting” their 
investigative functions for no good reason.226  In addition to being illegitimate 
in the sense that police involvement in vigilantism is unlawful and criminal, the 
implication in S v Hena is that police who use vigilantes to investigate crimes 
do so because they are so slothful that they want to circumvent their 
constitutionally-imposed obligation to exercise legitimate crime-fighting force 
themselves, and that they deserve censure for this reason too. 
 
                                            
223 See also Burchell Principles 496-500. 
224 See S v Pakane 2008 1 SACR 518 (SCA) para 43-44. 
225 S v Hena 40F.  The accused abducted and assaulted a suspect, and forced him to incriminate 
himself. 
226 42G and 42H. 
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4 2 8 Concluding remarks regarding objective factors contributing to 
state delegitimation 
There is good reason to believe that a normative legitimacy deficit, and 
thus also a heightened propensity to vigilantism, is closely related to the 
state’s inability to justify its power in terms of a common framework of belief.  
Where the criminal justice system is for whatever reason perceived as being 
incapable of addressing high crime levels, this heightens feelings of physical 
insecurity and lack of trust in legal authorities.  Minnaar views current 
vigilantism in South Africa as, in essence, both a “brutal indictment of the 
whole criminal justice system” and “an expression of its failure and the 
inadequacies of the policing that is or is not occurring”.227  The latter aspect, 
namely of vigilantism as a response to “due performance” and policing 
inadequacies, has been addressed.  The former, in terms of which vigilantism 
symbolises a denunciation of the wider criminal justice system, now needs 
further attention.  As the next section makes clear, satisfactory collective 
security and social order assurances entail more than just an efficient criminal 
justice system: dissonance between state and citizen beliefs regarding the 
substantive content of laws or the procedural methods of law-enforcement is 
another major determinant of weakened normative legitimacy, and hence 
vigilantism. 
 
4 3 The legitimacy implications of a “mismatch of polities” 228 
between state and citizen 
Now that the state’s unsuccessful attempts to serve the common good, 
and the connection between poor state performance and vigilantism, have 
been discussed, it is necessary to highlight the implications for vigilantism of 
the legitimacy requirement that power rules need to be derived from an 
authoritative source.  It is submitted that, besides being a cry for (self-)help 
from citizens who feel abandoned by the formal criminal justice authorities, 
                                            
227 Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 118. 
228 Barker Legitimating Identities 123. 
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vigilantism is also the product of a legitimacy gap caused when the values 
underpinning the legal rules of the formal criminal justice system are in many 
respects incongruent with the popular beliefs purportedly sustaining them.  A 
clash between state and citizen value systems – what Barker229 terms a 
“mismatch of polities” – may be as relevant for determining the likelihood of 
vigilante violence as an objective criminal justice system breakdown.  
Interestingly, Posel characterises this brand of South African vigilantism as 
being a result of the “burden of rights”, emerging “in the midst of a popular 
sense of a world going astray, and of the menace which inheres in the gift of 
freedom, particularly in respect of the breakdown of generational and gender-
based forms of authority”.230  As already mentioned,231 state remoteness from 
citizens goes beyond the mere spatial distance and “no-go areas” already 
considered: a frontier may also be “an inner one of state or ‘ruling class’ 
legitimacy, and the problem … one of reaching hearts and minds rather than 
actual places”. 232   The divergence between state and citizen beliefs may 
relate either to the substantive (“first-order”) rules determining the conduct 
deemed worthy of punishment, or to the procedural (“second-order”) rules 
defining how and by whom substantive rules can be made, who may apply 
and enforce them, the proper circumstances and procedures for their 
application and enforcement,233 and the consequences of rule-enforcement 
for those subject to them. 
 
4 3 1 Substantive (first-order) dissonance 
Discrepancies between state and citizens in their perception of what 
constitutes a crime are crucial for understanding the emergence of 
vigilantism. 234   In this section, the desire of marginalised communities in 
                                            
229 123. 
230  D Posel “Afterword: Vigilantism and the Burden of Rights: Reflections on the Paradoxes of 
Freedom in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (2004) 63 (2) African Studies 231 233. 
231 See § 4 2 2 above. 
232 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 169. 
233 155. 
234 Buur (2006) Development and Change 755. 
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particular to police “alternative orders”, 235  and how this tendency – as 
opposed to actual police failure – may lead to vigilantism, is explained and 
elaborated on.  It has already been emphasised that the vigilante agenda is 
not in essence a revolutionary one; vigilantes do not generally seek to institute 
truly new laws and moralities.236  However, where the state is perceived to be 
following alien, inappropriate or erroneous237 principles in making decisions 
about what should be criminalised, this may lead citizens to seek to broaden 
the reach of existing laws to protect values that they consider to be unduly 
neglected.   
To understand the interplay between vigilantism and substantive 
dissonance between state and citizens, it is important to keep in mind that the 
process of formal state criminalisation is essentially arbitrary; what a particular 
state chooses to criminalise is not absolute, but varies from time to time and 
place to place.  The only answer to the question “What is a crime?” that is 
always valid is: “A crime is any conduct which is defined by law to be a crime 
and for which punishment is prescribed”:238 nothing at all is specified about 
“what the content of a law of crimes is or ought to be.”239  This insight has two 
main implications that are relevant for vigilantism.  First, it serves as a 
reminder that there is not some universal scale of evil or public consensus as 
to what interests should take precedence when categories of crime are 
established.  According to Greenhouse, it is “[t]he interests of authority and its 
need for self-legitimization [that] determine crime, … not the nature of the acts 
in question”.240  Second, because those in power ultimately decide which 
forms of conduct should be labelled as criminal, there is an intimate 
relationship between the criminalisation process and legitimacy: for the state 
to be normatively legitimate, its subordinates must accept as lawful the 
criminalisation decisions it makes.  If there are discrepancies between the law 
                                            
235 Baker (2004) Society in Transition 213. 
236 Kirsch & Grätz “Vigilantism, State Ontologies & Encompassment” in Domesticating Vigilantism in 
Africa 8. 
237 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 29. 
238 J Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure Volume I: General Principles of Criminal 
Law (1997) 1. 
239 H L Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) 18. 
240 Quoted in S Jensen “Policing Nkomazi: Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflicts” in D Pratten 
and A Sen (eds) Global Vigilantes (2007) 56. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 189 
and people’s moral values regarding whether particular conduct is deserving 
of punishment, “the law is less likely to be able to call upon people’s moral 
motivations to support the legal system”.241  Combining these two insights, 
understanding that crime itself is not a fixed category, but is instead potentially 
“polyvalent”, 242  negotiated and contested, makes it apparent that the 
discourse of crime and criminalisation is one that “traverses, challenges and 
maintains the structures of authority”.243  From the state perspective, having 
the final say on what conduct it deems punishable is a resource that both 
displays and helps to maintain its authority.   
Vigilantes contest this conception of crime as being limited to the 
transgressions defined by the formal legal structures.  Resorting to self-help 
may thus be an expression of disagreement, sometimes violent disagreement, 
with the state regarding the punishable content of substantive crimes 
themselves.  Vigilantes may demand adherence to locally defined norms of 
good and bad behaviour about which the state prefers to leave individuals 
free to choose. 244   Such “social control” (as opposed to “crime control”) 
vigilantism245 may fulfil two distinct functions.  First, it may have the objective 
of compelling community members to abide by the values peculiar to that 
community.  It thus serves the purpose of consolidating the community by 
punishing those who display a disregard for community-specific relations and 
norms, even where such non-compliance is state-sanctioned, or indeed 
actively encouraged by the state.  Second, such vigilantism may be primarily 
concerned with excluding the deviant Other, who is once again not a criminal 
in the eyes of the state.  A more detailed account of vigilante rhetoric and 
practices aimed at violent inclusion and exclusion may be found in chapter 5.   
Social control vigilantism may occur in situations of societal transition 
where there is a state shift towards tolerating previously frowned-upon 
behaviour (for instance, where “gay-bashing” occurs in reaction to the 
decriminalisation of homosexuality), but may also be due to specific 
                                            
241 Tyler (2006) Journal of Social Issues 315. 
242 Buur (2008) Review of African Political Economy 572. 
243 Jensen “Policing Nkomazi” in Global Vigilantes 55-56. 
244 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 17. 
245 See Johnston (1996) British Journal of Criminology. 
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community values and beliefs about what constitutes punishable conduct 
simply being irreconcilable with those of the state.  Some examples of 
scenarios where vigilantes may take it upon themselves to compel 
compliance with distinctive political, religious, cultural or moral beliefs by 
punishing certain forms of non-criminal deviance are now outlined.   
 
4 3 1 1 Reintegration through punishment 
In many “traditional” societies there is tension between the state’s 
prioritisation of human rights on the one hand, and traditional socio-cultural 
forms of order and mechanisms of control on the other.  According to Buur, 
many view the legal entitlements granted to women, young people and 
children in terms of the Constitution as a state-sanctioned condonation of 
misbehaviour that flouts social norms and established hierarchies. 246  
Vigilantes often serve the conservative function of attempting to reinforce a 
variety of traditional gender and intergenerational hierarchies in order to 
(re)create and unite the moral community by punishing those who fail to 
respect time-honoured cultural norms.   
Vigilantism may occur as a result of an apparent breach of 
expectations regarding the respective roles of men and women in society.  An 
example of gender-based vigilantism is the punishment of women who do not 
dress in an appropriately modest way.  Anderson, studying vigilantism in 
Kenya, refers to an incident where women were stripped naked because they 
were “improperly” dressed in trousers.247  A similar occurrence took place in 
December 2014 in Harare, Zimbabwe, where a group of about 40 men 
accosted a woman in a mini-skirt and stripped her naked after accusing her of 
“improper dressing” at a bus terminal.  It provoked outrage and two of the 
perpetrators were later sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment.248   Harris 
                                            
246 Buur (2008) Review of African Political Economy.  See also Posel (2004) African Studies 233.  
247 D M Anderson “Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya” (2002) 101 African 
Affairs 531 537. 
248 Thompson_Reuters_Foundation “Jail for Zimbabwe Men who Publicly Stripped Woman Hoped to 
Deter Sex Pests: TRFN” (2015-03-28) Todayonline <http://www.todayonline.com/world/jail-
zimbabwe-men-who-publicly-stripped-woman-hoped-deter-sex-pests-trfn?singlepage=true> (2015-
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provides a case study of vigilantism triggered by a man not fulfilling his 
designated male role as provider when she describes how a young man is 
fined and sjambokked by a “kangaroo court” for not supporting his ex-
girlfriend financially.249 
Vigilantism may also occur as a reaction to perceived deviation from 
assigned roles within the family, especially concerning respect for elders.  
Buur describes various instances of vigilantism taking place in response to the 
undermining of accepted intergenerational hierarchies, including one whereby 
two youths were banished from the community by the Amadlozi vigilante 
group for disrespecting their father, 250  and another where members of a 
(vigilante) Safety and Security structure under the CPF in Kwazakele 
condoned a father beating his daughter with a sjambok for disobeying him 
and offending the honour of his family by sleeping over at her boyfriend’s 
house.251  Likewise, Oomen observes that older community members praised 
the vigilante group Mapogo A Mathamaga’s activities for representing a 
patriarchal vehicle for putting a protest-minded, frustrated and empowered 
younger generation back in their place.252  
These manifestations of vigilantism are in keeping with the notion of 
personhood as being in essence an ongoing process, with people’s existence 
being dependent on their relationships with others.  In contrast to the state-
endorsed conception of people being autonomous individual bearers of 
human rights,253 individual interests are subordinate to those of the group.  It 
is only by reincorporating those who flout community values – by violent 
means if necessary – that the community can remain strong and united.   
 
                                                                                                                             
06-10).  For a report of a similar case in Swaziland, see IOL “'Rape a Suitable Punishment for 
Miniskirts'” (2004-09-27) IOL News <http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/rape-a-suitable-punishment-
for-mini-skirts-1.222744#.VWxCX2AwyfQ> (2015-06-01). 
249 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 23. 
250 L Buur (2002) WISER Symposium on Law, Crime and Moral Logics of Everyday Life “Outsourcing 
the Sovereign: Local Justice and Violence in Port Elizabeth”. 
251 Buur (2008) Review of African Political Economy 574-576. 
252 Oomen (2004) African Studies 165. 
253 L Buur “Fluctuating Personhood: Vigilantism and Citizenship in Port Elizabeth's Townships” in D 
Pratten and A Sen (eds) Global Vigilantes (2007) 40-41.  See also § 4 3 2 5 below. 
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4 3 1 2 Exclusion through punishment 
The role of vigilantism as a resource “to forcefully articulate and impose 
a vision of community consensus”,254 bringing people into existence by forcing 
them to toe the line regarding what is culturally acceptable in gender and 
intergenerational terms, has been explored above. 255   In addition to this 
reintegrative purpose, however, vigilantism may also be a way to “create a 
separation between the ‘good’ community and the evil outsiders”.256  As is the 
case when the state labels someone a criminal, vigilantes constitute the 
outside of their moral community257 by defining their own brand of deviance. 
Vigilantism may thus be a way of definitively demonstrating boundaries: who 
belongs and who does not. 
A striking example of exclusionary social control vigilantism where 
formal avenues of redress are essentially irrelevant258 is where vigilantism 
occurs in response to witchcraft.  Witches are people believed to be using evil 
forces to harm and kill, and are viewed by many in Africa as abhorrent 
outsiders, “inhuman and not fit to live”.259  The state, by contrast, does not 
even deem the right to be free from occult violence to be an interest worthy of 
legal protection.260  No effective official avenues exist to deal effectively with 
this “matter of the most deadly seriousness”.261  Feeling defenceless due to 
the state being unwilling to protect them, witchcraft victims turn instead to 
vigilantism.262  Brutal methods such as “necklacing” are often employed to 
dispose of those thought to be witches, with the flames signifying “the total 
                                            
254 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 54. 
255 See § 4 3 1 1. 
256 Jensen “Policing Nkomazi” in Global Vigilantes 65. 
257 56. 
258  Rosenbaum & Sederberg “Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence” in Vigilante 
Politics 12-13. 
259  Quoted in J A Cohan “The Problem of Witchcraft Violence in Africa” (2011) 44 (4) Suffolk 
University Law Review 803 840. 
260 See § 2 5 1 1 3 above. 
261 A Ashforth Witchcraft, Violence and Democracy in South Africa (2005) 38; see also Nel (2014) 
Acta Criminologica. 
262 See Nel (2014) Acta Criminologica; Cohan (2011) Suffolk University Law Review 827; Jensen 
“Policing Nkomazi” in Global Vigilantes 55; Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign 
Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World 200; Ludsin (2003) Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 88; Jensen & Buur (2004) African Studies; N Tebbe “Witchcraft and 
statecraft: Liberal democracy in Africa” (2007) 96 Georgetown Law Journal 183; 187; 225; Baker 
(2004) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 166. 
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elimination of the defilement that had endangered the health, well-being and 
order of the community”.263 
It has also been argued that xenophobic attacks are a means of 
“establish[ing] or reinforc[ing] barriers along the lines of ‘citizenship’” in an 
attempt to enforce a new order of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa.264  
Other perceived outsiders who may be targets of hate crime and victimisation 
include homosexuals265 and those who publicise the fact that they are HIV 
positive.266  Such conduct may appear to be an example of vigilante exclusion 
based on the enforcement of first-order rules that differ from those of the state 
– i.e., a way of imposing the belief that foreigners or homosexuals or people 
living with AIDS are deserving of punishment.  It is submitted, however, that 
unlike witch-killings, violent acts resulting from xenophobia or homophobia are 
not truly a form of vigilantism since their victims are not victimised for 
perceived wrongdoing per se but rather primarily due to their membership of a 
specific group or class of persons.267   
 
4 3 1 3 Conclusion regarding first-order dissonance  
Although those who have been wronged view “ordinary” criminal 
violence and other non-criminal harms such as disrespect to elders and 
witchcraft as “part of the same moral universe of evil”,268 the state does not 
share this perspective.  From the above, it is apparent that while the state 
may be willing, though unable, to guarantee citizens protection against crime, 
it may not only be unable, but also unwilling, to enforce social control 
vigilantes’ conception of the common good, since doing so may conflict with 
the state’s self-legitimated identity as a liberal and democratic guarantor of 
                                            
263 D Chidester Shots in the Streets: Violence and Religion in South Africa (1992) 48-49; Nel (2014) 
Acta Criminologica 31. 
264 Von Holdt, et al. The Smoke That Calls 24. 
265  This includes incidences of “corrective rape” of lesbians.  See J Nel & M Judge “Exploring 
Homophobic Victimisation in Gauteng, South Africa: Issues, Impacts, Responses” (2008) 21 (3) 
Acta Criminologica 19 for more on hate crimes committed against gays and lesbians. 
266 See the example quoted by Harris (As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 41) of the health 
worker who was stoned to death by a mob for “degrading her neighbourhood” by disclosing her 
HIV-positive status. 
267 For more on this argument, see § 2 7 above. 
268 Jensen & Buur (2004) African Studies 206. 
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human rights and freedoms.269  The tension between the state’s professed 
adherence to a human-rights-friendly paradigm in the sphere of criminal 
justice and the more punitive crime-fighting approach espoused by vigilantes 
is even more acute when it comes to the enforcement of criminal norms upon 
which the state and vigilantes agree.  This issue is considered next. 
 
4 3 2 Procedural (second-order) dissonance 
Even where state and citizens share the common interest of repressing 
criminal conduct, differences of opinion about how such conduct should be 
dealt with may result in divergence between the state’s own legitimated 
identity and that of its citizens.  As briefly mentioned in § 3 4 above, the state 
seeks to justify its inherently arbitrary exercise of power by availing itself of 
ceremonies aimed at reinforcing respect for the law as the first duty of the 
subordinate.  In the criminal justice sphere, the most important solemn ritual 
employed by the state to “retain [its] aura of legitimacy”270 is the formal judicial 
process.  However, if the underlying values of the state and citizens 
concerning the foundations of justice and the treatment of criminal suspects 
diverge to such an extent that the “very rituals which satisfy and sustain the 
rulers incite disaffection among the ruled”, 271  formal implementation of 
criminal prohibitions risks undermining state legitimacy rather than 
strengthening it.   
Packer’s distinction between the “crime control” and “due process” 
models of criminal process is an instructive starting point for understanding 
the discrepancy between state and vigilante criminal justice priorities.  The 
crime control model emphasises achieving efficient protection of the 
community by using speedy and informal procedures to apprehend and 
convict the maximum number of criminals.272  The due process model, in 
contrast, gives precedence to obtaining reliable and fair convictions and 
                                            
269 See also Nel Crime as Punishment 30 and § 6 2 1 below. 
270 Chidester Shots in the Streets 37. 
271 Barker Legitimating Identities 127. 
272 Packer Limits of the Criminal Sanction 158-163. 
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upholding the rule of law, being prepared to sacrifice optimal efficiency in 
favour of protecting the rights of the accused against potential state abuse of 
power.273  Supancic and Willis274 argue that (crime-fighting) vigilantism is a 
“more pure version” of the crime control model, being compatible with an 
informal criminal justice agenda that prioritises the immediate and efficient 
elimination of those considered to be factually guilty. 
The sense that vigilantes and the state have seemingly irreconcilable 
law-enforcement paradigms is well illustrated by Zuko v S.275  The facts of the 
case were as follows:276  The complainant, a tavern owner, was robbed at 
gunpoint of money and a pistol by a group of seven men.  He reported the 
robbery to the police.  The next day he saw a person he thought was one of 
the robbers (the appellant) in the street, and followed him to his home.  He 
contacted the members of a vigilante group to which he belonged, consisting 
mainly of business-people, and a group of about 50 of them gathered that 
evening.  The complainant had by that time compiled a list of suspects by 
asking patrons of his tavern if they knew of local people “wat stout is”.277  At 
11pm the group proceeded to the shack that the complainant had seen the 
appellant enter.  The appellant answered the door and a group of vigilantes, 
including the complainant, then entered and searched the shack.  The 
complainant found his pistol in the shack.  The appellant was assaulted, 
seemingly in order to obtain information about others who had participated in 
the robbery.  He led the vigilantes to his co-accused, and the rifle used in the 
robbery was also recovered.  The vigilantes handed seven suspects over to 
the police, three of whom had to be admitted to hospital for injuries sustained 
at the hands of the vigilantes.  In the court a quo the defence put in issue the 
key evidence upon which the prosecution relied, namely the discovery of the 
pistol.  Despite finding that this evidence had been obtained in an 
unconstitutional manner, the magistrate was nevertheless prepared to admit it 
on the basis that the vigilante search and seizure was much less serious than 
the later violence and force used to obtain evidence about the other accused, 
                                            
273 163-171. 
274 Supancic & Willis (1998) Journal of Crime and Justice 197. 
275 Zuko v S. 
276 Paras 1-8. 
277 Translation: “who are naughty/misbehaving”. 
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which he duly excluded.278  On appeal, Plasket J had to consider whether the 
appellant had received a fair trial.  He held that the vigilantes’ conduct “viewed 
holistically”,279 was indeed very serious and had violated a number of the 
appellant’s fundamental rights, including the infringement of his right to 
privacy resulting from the “unlawful and unauthorised intrusion”280 into his 
home by the vigilantes.  He set aside the appellant’s conviction, holding: 
“It beggars belief that [the complainant] did not know that he had 
no right to simply enter a person’s home, assault the person to 
overcome resistance and force the person to provide information 
and to then conduct a search of the person’s premises.  The 
magistrate erred in accepting, as he did, that the complainant 
acted in good faith.  This is re-enforced by the following answer 
given by the complainant when it was put to him that he knew he 
had no right to enter a person’s house without that person’s 
consent. He said: 
‘Yes, that is true but in that case or in this case it is not 
easy for a person which has been robbed and you are able 
to identify a person when you arrive at that person’s place 
you have to talk softly with that person.  Because, even 
they, they never asked your permission to rob you when 
they robbed me.’”281 
The complainant’s words show clearly the extent to which his 
conception of justice is totally at odds with that of the formal criminal justice 
system.  While the latter prioritises due process, the former prioritises the 
outcome – the need to advance community security without delay – even at 
the expense of fair procedure.  Undeniably, vigilantes frequently appear to 
perceive due process protections as hurdles to efficient and speedy justice, 
rather than necessary for guaranteeing justice.  Some of the most significant 
                                            
278 Zuko v S paras 9-10. 
279 Para 25. 
280 Para 19. 
281 Para 23. 
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incompatibilities between the state “due process” model and the vigilante 
“crime control” model are now highlighted. 
 
4 3 2 1 Speedy justice 
 
The desire for punishment to be meted out swiftly is often cited as a 
justification for vigilantism.  The idea of prompt justice is the cornerstone of 
what many regard as a very attractive vigilante criminal justice framework.  
Achieving instant vigilante retribution is in sharp contrast to the ideals of the 
more protracted formal justice model.  Harris notes that the process of state 
justice is perceived as problematic because it delays punishment.  She quotes 
a respondent as saying, “People want to see things happening very fast.”282  
Vigilantes themselves recognise the appeal of an immediate response.  Buur 
quotes a (vigilante) Amadlozi leader as saying, “We act here and now.  We do 
not, as the police do, drag our feet.”283  Indeed, the Khayelitsha Commission 
notes with dismay that serious delays in criminal investigation and in obtaining 
convictions are very common, which is a “matter of grave concern”.284  In the 
random sample of dockets the Commission analysed to evaluate the quality of 
investigations, there had been delays – frequently “inordinate” – in finalising 
                                            
282 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 35. 
283  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 209; also Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 37. 
284 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 84. 
“But I will tell you, because I am young, I am in my early forties 
here in the township, we talk when we’re having beers, we talk 
about what is the quickest measure to get your things back 
when it is stolen … Just give him a few knocks and get it back 
before you go the long route of the police and that.  I am just 
saying these are the things we say.” 
– Testimony of Khayelitsha resident Mr Tyhido from O’Regan & Pikoli  
Khayelitsha Commission Report xxxii.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 198 
92% of the cases.285  The community frustration engendered by such delays 
is widespread and understandable. 
 
4 3 2 2 Bail 
 
The especially contentious issue of suspects being granted bail 
exacerbates unhappiness relating to the pedestrian speed of state justice.  
The complainant organisations before the Khayelitsha Commission identified 
the unreasonable granting of bail as being an issue of “critical importance” to 
the community.286  In support of this contention, they refer to the testimony of 
a witness to the beating to death of two rape suspects who said, “The police 
weren’t contacted [because] the community feels that the police do not care 
… even if the criminals had been arrested they would have immediately been 
dropped off in the main road again or released the following day.”  The 
women supporters of vigilantism cited in Meth’s study also advocated the 
punishment of suspects before reporting them to the police: “Yes, it is the best 
way because they [the criminals] are not jailed anymore”.287 
According to Harris, that bail-related issues are cited as a key factor 
behind vigilante actions is due to a fundamental misunderstanding about the 
                                            
285 218. 
286 Hathorn, et al. “Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a 
Breakdown in Relations Between the Community and Police in Khayelitsha: Complainant 
Organisations' Heads of Argument” Khayelitsha Commission para 359. 
287 Meth (2010) Planning Theory and Practice 256. 
“Most people are not aware as to how the criminal justice 
system functions.  If you can be arrested today and granted bail 
tomorrow … people think that the policeman is responsible and 
certainly they will assume that [the perpetrator] will never stand 
trial again.  And in some way they should try to avenge what he 
did themselves.” 
– SAPS member quoted in Harris As For Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 34.  
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role of due process.  Rather than being a necessary due process mechanism, 
bail is seen as an impediment to speedy justice, serving the interests of 
criminals instead of those of crime victims and the wider community.  It is 
regarded as a “space in which criminals are able to return to their 
communities and flaunt their ‘freedom’, as well as intimidate their victims and 
re-continue with criminal actions”.288 
 
4 3 2 3 The need for compensatory justice 
 
Within the context of marginalisation, socioeconomic deprivation and 
inequality in which most vigilantism occurs, one of the chief reasons for 
vigilante activities being supported by the community is that vigilantes do not 
just arrest and punish perpetrators of theft; unlike the police, they get the 
stolen goods back.289  This practical ability to restore material belongings 
makes informal justice solutions very attractive for impoverished community 
members, who cannot afford to pay for technology or private security to 
safeguard their possessions, nor for insurance if they are stolen.290  For state 
criminal justice agents, stolen items are merely evidence to be retained for 
                                            
288 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 35. 
289 See Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism. 
290 See Baker Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa 160; Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 37. 
“[Vigilantes in Mamelodi are successful because] you find the 
community saying the police can't do nothing, even if maybe my 
property was stolen and the person was found guilty by the 
court, they don't get a way of compensation, they don't get back 
what was stolen or whatever damage was sustained.  They 
don't get paid back so now if they take their case to the 
kangaroo court, judgment is passed and then people are paid 
back and so on.” 
– SAPS member quoted in Harris As For Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 21.  
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judicial proceedings to be held months – even years – hence.  For the victim 
of theft, in contrast, a stolen item like a television set may represent the loss 
of a year’s savings, of the only decent item the family possesses.291  Even the 
Khayelitsha Commission, which made precious few vigilante-specific 
recommendations beyond the need to develop strategies to deal with vigilante 
attacks more effectively, recognised that the formal criminal justice system’s 
non-restoration of stolen items could be a significant trigger for vigilantism.  
The Commission recommended that a study be requisitioned to consider 
whether it would be feasible to return stolen goods instantly to complainants 
rather than keeping them as exhibits.292 
There is thus a fundamental discrepancy regarding the need to retrieve 
stolen possessions between vigilantes’ retributive and – quite literally – 
restorative crime control justice framework and the rehabilitative and due 
process focus of the formal justice system – an “elementary distinction 
between the premises of each approach”293 that transcends any practical 
failings of the formal criminal justice system.   
 
4 3 2 4 Procedure and punishment 
 
                                            
291 Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 36. 
292 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 456; see also Hathorn, et al. “Commission of 
Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a Breakdown in Relations Between 
the Community and Police in Khayelitsha: Complainant Organisations' Heads of Argument” 
Khayelitsha Commission paras 373-375. 
293 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 21. 
“In order to get evidence … one sometimes ha[s] to apply 
pressure – ‘If you need water out of a sponge, you squeeze it a 
little’”. 
– Monthle John Magolego, leader of Mapogo-a Mathamaga, quoted in Comaroff 
& Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and 
Criminal Justice: International Perspectives 230.  
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That the fundamental criminal justice premises of vigilantes and the 
state may be seemingly irreconcilable is particularly pertinent where the 
procedure to be used to enforce first-order rules, as well as the determination 
of an appropriate sanction, is concerned.  The question of disproportionate 
vigilante punishments has already been highlighted, 294  and vigilante 
punishment processes and methods are further explored in chapter 5 below, 
where some of the parallels and discrepancies between formal and informal 
justice practices are outlined.  At this point it is merely necessary to reiterate 
that vigilantes reject the “soft” and “criminal-friendly” formal criminal justice 
system, harking back to a system capable of administering harsh and instant 
“popular justice”.  In so doing, they commonly draw on the discourse of an 
African notion of justice, using “culture” and tradition” to justify their strong 
leaning towards brutal methods of “fighting crime”.295  Popular punishments 
include the imposition of capital punishment and severe corporal 
punishment,296 both of which formal legal authorities reject as being cruel and 
inhuman punishment incompatible with the right to life and human dignity.297 
 
                                            
294 See § 2 4 2 above. 
295 See also Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 37-38. 
296 E.g., Mapogo A Mathamaga’s public administering of sethlare (meaning “medicine”, and referring 
to the sjambok that is dipped in traditional herbs and salt – or even a secret ointment containing peri-
peri sauce!) to suspects, occasionally causing death (Sekhonyane & Louw Violent Justice; Minnaar 
(2001) Institute for Human Rights and Criminal Justice Studies 28). 
297 E.g., the South African Constitutional Court declared both the death penalty (S v Makwanyane) and 
corporal punishment (S v Williams and others 1995 3 SA 632 (CC)) to be unconstitutional. 
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4 3 2 5 Understanding second-order dissonance: the role of human rights 
 
 
Vigilantes’ adherence to the crime control model – as evidenced by 
their prioritising swift, compensatory and punitive justice – may to some extent 
be understood as a reaction to misunderstandings about the necessity and 
function of procedural safeguards (such as bail and a fair trial), which are 
seen as advancing the interests of criminals at the expense of their victims 
and the community at large.  Nevertheless, vigilantism may probably better be 
explained as a fundamental divergence from – and, indeed, a disagreement 
with – the human rights framework underpinning the formal criminal justice 
system.298  There is a widespread mistrust of a human rights discourse that 
appears to prioritise the rights and interests of suspects and known offenders 
over those of “honest” citizens and crime victims,299 and such an attitude may 
lead to vigilantism.  Since effective law enforcement is perceived to be 
                                            
298 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 29.  For more on the idea of the “burden of 
rights”, see Posel (2004) African Studies 233 discussed in § 4 3 above.  See also G Kynoch 
“Apartheid Nostalgia: Personal Security Concerns in South African Townships” (2003) 5 South 
African Crime Quarterly 7. 
299 Martin (2012) State Crime 227. 
“In the past a person who stole a radio would be caught and 
beaten by people and it would end there.  That person would 
not do it again.  I don’t understand the present law that states 
that even criminals have rights.” 
“Crime is worse because people have rights now – even 
criminals have rights.  In fact they have more rights that the 
citizens who behave themselves in the community.  It is so sad.  
You can’t tell people anything now because they will tell you 
about their rights.” 
– Respondents interviewed for a Soweto research project (G Kynoch “Apartheid 
Nostalgia:  Personal Security Concerns in South African Townships” (2003) 5 
South African Crime Quarterly 7 10).  
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hampered by the excessive rights afforded criminals,300 from the vigilante 
perspective human rights, far from being seen as a safeguard for victims 
whose security is guaranteed by the state, may actually fuel criminal 
behaviour. 301   With many township residents viewing vigilantes as their 
primary bulwark against crime, vigilantism can be seen as a critical response 
to – and a site of struggle and negotiation over – the state’s attempts to 
“enshrine human rights as an all-encompassing foundational value”.302 
A township resident interviewed in Martin’s study encapsulates the 
profound dilemma of how to reconcile human rights and criminal punishment: 
“I know it [vigilantism] is illegal.  It’s illegal because of our 
constitution, because of the rights that we have.  But then he 
doesn’t have the right to go around abusing people.”303 
Understandably, vigilantes and their supporters struggle to grasp how 
“the rights we have” relate to the behaviour of someone who is not respecting 
the rights of others.  Has not such a person waived at least some of his own 
rights by violating those of another?  It is not that such individuals do not 
deem human rights to be a desirable common good in a distant, abstract sort 
of way.  However, for the everyday life of a marginalised township dweller, the 
legal enforcement of human rights and the hierarchical precedence afforded 
them has very little to offer practically when it comes to ensuring security.304   
Two of the main reasons why the beliefs purportedly sustaining the 
state’s human-rights-based criminal justice paradigm do not resonate with 
vigilantes relate to the individualistic slant of formal legal discourse, and to the 
related matter of the disputed role of corporal criminal punishment: 
As has already been noted, the vigilante fight to maintain societal order 
very often involves the repression of individual rights to due legal process as 
                                            
300 The view of Monthle John Magolego of Mapogo A Mathamaga, cited in Comaroff & Comaroff 
“Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International 
Perspectives 230. 
301 Buur (2008) Review of African Political Economy 572. 
302 573. 
303 Township resident quoted in Martin (2012) State Crime 227. 
304  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 210. 
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laid down by the state.305  Vigilantes favour enforcing the security rights and 
moral interests of the whole community and society, while the state 
downplays such communal interests and gives precedence to protecting 
individual rights – including those of suspected criminals.  This dichotomy is a 
symptom of what Pratten terms the striking juxtaposition between the South 
African Constitution’s “universalizing ideology of individual rights … and 
alternative ontologies of relational persons that are embedded in the practice 
of vigilante judgments and punishments.”306  While the criminal justice system 
views each person as an autonomous individual entitled to the rights 
enshrined in the Constitution, many citizens understand personhood very 
differently: people are, as it were, brought into existence solely by their 
relations with others, with personhood being “essentially an ongoing social 
construction”.307  The excessive state focus on people “having rights now” 
obscures individuals’ crucial social dimension – a substantial incongruence 
between the state and its citizens that may have serious implications for the 
legitimacy of formal criminal justice. 
The “legal notion of a ‘universal individual’”308 is clearly inadequate for 
understanding how personhood is figured in South Africa for another reason 
too.  One of the ways of “constructing” a person, and restoring them to 
wholeness within the community, is by administering corporal punishment.  
Buur argues that in vigilante-prone societies, the state prohibition on corporal 
punishment is seen as contributing to the breakdown of the social fabric in the 
sense that it removes from traditional authority figures their main means of 
instilling discipline through punishment.309  Vigilantes’ frequent use of corporal 
punishment, by comparison, “resonates and merges with everyday practices 
and with strongly held ideas concerning the evolution of human beings, that 
is, beings who can distinguish between ‘right and wrong’”.310  In essence, the 
vigilante paradigm regards personhood as being inextricably linked not only to 
an individual’s interactions and relations with others, but also to their having 
                                            
305 For more on the specific rights at issue, see § 6 3 1 2 below. 
306 Pratten (2008) Africa 12. 
307 Buur “Fluctuating Personhood” in Global Vigilantes 141. 
308 129. 
309 Buur (2008) Review of African Political Economy 577. 
310 577. 
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been taught how to become a proper member of the moral community 
through the administration of physical punishment.  Needless to say, this 
means of being “made a person” does not accord with the human-rights-
based model of justice whereby each individual has the right to be free from 
all forms of violence and not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman and 
degrading way.311  Ironically, the same corporal punishment that the vigilante 
regards as vital for rendering someone human, the state condemns as 
inhuman.   
 
4 3 2 6 Conclusion: second order dissonance 
Having compared the criminal process model adhered to by the state 
with that espoused by vigilantes, there may well be some irreconcilable 
incompatibilities, particularly relating to the role of corporal punishment.  
However, since both the state and vigilantes desire to address safety and 
security concerns by dealing effectively and efficiently with deviance, many of 
the differences do not relate to the underlying criminal justice aims as such, 
but rather to the relative weight accorded to the rights of perceived victims of 
crime vis-à-vis those of perceived perpetrators.  Vigilantes, who consider 
themselves and the wider community to be the victims, with the targets of 
their violence being the perpetrators, favour crime-fighting options that are 
swift, compensatory and aimed at addressing collective concerns.  They have 
little or no regard for the human rights of those they subject to punishment, 
except insofar as suffering physical chastisement may aid in reincorporating 
perceived wrongdoers as proper members of the moral community.312  In 
contrast, the state is obliged to comply with the constitutional measures in 
place to protect the rights of those accused of committing crimes (including 
vigilantes, whom it labels as criminal perpetrators rather than victims).313  This 
results in a formal criminal justice system that is arguably more fair and just, 
and is certainly less punitive and harsh, but that may risk alienating 
                                            
311 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 12(1)(c) and s 12(1)(e). 
312 For more on the dehumanisation of vigilante victims, see § 5 3 2 2 below. 
313 See particularly Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 35, which protects the rights of 
arrested, detained and accused persons. 
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community members on account of its ponderous, over-technical processes 
and the perception that it prioritises the interests of individual criminals above 
wider community concerns.  Potential strategies to better align formal and 
informal law-enforcement paradigms are considered further in chapters 6 and 
7.  Suffice it to say that the state would do well to take seriously community 
appeals to implement more responsive, community-orientated and restorative 
modes of doing justice. 
 
4 4 Overall conclusion 
Overall, what has been outlined above seems to paint a bleak picture 
of the formidable criminal justice legitimacy challenge facing the state.  Not 
only is the state confronted with practical obstacles to attaining the common 
good (and thus normative legitimacy) that appear insurmountable, but those 
from whom they seek legitimation often have disparate and opposing notions 
about how best to achieve community order and security. 
Some of the issues identified above may well fall in the category of 
“unsolvables”.  Factors relating to structural violence such as poverty, 
marginalisation, and inequitably-distributed financial resources for effective 
crime-fighting are impediments to legitimacy that are simply beyond the 
state’s short-term remit.  In a society with deep-rooted patterns of 
disadvantage and discrimination where the state lacks the funds to effect 
needed change, a degree of legitimacy erosion is inevitable.  Other issues 
may be unsolvable because the state simply does not want to solve them, and 
probably never will.  Much of the first and second-order dissonance discussed 
above is of this type.  Criminalising the wearing of short skirts or reinstating 
corporal punishment is not a realistic option for a state whose self-legitimated 
identity is premised on the supremacy of individual human rights.  This poses 
a dilemma for the state, since refusing to compromise its legitimating beliefs 
may risk alienating “law-abiding” citizens.  The perception that the state is 
letting “criminals” get away with “crimes” and is unnecessarily safeguarding 
the rights of such “criminals” may contribute to the undermining of state 
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legitimacy and potentially increase the probability of vigilantism.  While this is 
no doubt a conundrum, it is argued in §§ 6 4 and 7 1 below that such a “zero-
sum policy game” approach,314 which assumes that the rights of an accused 
can only be protected at the expense of those of victims or the community, is 
mistaken – at least in the context of upholding due process rights.  It may yet 
be possible for the state to relegitimate itself without undermining human 
rights.  In this regard, such strategies as harnessing the communal spirit of 
ubuntu in the fight against crime will be explored.  The state challenge is to 
find a better way to balance, on the one hand, the constitutional justice 
dictates of narrow individual due process rights, and, on the other, the 
community demand that those violating societal interests be dealt with in a 
manner that is seen to be just in the wider sense of satisfying the societal 
desire for speedy retribution and restitution. 
Indeed, in regard to state legitimacy erosion, the outlook may be rosier 
than initially assumed.  A number of the potential causes of state 
delegitimation (and hence vigilantism) – and crucially, some of the most 
significant according to empirical research315 – are within the power of the 
state to deal with in the short to medium term without entailing exorbitant 
financial outlay.  Exactly how the state might attempt to do so is explored in 
chapter 6.  Some of the possible interventions relate to community education 
(to address issues such as a pervasive culture of violence and a lack of 
respect for due process rights); improved police accountability and oversight 
(to increase police effectiveness and decrease police corruption and 
criminality); a focus on restorative rather than punitive solutions to vigilantism; 
and a policing model based on procedural justice (to enhance community trust 
in the criminal justice system).  These types of strategies have the potential 
both to enhance state legitimacy and correspondingly decrease the likelihood 
of people feeling the need to take the law into their own hands. 
Before proceeding to address how the state may relegitimate itself, 
however, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of how vigilantes 
                                            
314 Garland Culture of Control 11. 
315 See, e.g., § 4 2 6 above. 
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constitute themselves as viable alternative bearers of legitimacy in the 
criminal justice sphere.  This question is the focus of the next chapter. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: VIGILANTE COUNTER-
LEGITIMATION 
 
5 1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was argued that high rates of vigilantism 
reflect, inter alia, state failure to command widespread legitimacy due to the 
state being inefficient, corrupt and out of touch with popular concerns, a 
situation exacerbated in marginalised and poverty-stricken communities 
where violence is commonplace.  The root causes of vigilantism and 
vigilantism’s link with state delegitimation have thus been considered, and it 
has been established that vigilantism is at least partly a symptom of the 
significant erosion of state claims to legitimacy in the crime-fighting domain.  
Chapters 6 and 7 attempt to address state legitimacy shortcomings by 
identifying specific strategies that the state could consider using in order to 
persuade citizens that its particular brand of security provision is worthy of 
(re)legitimation.  But in a context of “multi-choice”1 policing, what exactly is the 
state up against as regards alternative service providers in the crime-fighting 
arena?  It is submitted that only by comprehending the underlying reasons for 
informal justice’s widespread appeal may the state find ways to counteract its 
manifestations – including vigilantism – effectively.  Ascertaining how 
vigilantes constitute themselves as viable alternative bearers of legitimacy in 
the criminal justice sphere is thus crucial for explaining the persistence and 
popularity of vigilantism, as well as for devising ways to neutralise such 
endeavours.  The state must perforce deconstruct, undermine or appropriate 
vigilantes’ crime-fighting power if it is to portray itself as a preferred and 
legitimate guarantor of social order and security; hence the focus of this 
chapter shifts to clarifying the issue of vigilante self-legitimation.2   
                                            
1 See Baker (2004) Society in Transition at 204-205; also Baker Multi-Choice Policing. 
2  In discussing vigilante attempts to acquire legitimacy, the term “self-legitimation” will be used 
interchangeably with the term “counter-legitimation”.  The former highlights that being recognised 
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As already noted, legitimacy relates to the justified exercise of power – 
indeed, the legitimation of power is an “inherent and characterising activity”3 
of those who lay claim to it.  Vigilantes’ appropriation of state power in respect 
of law-enforcement requires them, like the state, to justify their use of force in 
order to command widespread popular support: “Just as the constitutive 
power of formal law depends on the ability of legal institutions to legitimate its 
power, so too the social utility of [vigilantism is] dependent upon its capacity to 
garner legitimacy”.4  In the interests of clarity and consistency, it has been 
decided to link the analysis of vigilante attempts to enhance their legitimacy to 
the aspects of legitimacy identified in chapter 3, namely legal legitimacy, 
normative legitimacy and demonstrative legitimacy.  In Brown’s treatise on 
American frontier vigilantism, he considers what he terms the “philosophy of 
vigilantism” – the values based upon which vigilantes seek to legitimate their 
(consciously illegal) resorting to violence.  He identifies three main constituent 
parts of the vigilante ideology, namely popular sovereignty, self-preservation 
and the right to revolution.5  Significantly, as will be elaborated on below, 
contemporary adherents of vigilantism espouse elements of these basic 
vigilante values too.  It is submitted that each of these three aspects can be 
linked to one of Beetham’s legitimacy components.  First, popular sovereignty 
links to legal legitimacy in that it denotes the source of the (legitimate) power 
in question.  As will become apparent, vigilantes’ assertion that their violent 
acts are “legitimated by popular will”6 bases their legal legitimacy on the claim 
that they are acting democratically, with the support of “the people”.  Second, 
as regards self-preservation, an appeal to the right to self-protection is aligned 
with the normative legitimacy idea that the authority exercised by the powerful 
is justified by their serving the common good.  In this instance, vigilantes 
maintain that their role is to safeguard and preserve the moral community 
                                                                                                                             
as legitimate is an act or process that is primarily driven by those wishing to achieve such 
legitimation, whereas the latter emphasises that vigilante legitimation is closely bound up with – and 
a response to – state efforts at legitimation. 
3 Barker Legitimating Identities 30. 
4 S Jean & W Brundage “Legitimizing ‘Justice’: Lynching and the Boundaries of Informal Justice in 
the American South” in D Feenan (eds) Informal Criminal Justice (2002) 172. 
5 Brown “The American Vigilante Tradition” in The History of Violence in America 179-182; see also 
Little & Sheffield (1983) American Sociological Review 805. 
6 Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society 638. 
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from those “undesirable elements” deemed to be “subhuman”.7  Third, the 
notion of vigilantes’ appeal to the right to revolution resonates with the aspect 
of demonstrative legitimacy.  Vigilantes’ refusal to legitimate the state by 
demonstrating their submission to its moral authority in the realm of criminal 
justice may be viewed as a form of “justified popular insurrection”,8 which 
naturally tends to delegitimate the state.  The significance of the manner in 
which vigilantes both oppose and mimic the state’s “procedural and symbolic 
forms of legitimacy”9 while demonstrating their own counter-power in a bid to 
enhance their legitimacy will also be considered in this context. 
Vigilante appeals for legitimation thus address multiple audiences, and 
convey a different message to each.  A single act of vigilantism is at once an 
attempt to enforce respect for its power over the unruly with reference to a 
morally authoritative popular mandate for the use of force (legal legitimacy); it 
is an endeavour to justify vigilantes’ popular sovereignty to the community it 
serves on the basis of its being socially beneficial (normative legitimacy); and 
it is a type of “power play” that challenges state power by representing 
vigilante violence as a credible alternative source of authority (demonstrative 
legitimacy). 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to highlight and explore the three main 
aspects of vigilante counter-legitimation so as to establish the foundation of 
their popular appeal.  The first step is to show how vigilantes are empowered 
by the community, focusing on the basis for their popular mandate (legal 
legitimacy).  It will be shown that vigilantes elicit community identification by 
depicting their distinctive brand of violence as a legitimate means of enforcing 
group norms that is carried out by upstanding, honourable and respectable 
members of the community, rather than as deviance from such norms.10  
Next, it is argued that vigilantism may contribute to empowerment of the 
community (normative legitimacy), and it will be explained how vigilante 
                                            
7 B Baker “When the Bakassi Boys Came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism” (2002) 20 (2) 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 223 239. 
8 Brown “The American Vigilante Tradition” in The History of Violence in America 181. 
9 Buur Outsourcing the Sovereign: Local Justice and Violence in Port Elizabeth 750. 
10 See Jean & Brundage “Legitimizing "Justice"” in Informal Criminal Justice for this process at work 
in lynchings in the American South. 
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strategies of violent inclusion and exclusion may indeed be instrumental in 
bringing communities into being.11  Finally, vigilantism will be positioned in 
relation to state justice, with the emphasis being on how vigilantes 
delegitimate the state by expressing their own counter-legitimate authority 
(demonstrative legitimacy).  Drawing parallels between the legitimation rituals 
performed by the formal criminal justice system and vigilantes highlights the 
extent to which vigilantes may lay claim to the same sphere of crime-fighting 
authority as the state – often in ways that are more closely aligned with 
community members’ needs and values.  
The focus of this chapter is largely on how vigilantes justify their power 
to the external audiences to whom their appeals for self-legitimation are 
addressed.  For this reason, the chapter does not incorporate a discussion of 
vigilantes’ “inward-turning” modes and rituals of self-legitimation;12 this topic is 
included as Appendix A of the study instead.  Appendix A contains a 
discussion of the criminological and psychological theories that could help 
explain how vigilantes are able to maintain that their own conduct is not a 
deviant aberration, but is instead completely consistent with their self-identity 
as morally upright, law-abiding citizens who are simply doing their duty in 
protecting the community from harm.  
 
5 2 Legal counter-legitimation: “Legitimated by popular will” 
The justified exercise of power requires legitimation, which implies a 
degree of external support as well as self-legitimation.  As discussed in § 3 4, 
rule-derived validity (i.e. legal legitimacy) is crucial for power-holders in that it 
“confer[s] the rights on the powerful to require others to respect the 
exclusiveness which is the basis of their power.”13  Vigilantes’ effectiveness, it 
appears, is dependent on their achieving a clear mandate for their exercise of 
                                            
11 See S Jensen “Through the Lens of Crime: Land Claims and the Contestations of Citizenship on the 
Frontier of the South African State” in L Buur, et al. (eds) The Security-Development Nexus: 
Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in Southern Africa (2007) 211, where he characterises 
informal crime-fighting as a “community-producing performance”. 
12 See Barker Legitimating Identities. 
13 Beetham Legitimation of Power 56. 
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power.14  This analysis seems to imply that to have legal legitimacy, vigilante 
power must be acquired and exercised in accordance with the established 
laws of the land, making legal legitimacy an elusive – wellnigh impossible – 
goal for vigilantes.  Vigilante power is prima facie not particularly susceptible 
to legitimation, consisting as it does of the often brutal, extra-legal punishment 
of social deviance.  In addition, as outlined in § 2 5 2, a defining characteristic 
of vigilantism is that it occurs without formal state endorsement, so appeals 
for legal legitimation addressed to the state would in all likelihood fall on deaf 
ears.   
However, despite not being able to garner official support from the 
state, it is submitted that vigilantes have achieved a considerable degree of 
success with the legitimacy appeals they address to the communities whose 
interests they purport to serve.  The basis of the vigilante philosophy referred 
to in § 5 1 above is that the rule of the people is superior to all else – including 
the law itself.15  According to this paradigm, popular will may substitute for the 
law in justifying the exercise of power.  Vigilantes’ power to influence and 
shape the dynamics of their local neighbourhoods is derived from their claim 
to embody “the unrestrained will of the community”, thereby acting as 
“representative focal point for collective sentiment”.16  The Amadlozi vigilante 
group leadership declared:  
“We are chosen by the community, therefore we cannot be 
accountable to anyone else than the community.  They chose us 
because we work for them, and if they are not satisfied they will 
tell us what they do not like.  There is no fuss there, no agendas, 
no politics.  We are not like the politicians … like the [CPF]”.17  
Such vigilantes seem to claim to be exercising their power in an act of 
“direct” or “radical” democracy reminiscent of the 1980’s People’s Courts, as 
                                            
14  Rosenbaum & Sederberg “Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence” in Vigilante 
Politics. 
15 Brown “The American Vigilante Tradition” in The History of Violence in America 182. 
16 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 55, 64. 
17  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 199. 
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opposed to the constitutional democracy championed by the state.18  This 
insight makes it possible to understand the vigilante perspective that even if 
their activities are not formally state-sanctioned, having a direct popular 
mandate may in itself amount to achieving a species of legal legitimacy, since 
it denotes an obligation on community members to respect their power, if not 
necessarily its exclusiveness.  Notwithstanding Buur’s caveat that “most 
claims to having a mandate from ‘a community’ or working for ‘the community’ 
rest on the reified and tautological notion that the community is a stable, 
unproblematic entity”,19 the foundation on which this kind of popular mandate 
rests must now be considered in more detail. 
 
5 2 1 Achieving a mandate for violent exercise of power: ideologies of 
self-legitimation 
For vigilante violence to be legitimated by popular mandate, it needs to 
be portrayed as “ethically coherent” as well as justifiable in terms of a 
common framework of belief.20  Barker argues that “[i]dentification is the key 
to understanding legitimation, and legitimation is one of the principal functions 
of identification”. 21   This implies that securing and strengthening public 
approval of their actions depends on vigilantes’ creating and cultivating a 
distinctive identity to which community members can relate.  It has already 
been noted that vigilantes endeavour to enhance their legitimacy by assuming 
the moral high ground, representing their exercise of power as being a crucial, 
normatively justifiable and non-arbitrary “tool for the defence of civilization”.22  
This desire for justification is informed by vigilante’s recognition that vigilante 
violence is more likely to be identified with, and thus deemed legitimate, if it is 
recognised as being normatively congruent – a product of beliefs central to 
the cultural ethos of the community concerned, not marginal to it.23  Vigilantes 
need to employ mobilisation narratives that frame their actions as a necessary 
                                            
18 199. 
19 199. 
20 Barker Legitimating Identities; Beetham Legitimation of Power. 
21 Barker Legitimating Identities 35. 
22 Jean & Brundage “Legitimizing "Justice"” in Informal Criminal Justice 161. 
23 See Huggins Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America. 
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and credible response to a crisis situation, and framing them as such must 
“make sense”, resonating with the community by whom they wish to be 
legitimated.24  To elicit such identification and resonance, vigilantism must be 
depicted as a legitimate means of enforcing group norms that is carried out by 
upstanding, honourable and respectable members of the community, rather 
than as deviance from such norms. 25   Consequently, vigilante ideologies 
“[t]ak[e] values and behavioral cues from the prevailing political culture”.26  All 
in all, before they can wield legitimate power it is necessary for vigilantes to 
“invoke a set of values that may be expected to produce community support 
and approval”.27  It follows that if a large proportion of a particular society 
espouses vigilantism’s professed underlying values, this will facilitate its 
“ideological legitimation”, thus increasing vigilantes’ potential support base.28    
For example, as mentioned earlier, 29  the mainstream social mores 
underlying the American South’s strong tradition of vigilantism that were used 
to justify its patently illegal behaviour include the doctrine of vigilance 
(alertness to danger), the right to self-preservation and revolution, and popular 
sovereignty.30  Vigilante conduct was both respresented, and widely accepted, 
as an instance of popular insurgence that was justified in the interest of self-
protection aimed at securing community safety and defending the common 
good in the absence of effective formal justice provision.  Similarly, vigilantes’ 
ideological self-legitimation in contemporary South Africa draws on the 
discourse of popular justice, emphasising the right of the people to rule and 
the need to practise justice in a “traditional” and essentially “African” manner, 
invoking an “imagined order” of future peace and security.31  Some other 
values upon which vigilantes may rely to legitimate their actions to others, as 
                                            
24 Wisler & Onwudiwe (2008) Police Quarterly 438-439. 
25 See Jean & Brundage “Legitimizing "Justice"” in Informal Criminal Justice for this process at work 
in lynchings in the American South.  For more on this aspect of vigilante self-legitimation in the 
context of the justification of punishment, see § 2 6 3 1 1 above. 
26 P C Sederberg & H J Rosenbaum “Vigilante Politics: Concluding Observations” in H Rosenbaum 
and P Sederberg (eds) Vigilante Politics (1976) 267. 
27 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 808. 
28 Huggins Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America. 
29 In § 5 1 above. 
30 See Brown “The American Vigilante Tradition” in The History of Violence in America and Brown 
“The History of Vigilantism in America” in Vigilante Politics. 
31 See Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread and Nina (2000) African Security Review. 
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well as strategies employed by vigilantes to “demarcate the boundaries of 
legitimate mob violence”,32 are now investigated further.   
 
5 2 1 1 Legitimate v illegitimate vigilantism 
Legitimation requires vigilantes not only to emphasise the boundary 
between illegal criminality and legitimate vigilantism, but also to differentiate 
between justified vigilante exercise of power and “vigilantism” that oversteps 
the boundaries of what the community perceives to be vigilantes’ rightful 
role.33  This is crucial, since the indiscriminate use of power, unfettered by 
constraints as to its exercise, undermines claims to legal legitimacy.34  In a 
constitutional democracy, the state’s power is formally limited by its 
(constitutionally mandated) upholding of the rule of law.  While vigilantes often 
disagree with the state that the rule of law should be defined in terms of 
conformity to the laws and judicial processes, or advocate the temporary 
suspension of such laws and processes, the populist mandate of vigilantes 
similarly recognises that legitimate power is limited power.  For self-help 
violence to be perceived as justified, it needs to adhere to community 
expectations regarding the motivations for and extent of such violence, 
ensuring that what a particular community deems to be criminality and 
disorder are punished – and punished in a manner approved of by the 
community without needing to have recourse to the state criminal justice 
system.35  For this reason, vigilante violence is often “‘located’ – culturally and 
spatially – at the center of community life and surrounded by a code of 
assumptions as to its legitimate form”.36  Thus vigilantes tend to obey moral 
imperatives in administering “punishment”, with popular violence often being 
structured in terms of “legitimate” targets and “appropriate” sanctions.37 
                                            
32 Jean & Brundage “Legitimizing "Justice"” in Informal Criminal Justice 171. 
33 Wood (2003) Crime, History and Societies para 26. 
34 See Beetham Legitimation of Power 68. 
35 Baker Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa 167. 
36 Wood (2003) Crime, History and Societies para 20. 
37 Pratten (2008) Africa 10. 
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Various authors38 have recognised that vigilante lynchings in the 19th 
century American South invoked a set of values that community members 
could be expected to support and approve of, namely that of the state-
administered public execution.  Adopting the familiar is an “implicit appeal for 
legitimacy that invite[s] collective recognition”, 39  and the ways in which 
vigilante rituals mirror those of the state are discussed further at § 5 4 1 1 
below.  What is important to recognise at this point, however, is that lynchings 
were not merely arbitrary and random acts of violence, but were in fact 
restrained by certain widely-held and enduring criteria concerning what 
constituted an acceptable lynching.  Lynchings deviating from this 
stereotypical, recognisable form, for example where there was extreme 
disproportionality between the crime committed and the lynching itself, or 
where the vigilante violence was of an unseemly or gratuitous nature, were 
viewed as illegitimate and did not enjoy community support.40 
Similarly, modern-day vigilantes need to portray themselves as being 
accountable to their communities:  Public endorsement of vigilantism depends 
on the community being able to identify with the motivation for punishment, 
the conduct deemed punishable, the process whereby punishment is imposed 
and the particular punishment inflicted.  If there is dissonance between 
vigilante and community agendas, vigilantes risk their legitimacy being called 
into question – for instance, where the “crime-fighting” rhetoric of vigilantism 
merely offers a “legitimate” cover for “pure crime” committed for personal 
gain.41  Another threat to vigilante legitimacy is where organised vigilante 
groups transform over time from being the idealistic “champions of the people” 
to being as feared as the “criminals” they claim to be fighting – a relatively 
frequent occurrence.  A good example is the vigilante group the Bakassi 
Boys, active across south-eastern Nigeria between 1999 and 2002.  Despite 
their using brutal methods of execution, Meagher claims that the Bakassi 
                                            
38 See, e.g., Jean & Brundage “Legitimizing "Justice"” in Informal Criminal Justice; Garland (2005) 
Law and Society Review. 
39 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 808. 
40 Jean & Brundage “Legitimizing "Justice"” in Informal Criminal Justice. 
41 See Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread. 
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Boys “rapidly built a reputation for fairness and honesty”.42  A large part of 
their popular appeal was due to their strict anti-corruption mandate (which 
formed a stark contrast to the actions of official justice providers), as well as 
their impartial commitment to public rather than particularistic interests. 43  
Conversely, they lost public support when they demonstrated their own 
corruptibility; they were co-opted for political gain, acting as thugs for political 
patrons and abusing their status in order to extort money from the public.44  
Perhaps one could say that in the end they mirrored the Nigerian state too 
closely, undermining their legitimacy by becoming more like a political 
organisation (and hence criminal and corrupt), and less like the impartial and 
invincible “supernaturally powered superheroes”45 they had initially appeared 
to be.  The vigilante group PAGAD, most active between 1996 and 2000 in 
the coloured and mainly Muslim areas of the Cape Flats, is another illustration 
of how vigilantes’ failure to abide by their initial popular mandate can cause 
their downfall – in this instance, from “pure” crime-fighting to an increasing 
focus on militant religious fundamentalism.  Initially PAGAD characterised 
itself a community response focused on targeting criminals, particularly drug 
dealers and gangsters, and received widespread support, particularly in 
respect of its more peaceful manifestations (for example, “ultimatum marches” 
undertaken to the homes of alleged drug dealers or gangsters).46  When its 
members’ conduct became more radical and aggressive, and PAGAD was 
accused of committing drive-by shootings and petrol and pipe-bombings, its 
support waned.  It made the shift from vigilante movement to militant Islamist 
terrorist group, 47  thereby alienating many of those who had previously 
legitimated it.  As one Muslim community member lamented:  
                                            
42 K Meagher “Hijacking Civil Society: The Inside Story of the Bakassi Boys Vigilante Group of 
South-Eastern Nigeria” (2007) 45 (1) Journal of Modern African Studies 89 99. 
43 98-99.  Meagher recounts how the Bakassi Boys rejected a massive bribe to set a notorious armed 
robber free and, after executing him, burned rather than shared out his property. 
44 See D J Smith “The Bakassi Boys: Vigilantism, Violence and Political Imagination in Nigeria” 
(2004) 19 (3) Cultural Anthropology 429 and Smith A Culture of Corruption. 
45 Smith (2004) Cultural Anthropology 438; Smith A Culture of Corruption 177. 
46 Monaghan (2004) Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 6. 
47 See also Gottschalk Vigilantism v. the State: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of Pagad, 1996-
2000;Bangstad (2005) Journal of Southern African Studies; B Dixon & L Johns Gangs, Pagad and 
the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape (2001) and Africa, et al. Crime and 
Community Action. 
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“I attended PAGAD meetings at first.  They stood for good things.  
But you cannot kill off persons that you have not spoken to.  You 
cannot hate a man you have not met.  PAGAD’s actions are 
contrary to Islam and reflects badly on the oemma [the global 
community of Muslims].”48  
While the excessive use of violence is frequently part of vigilantes’ 
legitimation strategy, community support may switch to public opposition if 
vigilantes are perceived to have abused their power by resorting to 
unacceptably violent means to achieve their ends.49   In order to achieve 
popular legitimation, vigilantes must therefore walk the fine line between 
community-empowered, normatively legitimate vigilantism and abuse of 
power leading to delegitimation, which is no mean feat.  
 
5 2 1 2 The authority of the sjambok: corporal punishment and legitimacy 
 
The desirability of resorting to physical punishment has long been a 
contentious issue.  The official South African state discourse is resoundingly 
opposed to corporal punishment.  The Constitutional Court declared its use as 
a criminal punishment to be unconstitutional as early as 1995,50 and a year 
later legislation prohibiting its use in schools was promulgated.51  There have 
also been various moves to ban disciplinary chastisement in the home, 
                                            
48 Cited in Bangstad (2005) Journal of Southern African Studies 204. 
49 Kowalewski (1996) Crime, Law and Social Change 
50 S v Williams.  It was found to be in contravention of the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman 
and degrading punishment, as well as the right to human dignity. 
51 South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 s 10.  The constitutionality and applicability of this legislation 
in both public and private schools was confirmed in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of 
Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC).  
“How can you know right from wrong if you have not been 
beaten?” 
–  Community member quoted in Buur Review of African Political Economy 208.  
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including a clause in the 2006 Children’s Amendment Bill that would have 
removed the common law defence of reasonable chastisement, should a 
parent be charged with assaulting their child.52  Although this provision was 
not included in the final legislation, the government does not appear to have 
given up on doing away with state-sanctioned disciplinary chastisement.  As 
recently as May 2014 Social Development Minister Bathabile Dlamini 
confirmed government’s intention to ban corporal punishment “even in the 
home environment”,53 in line with South Africa’s obligations in terms of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,54 as well as its constitutional and 
legislative duties.55  Her view was that “when those in positions of authority 
use [violence] … children understand this as saying [that] violence is 
permissible when trying to persuade others to act in a certain way”.56 
Such statements are in sharp contrast to the vigilante rhetoric, which is 
indeed animated by a belief in violence as an indispensable problem-solving 
and community-building tool.  What needs to be clarified is why the 
communities on whom vigilantes rely for their legitimation are prepared to 
condone – and even encourage – their often excessive levels of physical 
force.  Buur theorises that vigilantes’ appeal to the need for corporal 
punishment is facilitated by a pre-existing justification and legitimation of the 
use of violence by the “wider sociocultural universe”:57  
“[R]outine violence continues to exist as a subtext in the township 
because it is through violence that people are turned into human 
beings, and it is through the constant performance and 
embodiment of violence that the moral community is performed, 
despite the official adherence to constitutional democracy.”58 
                                            
52 Children’s Amendment Bill B19B of 2006 clause 139. 
53 Anonymous “Government to Ban "Violent Means" of Discipline at Home - Minister” (2014-05-30) 
PAN: Children <http://children.pan.org.za/node/9526> (2015-08-03). 
54 A 19. 
55 E.g. s 12 and s 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and s 7 of the Children's 
Act 38 of 2005.  See also, for instance, Burchell Principles 193-203 and the authorities cited there. 
56  Anonymous “Government to Ban "Violent Means" of Discipline at Home - Minister” PAN: 
Children. 
57 Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 34. 
58  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 194. 
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Thus corporal punishment is given legitimacy by being a commonplace 
means of socialising young people into being able to distinguish between right 
and wrong. Vigilantes’ use of violence resonates on various levels with the 
community’s sense that using force is necessary and fitting.  In addition to the 
idea that the “everyday practice”59 of violence is a way of helping people to 
evolve into moral human beings, thus (presumably) restoring order and 
preventing future crime, it is also seen as legitimate in the pragmatic sense 
that it “produces ‘the goods’ economically”60 – i.e., because a person who is 
beaten is more likely to reveal the location of stolen property.  Harsh 
punishment also has a historical significance: Comaroff and Comaroff suggest 
that the violent methods employed by Mapogo A Mathamaga “also [re-enact] 
a visceral memory of violence past”,61 which is in line with the idea raised 
earlier that vigilante violence is somehow the “traditional” manner of enacting 
justice – the “African way of stopping crime”, as Monthle John Magolego, 
head of Mapogo, puts it.62  It must be stressed, too, that resorting to physical 
punishment is a potent manifestation of “expressive justice”; a means for 
community members to release powerful emotions, and a public opportunity 
for “acting out communal outrage”63 that cannot be adequately approximated 
by the sanitised, impersonal penalties of formal justice.  These justifications 
have broad community support and form the foundation for vigilantes’ populist 
mandate. 
It is hard to imagine reconciling the state’s avowed intention to do away 
with physical punishment in all spheres of society with the vigilante 
perspective that their use of violent punishment is a community-authorised 
means of “making the world at once safe, morally founded and spiritually 
clean”.64  There is no doubt that many citizens would agree with Magolego 
when he opines, “We are sick to death of the soft-handed techniques of 
                                            
59 Buur (2008) Review of African Political Economy 577. 
60 Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 38. 
61  Comaroff & Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: International Perspectives 228. 
62 Quoted at 225. 
63 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 820. 
64  Comaroff & Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: International Perspectives 223. 
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democracy … If they won’t listen, their asses must burn.” 65   While it is 
tempting to discount the state’s denunciation of violence as mere lip service 
being paid to human rights and democracy, its official stance reflects its 
express desire to situate its identity as human rights guarantor as a central 
component of its self-legitimation.  A question to be addressed in chapter 7 is 
how the state can persuade citizens that its self-avowed human-rights-friendly 
identity is more worthy of being legitimated than is the vigilante’s identity of 
being an authoritarian disciplinarian66 who violently purges society of all ills.   
 
5 2 1 3 Fighting spiritual battles 
The fight against deviance is not waged on the corporeal plane alone.  
According to Chidester,67 any power-holder – whether formal or informal – 
must “draw on symbolic resources of superhuman power and sacred purity if 
it is to retain an aura of legitimacy”.  By so doing it seeks to disguise the 
tenuous grounds of its legitimacy, its often arbitrary choice of victims and its 
use of violence to quell opposition.  Its aim is to be mandated as the only 
“holy, just and legitimate violence” that would restrain all opposing violence.68  
While these insights apply to state and vigilante alike, it is submitted that – at 
least overtly – vigilantes have been more successful at harnessing this 
spiritual dimension of crime-fighting for the purposes of self-legitimation.  They 
do so on two levels: not only are superhuman powers often attributed to 
vigilantes, but they claim to do battle with metaphysical as well as physical 
enemies on behalf of communities under threat. 
As regards the first level, the Bakassi Boys of Nigeria are a useful 
illustration of a vigilante group that were regarded as being somehow 
superhuman.  Smith explains that they were legitimated not simply on the 
basis of their integrity and anti-corruption stance; their incorruptibility was 
believed to be spiritually assured, and they were viewed as “supernaturally 
                                            
65 Quoted at 225. 
66 Baker Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa 39. 
67 See Chidester Shots in the Streets 36-37. 
68 See 36-37. 
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powered superheroes”.69  Much of the power of their “image as symbolically 
legitimate crime fighters” rested on their being portrayed as heroes who were 
protected from criminals’ bullets by magical charms and who were able to 
detect innocence or guilt by using their magical machetes.70  The belief that 
these vigilantes’ ability to judge criminality accurately was supernaturally 
legitimated helps explain why so much confidence was placed in their ability 
to fight crime, as well as why there was little public concern – at least initially – 
about the possible loss of innocent lives.  Smith also observes that the 
Bakassi Boys’ superhero image “enabled the Nigerian public to justify 
vigilante executions without empathizing with the executioner or the victim”.71  
The depiction of vigilantes as “superheroes” eliminating “bad guys” served to 
allow ordinary citizens witnessing public executions to distance themselves 
mentally and morally from the spectacle of gratuitous violence as if watching it 
on a cinema screen, and to cheer on – legitimate – the conduct of vigilantes 
without experiencing emotions of personal culpability.  The Bakassi Boys’ 
appeal for legitimacy was given collective recognition for a time, until their 
corrupt behaviour demonstrated that they were not in actual fact 
supernaturally sanctioned superheroes.  Subsequently their legitimacy, with 
its reliance on “an idiom of accountability tied to the supernatural”, was 
undermined.  Thus it appears that legitimation based purely on supernatural 
powers – particularly in circumstances where the claim of purity is defiled in 
practice by corrupt actions – may be fleeting and conditional, and is unlikely to 
form the basis for a long-standing collective mandate.  
The second level on which the spiritual aspect of crime-fighting is 
relevant for vigilantism relates to vigilantes’ purported capacity to fight 
witches.72  This claim forms a significant basis upon which many communities 
legitimate vigilante actions, and demonstrates a power that police and other 
                                            
69 Smith (2004) Cultural Anthropology 438; Smith A Culture of Corruption177. 
70 Smith (2004) Cultural Anthropology 440; Smith A Culture of Corruption 178. 
71 Smith (2004) Cultural Anthropology 441; Smith A Culture of Corruption 179-180. 
72  Anti-witchcraft violence has already been mentioned § 4 3 1 2 in the context of substantive 
dissonance between state and citizen law-enforcement beliefs, and was there characterised as a form 
of social control vigilantism.  It was also discussed in §§ 2 5 1 1 1 and 2 5 1 1 3 when analysing the 
unlawful attack requirement for private defence, where it was noted that spiritual attacks are not 
classified as “real”, or the interests they infringe worthy of protection, for the purposes of reliance on 
private defence. 
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state law enforcement agents palpably lack.73  As noted earlier,74 vigilantes 
have to portray their violence as being in accordance with conventional 
community values and sources of authority so as to promote and sustain their 
claim to legitimacy.  If community members perceive vigilante self-help to be a 
product of beliefs that are shared by all, they are able to identify more easily 
with vigilantes and may be more inclined to unite under their moral authority.  
In this, anti-witchcraft vigilantes appear to have had considerable success – 
perhaps owing to the prevalence of strongly-held witchcraft beliefs throughout 
Africa.75  Faced with the threat of occult violence from those prepared to use 
evil forces to harm and kill, and living in a mode of anxiety, suspicion and fear 
as a result, it is perhaps unsurprising that witchcraft believers are prepared to 
legitimate the actions of those carrying out witch-killings so as to alleviate their 
spiritual insecurity.76  There is ample evidence that those who support and 
organise violent action against witches are viewed as “perform[ing] a valuable 
social service, [thereby] attain[ing] political legitimacy”.77  Vigilantes who battle 
the embodiments of metaphysical malevolence are accorded near-
superhuman status.  A journalist quoted by Crais says that those who 
“destroyed people accused of being witches or wizards were, and still are, 
seen by others in the community as ‘selfless heroes’ who are committed to 
freeing people from ‘supernatural evils’.”78  
As long as harmful witchcraft is practised and its practitioners feared, 
there will always be vigilantes prepared to take the law into their own hands to 
punish witches.  Communities desire protection from occult violence, and the 
state is very unlikely to act on Cohan’s proposal that authorities conduct 
witchcraft trials “as a way of placating the public’s fears”79 and preventing mob 
violence.  Unless the causes of witchcraft believers’ predicaments, fears and 
                                            
73 For more on the state’s incapacity to ward off spiritual attacks, see Nel (2014) Acta Criminologica. 
74 At § 5 2 1. 
75 Cohan (2011) Suffolk University Law Review 807. 
76  See I Niehaus Witchcraft and a Life in the New South Africa (2013) 204; Nel (2014) Acta 
Criminologica 26. 
77 I Niehaus Witchcraft, Power and Politics: Exploring the Occult in the South African Lowveld (2001) 
154; also A Minnaar “Legislative and Legal Challenges to Combating Witch Purging and Muti 
Murder in South Africa” in J Hund (eds) Witchcraft Violence and the Law in South Africa (2003) 37. 
78 C C Crais The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power and Political Imagination in South Africa (2002) 
116; also Nel (2014) Acta Criminologica 29. 
79 Cohan (2011) Suffolk University Law Review 853; 809. 
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anxieties are addressed, namely their lived experiences of “misery, 
marginalisation, illness, poverty and insecurity”,80 it is difficult to contemplate a 
solution to the problem of witchcraft-related vigilantism.  In the meantime, an 
aura of supernatural legitimation, or alternatively, being seen to offer a 
solution to the problem of threats of a supernatural origin, are powerful 
legitimation strategies for vigilantes. 
 
5 3 Normative counter-legitimation: promoting community 
empowerment and cohesion 
Now that some of the ideologies vigilantes rely upon to legitimate their 
power by popular mandate have been considered, the question remains why 
such substantial segments of certain communities heed the vigilante appeal 
for legitimation, contributing to the continued existence of vigilante groups 
either by participating in acts of vigilantism themselves or by passively 
condoning vigilante activities.81  In § 3 5 2 2 it was observed that the chief 
means of convincing the subordinate that a power-holder’s exercise of 
authority is normatively justifiable is to ensure that it satisfies the interests of 
the subordinate and serves to advance the common good – which for the 
state means (inter alia) safeguarding the well-being and security of all 
citizens.  It is submitted that vigilantes’ claim to legitimacy likewise depends 
on their ability to justify their power as amounting to more than simply the 
convenient disposal of or intimidation of undesirables: vigilante violence 
needs to be represented as constituting empowerment of, and not only by, the 
community.  If vigilantes can convince community members that it is socially 
                                            
80 Niehaus Witchcraft, Power and Politics 193. 
81 See Monaghan (2004) Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement and C Montana “Day of the 
Leopard” (1999) 15 Focus 2 for accounts of well-attended mass meetings of PAGAD and Mapogo A 
Mathamaga supporters respectively.  Also, about half of a 470-strong Eastern Cape sample viewed 
vigilantism as acceptable, even positive, while 20% of respondents would consider participating in 
vigilante activity (Schönteich, et al. Private Muscle: Outsourcing the Provision of Criminal Justice 
Services).  The 2003 South African Victims of Crime Survey likewise found that 7% of the 4 860 
respondents were aware of a community-protection organisation operating locally that administered 
physical punishment to suspects (P Burton, A Du Plessis, T Leggett, A Louw, D Mistry & H Van 
Vuuren “National Victims of Crime Survey South Africa 2003” (2004-07-01) ISS 
<https://www.issafrica.org/publications/monographs/monograph-101-national-victims-of-crime-
survey-south-africa-2003-patrick-burton-anton-du-plessis-ted-leggett-antoinette-louw-du> (2015-02-
03)). 
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beneficial for them to come together to eliminate common enemies, not only 
may vigilantes’ own moral authority be augmented by the community’s 
expressed consent, but such participatory support also “has a binding effect, 
establishing complicity and implying group membership”.82  Indeed, according 
to Pratten, vigilantism itself may amount to a “powerful and productive” means 
of constructing a community, its acts of violence serving to “make and mark 
community boundaries”.83  In this way, to use Jensen’s terminology, practices 
to uncover and punish deviance are “community-producing performances”84 – 
the “midwives of community”.85  
Vigilantism may counteract societal fragmentation in two contrasting 
but complementary senses.  First, it may be a unifying force, serving to 
strengthen and re-establish community authority by reinforcing common 
values and “repairing tears to the social fabric caused by disputes” – what 
Wood terms “violence of community”; 86  and second, it may be a type of 
“violence of exclusion”87  – a divisive force that promotes social solidarity 
through the forcible elimination of community “enemies” from the shared 
community space.  These aspects of self-legitimating vigilante community-
building are considered separately below. 
 
  
                                            
82 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 823. 
83 D Pratten “Bodies of Power: Narratives of Selfhood and Security in Nigeria” in T G Kirsch and T 
Grätz (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa (2010) 119; Sen & Pratten “Perspectives on Justice 
and Violence” in Global Vigilantes 11. 
84 Jensen “Through the Lens of Crime: Land Claims and the Contestations of Citizenship on the 
Frontier of the South African State” in The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty 
and Securitization in Southern Africa 211. 
85 195. 
86 Wood (2003) Crime, History and Societies para 17. 
87 Para 17. 
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5 3 1 “Violence of community”: counter-legitimation through violent 
inclusion 
 
Vigilante violence may be characterised as a ritual that symbolises 
social cohesion, which acts as a vehicle for realising such solidarity.88  In this 
regard, Durkheim argues that the purpose of punishment is not primarily to 
“correct the guilty person or to scare off any possible imitators”, but rather to 
“maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common 
consciousness in all its vigour”.89  Durkheim’s view is that “[c]rime draws 
honest consciences together, concentrating them”. 90   According to this 
                                            
88 W Brundage Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930 (1993). 
89 Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society 62-63. 
90 58. 
“Let me give you an example of what happened in my 
neighbourhood just this morning at 5.00am!  We heard a woman 
screaming “i-Bag yam? I-Bag yam? Nal’isela” (My bag! My Bag! 
Here’s a thief!!)  In no time, I mean, in no time, everybody was 
coming out, slamming doors behind them.  I mean, it was like a 
split second – and they were all dressed in their clothes, not 
pyjamas.  It was as if they were waiting, ready all night for exactly 
this kind of thing to happen.  Then they descended upon this man 
– they came with all sorts of weapons to assault him.  Rocks on 
the street were thrown at him.  In no time, the man was gone – in 
no time – they had finished him.  Think about it, in a matter of a 
few minutes, perhaps seconds, a man is dead, killed by a group of 
people in my community for snatching a woman’s handbag on her 
way to work.  Glancing at his body lying on the side of the street 
as I went to work, I saw that a large concrete slab – you know 
those slabs used to divide freeway roads.  A concrete slab had 
been thrown on the back of his head to finish him off.” 
–  Extract from Dr Godobo-Madilizela’s interview with a Khayelitsha community 
member, quoted in O’Regan and Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 342.  
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paradigm, punishment – which could include violent community responses to 
deviance – is seen as a means to reaffirm values that are perceived to be 
under threat, thus re-establishing or clarifying normative boundaries 
threatened or destabilised by social chaos.91  Snodgrass Godoy agrees that 
public acts of punishment are “only peripherally about the crime that precedes 
them; at their heart lies the goal of repairing ruptured solidarities and 
reinforcing bonds among the non-criminal members of the community”. 92  
Whatever one’s views regarding the harsh punishment meted out to the 
suspected thief in the opening quote of this section, the incident reveals that 
this particular neighbourhood has a very high level of solidarity and social 
capital.93  Upon hearing a cry of distress, “everybody” was instantly prepared 
to accept their social responsibility to the community as a whole, 
spontaneously galvanising “in no time” to protect the interests of one of their 
number who had been victimised.94   
Similarly, Wood95 characterises the vigilante manner of dealing with 
perceived deviance through self-policing as a complex mechanism aimed at 
maintaining community cohesion.  There are two main senses in which 
vigilante-administered punishment may contribute to community unity.  These 
relate to vigilantes’ ability to empower and unite communities by serving as 
“representative focal point for community sentiment”96 as well as the capacity 
of vigilante violence to demarcate the boundary between “the community” and 
“outsiders”. 
First, vigilantism may strengthen and reassemble community 
authority97 in that vigilante acts reassert the power and values of a social 
order at odds with that of the state – one that relies on a reactionary and 
                                            
91  See also Little & Sheffield (1983) American Sociological Review; Brown “The History of 
Vigilantism in America” in Vigilante Politics. 
92 Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society 636. 
93 According to R D Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000) 
19, social capital “refers to the collective value of all ‘social networks’ and the inclinations that arise 
from these networks to do things for each other.” 
94 See also the testimony of Brigadier Dladla, Station Commander of a Khayelitsha police station, who 
confirmed: “[W]e are serving the poor people who – where R20 … means a lot, so if you take his 
money and he shouts a thief, people will respond just like that.” (O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha 
Commission Report 227). 
95 Wood (2003) Crime, History and Societies para 17. 
96 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 64. 
97 Wood (2003) Crime, History and Societies para 18. 
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punitive vision of community consensus. 98   Vigilante violence, then, is a 
means of producing a type of localised sovereignty that “constitute[s] the 
formation of the moral community”. 99   In purporting to represent “latent, 
unacknowledged and non-legitimated strains of public sentiment”, vigilante 
violence celebrates a particular communal identity, 100  which functions to 
produce social solidarity.  The “binding effect” of participating – even 
vicariously – in an act of vigilante violence not only implies group 
membership, but also encourages complicity.101  Of course, from the state’s 
perspective vigilante complicity may not imply a concentration of non-criminal 
“honest consciences”102 per se: solidarity may instead be a potential factor 
precipitating the conspiracy of silence that often surrounds acts of 
vigilantism.103   
A second function of extra-legal punishment related to community 
cohesion is its capacity to “redefine the identity, conscience or boundary for 
the threatened collective”.104  It was noted earlier that community members 
must be able to identify with vigilantes in order to legitimate them.  Barker 
observes that enemies are “necessary to identification, since by saying who is 
not, an individual, community or group marks out its boundaries more 
clearly”. 105   The “inside threshold of society” 106  is thus constituted with 
reference to the distinction between good and evil.  As will be examined 
further when “violence of exclusion” is discussed below,107 vigilante acts of 
“everyday violence” serve to delineate group membership by demarcating the 
margins between behaviour that is viewed as acceptable according to societal 
norms and that “which is de-legitimised, immoral, or even, quite literally in 
cases of suspected witchcraft, demonized”.108  Vigilantes exploit the notion of 
                                            
98 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 819; Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 54. 
99 Buur & Jensen (2004) African Studies 146. 
100 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 819. 
101 823. 
102 To use the terminology of Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society 58. 
103 See § 5 4 1 1 below for a discussion of the vigilante conspiracy of silence in respect of the aspect of 
fear. 
104 Supancic & Willis (1998) Journal of Crime and Justice 199. 
105 Barker Legitimating Identities 36.  See from § 5 3 below for more on enhancing legitimacy through 
inclusion and exclusion. 
106 Buur (2006) Development and Change 753. 
107 From § 5 3 2. 
108 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 54. 
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enhancing identification through boundary-making (inclusion and exclusion), 
distancing themselves from criminal violence through an ingenious shifting of 
blame away from themselves towards their victims.109  Labelling their victims 
as “criminals” deserving of “punishment” promotes community cohesion by 
reinforcing vigilantes’ own identity (and that of the communities whose 
interests they claim to protect) as innocent, long-suffering “victims”.  Justifying 
their resort to brutal acts of violence by focusing on the need to protect the 
victimised community from harm enables vigilantes to enhance their 
normative legitimacy, since their conduct serves to advance an important 
societal interest.   
The vigilante violence demarcating the border between the moral 
community and outsiders is not simply aimed at excluding the deviant enemy, 
however:  Its objective may also be to draw errant individuals back into the 
community.  Buur notes that, particularly where young women or girls are 
concerned, the primary purpose is often reintegration: physical discipline 
teaches community members “the right way” so that they may be fully 
restored as members of the moral community.110   
  
                                            
109 See Knox & Monaghan Informal Justice in Divided Societies 56-67 and Appendix A (particularly at 
A.iv) below on internally-directed self-legitimation strategies. 
110  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 205-207.  See also the discussion of the role of corporal punishment at §§ 4 3 2 4 
and 5 2 1 2 above.  In contrast, see in the context of pre-1994 vigilantism Abel Politics by Other 
Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid 322-323 who cites a Business Day report detailing the 
potentially restorative and reintegrative functioning of a People’s Court that explicitly eschews 
violent punishment, declaring that “the court’s intention is to educate, not punish”.  Appearing before 
the Alexandra Action Committee (“AAC”), the complainant had accused a young man of theft and 
demanded that he be sjambokked.  After hearing evidence, the judge found that the accused’s issues 
stemmed from alcohol abuse, and persuaded his “nephews” to let him live with them after agreeing 
that the AAC, the nephews and the complainant would monitor his drinking and spending.  The 
judge concluded: “We do not believe that the accused is beyond redemption.  He can be rehabilitated 
… Sjambokking a man does not necessarily mean he will change … We will work hard to make the 
accused a good person and we will also ask you to help us change this man.  What do you say?  Can 
you help us?” 
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5 3 2 “Violence of exclusion”: counter-legitimation through violent 
elimination 
 
Now that the power of vigilante violence to generate and perpetuate 
community cohesion has been reflected on, it is necessary to elaborate on its 
unavoidable counterpart; the exclusion of those who do not form part of the 
cohesive community.  As already mentioned, the identification process 
essential for legitimation necessarily also entails defining group membership 
in terms of those who are excluded as “the repulsive other”. 111   By 
symbolically creating enemies, vigilantes reinforce the normative boundaries 
between “us” and “them”.  Garland terms this tendency to employ punishment 
primarily to exclude, “the criminology of the other”, 112 with the “other” being 
the epitome of all that is evil and undesirable – a deserving target for violent 
retribution who is by definition “intrinsically different from the rest of us”, an 
“opaquely monstrous [creature] beyond or beneath our knowing”.113   
 
5 3 2 1 Targeting the scapegoat114 
A useful starting-point for understanding this “violence of exclusion” is 
Girard’s “scapegoat mechanism”.  It will become apparent that the 
“scapegoat” interpretation of vigilante violence as a “sacrificial act [that] 
                                            
111 Thurston Witch, Wicce, Mother Goose 34. 
112 Garland Culture of Control 184. 
113 184. 
114  See Leviticus 16: 7-10 for the original biblical reference to a scapegoat (Anonymous Life 
Application Bible: King James Version (1986) 206. 
“[F]or the low, brutal, cruel, lazy, ignorant, insolent, sensual 
and blasphemous miscreants that infest the frontier we 
entertain but one sentiment – aversion – deep, strong and 
unchangeable”. 
–  19th century American vigilante Thomas Dinsdale quoted in Brown The History of 
Vigilantism in America 91.  
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appears as both sinful and saintly, an illegal as well as a legitimate exercise of 
violence”115 provides valuable insight into the ritualistic and paradoxical nature 
of vigilantism.  It explains collective violence as a way for social groups to 
“deflect the potential, uncontrolled violence of the society itself”116 by focusing 
all their wrath on an arbitrary sacrificial victim – a surrogate target for all active 
or endemic community dissensions, rivalries, jealousies and quarrels.117  Self-
purification and a new moral community may only be achieved through an act 
of expulsion whereby all dissonances are overcome by directing internal 
aggression against “a common enemy in which all evil, detestable forces [are] 
personified”.118  In Girard’s terms, the selection of a surrogate victim (the 
scapegoat) represents the “violent unanimity of a community that focuses, 
deflects, and thereby restrains its own potentially self-destructive violence”: 
the internal “bad” violence is channelled into “good” violence that violently 
expels or eliminates its sacrificial victims with the aim of restoring harmony to 
the community.119    
The characterisation of the vigilante victim as surrogate – proxy – 
target may seem at first to contradict the reality that victims of vigilantism are 
attacked because they are perceived to be wrongdoers, not innocent 
unfortunates.  However, it must be kept in mind that an act of vigilantism is a 
response to much more than simply the single criminal incident against which 
the immediate violence is directed.  The reason vigilantes lash out violently 
has to do with multiple factors other than merely their grievance with an 
individual miscreant: as has been discussed, marginalisation, abandonment, 
fear, high overall levels of violence, disillusionment with formal channels of 
redress, anxiety and frustration contribute towards escalating tensions, with 
the final act of vigilantism being a symptom of a far greater lack of social order 
and security.  According to Girard, “only violence can put an end to violence, 
                                            
115 R Girard Violence and the Sacred (2005) 21. 
116 8; Chidester Shots in the Streets 27. 
117 According to Girard, “[a] single victim can be substituted for all the potential victims, for all the 
enemy brothers that each member is striving to banish from the community.  Each member’s 
hostility, caused by clashing against others, becomes converted from an individual feeling to a 
communal force unanimously directed against a single individual.” (Girard Violence and the Sacred 
83). 
118 J Harnischfeger “Witchcraft and the State in South Africa” in J Hund (eds) Witchcraft Violence and 
the Law in South Africa (2003) 55.  See also Nel (2014) Acta Criminologica 30-31. 
119 Chidester Shots in the Streets 34-35; Girard Violence and the Sacred 8; 83-84; 281. 
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and that is why violence is self-propagating”.120  Where the legitimacy and 
power of the formal judicial system are such that it is able to maintain the 
exclusive, legitimate exercise of violence in a society, the state may function 
effectively to “deflect the menace of [private] vengeance”.121  In the absence 
of a legitimate judicial system to contain and restrain violence, however, 
Girard argues that the social order breaks under a “sacrificial crisis” and 
begins to identify and eradicate surrogate victims in an attempt to renegotiate 
the order of its world.122  Where there is a unanimous conviction that the 
surrogate is a single “polluted” enemy who is responsible for the “violent 
mimesis” besetting the community, destroying such surrogate victim has the 
effect of freeing the community from the vicious circle of vengeance and 
reprisals. 123   By selecting, eliminating and desecrating a single surrogate 
victim, says Girard, a community briefly defends itself against the imitative 
and self-propagating violence that threatens to destroy it.124  The function of 
the sacrifice is to quell violence within the community and prevent conflicts 
from erupting, thus reinforcing the social fabric.125  This explanation resonates 
in the vigilante context: Vigilante violence may indeed be conceived of as an 
act of “violent unanimity” 126  whereby the social solidarity and internal 
coherence of the community are enhanced by the elimination of relatively 
arbitrarily-designated targets.  
While any person could potentially be targeted, the ideal scapegoat is 
someone on the fringes of society,127 a marginal, liminal or borderline person 
who is identified as being “neither too familiar to the community nor too 
foreign to it”.128  The surrogate (vigilante) victim thus stands on the symbolic 
                                            
120 Girard Violence and the Sacred 27. 
121 16. 
122 See 19; 41-70; Chidester Shots in the Streets 32-37. 
123  This is because violence against the surrogate victim does not provoke a reprisal (see Girard 
Violence and the Sacred 86; 90).  This corresponds with G Agamben Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power 
and Bare Life (1998) 82, where he describes his equivalent of the surrogate victim, homo sacer, as 
being continually exposed to “unsanctionable killing  that … is classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as 
homicide”. 
124 Girard Violence and the Sacred 86; Chidester Shots in the Streets 32-33. 
125 Girard Violence and the Sacred 14; 8. 
126 84. 
127 12. 
128 286. 
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boundary dividing the inside from the outside of the community.129  Buur 
describes those whom vigilantes target for punishment as “constitutive 
outsider[s]”,130 embodying both what needs to be excluded as well as (by 
contrast) that which is included – a state Agamben terms “inclusive 
exclusion”. 131   De Souza Martins suggests that there are “fixed cultural 
images about the kinds of crime and the categories of people susceptible to 
lynchings”.132  Although it is difficult to generalise about the types of offences 
that tend to incite vigilantism, since they range from non-criminal antisocial 
behaviour to heinous murder or child-rape, crimes that invite strong 
identification with, and sympathy for, a vulnerable victim may be particularly 
likely to provoke a vigilante response. 133   The categories of individuals 
especially at risk of suffering vigilante punishment may likewise depend on the 
specific societal context and the type of deviance at issue.  As regards victims 
who are targeted due to their apparent criminality, such “generic criminals”134 
are usually young men.  Jensen describes the beating of young men in front 
of the whole community as a “ritualised enactment of generational 
hierarchies” functioning as a means of reaffirming a particular social order – 
one which views the youth with considerable suspicion.135  Buur observes that 
having been branded as a criminal in a specific case, such young men are 
excluded from civil society.  Once they have been marginalised as an 
underclass “it becomes possible and acceptable to treat the person as a 
‘bare-being’’ – that is, a being that one can treat as one wishes, with impunity 
and without regard for their psychological and physical well-being”. 136  
                                            
129 At 307 Girard describes the qualities of a “good” sacrificial victim thus: “If [he] is to polarize and 
purge the emotions of the community, he must at once resemble the members of the community and 
differ from them; he must be at once insider and outsider, both ‘double’ and incarnation of the 
‘sacred difference.’  He must be neither wholly good nor wholly bad.” 
130 Buur (2006) Development and Change 753. 
131 Agamben Homo Sacer 8. 
132 J De Souza Martins “Lynchings – Life by a Thread: Street Justice in Brazil, 1979-1988” in M K 
Huggins (eds) Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America (1991) 29. 
133 R Shotland & L Goodstein “The Role of Bystanders in Crime Control” (1984) 40 Journal of Social 
Issues 9 argue that crimes evoking strong empathy with the victim may increase the feeling of moral 
obligation to engage in spontaneous vigilantism because community members are left with a strong 
sense of their own vulnerability. 
134 Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 34. 
135 Jensen “Through the Lens of Crime: Land Claims and the Contestations of Citizenship on the 
Frontier of the South African State” in The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty 
and Securitization in Southern Africa 207. 
136 Buur (2003) Anthropology and Humanism 35. 
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Comaroff and Comaroff also note that young men are most susceptible to 
being criminalised: “They become the nightmare anticitizens who must be 
disciplined if order is to be restored”.137  Clearly, branding their targets “bare-
beings” or as “anticitizens” would help legitimise vigilantes’ use of force 
against them.  
The targets of anti-witchcraft vigilantism, by contrast, are generally not 
young men.  Petrus’ study of witchcraft-related violence in the Eastern 
Cape 138  found that “cultural profiling” is often the basis for distinguishing 
between perpetrator and victim, with the targets of witch-purging in South 
Africa mostly being elderly women, whereas witch-hunters are young males.  
Antisocial, over-individualistic, morose or “difficult” people may also be 
accused due to their perceived undermining of community cohesion. 139  
Minnaar140 notes that witchcraft accusations are often motivated by jealousy, 
targeting opponents or rivals whose supposed reliance on the occult has 
given them an unfair advantage.  In this vein, Jensen explains that witchcraft 
accusations against the rural elite may function as a way in which young 
“comrades” (usually the targets of intergenerational vigilante violence) can 
contest the “rule of gerontocracy” and their socioeconomic marginalisation by 
asserting a parallel or even opposing moral community; that their (elderly) 
victims are witches who are getting richer by exploiting the poor. 141   He 
mentions the instance of a well-connected sugar cane farmer who was 
accused of killing community members to turn them into zombies who would 
work his fields without being paid.142  
  
                                            
137 Comaroff & Comaroff “Popular Justice in the New South Africa” in Legitimacy and Criminal 
Justice: International Perspectives 233.  See also De Souza Martins “Lynchings – Life by a Thread” 
in Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America 29, who observes that stereotypical victims of 
vigilantism in Brazil are “idle youth” with “criminal characteristics”. 
138 T Petrus “Critical Issues Regarding the Victims of Witchcraft-Related Crime in South Africa” 
(2012) 24 (1) Acta Criminologica 29 33-34. 
139  Ludsin (2003) Berkeley Journal of International Law 80-81.  See also Nel (2014) Acta 
Criminologica 31. 
140 Minnaar “Legislative and Legal Challenges to Combating Witch Purging and Muti Murder” in 
Witchcraft Violence and the Law in South Africa 73. 
141 Jensen “Through the Lens of Crime: Land Claims and the Contestations of Citizenship on the 
Frontier of the South African State” in The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty 
and Securitization in Southern Africa 211. 
142 210. 
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An example cited in an interview by Harris is a final instructive 
illustration of vigilante scapegoating: 
“[At around 4pm] I heard this loud noise, [two men] were breaking 
the window [of my house] … I took my firearm … and tried to 
shoot one [but I missed him] and he ran away.  [I ran after the 
other guy and] I managed to grab him.  He was very tall and he 
was tough [and he was a makwerekwere, or foreigner.  Some of 
the neighbours came out and we dragged him to my house].  
Then we assaulted him.  We assaulted him very, very, very badly 
so to say.  [I felt so angry because this was the third attempted 
break-in at my house and the police had not done anything about 
it].  So we assaulted this guy until 8am …. There was this crowbar 
that [we] used.  We beat him on the toes with that, we beat him on 
the head with that.  And then … we removed all his clothes, then 
we painted him and we let him stand on top of the electric box so 
that people could see him … see that he is a criminal.”143  
This victim has many of the characteristics of the quintessential 
scapegoat: he is peripheral to the community in that he is a foreigner, but one 
can infer that he is a local resident in that he is familiar with the environment, 
so he is simultaneously insider and outsider.  He is a tough young man – the 
epitome of Buur’s generic criminal.  His treatment at the hands of the 
vigilantes is grossly disproportionate to his suspected crime, and in this 
respect he is an undeserving surrogate victim of such a harsh assault.  The 
interviewee explicitly makes a connection between his anger and frustration 
about previous incidences of crime that were met with police apathy and the 
present victim’s severe punishment, revealing that inflicting vigilante 
punishment provides a collective purpose and cathartic release for 
participants that may be unrelated to the specific criminal incident.  Garland 
notes that the “penal excess” of public lynchings (and, it is submitted, other 
forms of violent vigilantism) is “designed to degrade [the victim], to strip him of 
                                            
143 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 24. 
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human dignity, and to restore him to his place as inferior”.144  It would be hard 
to conceive of a more tormenting, dehumanising or emasculating “inclusive 
exclusion”145 and public “ritual humiliation”146 than being severely assaulted, 
stripped naked, painted and put on display.  He is isolated, but fully in the 
public eye, serving as a graphic reminder of the external limits of society to 
those within the community who witness his degradation.   
Thus the conception of the vigilante victim as scapegoat makes it 
possible to understand many aspects of vigilantism better, including the 
reasons underlying its frequently excessive violence and the choice of victim, 
as well as vigilantism’s societal function.  
 
5 3 2 2 “Linguistic black magic” 
 Vigilantes’ power of symbolic exclusion and elimination may operate 
on a figurative level, with vigilantes waging a “war of words” against those 
they define as enemies.  The rhetoric of vigilante violence employs such 
techniques as inverting the categories of “victim” and “perpetrator” 147 and 
characterising what vigilantes do as “punishment”, thereby implying that 
victims deserve the “just retribution” being meted out.148  In addition, to obtain 
community sanction for their harsh and sometimes lethal actions, vigilantes 
tend to portray their victims not as fellow human beings, but as a subhuman, 
non-human or bestial underclass149 – those who are “inhuman and not fit to 
live”. 150  Ascribing evil to others through the use of powerful stigmatising 
                                            
144 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 820. 
145 Agamben Homo Sacer 8. 
146 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 820. 
147 See Annexure A.iv below for how vigilantes may “neutralise” their deviance by denying the victim.  
See Black “Crime as Social Control” in Towards a General Theory of Social Control Volume 2: 
Selected Problems 12-13 for more on the tendency of those engaged in violent social control to 
reverse the role of victim and offender; also Petrus (2012) Acta Criminologica for a problematisation 
of who are actually the victims in witchcraft-related crime.  Vigilantes’ dual role as perpetrator and 
victim is also noted in § 4 3 2 6 above. 
148 Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal Criminal Justice. 
149 See Buur Outsourcing the Sovereign: Local Justice and Violence in Port Elizabeth 23; also Baker 
Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa 145; Baker (2002) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 239; 
De Souza Martins “Lynchings – Life by a Thread” in Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin 
America. 
150 The description of a witch quoted in Cohan (2011) Suffolk University Law Review 840. 
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labels is a means of transforming them “into legitimate victims of [vigilantes’] 
own inhuman behaviour.”151 
Using this “linguistic black magic” 152  has troubling practical 
implications, the most disquieting of which is that “dehumanising criminals and 
emphasising their inhumanity underscores their lack of rights”.153  The targets 
of vigilante violence are the position of Agamben’s homo sacer:  
“[Their] entire existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of every 
right by virtue of the fact that anyone can kill [them] without 
committing homicide; [they] can save [themselves] only in 
perpetual flight or a foreign land.  And yet [they are] in a 
continuous relationship with the power that banished [them] 
precisely insofar as [they are] at every instant exposed to an 
unconditioned threat of death.”154   
Vigilantes negate their victims’ humanity, judging them unworthy to 
exercise the right to access to state-imposed adjudication and punishment155 
(with its concomitant procedural safeguards), and appropriate to themselves 
the right to punish them with impunity.  Due to vigilante victims’ perceived 
subhuman inability to “control [their] desires, hatreds and ambitions”156 their 
status is adjudged to be akin to that of mere animals,157 who are denied or 
have forfeited the rights and protections afforded citizens in the 
Constitution. 158   The sovereign power sanctioned to deal with their 
wrongdoing is thus not the constitutionally-circumscribed authority of the 
state, but the unlimited power of informal agents of justice such as 
                                            
151 Abrahams “What's in a name?” in Informal Criminal Justice 34. 
152 33. 
153 Meth (2010) Planning Theory and Practice 258. 
154  Agamben Homo Sacer 183.  See also Girard Violence and the Sacred 13, where he says the 
sacrificeable are distinguished from the non-sacrificeable on the basis that they “can be exposed to 
violence without fear of reprisal” since the crucial social link between them and the community is 
missing. 
155 De Souza Martins “Lynchings – Life by a Thread” in Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin 
America 26. 
156 26. 
157 The terminology used to describe outsiders echoes this sentiment.  See, for instance, the use of the 
word “infest” to describe the how the “miscreants” of the opening quote are taking over, and 
Garland’s conception of the Other as a “monstrous creature”. 
158 Baker Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa 145. 
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vigilantes,159 who are imbued with right “to decide on life and death [and] the 
capacity to visit excessive violence on those declared enemies and 
undesirables”.160  For as long as the mindset that “criminals haven’t got rights.  
Human rights for criminals is a sjambok on the buttocks”161 is prevalent, the 
Other will be viewed as undeserving of the privilege and protection of human 
rights, and vigilantes’ brutal treatment of them will be accorded legitimacy. 
 
5 3 2 3 Exorcising evil 
Vigilantes also direct their violence towards the literal exclusion of their 
enemies, either by banishing them from the community162 or by killing them.  
Elimination from the community – “social death”163 – is a severe sentence.  
Losing access to local support networks, in the words of one of Buur’s 
interviewees, is “the worst that can happen to a person living in the township – 
to be alone.”164  As already noted, vigilante killings often exhibit an excessive 
degree of force, potently expressing the perceived worthlessness and enemy 
status of their victims, who are often tortured or mutilated prior to being 
dispatched, frequently by burning.  “Necklacing” is a particularly popular 
killing-method in South Africa. Not only is the victim’s death exceptionally 
excruciating, but the burning of the body also symbolises purification, with the 
flames signifying “the total elimination of the defilement that had endangered 
the health, well-being and order of the community”.165  Death by burning is 
also particularly final, destroying the soul as well as the body and preventing it 
from returning to haunt the living – an important consideration in witch-
killings.166  Similarly, De Sousa Martins argues that the “rites of disfiguration” 
frequently accompanying Brazilian lynchings preclude the deceased from 
                                            
159 Buur Outsourcing the Sovereign: Local Justice and Violence in Port Elizabeth 23. 
160 Hansen & Stepputat (2006) Annual Review of Anthropology 301. 
161 Monhle John Magolego, founder of Mapogo A Mathamaga, quoted in Montana (1999) Focus 4. 
162 See Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 202-203 for an example of two sons who were ordered to leave their father’s 
house and not come back because they had disrespected their father. 
163 204. 
164 203. 
165 Chidester Shots in the Streets 48-49. 
166 Crais The Politics of Evil 130; see also Chidester Shots in the Streets 50; also Nel (2014) Acta 
Criminologica 31. 
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achieving redemption through burial, thus furthering their damnation and 
demonstrating their “exclusion from the human species”.167 
Executing their victims may therefore be understood as a symbolic way 
for vigilantes to expel evil in order to “re-negotiat[e] the wholeness of a 
community”168 disrupted by violence, fear, misfortune and marginalisation.  As 
has been shown, this exercise of vigilante power is portrayed as a collective 
and empowering rite of normative self-legitimation.  It will be explained further 
below169 that in their endeavours to be accorded a mass mandate, vigilantes 
include sufficient elements of the formal criminal justice process for their ‘law-
enforcement’ to seem reassuringly familiar and conventional, whilst also 
gratifying punitive sentiments by giving participants’ basic urge for violent 
retribution against wrongdoers free rein.  The “momentary, spontaneous, 
violent unanimity achieved by a community” 170  through the permanent 
elimination of their perceived enemies demonstrates vigilantes’ heroic ability 
to defend the community against the evil forces that threaten to destroy social 
order and collective security, thus enhancing their normative legitimacy.  It is 
also a powerful expression of vigilantes’ own legitimacy-enhancing power.  
The methods that vigilantes employ to delegitimate the state and to 
demonstrate their own counter-legitimate authority will now be elaborated on. 
 
5 4 Demonstrative counter-legitimation 
As explained in § 3 6, public actions demonstrating recognition of a 
particular power relationship are essential for those in power, serving not 
merely as expressions of subordinates’ belief in power-holders’ legitimacy, but 
actually conferring – and contributing to the enhancement of – the dominant’s 
legitimacy.  The powerful are legitimated when those subject to their power 
symbolically communicate their willingness to submit to power-holders’ moral 
authority. The opposite of demonstrative legitimacy, namely delegitimation, 
                                            
167 De Souza Martins “Lynchings – Life by a Thread” in Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin 
America 29. 
168 Chidester Shots in the Streets 50. 
169 At §§ 5 4 1 1 and 5 4 1 2. 
170 Chidester Shots in the Streets 32. 
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occurs when there is an active withdrawal of such consent.  The ultimate 
demonstration of delegitimation entails subordinates collectively laying claim 
to the moral authority of the powerful by presenting themselves as an 
alternative source of legitimate power.  In this section performative acts 
denoting both the unwillingness of vigilantes to submit to the state’s criminal 
justice authority, and corresponding vigilante expressions of counter-
legitimation, are considered.  It will be shown how vigilantes demonstrate their 
opposition to a state they perceive to be unsatisfactory, whilst also engaging 
in counter-legitimation practices that “require fluency in the ‘languages of 
stateness’”.171  Many vigilante actions may be understood both as “explicit 
indictments”172 of the modern justice system and mocking reproductions of it.  
The former aspect – the challenge vigilante acts pose to demonstrative state 
legitimacy – is explored first, followed by an analysis of vigilante attempts to 
demonstrate that they are a viable alternative source of legitimate power in 
the sphere of criminal justice. 
 
5 4 1 Vigilantism as a form of power-play undermining state legitimacy  
Despite not having a predominantly political motive, vigilante violence 
is nonetheless an inherently political act, since vigilantes in effect “co-opt the 
position of power that is normally the reserve [sic] of the criminal justice 
system”. 173   In the previous chapter, it was argued that vigilantism is a 
reaction to the profound sense of powerlessness experienced by citizens 
upon being confronted with inadequate state protection.  Vigilantes’ harsh 
“punishments” may consequently be understood as a public display of 
unorthodox sovereign might – a “display of raw power”174 that serves as a 
“perverse form of community empowerment”.175  
                                            
171 Pratten (2008) Africa 6. 
172 Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society 637. 
173 Silke (2001) The Police Journal 126; also De Souza Martins “Lynchings – Life by a Thread” in 
Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America. 
174 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 817. 
175 Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society 640. 
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Vigilante violence is a double discreditation of state legitimacy, an 
implicit denunciation of state policing power that happens on two levels.  On 
one level, it challenges state authority in that vigilantes flout criminal sanctions 
prohibiting unjustified violence – i.e., it undermines the state’s claim to a 
monopoly on the use and allocation of coercive force.  Vigilantism’s non-state-
sanctioned and violent character has been explored at length in chapter 2, 
and will therefore not be revisted here.  Suffice it to say that all vigilantism 
unlawfully appropriates the state’s power to punish to some degree.  On a 
second level, vigilante violence may contest the state agenda in the sense 
that vigilantes disregard state tenets in respect of the content or enforcement 
of criminal norms.  Vigilante counter-legitimation in resistance to the state 
takes the form of “defining a counter-narrative of power by not only creating 
alternative freedoms but also by imposing different inequalities and 
exclusions”.176  In this sense vigilantism is “counterhegemonic”:177 vigilantes 
claim the authority to replace the existing power hierarchies with new ones 
that give expression to community values and priorities concerning the 
definition or enforcement of standards of behaviour that are contrary to those 
espoused by the state.  Once again, this aspect has already been covered in 
chapter 4, where first and second-order dissonance were discussed.  What is 
clear is that vigilantes’ imposition of harsh punishments, their disregard for 
due process and their policing of morality as well as criminality are a means of 
“claiming the power to impose an alternative [political] order”.178  
 
                                            
176 Wood (2003) Crime, History and Societies para 28. 
177 Nina (2000) African Security Review 21. 
178 Wood (2003) Crime, History and Societies para 29. 
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5 4 1 1 Legitimation rituals179 mirroring those of the state: characteristics and 
comparison 
In disregarding the externally imposed restraints of state law and 
procedure by flouting criminal prohibitions and imposing alternative rules and 
punishments, vigilantes proclaim a distinctive communal identity and define 
themselves as sovereign in opposition to the state.180  Interestingly, while they 
invert the state’s notions of law and lawlessness to serve their own ends, 
seemingly rejecting the official justice system in favour of an autonomous, 
community-initiated substitute, vigilante “justice” is often carried out in a 
manner that crudely parallels the functioning of the formal justice system.181  
Now that the general notions of state delegitimation and corresponding 
vigilante demonstrative legitimation have been considered, the focus shifts to 
particular vigilante rituals and practices that mirror state activities and the 
language of the law.   
To be recognised as a credible guarantor of collective security, 
vigilantes need to represent their exercise of power as comparable with, but 
superior, to conventional law-enforcement.  Barker observes: 
 “[T]he way in which people legitimate their political identities will 
often be a deliberate reversal of the legitimation of rulers, using, 
and inverting, the symbols and claims of those they oppose to 
express their own identity, grievances or claims.” 182  
Vigilantes do indeed appear to engage in such “legitimation by 
association”, consciously mimicking the forms and rituals of criminal 
punishment in an apparent attempt to disguise the distinction between formal 
and informal justice.  Vigilantes’ appropriation of elements from state criminal 
justice serves a variety of functions.  It may reveal an implicit desire for 
                                            
179 Here, “ritual” is used in Bell’s sense of “ritualisation”, which she views as a “way of acting that is 
designed and orchestrated to distinguish and privilege what is being done in comparison to other, 
usually more quotidian, activities.  As such, ritualization is a matter of various culturally specific 
strategies for setting some activities off from others, for creating and privileging a qualitative 
distinction between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’, and for ascribing such distinctions to realities 
thought to transcend the power of human actors” (C Bell Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (1992) 74). 
180 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 816; 818. 
181 Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society 637.   
182 Barker Legitimating Identities 115-116. 
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legitimation from the communities they “serve” in that where aspects of their 
activities appear reassuringly familiar, “law-abiding” community members 
might be more likely to identify with and legitimate their violent conduct.183  
Mirroring the ritual forms of state punishment also stresses the communal, as 
opposed to private, nature of vigilante acts, thereby inviting collective 
recognition and legitimation.184  In addition, drawing attention to the similarity 
between formal and informal law enforcement may enhance vigilantes’ own 
unofficial authority185 as competent “crime-fighters” by making a mockery of 
the state’s claim to exercise exclusive power in respect of guaranteeing 
collective security and social order.    
Snodgrass Godoy agrees with Durkheim’s characterisation of 
repressive justice (such as vigilantism) as having a “certain religious stamp”186 
in that it is a community rite possessing a “quasi-religious character”. 187  
Garland describes the public torture lynchings of the American South as being 
“more like acts of war than acts of worship”, 188  but he nevertheless 
characterises them as a kind of ritual.  The same may be said about much 
contemporary mob justice.  Vigilantism as a ritual has certain distinctive 
characteristics.  Even vigilantism that is initially spontaneous and reactive 
tends to be, once it is under way, “generally shaped and sequenced by a 
familiar script”, producing a “performance with a distinctive form and 
character”.189   
First, vigilantes seek to represent their conduct as a “collective rite”190 
akin to criminal punishment – a means of “acting out communal outrage”.191  
Their aim is to acquire the public authority that comes with the crowd: 
amassing a mob is an “officialising” gesture 192  in the face of weak or 
                                            
183 See Jean & Brundage “Legitimizing "Justice"” in Informal Criminal Justice and §§ 5 2 1 and 5 2 1 1 
for more in the context of legal legitimacy. 
184 See Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 807-808. 
185 See Little & Sheffield (1983) American Sociological Review. 
186  Durkheim The Division of Labour in Society 56, a different translation to the one quoted in 
Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society n 69. 
187 Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society 636. 
188 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 807. 
189 808. 
190 Snodgrass Godoy (2004) Theory and Society 338. 
191 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 820. 
192 Bourdieu (1990) The Logic of Practice 108 cited at 817. 
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contested state governance.  Buur also notes that the “angry mob” “may be 
the ultimate image of sovereign power” – an authority capable of “interpreting 
and conveying the commands of the silent majority in the most powerful 
manner”.193 
Second, mob justice is a public ritual, not a private act.  Instead of 
being covert, the fact that there is mass participation that is witnessed by 
many politicises it, “converting its significance from an act of unlawful violence 
into a law of its own”.194  For example, Oomen describes the sjambokking 
sessions carried out by Mapogo A Mathamaga members as an “open critique” 
of the state:  They took place in broad daylight with as many spectators as 
possible, and even the media were invited to attend.  Having caught, 
interrogated and punished criminals, they would dump their bleeding bodies 
on the doorstep of local police stations.195  Similarly, the Nigerian Bakassi 
Boys’ executions of alleged violent criminals “typically took place in prominent 
public spaces” and attracted large crowds of observers.196  In her analysis of 
the incident referred to in § 5 3 2 1 during which a housebreaker was badly 
assaulted, stripped naked, painted and forced to stand on top of an electric 
box, Harris emphasises that this created a physical and symbolic distance 
between the vigilante victim and the rest of the community, and notes the 
irony that his isolation – and the message it conveyed to those witnessing it – 
depended on his “remaining fully in the public eye”.197  
A third characteristic of the vigilante ritual is that vigilantes attempt to 
enforce obedience and demonstrate their capacity to impose their authority by 
instilling fear.  This aspect is linked with the two characteristics already 
identified, particularly with the idea of vigilantism as a public spectacle.  Since 
this dimension of vigilantism has not yet been explored, some elaboration is 
required.  Vigilante violence is indeed a fear-inducing display of extreme 
power, a potent message intended to enforce respect for vigilantes’ legal 
legitimacy by showing that they are able to exert control over criminals and 
                                            
193 Buur (2009) Critique of Anthropology 28-29. 
194 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 817. 
195 Oomen (2004) African Studies 167. 
196 Smith (2004) Cultural Anthropology 431. 
197 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 24-25. 
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community members alike, thus cementing respect for vigilante authority – a 
vital component of legal legitimacy.198  Fear and vigilantism go hand-in-hand, 
with vigilantism engendering fear both in those directly subject to vigilante 
violence and in those who witness it being inflicted.  Harris states that 
vigilantism, “by virtue of its public and violent nature, pivots on fear”.199   
The open enactment and violence inherent in vigilantism is indeed fear-
inducing.  As was discussed in §§ 2 6 3 1 and 2 6 3 1 1, vigilante violence 
conveys a potent message to its specific target, aimed not only at punishing 
the present misdeed, but also at compelling continued desistance on pain of 
further punishment.  In instances where the vigilante victim is killed, the 
objective is not individual deterrence, but absolute, permanent prevention – 
incapacitation – instead.  Vigilante violence also serves an exemplary function 
for the community at large, discouraging prospective challenges to vigilante 
authority in two distinct ways.  First, it is intended to deter future disobedience 
by intimidating potential offenders.  Warning the disorderly against eroding the 
values vigilantes hold dear thus also serves the crucial symbolic function of 
violently sanctifying deeply cherished societal values.200  Second, the “aura of 
fear”201 that vigilantes build up around themselves makes non-participating 
bystanders reluctant to report witnessed vigilante attacks to the police for fear 
of being intimidated or being labelled informers, and so risk becoming targets 
of vigilante violence themselves.202  The fear-induced conspiracy of silence 
shrouding vigilantism,203 which is engendered by public and brutal displays of 
vigilante violence, goes a long way towards explaining the persistence of 
vigilantism.  And since vigilantes are seldom apprehended and punished, 
owing to a lack of reliable evidence against them, they feel empowered to 
continue engaging in their activities with impunity.204    
                                            
198 See Beetham Legitimation of Power. 
199 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 20. 
200 Brown “The History of Vigilantism in America” in Vigilante Politics 81. 
201 Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 119. 
202 Another reason they may be unwilling to come forward or reveal details, of course, is that they 
support those carrying out the acts of vigilantism. 
203 Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007) Acta Academia 126-127 view the vigilante conspiracy of silence as 
so fundamental to its nature that they identify it as one of vigilantism’s defining elements.   
204 The SAPS Bundu Courts Report makes for depressing reading in this regard.  Time and time again 
the police arrive at a scene of vigilante violence, and identify what appear to be many potential 
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A fourth defining characteristic of the collective performance of mob 
justice is that it involves “a set of formal conventions and recognizable roles; a 
staging that [is] standardized, sequenced, and dramatic; and a recognized 
social meaning that [sets] the event apart as important, out-of-the-ordinary, 
highly charged in symbolic significance.”205 
State criminal justice rituals share all these characteristics of ritual mob 
justice, namely public participation, favouring openness as opposed to 
secrecy, being fear-inducing and having a recognisable law-enforcement 
“script”:  
First, as regards the opportunity for citizen involvement in decision-
making and in the criminal justice process, § 3 7 above cites numerous 
extracts from case law reiterating that public participation enhances 
legitimacy.  Needless to say, without active and widespread citizen 
participation the key constitutional ideal of democratic governance cannot be 
realised.   
Second, in respect of openness, judicial opinion highlighting the link 
between legitimacy and the need for justice to be seen to be done is also 
cited in § 3 7.  Openness is seen as a foundational constitutional value, with 
limitation of rights only being possible in terms of a law of general application, 
and then only “to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.206  The right to have legal disputes settled in a “fair public hearing” 
is recognised in section 34 of the Constitution, and the right to a public 
criminal trial is also protected in section 35(3)(c),207 showing once again that 
                                                                                                                             
witnesses, but they seem to melt away when the police arrive.  One of the reports notes, “[SAPS 
members] further noticed a group of community members that were standing not far from the 
victim’s body, but none of them would give information as to what transpired” (15).  Another one 
simply notes tersely, “No witnesses came forward” (27).  See Knox & Monaghan Informal Justice in 
Divided Societies; Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 120-121.  
Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007) Acta Academia 120 identify another reason that vigilantes being 
protected by a conspiracy of silence might be detrimental: it increases the danger that the state will 
not realise the extent of the vigilantism problem “until its authority has been undermined to a point 
where it cannot be rectified without brute force”. 
205 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 807 (emphasis added). 
206 S 36(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (emphasis added). 
207 Emphasis added. 
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public access and openness is highly prized in the contexts of both civil and 
criminal dispute resolution. 
Third, as to instilling fear, the entire formal criminal justice system is 
overtly coercive, premised on enforcing respect for the state’s exercise of 
power by inducing obedience through threat of punishment.  The state does 
not merely forbid conduct it deems undesirable, but backs up its prohibition by 
threatening to inflict pain and suffering on those who disobey.  The 
assumption underlying criminalisation is that making citizens afraid of the 
unpleasant consequences of deviant or antisocial behaviour will deter them 
from stepping out of line, with the criminal justice system being the means by 
which the state attempts to make good the threat of punishment should 
citizens not be sufficiently deterred.  Just as is the case with vigilante 
punishment, the deterrent effect of fear of state punishment is intended to 
operate both on the level of the one being punished (having been punished, 
they will not wish to undergo such suffering in the future again) and those 
witnessing the punishment (witnessing another’s punishment will dissuade 
them from crime so as to avoid bringing similar suffering upon themselves). 
Fourth, it need scarcely be mentioned that the process of administering 
state criminal justice is by its very nature formal, standardised and ritualistic, 
involving a host of self-legitimation rituals as a means for the state to 
“sanctify” its moral authority in the criminal justice sphere.  These formalities 
and traditions are deemed so central to the state’s depiction of its exercise of 
power as sacrosanct and exalted (and hence legitimate) that undermining 
them is subject to formal denunciation.  For example, violating the dignity of a 
judicial body – even in respect of such trivial matters as appearing in court 
improperly dressed – is punishable as contempt of court.208 
It is clear from the above that both vigilantes and the state engage in 
demonstrative rituals of self-legitimation.  In order to appreciate fully the 
parallels between the rituals of the formal criminal justice system and those of 
vigilantes, it is useful to identify some specific instances of similarity.  For this 
reason, examples of how vigilantes mirror the state, particularly in respect of 
                                            
208 See Burchell Principles 838-841. 
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the “formulaic character”209 of the “piece of political theater”210 that is an act of 
collective vigilantism – its “criminal justice” process from the stage of 
investigation to punishment – are now considered in more depth. 
    
5 4 1 2 Legitimation rituals mirroring those of the state: examples and 
analysis  
 
  
                                            
209 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 804. 
210 808.  
Extract from Ivory Park Peoples’ Court Code of 
Punishment 
Adultery: 500 lashes for the man and banishment or 500 lashes for the 
woman. 
Murder: Necklacing or execution at gunpoint. 
Rape: Paraded naked before receiving 400 lashes, or execution. 
Child abuse: 380 lashes and banishment. 
Motor vehicle hijacking: Death for repeat offenders.  Lashes or execution 
for first timers. 
Theft: 50 lashes. 
Burglary: 200 lashes for first offence.  If items not returned to owners, extra 
300 lashes. 
Assault: 90 lashes. 
Assault by a man on his wife: 50 lashes. 
Contempt of court: An additional 40 lashes and a two-year banishment 
from the area. 
 
 – quoted by A Minnaar (2001) Institute for Human Rights and Criminal Justice Studies 50.  
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What follows are practical illustrations of how vigilante groups identify 
“perpetrators”, who are “arrested” following “investigations” involving 
“interrogation”, summoned to appear in “court”, “tried” by “judges” in “people’s 
courts” (which may entail complaints being raised against them by their 
“accusers” and their being given the opportunity to “plead” and “defend 
themselves”), “convicted” and “sentenced” to prescribed – and even 
occasionally formally codified211 – “penalties”. 
The first example is a typical act of spontaneous vigilantism, and is 
taken from the factual scenario of the unreported S v Mvabaza and others.212  
A Khayelitsha resident was robbed of her money, cell phone and handbag in 
the early morning hours on her way to work.  The victim ran home, weeping, 
and reported the robbery to her mother and father (accused 1).  She phoned 
the police using her mother’s phone. Accused 2, 3 and 5 witnessed the 
robbery while they were sitting and drinking.  They chased the robbers and 
caught one of them (the deceased).  They dragged him by the belt to accused 
1’s house, where other community members joined them.  The deceased was 
assaulted with sticks and stones.  The victim was asked whether the 
deceased had robbed her, and her response was that she was unsure 
whether she could identify the robbers due to her shocked state.  By that 
stage the deceased had been assaulted so severely that he was “covered in 
blood”.213  His feet were tied with rope.  He told the group that he could go 
and point out the things that were stolen, and he was transported some 
distance in the boot of accused 1’s car to look for the stolen goods.  The 
search was fruitless and the cars returned to accused 1’s house, dropping the 
deceased off at the street corner nearby.  Accused 1 instructed his daughter 
to phone the police again as well as asking his friend to fetch the police.  
Shortly afterwards, the deceased was assaulted with sticks by about 30 
“unnamed members of the group”.  Some time later a police constable found 
him dead with a car tyre on his body and the lid of a concrete drain cover on 
his chest. 
                                            
211  See the Ivory Park Peoples’ Code of Punishment.  Note also the conservative and patriarchal 
standards of morality implicit in this Code – e.g., assault by a man on his wife is viewed in a less 
serious light than other forms of assault. 
212 S v Mvabaza and others Case no. SS62/2012; decided 2013-05-14 (WCC). 
213 Para 6. 
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Despite the fact that it took place on the spur of the moment as an 
immediate response to a crime just committed, this incident is nevertheless by 
no means a “wild [outburst] of spontaneous violence”.214  On a superficial 
level the sequence of events closely mirrors the formal criminal justice 
process: A crime is witnessed; a suspect is arrested following a pursuit; the 
suspect is brought to a place of judgment (accused 1’s house, in this case); 
the victim is asked to identify her assailant; the suspect is interrogated and 
confesses; an attempt is made to obtain further evidence and identify other 
suspects; upon returning to the place of judgment, a (death) sentence is 
decided upon and carried out.215  
The second example is an instance of a less spontaneous vigilante 
investigation that does not culminate in vigilante-style “punishment”, but is 
nevertheless a faithful approximation of formal methods of criminal 
investigation.  In the factual scenario of S v T,216 the mother of a 9-year-old 
victim of indecent assault reported the matter to members of the local street 
committee in addition to the police.  The street committee members identified 
an individual (the accused) on the basis of the description given by the 
victim’s mother (he had a defective eye and scars on his face).  The accused 
was visited by four street committee members and was “‘invited’”217 to attend 
a street committee meeting to discuss the matter.  An informal identity parade 
was then carried out, during which the accused, a man with a false eye, and 
another with a squint were seated among the male members of the street 
committee.  The victim and a friend who had been with him were requested to 
                                            
214 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 797. 
215  See Mzanywa v Minister of Safety and Security for a vigilante scenario which, although less 
spontaneous, followed a similar “script” to S v Mvabaza and others: Members of the community 
resolved at a meeting to assault three people suspected of stealing.  Community members went 
looking for them, and upon finding them, assaulted them severely.  The suspects were then taken to a 
school and questioned about the stolen goods.  When they denied having stolen them, community 
members assaulted them with sjamboks.  See also Zuko v S, referred to in § 4 3 2: A robbery victim, 
after having reported a robbery to the police, identified a man he thought was one of the robbers.  He 
then contacted members of a vigilante group of which he was a member, and they proceeded to the 
shack the victim had seen the suspect enter earlier that day.  They entered the shack without seeking 
or obtaining the suspect’s consent, and the victim’s firearm was recovered.  The suspect was 
assaulted in his shack to force him to take the vigilantes to his co-accused, which he duly did.  The 
next morning the vigilantes handed their severely injured captives over to the police. 
216 S v T 2005 2 SACR 318 (E). 
217 Para 9; inverted commas in the original!  The clear implication is that the judge was of the view that 
duress was involved. 
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identify the assailant, which they both duly did.  The police were then called 
and the accused was arrested. The accused was convicted in the magistrates’ 
court; however, on appeal his conviction was set aside on the basis that the 
informal identity parade had tainted the process to such an extent that even a 
later identification could not properly be relied upon.  
This example shows clearly the intimate relationship between formal 
and informal justice, as well as the tensions that may arise when they attempt 
to act as security providers in the same realm.  The street committee 
members seemed happy to work with the police, handing the suspect over to 
them directly after the “identity parade”, and their conduct also speaks to their 
seeming readiness to accommodate and utilise the techniques of justice-
seeking offered by the state, but to employ police tactics “in a creative 
manner”(!). 218   These vigilantes appeared to be under the bona fide 
impression that the authorities would condone – even applaud – their 
“investigation” and that it would result in a criminal receiving deserved 
punishment.  As was the case in Mvabaza,219 the victim’s mother was willing 
to hedge her bets as far as provision of security was concerned.  She 
approached the police as well as the vigilantes for help – but significantly, she 
only reported the crime to authorities two days after the incident, having been 
advised to do so by the doctor who examined her son, whereas the local 
street committee was her first port of call.220  Even the court a quo was 
prepared to condone the extra-legal vigilante-style justice provision, with the 
magistrate convicting and sentencing the accused on the strength of the 
“identification parade”.  However, while the consumer and co-provider of 
community security, as well as the initial arbiter of criminal justice, were 
inclined to accommodate a deviation from the letter of the law in pursuit of a 
seemingly just outcome, the appeal court judge was not.  Plasket J stated in 
                                            
218 T Grätz “Dévi and his Men: The Rise and Fall of a Vigilante Movement in Benin” in T G Kirsch 
and T Grätz (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa (2010) 92. 
219 See above. 
220 This is an example of what Baker (2004) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 170-171 terms 
“multi-choice policing”: Policing, in his view, is not just diverse or private, but is rather a complex 
pattern of overlapping agencies with people’s experiences and choices related to policing being 
based on what is available, what works best and what is affordable, not who controls the policing 
body and to whom they are accountable.  Baker also confirms that in most situations Africans look 
first to non-state agencies for crime protection and crime response (Baker Security in Post-Conflict 
Africa 39). 
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no uncertain terms that there was “no basis upon which the street committee 
could justify its usurpation of the investigative functions of the police”,221 and 
directed street committees instead “in future, [to] ensure that [they work] with 
the police in the combating of crime by providing relevant information to the 
police so that a proper investigation can be conducted”.222  Ironically, it is 
highly probable that the street committee members would have characterised 
their “identification parade” as doing precisely as the judge suggests: co-
operating with the police and supplying them with useful information.  They 
would in all likelihood have agreed with the Nigerian Bakassi Boys when they 
stated openly that they had no problem with the police: “We work for the same 
goal of making [the] state free of criminals”.223  This disconnect between 
formal and informal justice provision concerning the extent to which (laudable) 
ends should be allowed to justify (questionable) means in the criminal justice 
sphere is raised again in chapter 7. 
A third example of a vigilante legitimation ritual that mirrors that of the 
state comes from Buur’s ethnographic research into the modus operandi of 
the Amadlozi vigilante group operating in Port Elizabeth, and its observations 
confirm those of the case law findings referred to above.  Buur notes that 
Amadlozi “working groups” “conduct raids that resemble ordinary police 
investigations or operations”, 224  and also approach suspects, “hunt down 
criminals”, summon people and enter premises for investigative purposes. 
Buur225 outlines one of the “quasi-court sessions” of the Amadlozi taking place 
in a local classroom, which parallels the processes of formal justice with eerie 
precision: The “accused” were summoned to appear in the “court”; there was 
“testimony” against them by their “accuser”; the “accused” were given the 
opportunity to give their side of the story and defend themselves; the “judge” 
(the chairperson) then asked community members in the audience for advice, 
as well as asking the “accuser” what he wanted the “court” (the Amadlozi) to 
do; the “judge” gathered the “executioners” (Amadlozi youths) and got the 
                                            
221 S v T para 39. 
222 Para 40. 
223 Vanguard Daily (200-12-16), quoted in Baker Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa. 
224  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 201. 
225 202-203. 
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accused to accompany them to a house; when they returned the accused had 
clearly been administered corporal punishment.  The chairperson then 
imposed an additional punishment: the accused were ordered to leave home 
– a sentence of banishment or “social death”. 226   The most significant 
difference between this example and the case law cited earlier is that in this 
instance the “offence” committed by the accused was not criminal in nature: 
they were accused of having shown disrespect towards their father.  The ritual 
is in other respects very similar. 
A fourth example highlights another form of vigilantism that punishes 
deviant but non-criminal behaviour, namely anti-witchcraft violence.  Here 
again, the traditional witch-hunting process tends to replicate very faithfully 
the rituals of the formal criminal justice system: Misfortune occurs; an expert 
(a diviner) is consulted to detect the person responsible; the witch is identified 
by techniques considered reliable by all parties concerned (such as smelling-
out or pointing-out); the witch is publicly named and apprehended; they are 
found guilty and are not given the opportunity to repent; there is collective 
consensus that they should be eliminated; and punishment is carried out.227  
Some interesting insights may be gleaned from these examples: First, 
vigilantes are not necessarily “anti-police” per se.  In both instances where the 
“wrongs” being policed were capable of enforcement by the state authorities, 
the authorities were contacted and their assistance was requested, implying 
that community members had not completely abandoned faith in formal justice 
(see examples one and two).  Indeed, in S v Mvabaza the court considered 
the fact that accused 1 had asked a friend to report the incident to the police 
as evidence of his dissociation with the deceased’s subsequent death, and 
acquitted him of murder on this basis.228  This positive observation from the 
state’s perspective is picked up on by the Khayelitsha Commission report.  In 
citing the findings of the Mthente survey, the Commission notes that while the 
                                            
226 204. 
227 See Nel (2014) Acta Criminologica 30.  See also W E A Van Beek “The Escalation of Witchcraft 
Accusations” in G Ter Haar (eds) Imagining Evil: Witchcraft Beliefs and Accusations in 
Contemporary Africa (2007) 307-311 for an interesting model explaining the escalation of witchcraft 
violence from social tension to witch-execution. 
228 S v Mvabaza and others para 47.  He was convicted of assault with intent to do grievous bodily 
harm instead (para 48). 
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survey indicated high levels of distrust of the police in Khayelitsha and high 
levels of dissatisfaction with the service provided by the police in Khayelitsha, 
it also indicated that the majority of residents do not consider vigilante action 
as justified.  This is encouraging, observes the Commission, in that “it 
suggests that the majority of residents in Khayelitsha want criminal conduct to 
be dealt with in a fair manner, and consistently with the rule of law.”229  In 
other words, a trustworthy and efficient formal criminal justice system is 
viewed as first prize even in crime-ridden, vigilante-prone and marginalised 
communities, with vigilantes playing the role of a necessary but interim stop-
gap.    
Second, a sanguine reading of these examples would seem to imply 
that vigilantism would inevitably vanish if the formal criminal justice system 
executed its tasks optimally.  Yet the legal and extralegal administration of 
justice actually appear to be complementary instead of contradictory, with 
vigilantism being a “preferred alternative to ‘official’ justice” rather than a 
substitute for it in certain circumstances.230  Kirsch and Gratz characterise 
vigilantism as “a specific way of executing state power”,231 implying that it 
cannot be distinguished unequivocally232 from state justice.  In this vein, too, 
Baker233 situates vigilantism and state policing together as two of the many 
options forming part of the continuum of security providers – there is no 
“either-or”.  Indeed, Loader (although not specifically with reference to 
vigilantism) goes so far as to say that the fragmentation of policing may create 
or reinforce new cultural meanings “which valorise consumer choice in the 
field of policing and stigmatise dependence on the state”.234  Thus law and 
vigilantism are not automatically “entwined in a relationship of mutual 
exclusion”,235 with the scope for vigilantism shrinking in inverse proportion to 
the influence of the formal criminal justice system.  Their respective spheres 
                                            
229 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report134. 
230 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 798.  See also Baker Multi-Choice Policing and Baker 
(2004) Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 
231 Kirsch & Grätz “Vigilantism, State Ontologies & Encompassment” in Domesticating Vigilantism in 
Africa 10. 
232 Buur (2006) Development and Change 750. 
233 Baker Multi-Choice Policing 79. 
234 Loader (1999) Sociology 383. 
235 J Reider “The Social Organization of Vengeance” in D Black (eds) Towards a General Theory of 
Social Control Volume 1: Fundamentals (1984) 134. 
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of influence are not antagonistic and may well overlap considerably, since 
they profess a mutual allegiance to the regulation and control of crime236 and 
have a shared “language of authority”.237  The conduct of accused 1 in S v 
Mvabaza illustrates this point well: he took the law into his own hands, 
punishing the man who had robbed his daughter by assaulting him with his 
fists and an iron rod,238 yet he also chose to summon the police to deal with 
the suspect; in his mind, the options were by no means mutually exclusive.  
Needless to say, where non-criminal norms are being enforced (as in 
examples three and four) resorting to state justice is not an option.  Vigilantes 
are the only resource available to safeguard such social or moral standards.  
All in all, in the context of “frontier” communities the idea that the state could 
ever achieve a monopoly on the use of crime-fighting force seems at best far-
fetched and theoretical, with vigilantes invariably being afforded many 
opportunities to demonstrate their influence in the “crime-fighting” sphere. 
Third, even where vigilantes have demonstrated their own power and 
legitimacy by successfully emulating state justice processes in many respects, 
there remains a blatant contrast between formal and informal “criminal justice” 
– both in instances where the criminal norms are shared by the state 
(examples one and two) and those where they are not (examples three and 
four).  This distinction lies in the respective means considered necessary to 
punish deviance and in vigilantes’ denial of the due process safeguards 
intrinsic to formal justice.  Despite vigilantes’ attempts to portray their power 
as the ritual carrying out of community-endorsed “deserved punishment” 
following a “guilty verdict”, the often exceptionally brutal and intentionally cruel 
methods used to obtain “evidence” and execute “sentences” starkly expose its 
disproportionate and excessive nature.  The “punitive excess” characterising 
much vigilantism represents a deliberate rejection of the removed, restrained 
and impersonal tone of the formal criminal justice process in favour of an 
                                            
236  Contra Little & Sheffield (1983) American Sociological Review; Rosenbaum & Sederberg 
“Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence” in Vigilante Politics. 
237 Buur (2006) Development and Change 750. 
238 S v Mvabaza and others para 48. 
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impassioned, unmediated, communal, almost intimate, means of dispensing 
“wild justice”.239   
The exercise of vigilante power is thus portrayed as a collective rite of 
self-legitimation incorporating what vigilantes perceive to be the “best” 
features of both formal and informal justice: a recognisable “law-enforcement” 
ritual combined with the opportunity for a socially-sanctioned, cathartic 
release of unrestrained righteous anger. 
 
5 5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how vigilantes constitute themselves as viable 
alternative bearers of legitimacy in the criminal justice sphere.  A discussion of 
the three main aspects of vigilante counter-legitimation has convincingly 
established that from a state perspective, vigilantes’ considerable popular 
appeal vis-à-vis that of formal law-enforcement is founded on an ingenious 
combination of the familiar240  and the foreign.241  This chapter also confirms 
the value of Beetham’s three legitimacy components in forming the foundation 
of an explanatory framework for exploring vigilante attempts to legitimate their 
violent acts to others.  The moral authority upon which their popular mandate 
is based – including an appeal to popular sovereignty and the use of corporal 
punishment – affords vigilantes a measure of legal legitimacy; the social utility 
of vigilantism with reference to its power to unite communities against a 
common enemy provides vigilantism with normative legitimacy; and vigilantes’ 
ability to perform state-like ritualistic acts in the criminal justice sphere reveals 
the demonstrative dimension of vigilante legitimacy.   
What must be considered next is how the state may best respond to 
vigilante claims to share legitimacy in the criminal justice arena.  It is  hoped 
that the insights arrived at regarding vigilante counter-legitimation may prove 
                                            
239 Garland (2005) Law and Society Review 817-818; S Jacoby Wild Justice: The Evolution of Revenge 
(1985). 
240  E.g., accountability, a democratic (populist) mandate and the enforcement of social order and 
collective security in ways that uphold recognised conventions and formalised rituals. 
241  E.g., extreme violence and punitiveness, the widespread use of corporal punishment and the 
capacity to ward off supernatural threats. 
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beneficial to the state in its quest to portray itself as a credible bearer of 
crime-fighting authority, directing it towards (re)legitimation strategies that play 
to its own strengths without downplaying the valid security concerns of 
vigilantes and the communities they serve.  The state’s main relegitimation 
options are either to discredit and/or exclude vigilantes, or to counteract their 
authority through incorporating or formalising their crime-fighting power in 
some way.  These seemingly contradictory aspects are the focus of chapters 
6 and 7 respectively. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX: STATE RELEGITIMATION 
THROUGH EXCLUSION 
 
6 1 An introduction to exclusionary state strategies: the “zero-
sum game”1? 
The study has thus far explored factors contributing to erosion of state 
legitimacy in the criminal justice sphere, and corresponding vigilante 
endeavours to legitimate themselves as alternative guarantors of collective 
security and social order.  The following two chapters consider possible state 
responses to vigilantism – specifically, what steps the state might take to 
relegitimate2 itself.  As will become apparent, the potential solutions to the 
state’s legitimacy crisis are disparate and wide-ranging, and some 
relegitimation choices even contradict others.   
A central question underlying these chapters is: How can the state 
justify the “deservedness” of its exercise of criminal justice authority in its own 
eyes as well as in those of others?  To arrive at an answer, it is necessary to 
engage with a preliminary issue, namely the extent to which non-state 
participation in crime-fighting truly threatens state legitimacy by undermining 
state claims to monopolise the use of force.  States typically display an 
aversion to competition as regards the use of crime-fighting force.3  This could 
be because where the state police are seen as irrelevant, this perception may 
easily be extended to encompass the state itself: “people may perceive it as 
pointless to engage with a state that can’t even offer a basic service such as 
                                            
1 The conception of power or legitimacy as a “zero-sum game” implies that if one gains, another loses 
– i.e., vigilante acquisition of power would necessarily imply a corresponding loss of state power, 
and vice versa. 
2 It may be more accurate to refer to state legitimation, rather than state relegitimation, since it could be 
argued that a state such as South Africa was never truly legitimate, and thus is now in need of 
legitimation (from scratch) as opposed to relegitimation (which implies that the state was once 
legitimate, lost legitimacy and must now regain that lost legitimacy).  While the persuasiveness of 
this argument is acknowledged, using the term “relegitimation” is a recognition that achieving state 
(re)legitimation is not a once-off, new event or “thing”, but is part of an ongoing, active process of 
achieving and maintaining legitimacy. 
3 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 76. 
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personal security as well as private initiatives can”.4  This points to a pressing 
normative legitimacy concern that confronts the state, namely whether 
“informal sector” involvement in the criminal justice sphere should inevitably 
be viewed a threat to the rule of law and state legitimacy.5   
If it is correct to contend – as was argued in chapter 4 in particular – 
that vigilantism is at least to some extent a demonstration of state 
delegitimation stemming from lack of trust in the formal criminal justice 
system, it would follow that vigilante self-legitimation occurs at the expense of 
state legitimacy.  Cohan goes so far as to say that “[w]hen a community so 
vehemently and desperately tries to achieve its objectives through 
lawlessness [vigilantism], the law becomes a symbol of incapacity, of failure.”6  
Whether this “zero-sum” approach that assumes an inverse relationship 
between state and vigilante power is necessarily accurate in all instances is 
up for debate.7  However, the prevalence of such discourse underscores the 
need for the state to engage seriously with the issue of vigilantism.  Not doing 
so could imply that the state condones the flouting of its moral authority, and 
would be tantamount to further empowering and legitimising vigilantes at the 
expense of its own legitimacy.8  In addition, turning a blind eye to vigilante 
excesses and human rights violations is a contravention of the state’s human-
rights-based criminal justice mandate.9  Action is required – but what?  This 
chapter is devoted to considering how the state can bolster its moral 
authority10 vis-à-vis those – including vigilantes – whose actions would seem 
to undermine it. 
                                            
4 Baker Lawless Law Enforcers in Africa 170. 
5 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 76. 
6 Cohan (2011) Suffolk University Law Review 871. 
7 See §§ 6 2 3, 6 4 and 7 1 for more on the zero-sum game argument. 
8 Nel (2014) Acta Criminologica 31. 
9 See, for instance, the Nkomazi police station commander quoted in Jensen “Through the Lens of 
Crime: Land Claims and the Contestations of Citizenship on the Frontier of the South African State” 
in The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in Southern 
Africa 205, who said of the vigilante group Khkula, “Sometimes you have to turn a blind eye for the 
sake of crime.  If you for instance have someone coming in accused of raping a three-year-old, and 
he has been beaten up, then you do turn the blind eye.  You know that is like victim support”.  As 
will be elaborated on in § 7 3 2 below, this “cop-out”(!) approach is undesirable in the light of the 
state obligation to uphold and protect the human rights of all, including those accused of crimes. 
10 Both to itself and to external audiences, such as vigilantes and the wider community. 
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The point of departure of this chapter is the “zero-sum” understanding 
of power relations:  In that it calls into question the exclusivity and prestige of 
state crime-fighting power, vigilante empowerment is detrimental to state 
legitimacy.  The chapter examines the state’s relegitimation response that is 
aimed at quelling or eliminating the undesirable conduct of those who seek to 
challenge its authority.  The state strategies discussed here are therefore 
categorised as predominantly exclusionary, echoing the previous chapter’s 
discussion of counter-legitimation through violent elimination.11   The state 
reaction to the non-law-abiding members of society is at the forefront, in that 
state approaches to fighting crime in general, in addition to the specific crime 
of vigilantism, are investigated.   
The chapter commences by focusing on the state’s own self-
legitimation attempts.  As has become apparent, since vigilantism is 
frequently justified on the basis that vigilantes fill the “policing gap” left by non-
existent or inadequate law enforcement, the state must reinforce its deficient 
normative legitimacy by clearly demonstrating and enhancing its law-and-
order capabilities.  This section explores state efforts to convince itself and 
others of the rightfulness of its crime-fighting power by addressing its own 
failings as regards provision of security and justice.  Next, exclusionary state 
relegitimation tactics that have vigilantes as the target audience are 
considered.  The emphasis is on how the state might delegitimate vigilantes 
by discrediting their ideologies and proscribing their conduct.  The most 
suitable criminalisation options are also identified and elaborated on.  It must 
be kept in mind, however, that even where the state’s primary strategy is 
exclusionary – to label its citizens as criminals – the core underlying 
assumption remains that none of its relegitimation approaches should 
undermine or contradict its self-legitimated identity as guarantor of human 
rights; rights that are guaranteed to perpetrators and targets of vigilantism 
alike.   
 
                                            
11 See from § 5 3 2 above. 
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6 2 Addressing the real, underlying causes of criminal justice 
delegitimation 
In a quest for self-legitimation in the arena of criminal justice provision, 
and policing in particular, states and their criminal justice agents are 
constantly engaged in a war of words aimed at constructing an image of 
policing that portrays the police service “as the sole legitimate, effective, and 
accountable provider of nationwide policing” as compared to their poorly-
trained, abusive, unaccountable and often illegal non-state counterparts.12  If 
this self-identity accurately reflected reality in the sense that the criminal 
justice system was believed and experienced to be functioning effectively, 
such a demonstration of the state’s abilities would indeed undermine the most 
powerful rationale for vigilantism – that vigilantes take the law into their own 
hands as a desperate last resort – thereby weakening the foundation of 
vigilantes’ counter-legitimation substantially.  In chapter 4, some of the main 
reasons why the state is perceived to be failing to carry out its law and order 
mandate were identified.  The next section considers possible counter-
measures that could be implemented to reverse this trend, thus contributing to 
state relegitimation.  
 
6 2 1 Effective crime-fighting: achievable prospect or myth? 
How, then, to enhance the moral authority of the formal criminal justice 
system?  Prima facie, the answer would seem to be: By implementing 
strategies aimed at addressing practical law-enforcement failings.  Few would 
disagree with the sentiments underlying Minnaar’s critique of the criminal 
justice system or his proposed solutions for combating vigilantism:  
“[T]he state needs to assert its authority, enforce its laws 
effectively and efficiently and put functioning systems of criminal 
justice and policing into those areas that need it most, namely the 
                                            
12 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 46. 
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poorer urban neighbourhoods, informal settlements and deep 
rural areas”. 13   
He goes on to say:  
“[T]he whole criminal justice system needs to be unclogged, 
speeded up, and corruption stamped out so that criminal cases 
can be dealt with quickly.  The public needs to see justice happen 
to criminals caught and handed over to the authorities”.14   
Laudable though these sentiments may be, it is submitted that focusing 
exclusively on eradicating the root causes of vigilantism is an ideal aspiration 
rather than a realistic solution. 
First, although it is recognised that it is undoubtedly desirable – and 
may even be feasible – to improve aspects of the criminal justice system’s 
performance, 15  individual states’ capacity to do so is severely limited by 
practical and resource constraints.  Particularly in the developing world, where 
informal justice is most prevalent, budgetary limitations may result in even the 
best law-enforcement relegitimation plans remaining unimplemented, or being 
only partially realised.   Baker makes a good point when he observes that 
“extend[ing] and reform[ing] expensive state punitive justice systems that are 
available to very few … makes little sense and is not a sustainable 
programme in terms of cost.”16  Perhaps the problem also lies with the nature 
of the formal criminal justice paradigm itself: Even if the state did manage to 
provide universal access to criminal justice, a state process that is inevitably 
lengthy, expensive and adversarial may be inappropriate and ill-suited to 
resolving disputes in a setting of poverty.17 
                                            
13 Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 130. 
14 130. 
15  The Khayelitsha Commission recommendations in this regard include police providing target 
response times in relation to calls for assistance; giving regular feedback to complainants regarding 
dockets; providing visible policing patrols; attending and participating in all partnership meetings; 
and undertaking to “process all complaints made against SAPS members transparently, efficiently, 
thoroughly and fairly”, including providing full and regular feedback to complainants (O’Regan & 
Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 440).    
16 B Baker “‘He Must Buy What He Stole and Then We Forgive’: Restorative Justice in Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone” (2007) 1 Acta Juridica 171 191. 
17 191. 
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Second, the state may be justifiably reluctant to heed certain citizen 
demands, even if it is theoretically capable of doing so.18  Some might argue 
that the state should consider appeasing vigilantes and their supporters by 
expanding the categories of conduct subject to criminal punishment, removing 
the due process safeguards for certain accused persons or resorting to ever-
harsher forms of punishment – and indeed, states sometimes succumb to 
public pressure in this regard.19  However, pandering to punitive sentiments, 
although a politically expedient, quick-fix solution, is unwise: it may risk 
threatening the rule of law, which forms the very foundation of the state’s 
moral authority and guarantees every citizen protection from state abuse of 
power. 
Third, many of the factors giving rise to a violent and vigilante-prone 
society are matters concerning which the criminal justice system can do very 
little – poverty, marginalisation and inequality to name but three.  Resolving 
issues such as these is certainly beyond the remit of the criminal justice 
system alone, since they stem largely from a lack of resources (or the 
unavoidably inefficient distribution of available resources).  Such wider 
societal problems that lead to vigilantism can never permanently be 
eradicated at source – they “seem likely to be givens everywhere”.20   
Fourth, in the South African context state relegitimation has to 
surmount the extra hurdle of the legacy of apartheid. The widespread 
suspicion of criminal justice authorities engendered by brutal and 
discriminatory apartheid-style policing has by no means yet been overcome.21  
                                            
18 See from § 4 3 above. 
19  E.g., by enacting minimum sentencing legislation such as ss 51(1) (3) of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 105 of 1997, which makes life imprisonment mandatory for certain prescribed 
offences, unless “substantial and compelling” circumstances exist.  This fetters the previously-
existing judicial discretion that allowed judges to impose a less harsh sentence in appropriate 
instances even where “substantial and compelling” circumstances were not present.  See also the oft-
amended s 49(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the 2012 incarnation of which permits the use of 
lethal force while effecting the arrest of a fleeing suspect even where there is no immediate threat of 
serious bodily injury to the arrester or any other person (also see discussion in Burchell Principles 
156-158 and Snyman Criminal Law 132-133). 
20 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 161. 
21 See J Steinberg Thin Blue: The Unwritten Rules of Policing in South Africa (2008), who notes that 
the post-1994 government was misguided in its belief that urban South Africans have long ago given 
their consent to be policed, and uses gripping narrative examples to illustrate this point (see 98-99; 
also 114-115 for the attitude of township residents to police in the “old days”).  
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As outlined in the opening chapter, many communities were left to their own 
devices as regards policing, making informal policing the only feasible option 
for many decades.  For this reason, Steinberg opines: 
“To get South Africa to give its consent to being policed would 
require breaking down a generations-old architecture of security 
and protection.  It would require bringing a body with 
unprecedented authority into township life, a body elevated above 
existing security markets and thus able to break their logic.  A 
body without that authority would simply have to negotiate its way 
into existing markets, becoming yet another player among 
many.”22  
It is doubtful whether the beleaguered South African criminal justice 
system is indeed at present a body with the necessary authority to overcome 
community mistrust and a long-standing culture of self-sufficiency and self-
help. 
With this gloomy prognosis, it may rightly be asked what steps 
government actors can realistically take to enhance their own legitimacy and 
remove the justification for vigilantism, weighed down by the burden of 
scarcity of resources and historical mistrust as they are.  Two modest, cost-
effective and relatively simple-to-achieve interventions will now be outlined. 
 
6 2 2 Minimalist and minimal policing 
While many – including the police themselves – accept, albeit 
reluctantly, that the demand for security outstrips the capacity of the state to 
provide it,23 this does not imply that the police need simply surrender their 
policing responsibilities to non-state actors such as vigilantes.  The police 
have “symbolic power” and unique capacities that make citizens desire the 
                                            
22 98. 
23  M Marks, C Shearing & J Wood “Who Should the Police Be?  Finding a New Narrative for 
Community Policing in South Africa” (2009) 10 (2) Police Practice and Research 145 146. 
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presence of the state in the policing arena,24 even if the security-provision 
arena is shared with others.  In this regard, Marks et al dispute the notion that 
formal policing in developing countries such as South Africa can be “the hub 
of all community/societal problem-solving that is linked to broad notions of 
security”.25  They argue that recognising that alternative, non-state ways of 
social ordering do exist, and may in many instances be more appropriate than 
the cumbersome, inaccessible state machinery in resolving everyday security 
concerns, 26  may actually create the space for the police to “feel less 
pressured to respond to an ever-widening demand for their interventions”.27   
Marks et al propose that the best way for police to build legitimacy 
would be for there to be a “‘minimalist’ vision of public police”,28 which entails 
police “demonstrat[ing] their effectiveness in their core function”29 instead of 
spreading themselves too thinly across the entire security-provision arena.  
Marks and Wood similarly argue against the widening of the reach of the 
police through “generally poorly determined ‘community policing’ programmes 
or highly interventionist and even militaristic strategies”,30 in favour of the 
police confining themselves to doing only what they are trained and resourced 
to do.  According to Marks et al,31 the core function and primary role of the 
police should be to “intervene authoritatively to restore order, resolve conflict, 
control crowds, and curtail (rather than prevent) crime”.   Marks and Wood 
submit that this minimalist approach to policing which allows police to be “real 
police”32 should go hand in hand with a minimal view of policing, which entails 
that police should intervene chiefly when their expertise and authority is 
requested by communities feeling threatened by crime: “the police [should] 
co-operate with and respond to the demands of the public, rather than vice 
versa”.33  A minimalist and minimal police framework would allow police to 
                                            
24 Cooper-Knock & Owen (2015) Theoretical Criminology 361. 
25 Marks, et al. (2009) Police Practice and Research 151. 
26 See, e.g., Baker (2007) Acta Juridica 191. 
27 Marks, et al. (2009) Police Practice and Research 151. 
28  M Marks & J Wood “South African Policing at a Crossroads: The Case for a ‘Minimal’ and 
‘Minimalist’ Public Police” (2010) 14 (3) Theoretical Criminology 311 321. 
29 Marks, et al. (2009) Police Practice and Research 151. 
30 Marks & Wood (2010) Theoretical Criminology 321. 
31 Marks, et al. (2009) Police Practice and Research 151. 
32 Marks & Wood (2010) Theoretical Criminology 322. 
33 323. 
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enhance their legitimacy by demonstrating their effectiveness “as a public 
service agency with unique mandates, skills and resources” (minimalist 
policing) while also showing that they are democratic (concentrating on 
minimal policing that is initiated by community demands).   
The approach of Marks and her colleagues outlined above has much to 
commend it.  While implementing effective policing always has budgetary 
implications, abandoning the elusive ideal of monopolising public policing 
means that the state may save costs and utilise scarce crime-fighting 
resources optimally, since the peripheral everyday security concerns requiring 
problem-solving rather than the “big gun”34 may be outsourced to non-state 
actors.  As regards formally monitoring the activities of such non-state actors, 
Marks et al are of the view that the state should limit its role to ensuring and 
facilitating public safety and security by making certain that non-state actors 
adhere to publicly agreed-upon norms and that due process and justice are 
upheld.35  The benefits and pitfalls of co-opting vigilantes as non-state security 
partners are discussed further in chapter 7 below.  Before considering 
potential strategies to include vigilantes in state policing efforts, however, it is 
necessary to deal with how best to approach the deep-seated lack of trust 
between criminal justice authorities and citizens, since resolving this issue 
may go a long way towards achieving state relegitimation as regards the 
performance of its core policing functions. 
 
6 2 3 Enhancing procedural justice and perceptions of legitimacy 
As was expanded on in chapter 3, people do not only defer to state 
authority because they anticipate reward or fear punishment: research 
indicates that the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system activates 
self-regulatory mechanisms, making citizens more willing to defer voluntarily 
to, and co-operate with, legal authorities because they believe it is the right 
                                            
34 322. 
35 Marks, et al. (2009) Police Practice and Research 152.  This aspect is considered further at § 7 3 3 
below. 
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and proper thing to do.36  This internal sense of obligation to defer to state 
directives and rules is a key determinant of citizen assessments of state 
legitimacy, and its presence allows authorities to gain active co-operation from 
the public without needing to resort to (costly) coercive measures to enforce 
obedience.37   
Most significantly for present purposes, positive judgments regarding 
police legitimacy appear to have implications not only for citizen willingness to 
defer to state authority (obedience) but also for the likelihood of citizens being 
prepared to resort to violent self-help.  Evidence shows that there is a link 
between whether state authorities are able to secure a normative monopoly 
on rightful force in the eyes of citizens and citizen perceptions of state 
legitimacy.  Jackson et al’s study among young male ethnic minority 
Londoners confirms that positive legitimacy judgments appear to have a 
“‘crowding out’ effect” on positive attitudes to private use of violence, with 
there being less acceptance of private violence if police are felt to be 
legitimate.38  Conversely, the less legitimate the police are perceived to be, 
the more likely it is that citizens will tolerate use of private violence – including 
vigilantism39 – and regard it as being justified.40  Jackson et al were at pains 
to emphasise, however, that while there is possibly “something of a zero-sum 
relationship between approval of state violence and approval of non-state 
violence”,41 this does not necessarily imply that there is a causal nexus – as 
opposed merely to a correlation – between legitimacy judgments and attitudes 
towards private violence: further research is required to tease out the precise 
nature of the connection.  
Now that the existence of an empirical basis for linking high levels of 
perceived state legitimacy with citizen co-operation, deference, trust and 
reduced proneness to vigilantism has been reiterated, some practical ways in 
                                            
36  See, for instance, Tyler, et al. “Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives” in 
Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives 10-11. 
37 10-11; 15; 27. 
38 Jackson, et al. (2013) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 490. 
39 Jackson et al define private violence as including violence outside formal state channels as a means 
of social control – i.e., as a substitute for the police – which seems to encompass vigilantism. 
40 Jackson, et al. (2013) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 479-480; 490-491. 
41 490-491. 
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which the state may apply these insights in formulating and implementing a 
policing strategy and agenda to enhance its legitimacy whilst minimising the 
risk of vigilantism will be outlined.  In the previous section, the myth of 
attaining certainty of state punishment for rule-breaking was debunked: a 
developing state such as South Africa simply lacks the resources to motivate 
compliance with the law effectively via the application of sanctions.  Indeed, 
even if the state could ensure that deserved punishment were imposed on 
each and every wrongdoer, relying on this instrumental and punitive model 
alone has disadvantages beyond the financial.  A punitive orientation results 
in an increase in prison populations, which already consist disproportionately 
of the (vigilante-prone) poor and marginalised.42  It also tends to lead to a 
counterproductive and hostile relationship between citizens and criminal 
justice authorities.43  Jackson et al’s study linking lack of legitimacy with a 
likelihood to resort to private violence recommends that in situations of 
policing social unrest in marginalised communities, police would be well 
advised not to adopt aggressive or punitive policing styles.  Rather, they 
should “develop a more consensual way of policing … that seeks to generate 
and maintain police legitimacy”, focusing on policing methods that prioritise 
the generation of mutual trust and a sense of shared aims.  The primary 
objective of policing should be to give as many citizens as possible an active 
stake in the – presumably state-sanctioned – (re)production of social order.44  
Therefore, if it can be concluded that a purely sanction-based approach to 
motivating obedience to the law is at best unattainable and at worst 
undesirable, the state needs to explore other options that are more cost-
effective and have the potential to produce better results both in terms of 
citizen compliance and trust and in enhanced state legitimacy.   
                                            
42  This may be because poverty precludes people from access to justice such as adequate legal 
representation, or it may be more to do with the insidious effects what is sometimes termed the 
criminalisation of poverty.  For more on the idea of criminalising poverty and race, see M Schuberth 
“Challenging the Weak States Hypothesis: Vigilantism in South Africa and Brazil” (2013) (20) 
Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development 38, who argues that in the context of “polarization and 
marginalization, the construction of an intrinsic connection between poverty, crime and violence 
leads to the stigmatization of the poor as criminals”.  See also Bénit-Gbaffou (2008) Journal of 
Southern African Studies 105, who is of the view that the criminalisation of poverty is used as a tool 
to demonstrate and enforce the separation and social distinction between rich and poor. 
43 Tyler (2006) Journal of Social Issues 308. 
44 Jackson, et al. (2013) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 491. 
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The most promising alternative for achieving such consensual policing 
is what Tyler terms a “process-based model of regulation”, where the 
emphasis is on motivating compliance and co-operation due to an experience 
that the criminal justice system and its authorities are acting justly instead of 
on threat of sanction.45  As already explained, for an approach focusing on 
procedural justice the mechanisms postulated as resulting in obedience to the 
law are the internal motivations of responsibility and obligation to authorities 
(i.e., legitimacy) engendered by fair procedures.46  The idea of getting citizens 
to become more self-regulating in this potentially positive sense 47  is an 
attractive one.  Encouraging the police and other criminal justice agents to 
endorse constitutional values such as respect for individual human dignity, 
accountability, openness and responsiveness not only expressly reiterates the 
state’s self-legitimated identity as guarantor of human rights, but also  does so 
in a way that is comparatively affordable.  What is required is not harsher 
punishment, more expensive crime-detecting apparatus or even necessarily 
additional manpower, but rather a conscious effort to educate all criminal 
justice agents regarding the need to prioritise the values of procedural justice 
actively in their day-to-day interactions with the public.  Assuming there is the 
necessary political will to implement it, fostering a practice of good policing – 
by actively sensitising police to behave in accordance with their human rights 
mandate when engaging with the public – could be a sustainable and 
financially viable objective, and would reap significant rewards in terms of 
enhanced state legitimacy. 
The benefits of employing a procedural justice model of policing are 
acknowledged in the Khayelitsha Commission report, where it is noted that 
utilising a procedural justice model has the capacity to create what it terms a 
virtuous – as opposed to vicious – circle: 
                                            
45 Tyler (2006) Journal of Social Issues 309.  
46 See also Tyler (2006) Journal of Social Issues316. 
47 As opposed to Foucault’s “responsibilisation” sense.  As Brown Undoing the Demos 133 observes, 
“[W]hen the act of being responsible is linguistically converted into the administered condition of 
being responsibilized, it departs from the domain of agency and instead governs the subject through 
an external moral injunction – through demands emanating from an invisible elsewhere”.  She 
continues by saying that responsibilisation  “signals a regime in which the singular human capacity 
for responsibility is deployed to constitute and govern subjects and through which their conduct is 
organized and measured, remaking and reorientating them for a neoliberal order.” 
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 “If police treat people fairly and respectfully, and consistently with 
constitutional values and ubuntu, the police themselves will be 
respected, and this cycle of respect will promote a sense of social 
inclusivity and respect for the law.”48   
Furthermore, the Commission’s recommendations emphasise the 
importance of implementing such a policy across the board in order for the 
police to build better relationships with the community:  
“[E]ach interaction between a SAPS member and a civilian has 
the capacity to foster or undermine the relations between SAPS 
and the community.  Each interaction communicates to the civilian 
how SAPS values him or her – as a person worthy of equal 
respect, or not.”49   
Significantly, the Commission linked the values upon which the 
(Western) procedural justice model is based with the (African) principle of 
ubuntu.  The saying “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu”, meaning “a person is a 
person through other people”, encapsulates the idea of people being defined 
in terms of their relationships with others.  According to Langa J in S v 
Makwanyane, the ubuntu paradigm: 
“places … emphasis on the communality and on the 
interdependence of the members of a community.  It recognises a 
person’s status as a human being, entitled to unconditional 
respect, dignity, value and acceptance from the members of the 
community such person happens to be part of.  It also entails the 
converse, however.  The person has the corresponding duty to 
give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each 
member of that community.  More importantly, it regulates the 
exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-
responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all”.50 
                                            
48 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 442. 
49 441. 
50 S v Makwanyane para 223-224 (emphasis added). 
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 The Commission’s coupling of the seemingly alien procedural justice 
policing model with the long-entrenched and familiar justice paradigm of 
ubuntu points to the insight that it is possible for certain traditional African 
values to co-exist harmoniously with liberal human rights in the criminal justice 
sphere.  For a state determined not to alienate its citizens while still aspiring to 
retain its identity as upholder of human rights, this demonstrates that custom 
and human rights are not necessarily at odds.  It may be possible – and could 
indeed be imperative – for the state to harness the best of both traditional and 
procedural justice in its quest for successful relegitimation.  The centrality of 
the underlying premise of ubuntu in a restorative justice paradigm is further 
explored below at §§ 7 5 2 and 7 5 3.   
 
6 3 Relegitimation through exclusion: targeting vigilantes 
Now that state efforts to enhance its identity as both security provider 
and upholder of human rights have been considered, focus shifts to an 
alternative relegitimation strategy, namely state attempts to undermine the 
legitimacy of vigilantism by discrediting vigilantes and repressing their 
conduct.  In societies where vigilantism is ubiquitous, vigilante violence is a 
symptom of a widespread disregard for the law that is sustained by a 
perceived “message of impunity”;51 where the state appears not to challenge 
vigilantes’ claim to “law-enforcement” power, it is easier for communities to 
“accept … vigilantism as legitimate and congruent”. 52   To counteract 
vigilantism’s “latent popularity” the state needs to send a powerful message, 
both to society at large and to those prone to vigilantism in particular, that it 
will not tolerate self-help.53   
This section highlights a two-pronged approach that the state could 
follow in attempting to restore its legitimacy through vigilante exclusion.  The 
state’s first option is to win the hearts-and-minds struggle against vigilantes 
for local community support; its second is to utilise the criminal sanction to 
                                            
51 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 42. 
52 Silke (2001) The Police Journal 129. 
53 131; Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread. 
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condemn vigilantism.  In relation to the first approach, the state might choose 
to break down vigilantes’ aura of impunity and integrity by waging a war of 
words aimed at exposing vigilante weaknesses and failures.  By concentrating 
on the human rights abuses vigilantes perpetrate in the name of protecting the 
community, the state might be able depict itself as more deserving of 
legitimation in comparison.  As regards the second approach, the state could 
achieve legitimation through exclusion by treating vigilantism as a crime – 
preferably separately criminalised – and devising community-based 
restorative penalties for it.  The best strategy would be for the state to take 
seriously vigilantes’ status as criminals, whilst simultaneously acknowledging 
vigilantism’s status as a “moralistic” crime with social causes beyond 
vigilantes’ control that decrease the reprehensibility of their conduct 
considerably.  The state’s relegitimation prospects could thus be enhanced by 
prosecuting vigilantes for what they do, but still exhibiting sensitivity to 
community sentiment regarding vigilantes’ comparatively lower 
blameworthiness level vis-à-vis “ordinary” criminals.  Of course, neither 
approach is foolproof nor without its drawbacks, but both are worth 
attempting, if only because their focus is on showing the state to be a 
champion of human rights.  Both alternatives are considered below.   
 
6 3 1 “Devalourising” the symbolic power of vigilantes54 
In communities where vigilantism has entrenched itself, effectively 
usurping some of the official criminal justice system’s power and authority, 
relegitimation requires the state to find ways to undermine community 
members’ identification with vigilantes.55  It may be aided in its efforts to 
address the “thorny question of popular support for vigilantism” 56  by the 
ambivalent response that vigilantism generally evokes; even those who view 
vigilantism as the only available crime-fighting option tend to be willing to 
acknowledge that it is a flawed alternative.57  Despite the perceived popularity 
                                            
54 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 54. 
55 Silke (2001) The Police Journal 130-131. 
56 130. 
57 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 62. 
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of vigilantism, 73.3% of respondents to the Mthente survey in Khayelitsha, 
when questioned about whether vigilantism is ever a justified response to 
crime, were of the view that it is not justified.58  In light of this finding that, 
even in a vigilante-prone community with high levels of police inefficiency, 
vigilantism was by no means universally condoned, there is clearly scope for 
the state to deconstruct vigilante legitimation ideologies and draw attention to 
its problematic methods of “administering justice”.  This may serve to 
delegitimate vigilantes’ crime-fighting power and make the state’s criminal 
justice efforts seem more legitimate in comparison.  However, Silke59 warns 
that attempts to alienate vigilantes from the wider community in this way 
should be done in a circumspect manner.  If allegations concerning vigilante 
wrongdoings are less than truthful and accurate, such a smear campaign 
could backfire and risk fostering more support for the seemingly persecuted 
and hard-done-by vigilantes within their immediate communities. 
 
6 3 1 1 Deconstructing/discrediting vigilante ideologies 
As regards vigilante ideologies, the key myth that the state needs to 
deconstruct is the conception of vigilante violence as “noble and altruistic and 
something to be supported”.60  This may be achieved by drawing attention to 
vigilantes’ personal inadequacies and failings.  Identifying and publicising 
instances where ostensible crime-fighting or community protection is merely a 
cover-up for serious crimes committed for personal gain may convincingly 
demonstrate that vigilantes are merely exploiting the vigilante rhetoric that 
they act as crime-fighters on behalf of the community to commit private “pure 
crime”. 61   This argument is especially compelling in discrediting vigilante 
groups that request payment for services, since a profit motive is a clear 
indication that their conduct is driven by personal benefit rather than 
community well-being.62   
                                            
58 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 133. 
59 Silke (2001) The Police Journal 131. 
60 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 41. 
61 46. 
62 See 46. 
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In addition, the state may portray vigilantism as a self-motivated act of 
revenge,63 fuelled by emotions of violent anger and a desire to retaliate rather 
than to do justice in the collective interest.  This image of the bloodthirsty and 
vengeful mob undermines the vigilante depiction of their violent conduct as a 
“morally painful but necessary business”, carried out as a last resort “with 
deep sorrow”.64    
Another unsavoury aspect of South African vigilante ideology that the 
state could highlight relates to the fact that vigilantism “perpetuates a 
dominant and staunchly traditional, patriarchal community structure, one that 
draws strength from conservative notions of gender, ethnicity and primacy of 
age.” 65   Martin observes that vigilantism employed to suppress poor and 
marginalised groups – particularly indigent male youth, but also women and 
foreigners – has developed into a “highly troubling and systematically 
reproduced trend”.66  By pointing out the part played by vigilantes in keeping 
in place an “iniquitous system” that entrenches the interests of older, wealthier 
men at the expense of other community members, the state could discredit 
the vigilante claim to be addressing the needs of the whole (law-abiding) 
community, rather than merely sections of it.   Revealing the vigilante agenda 
as being reliant on the discourse of cleansing society of a sub-class 67 
identified as undesirable for reasons other than immediate personal deviance 
exposes the role played by vigilantism in reproducing and exacerbating social 
inequality, and could well weaken support for vigilantes within the community 
on that basis.  
 
                                            
63 This strategy is employed in the Khayelitsha Commission report in that the commissioners plump for 
the term “vengeance attack” to describe vigilantism, as opposed to using more neutral and less 
emotive terminology, thus (it is submitted) implicitly demonstrating their disapproval of informal 
justice. 
64 Burrows Vigilante! 13. 
65 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 66.  See also Oomen (2004) African Studies; Buur & Jensen 
(2004) African Studies and Buur (2008) Review of African Political Economy. 
66 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 54. 
67 Baker (2002) Journal of Modern African Studies 49. 
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6 3 1 2 Emphasising negative aspects of vigilante practices vis-à-vis the 
benefits of formalism 
To relegitimate itself, the state needs not only to discredit the myths 
and ideologies of vigilantism, but also to find ways of emphasising the 
advantages of formal in contrast to informal justice.  As noted in chapters 4 
and 5, informalism has various strengths that vigilantes rely on to gain 
community support.  Attractive characteristics of vigilantism and other types of 
informal justice include accessibility, intelligibility, affordability and 
effectiveness. 68   However, these same qualities that allow vigilantes to 
provide efficacious, speedy, understandable and often permanent solutions to 
problems of social order make vigilantism a style of “justice” that lacks the 
safeguards necessary to make it “just”.  This was recognised by focus group 
participants in the Mthente survey who, when asked for reasons why they 
regarded vigilantism as unjustified, explained that vigilante groups “never 
have enough evidence”, “never conduct thorough investigations” and are 
themselves “committing a crime”. 69   Other witnesses testifying before the 
Khayelitsha Commission pointed to the disproportionality between crime and 
punishment, and several times suggested that “the victim of the vengeance 
attack was not the person who had actually committed the crime that had 
triggered the attack”. 70   The link between vigilante “justice” and the 
infringement of constitutional rights will now briefly be explained.   
Section 35(1) of the Constitution guarantees those who have been 
arrested for allegedly committing a crime the right to remain silent,71 to be 
informed promptly of this right72 and the consequences for not exercising it,73 
as well as the right not to be compelled to make an admission or confession 
that could be used in evidence against them.74  Since vigilantes routinely 
resort to torture to obtain confessions, they plainly do not uphold these rights.  
At the trial stage, the fair trial rights afforded the accused in section 35(3) 
                                            
68 See also Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 39-42 for more details. 
69 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 133. 
70 387-388. 
71 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 35(1)(a). 
72 S 35(1)(b)(i). 
73 S 35(1)(b)(ii). 
74 S 35(1)(c). 
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include the right to be informed of the charge in sufficient detail to be able to 
answer it;75 to have time and resources to prepare a defence;76 to be tried 
publicly before an ordinary court;77 to be present at trial78 and to be tried 
“without unreasonable delay”;79 to choose to have legal representation and to 
be informed of this right;80 to “be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not 
to testify during the proceedings”;81 to adduce and challenge evidence,82 but 
not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; 83  and not to be 
convicted for committing conduct that is not criminalised under law. 84  
Assuming that most acts of vigilantism combine the arrest and trial stages, 
vigilante victims are usually “tried” publicly and speedily, and the “trial” takes 
place in their presence.  However, the other fair trial rights mentioned are 
routinely violated.  The spontaneous and instantaneous vigilante criminal 
justice “process” circumvents the safeguarding of an accused’s right to 
prepare a defence, to obtain legal representation, to bring or dispute evidence 
and depending on the circumstances, also their right to be informed of the 
charge against them.  The “trial” is not carried out in an independent and 
impartial85 setting, which is contrary to the right to be tried by an “ordinary 
court”.  As was mentioned above, torture is frequently used to compel 
confessions, which also negates the right to remain silent.  While much 
vigilantism may be carried out against persons suspected of committing 
recognised offences, social control vigilantism violates the right to be 
convicted only of conduct that is recognised by law as an offence, and 
simultaneously undermines the principle of legality.86  Without the safeguards 
provided for in section 35, the likelihood of innocent persons being targeted 
for vigilante punishment increases exponentially.  All in all, it is clear that 
vigilantes view the presumption of innocence, due process guarantees and 
                                            
75 S 35(3)(a). 
76 S 35(3)(b). 
77 S 35(3)(c). 
78 S 35(3)(e). 
79 S 35 (3)(d). 
80 S 35(3)(f) and (g). 
81 S 35(3)(h). 
82 S 35(3)(i). 
83 S 35(3)(j). 
84 S 35(3)(l). 
85 Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 130. 
86 The relevant principle is that of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without a law) (Snyman Criminal 
Law 34). 
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the rule of law as “more of an obstacle to maintaining social order than … an 
effective guarantee of it”.87  
In addition, vigilante violence violates numerous other constitutional 
rights of its victims.  The right to equality is undermined in various respects.  
As mentioned above,88 vigilantes tend to target certain categories of person 
for punishment, particularly young men, in a manner that discriminates 
against them based on their age and sex.89  Vigilante victims are also treated 
unequally in the sense that they are not afforded any formal due process 
protections, which distinguishes their position from those who are subject to 
the formal trial and punishment process.  Unlike state criminal justice 
authorities, vigilantes cannot be held accountable, since there is no 
opportunity for an appeal whereby their victims could challenge the imposition 
of a sanction on the basis of rules that would be applied equally to others.90  
The right of vigilante victims to human dignity91 is definitely at issue too.  The 
punishments imposed by vigilantes violate their victims’ inherent humanity.  
Even where victims are not killed, the public nature of their punishment can 
lead to ostracising or shunning,92 or they may be completely expelled from the 
community. 93   These actions express the perpetrators’ intolerance in a 
manner that is clearly not in line with the constitutional obligation to respect 
and protect human dignity.  Vigilantes also violate the right to life94 all too 
often.  They frequently impose “death sentences” that are grossly 
disproportionate to the perceived wrongdoing95 of their victims, and that are 
carried out in ways that further dehumanise them.96  The right to freedom and 
security of the person is severely compromised by acts of vigilantism as well.  
Section 12(1) of the Constitution guarantees the right, inter alia, not to be 
                                            
87 Baker (2002) Journal of Modern African Studies 51. 
88 See §§ 4 3 1 1 and 5 3 2 1. 
89 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9(4). 
90  C Harvey “Legality, Legitimacy and the Politics of Informalism” in D Feenan (eds) Informal 
Criminal Justice (2003) 22. 
91 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 10. 
92 Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 130. 
93 Resulting in the “social death” referred to by Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: 
Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World 204 and discussed in § 5 3 2 3 above. 
94 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 11. 
95 Killing suspected housebreakers is a pervasive vigilante practice. 
96 E.g., stoning, sjambokking or “necklacing”.  
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deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause;97 not to be detained 
without trial;98 to be “free from all forms of violence from either public or 
private sources”;99 and not to be tortured100 or subjected to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.101  It need scarcely be pointed out that 
the violation of one or more of these rights of vigilante victims is 
commonplace.  Vigilantes who carry out unauthorised searches of the 
dwellings or possessions of those they identify as suspects under the guise of 
evidence-gathering also fall foul of section 14 of the Constitution, which 
guarantees the right to privacy, specifically including the right not to have 
one’s person, home 102  or property 103  searched or one’s possessions 
seized.104   
Regarding the question of whether any of the rights-limitations 
identified above is capable of being viewed as “reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”, as provided for in section 36(1) of the Constitution, it is submitted 
that the answer must be no.  The import of the rights at stake,105 coupled with 
the nature and extent106 of rights violations and the fact that there are indeed 
“less restrictive”107 means to ensure community safety and security, makes 
the vigilante infringement of human rights constitutionally indefensible.   
Armed with this knowledge, the state may demonstrate convincingly 
that vigilantism should not be viewed as a speedy and effective form of 
justice, but instead as a serious and persistent form of human rights abuse.  
The state may well be able to impress on vigilante supporters that those 
whose cause they champion are not crime-fighting heroes, but criminals in 
their own right.  In a global society that is becoming ever more attuned to the 
significance of human rights and the need to be seen to be abiding by a 
                                            
97 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 12(1)(a). 
98 S 12(1)(b). 
99 S 12(1)(c) (emphasis added). 
100 S 12(1)(d). 
101 S 12(1)(e). 
102 S 14(a). 
103 S 14(b). 
104 S 14(c). 
105 S 36(1)(a) – they include life and human dignity, after all. 
106 S 36(1)(c). 
107 S 36(1)(e). 
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human rights ethos, this may go some way towards “devalourising” vigilantes’ 
power and legitimacy in the eyes of the community.  The issue of educating 
citizens regarding the benefits of due process and respect for human rights, 
and the need to portray human rights for all as more than merely an 
unnecessary hurdle to achieving justice, is discussed further in § 7 6 1 below. 
 
6 3 2 Criminalisation of vigilantism 
As already stated, the rationale for prosecuting and convicting 
perpetrators of vigilantism as a form of crime is that vigilantism is an overt 
manifestation of state weakness – a symptom of complete disregard for the 
law – and the state must act decisively to counteract the perception that 
vigilantes operate with impunity.  The state may deem it necessary to thwart 
the symbolic power that vigilantes wield by – often quite literally – getting 
away with murder108 by severely punishing vigilantes.  In coming down hard 
on vigilantes the state may “reactivate [its own] myth of sovereignty”109 by 
publicly demonstrating its own power to potential supporters and opponents 
alike.  In so doing, the state may not only symbolically reassert its claim to the 
exclusive exercise of coercive force but also expressly brand vigilantes as 
“enemies” by stigmatising them as criminals, availing itself of the formal 
criminal justice system to suppress and punish vigilantism swiftly.110   
An approach that focuses on treating vigilantism as a crime appears to 
have the support of the Khayelitsha Commission.  Its report criticises SAPS 
for appearing “somewhat ambivalent” towards vigilantism and for lacking a 
specific strategy to address the problem of vigilantism or vengeance 
attacks.111  The report recommends (inter alia) that all instances of vengeance 
attacks and killings be recorded and reported at SAPS Cluster Crime 
Combating Forum meetings, and that the Cluster Detective Coordinator 
                                            
108 Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 41. 
109  D Garland “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary 
Society” (1996) 36 (4) British Journal of Criminology 445 460. 
110 See Harris As for Violent Crime That’s Our Daily Bread 41; Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in 
Informal Criminal Justice 129-130; Bidaguren & Nina (2004) Social Justice 165; 177. 
111 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 388. 
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institute an “intelligence-based approach to vengeance attacks and 
killings”.112  A last suggestion of the report is that a specific policing strategy 
be developed to deal with vengeance attacks, which should include provision 
for rescuing victims, arresting perpetrators and securing crime scenes.113  
However, as will become apparent in the next section, the state faces 
considerable challenges in attempting to deal authoritatively with vigilantes. 
 
6 3 2 1 The challenge of tackling the mob 
 
Successfully implementing a get-tough strategy with respect to 
vigilantism is easier said than done.  As Wisler and Onwudiwe rightly note, 
“[a]lthough the rhetoric of ‘criminalizing’ informal policing can serve the long-
term normative goals and enterprise of state builders, they [sic] might not 
correspond to the reality of policing in an incomplete and weak state.”114  
Indeed, the Khayelitsha Commission report readily acknowledged that 
“bringing an end to such attacks is not something that SAPS will be able to do 
quickly or on its own”.115  There are a variety of reasons why prosecuting 
instances of mob-led informal punishment poses difficulties for the state. 
                                            
112 456. 
113 456. 
114 Wisler & Onwudiwe (2008) Police Quarterly 429. 
115 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 388. 
“When arriving at these scenes you usually almost catch the 
people in action, but with the arrival of marked vehicles they 
disappear into the structures.  Witnesses don’t want to identify 
anyone.  It’s like it’s being committed by ghosts.  So no one 
wants to step forward and say I can identify [the perpetrators].  
There are just no witnesses, no one saw anything.” 
Khayelitsha Station Commander Colonel Nel, quoted in O’Regan and Pikoli 
Khayelitsha Commission Report 232. 
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Some of the factors sustaining vigilante activity by impeding its 
prosecution have been mentioned in previous chapters.  There is the 
“conspiracy of silence” that was discussed in § 5 4 1 1 in the context of the 
terror-inducing nature of vigilante violence.  The general lack of co-operation 
from witnesses116 living in the vicinity of vigilante incidents is a notable feature 
of vigilantism – so significant, indeed, that Swanepoel and Duvenhage identify 
it as one of vigilantism’s defining characteristics.117  The reluctance to testify 
may be because those who identify perpetrators of vigilantism fear being 
labelled as informers, which might out them at risk of violent attack 
themselves. 118   Witness intimidation is a distinct possibility in close-knit 
communities where witness anonymity cannot be guaranteed: fear and what 
Minnaar terms “sheer crowd apathy” 119  coupled with fear may cause 
community members to falsely deny witnessing an act of vigilantism in order 
to avoid involvement.  It may also be hard in practice to distinguish between 
mere bystanders and those who are themselves involved in the act of 
vigilantism 120  – it may well be that those whom the police question as 
witnesses are in fact perpetrators, and would be unwilling to assist police for 
this reason.  Those who support or condone the actions of vigilantes, even if 
they are not directly involved, may likewise refuse to come forward or to 
testify.  Their high levels of frustration (or open anger)121 about the havoc 
wreaked by crime in their communities may have caused them to support and 
legitimise vigilante crime-fighting initiatives, and they would therefore have no 
incentive to help authorities to prosecute vigilantes.  In S v Dikqacwi, Binns-
Ward J opines:  
“Denial and cover-up appear … to be an integral characteristic of 
the culture of vigilantism.  This is evidenced by the refusal or 
inability of affected communities to treat it as an evil rather than a 
good, and the consequent lack of co-operation with which the 
                                            
116 Martin (2012) State Crime 230. 
117 Swanepoel & Duvenhage (2007) Acta Academia 126-127. 
118 Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 120. 
119 120. 
120 Martin (2012) State Crime 230.  For more on the grey area between witnesses and perpetrators in 
the context of joint criminal enterprises, see § 6 3 2 2 below. 
121 Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 120. 
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police and the courts have to deal in cases in which it is a 
feature.”122   
In addition, an over-harsh and punitive strategy against vigilantes may 
easily breed citizen resentment. 123  If the state is perceived to be squandering 
scarce resources on opposing popularly-backed “crime-fighters” rather than 
“genuine” criminals, community members would not want to come forward to 
assist the police. 
Even if all these hurdles are overcome and vigilante suspects are 
arrested, the state is frequently still faced with the “procedural nightmare” 124 
of charging tens – even hundreds – of people with a crime.  As Abel correctly 
notes, “[c]riminal law is ill-suited to repress mass action”.125  The issue of the 
crime(s) with which vigilantes may be charged, and how such prosecution is 
to be accomplished, is the topic of the next section. 
 
6 3 2 2 Common purpose liability and other problematic issues 
There is a wide range of criminal prohibitions in terms of which 
vigilantes’ conduct may be penalised.126  Depending on the nature of the 
incident, the charge could be murder, assault, arson, malicious damage to 
property, public violence or defeating the course of justice, or related 
competent verdicts such as liability as an accomplice, attempt liability, 
conspiracy and incitement.  Whatever the specific charge, the state often 
faces the difficulty of having to prosecute vigilantes en masse.127  
                                            
122 S v Dikqacwi and others para 29. 
123 See also para 7, quoted in § 6 3 2 3, where Binns-Ward J refers to the fact that imposing harsh 
punishments on vigilantes may well alienate community members still more, since lengthy prison 
sentences may well be viewed as “indications of the system being harsh on those who they see as the 
ones trying to do something effective about crime while it is otherwise soft on crime, or ineffective 
about it”. 
124 Martin (2012) State Crime 230. 
125 Abel Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid 373. 
126 See § 2 4 2 above for more details. 
127 Although lone vigilantes are by no means unheard of, this section addresses the legal implications of 
acts of collective or group vigilantism.   
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Successful prosecution of participants in acts of mob justice poses a 
significant challenge for the state, especially when charging individual 
participants with a consequence crime such as murder.  The general rule is 
that the state needs to prove a causal link between the conduct of the 
accused and the unlawful consequence (i.e., death) before criminal liability 
can ensue.  This entails asking, first, whether, but for the accused’s conduct, 
the unlawful consequence would have occurred (the conditio sine qua non or 
“but for” test). 128  If the answer is no, factual causation has been established.  
The second step is to ascertain whether it is reasonable and fair, on legal 
policy grounds, to hold the accused liable for factually causing the 
consequence, usually by means of establishing whether there is a sufficiently 
close connection between the accused’s conduct and the ensuing unlawful 
consequence. 129   Only once both factual and legal causation have been 
proven (and assuming the other liability requirements of unlawful conduct and 
fault are also present) is there the possibility of conviction.   
Causation is particularly hard to prove in instances of joint murder such 
as an incident of mob justice: if a group of individuals acting together kills a 
vigilante victim, there may be no doubt that one or more of the group was 
responsible for the death, but it may be very tricky to ascertain – let alone 
prove beyond reasonable doubt – which one or more of the group was in fact 
the cause of death.  To illustrate this practical and legal difficulty, Snyman 
uses the (typically vigilante) example of a group of twenty people who decide 
to kill someone by stoning him to death, and succeed in killing him by each 
throwing a stone at him.  The usual test for factual causation may be applied 
to the scenario by asking: “But for the act of any particular member of the 
group, would the victim nevertheless have died?”  The answer is self-evidently 
                                            
128  This test therefore involves a hypothetical elimination of the accused’s conduct to see if the 
unlawful consequence would have disappeared or not.  Decisions approving of the application of the 
conditio sine qua non test for legal causation include Minister of Police v Skosana 1977 1 SA 31 (A) 
34F-G; S v Daniëls en ’n ander 1983 3 SA 275 (A) 324G-H (Trengove JA) and 331B (Jansen JA); S 
v Tembani 2007 1 SACR 355 (A) para 10; Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2013 (2) SA 144 
(CC) paras 39-40 and 48.  
129 Tests for determining whether there is a sufficiently close connection to establish legal causation (S 
v Mokgethi en andere 1990 1 SA 32 (A) 45G-H) include the proximate cause test (which has been 
subject to much criticism, and its application rejected on the facts of S v Daniëls en ’n ander by 
Jansen JA at 332-333); the adequate cause test (applied in S v Daniëls en ’n ander by Jansen AJ at 
331-332); and the novus actus interveniens test (applied in S v Daniëls en ’n ander by Trengove JA 
at 325). 
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yes, since the conduct of the other group members would have been sufficient 
to cause the victim’s death, even if the participation of any one member of the 
group is “thought away”.130  The same reasoning would apply in respect of all 
the other group members too.  The inevitable conclusion, ridiculous as it may 
seem, is that all group members ought to escape liability on the basis that 
there is no decisive factual link between their conduct and the death.   
It is in precisely this type of scenario that the so-called common 
purpose doctrine is applicable.  In terms of the common purpose doctrine, 
where it is proven that two or more people have agreed to commit a crime131 
or where they actively associate132 in a joint criminal enterprise, each member 
will be responsible for specific criminal conduct committed by any of their 
number in execution of that purpose.133  Provided they all agree to commit the 
particular crime beforehand (or alternatively actively associate themselves 
with its commission), and they act with the requisite fault (mens rea), no proof 
beyond reasonable doubt is required that each participant contributed 
causally to the ultimate unlawful consequence.134  In effect, the conduct of 
whichever participant actually caused the consequence is imputed to all the 
other participants.  Thus the common purpose doctrine allows for a departure 
from the general principle that, in consequence crimes, the state must 
establish a link between the unlawful consequence and the conduct of the 
accused, serving to alleviate the burden on the prosecution to prove the 
                                            
130 Snyman Criminal Law 255-256. 
131 This is the “prior agreement” scenario where, e.g., a vigilante group agrees to undertake an armed 
march to the home of a known drug-dealer with the aim of attacking or killing him.  All who are 
parties to this joint agreement may be held liable for the drug-dealer’s death in a subsequent shooting 
carried out between members of the vigilante group and the drug dealer.  Liability could ensue even 
for group members who were not on the scene of the crime at the time of the killing.  
132  The “active association” form of common purpose would be most commonly applied in the 
instances of spontaneous mob justice – see S v Safatsa and others 1988 1 SA 868 (A) and S v 
Mgedezi  and others 1989 1 SA 687 (A).  In  705I-706B, extra requirements were prescribed for 
common purpose where prior agreement was absent, namely (1) presence at the scene of the 
violence; (2) awareness of the assault; (3) intention to make common cause with the actual 
perpetrators of the assault; (4) “performing some act of association” that manifests the sharing of a 
common purpose with the conduct of the others; and (5) the necessary fault (mens rea), which is also 
a requirement for prior agreement common purpose.  These requirements were cited and approved of 
in S v Thebus (see paras 20 and 50). 
133 Burchell Principles 467; Snyman Criminal Law 256-257. 
134 S v Safatsa and others 897A. 
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causal contribution of each and every participant to the unlawful consequence 
beyond reasonable doubt.135   
The state frequently invokes the common purpose doctrine to 
prosecute cases involving vigilantism.  Since a mandate or prior agreement to 
commit a specific crime can seldom be proven in vigilante cases, the state 
most often uses the active association variant of common purpose to obtain 
convictions. 136   Significantly, much of the key case law concerning the 
common purpose doctrine comprises of such vigilante-type scenarios.  For 
example, S v Safatsa137 (also known as the “Sharpeville Six” case), where the 
SCA decisively held that causation need not be proven in instances of 
common purpose, was a case of apartheid-era vigilantism of the active 
association type.  In 1984, following wide-spread riots against the planned 
increase of service levies, a mob of approximately 100 people stoned and 
then burned to death the deputy mayor of the Lekoa town council for being a 
“sell-out” to the white authorities for favouring the plan.138  It was not possible 
to determine which specific crowd members were responsible for the killing.  
In the end, only six members of the crowd were convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death based on the application of the common purpose doctrine, 
including a woman whose sole contribution to the outcome had been to shout 
repeatedly, “Hy skiet op ons, laat ons hom doodmaak”139 and to slap a woman 
for opposing the plan to burn the deceased.   
The most important post-1994 era common purpose case – S v 
Thebus,140 where the constitutionality of the doctrine was confirmed – is also 
a vigilante scenario.  It concerned a group of vigilantes from Ocean View in 
Cape Town who, in November 1998, decided to act against those whom they 
suspected of being drug dealers.  They armed themselves and visited the 
                                            
135 Burchell Principles 473. 
136 Even in S v Thebus, where there was clearly a preceding agreement among community members to 
embark on an armed march to the homes of suspected drug-dealers, participants in the subsequent 
killing of a bystander who was killed in the crossfire between vigilantes and a drug dealer were 
viewed as part of the common purpose via active association, with Moseneke J holding that “the 
evidence does not prove any … prior pact” (para 19). 
137 S v Safatsa and others. 
138 888D-E; 889C. 
139 “He is shooting at us, let us kill him” (889D). 
140 S v Thebus. 
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addresses of suspected drug dealers, assaulting them and destroying their 
property.  The vigilantes were driving in a motorcade at an intersection close 
to populated blocks of residential flats when a suspected drug dealer, whose 
house they had damaged earlier that day, discharged his firearm in their 
direction.  Members of the group returned fire, and a seven-year-old girl was 
killed in the crossfire.141  The two men eventually convicted of her murder in 
accordance with the common purpose doctrine were identified by a single 
witness as standing nearby holding a pick handle and retrieving spent 
cartridges discharged from the firearms of the other vigilantes, respectively.142  
As is well illustrated by both the Safatsa and Thebus cases, even peripheral 
participation in a common purpose may result in conviction, despite there 
being no causal link between the conduct of the accused and the deadly 
outcome. 
So what is the justification for this drastic departure from the underlying 
foundation of criminal law, namely that the state needs to prove all elements 
of criminal liability beyond reasonable doubt – including causation in the case 
of consequence crimes – before an accused can be convicted and punished?  
The rationale for the common purpose doctrine is clearly based on 
expediency.143  The Constitutional Court in Thebus declared that the aim of 
common purpose doctrine is to combat the “significant societal scourge” of 
crimes committed by individuals “acting in concert”.  Requiring proof of 
causation as a prerequisite for liability in instances of collective criminal 
conduct would, opines Moseneke J, “make prosecution of collaborative 
criminal enterprises intractable and ineffectual”.144  Moseneke J tries valiantly 
to defend his reasoning for retaining the doctrine, declaring: 
“[The common purpose doctrine] serves vital purposes in our 
criminal justice system.  Absent the rule of common purpose, all 
but actual perpetrators of a crime and their accomplices will be 
beyond the reach of our criminal justice system, despite their 
                                            
141 S v Thebus and another para 1. 
142 Para 4. 
143 M Reddi “The Doctrine of Common Purpose Receives the Stamp of Approval: Notes” (2005) 122 
(1) SALJ 59 64. 
144 S v Thebus para 34. 
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unlawful and intentional participation in the commission of the 
crime.  Such an outcome would not accord with the considerable 
societal distaste for crimes by common design.  Group, organised 
or collaborative misdeeds strike more harshly at the fabric of 
society and the rights of victims than crimes perpetrated by 
individuals.  Effective prosecution of crime is a legitimate, 
‘pressing social need’.  The need for ‘a strong deterrent to violent 
crime’ is well acknowledged because ‘widespread violent crime is 
deeply destructive of the fabric of our society’.  There is a real and 
pressing social concern about the high levels of crime.”145  
It is submitted that Moseneke J’s reasoning is unpersuasive, being high 
on emotive and punitive sentiment and low on substance.  His rather vague, 
repetitive and clichéd litany of complaint against collective wrongdoing gives 
the impression that he is protesting too much.  Most of his objections to joint 
criminal enterprises are equally applicable to crimes committed by a single 
individual,146 and his implication that some participants in acts of collective 
violence would walk free should the common purpose doctrine be abolished is 
simply erroneous.147  Ironically, despite citing a passage in S v Dhlamini148 
warning against using the alarming level of crime to justify extensive and 
inappropriate invasions of individual rights,149 Moseneke J then proceeds to 
do precisely that by confirming the constitutionality of the common purpose 
doctrine. 
While some writers are supportive of the Constitutional Court’s 
upholding of the constitutionality of the common purpose doctrine, citing 
crime-control rationales similar to those of Moseneke J,150 others151 are of the 
                                            
145 Para 40. 
146 For a critique of this aspect of Moseneke J’s reasoning, see also Snyman Criminal Law 262-263 n 
55. 
147 The many other options available for convicting multiple participants in crimes are outlined in  
§ 6 3 2 2 below. 
148 S v Dhlamini; S v Dladla and others; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat 1999 4 SA 623 (CC) para 68. 
149 In n 65 of the judgment. 
150 See, e.g., Reddi (2005) SALJ 66, who says, “It is … fortunate that the Constitutional Court has 
rescued the doctrine of common purpose from further attempts at extinguishing it.  In a society that is 
currently reeling from the impact of a pandemic of serious crimes committed by collective 
individuals acting in concert, the doctrine of common purpose is crucial to the eradication of the 
ubiquitous threat posed by such criminals” and Snyman Criminal Law 262, who welcomes the 
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view that the common purpose doctrine is a “truly unnecessary evil”,152 the 
continued application of which does indeed violate a number of constitutional 
rights.  Constitutional arguments against the common purpose doctrine are 
applicable to both its prior association and active agreement manifestations.  
However, Burchell claims – correctly, it is contended – that constitutional 
objections to common purpose liability are particularly persuasive where 
liability is based on the active association of a large group.153  Where there is 
the prior agreement of a small, organised band of criminals, special principles 
of imputation may more easily be justified – a perspective seemingly in line 
with that of Moseneke J above, where he specifically decries “group, 
organised or collaborative misdeeds”, appearing to place emphasis on the 
reprehensibility of co-perpetratorship’s pre-planning aspect. 154   For this 
reason, constitutional objections to common purpose may be deemed 
especially relevant in the “amorphous group”155 context, which is typical of 
vigilante mob justice.   
The arguments in favour of excising the common purpose doctrine 
from our law will not be comprehensively canvassed here.156  Critique of the 
doctrine will be confined to the most persuasive contention, namely that its 
dispensing with proof of the causal element in circumstance crimes 
contradicts the fundamental rule that the prosecution must prove the elements 
of liability beyond reasonable doubt and in so doing, infringes the presumption 
of innocence.157  Moseneke J dismisses the argument that the right to be 
presumed innocent is violated.  His view is that the doctrine “neither places an 
onus upon the accused, nor does it presume his or her guilt.  The state is 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime 
                                                                                                                             
decision “despite the fact that the grounds advanced by the court for its decision do not always go to 
the core of the reason for the existence of the doctrine”. 
151 See, especially, Burchell Principles 475-483 and J Grant “Common Purpose, Thebus, Marikana and 
Unnecessary Evil” (2014) 30 (1) SAJHR 1. 
152 Grant (2014) SAJHR 23. 
153 Burchell Principles 477-478. 
154 S v Thebus para 40. 
155 Burchell Principles 478. 
156 For instance, there are some rather far-fetched claims in Grant (2014) SAJHR regarding the extent of 
the common purpose doctrine’s deviation from the general principles of criminal law that need not 
detain us here. 
157 Burchell Principles 476. 
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charged under common purpose.”158  What Moseneke J overlooks, however, 
is that absolving the state of the burden to prove causation does far more than 
create a reverse onus or presume that causation has been established: by 
imputing the causal contribution of one participant to all co-perpetrators, “it 
places the issue of the proof of causation beyond any proof that an accused 
could raise”159 and allows for the possibility of an accused being convicted 
despite the existence of reasonable doubt in their favour.   
What is more, since Moseneke J is of the view that no rights are 
infringed by the common purpose doctrine, he does not even consider 
whether or not any limitation of an accused’s presumption of innocence is 
defensible in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution.  There is good reason 
for supposing that if a limitations analysis were engaged in, it would conclude 
that the seeming violation of the right to be presumed innocent is not 
reasonable, nor is it justifiable.  The most important question to be addressed 
in this exercise is whether it is possible for the state to deal effectively with 
instances of mob vigilante violence without the aid of the common purpose 
doctrine.160  It is clear that there are a range of alternative means of punishing 
persons involved in joint criminal activity, including public violence, 161 
attempt, 162  conspiracy, 163  incitement 164  or holding them liable as 
                                            
158 S v Thebus para 43. 
159 Grant (2014) SAJHR 15. 
160 17. 
161 Public violence occurs where a number of persons act in concert, unlawfully and intentionally to 
commit sufficiently serious acts which are intended to disturb the public peace or security forcibly, or 
to violate the rights of others (Burchell Principles 755; Grant (2014) SAJHR 21).  Most if not all acts 
of group vigilantism would also amount to public violence. 
162 An attempt is when an accused, intending to commit a crime, nevertheless fails in their purpose.  To 
qualify as an attempt, the accused’s conduct must go beyond mere acts of preparation – they must 
have commenced with the consummation of the crime (R v Schoombie 1945 AD 451 545-547).  It is 
easily conceivable that a participant in vigilante violence could be guilty of attempted murder for 
having acted in such a way as to demonstrate their intention to cause the death of a victim and having 
proceeded beyond the preparation stage, but where another carries out the actual killing. 
163 A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to “commit, or to aid or procure the 
commission of, a crime” (Burchell Principles 529).  This would apply in instances where there is a 
prior agreement between vigilantes to commit a crime (such as murdering a suspected robber), 
regardless of whether that crime is actually perpetrated later. 
164 Incitement is where one person (the inciter) makes a communication to another (the incitee) with the 
intention of influencing the incitee to commit a crime (Burchell Principles 519).  Without a doubt, 
accused no 4 in S v Safatsa and others, who encouraged others to kill the deputy mayor, was guilty 
of incitement. 
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accomplices165 to a crime committed by the main perpetrator(s).  Far from 
allowing a vigilante to “get away with murder”, all these options permit the 
courts to impose – where appropriate, depending on the accused’s degree of 
participation – punishments as severe as if the vigilante had been convicted of 
the main offence.166  The plethora of other options available for convicting 
vigilantes illustrates that it is indeed possible to realise the (undoubtedly 
important) objective of crime control whilst advancing the interests of “fair 
labelling”167  – shifting from an approach based on imputed co-perpetrator 
liability under the common purpose principle to one that focuses on punishing 
an accused for what they actually did. 
 
6 3 2 3 Criminalising vigilantism separately: Comparing the practical 
application and implications of strategies focusing on forward-looking 
restoration v backward-looking retribution 
Convicting a vigilante for being an accomplice to murder, for having 
participated in public violence, for inciting harm to another168 or for having 
attempted to defeat the administration of justice169 instead of harnessing the 
common purpose doctrine to convict them of murder, is clearly a step in the 
right direction as far as the fair labelling of vigilante misdeeds is concerned.  
However, it is submitted that the ideal of fair labelling in the vigilante context 
may only truly be realised if vigilantism is criminalised as a separate offence.  
In chapter 2, the elements of a proposed crime of vigilantism were outlined 
and explained.  To recap, the crime of vigilantism would occur where a person 
or persons in their private capacity unlawfully and intentionally use (or 
threaten to use) force against the person or property of another who is the 
                                            
165  Accomplices are participants who further or assist in the commission of a crime prior to its 
completion, without qualifying as actual perpetrators (S v Williams en ’n ander 1980 1 SA 60 (A)). 
166 See the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 s 18(1) and 18(2) in respect of incitement, conspiracy 
and attempt to commit a statutory offence.  Where common law attempt liability is concerned, 
punishment is generally less severe because less harm is caused, but an accomplice to a crime whose 
contribution is more substantial than that of the actual perpetrator may actually be punished more 
severely than the perpetrator (Burchell Principles 517; 502). 
167 See the discussion of fair labelling in § 2 7.  It is submitted that criminalising vigilantism separately 
is an even better way of abiding by this principle. 
168 See the accused in S v Safatsa and others who encouraged others to kill the deceased. 
169 See the accused in S v Thebus who was responsible for collecting the used shell-casings. 
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perpetrator of an actual, potential or imputed criminal or non-criminal 
wrongdoing.  The specific intention of the vigilante(s) must be to punish such 
person, and their conduct must be aimed (at least in part) at offering 
guarantees of collective security and social order in circumstances where 
there is a real or perceived absence of effective formal guarantees of order 
and security.  Vigilantism so defined is not a consequence crime (i.e., it does 
not criminalise the causing of harm), focusing instead on whether or not force 
is used, which means that the common purpose doctrine is irrelevant for its 
utilisation.   
The main benefit of criminalising vigilantism separately – beyond the 
crucial fair labelling considerations already mentioned – would be so that a 
nuanced and specifically-targeted sentencing regime could be devised and 
implemented for those convicted of vigilantism.  That there is little unanimity 
about how to punish those guilty of vigilante crimes is evident if the trial and 
Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) judgments of S v Thebus are compared.  In 
the Western Cape High Court, Mitchell AJ used the common purpose doctrine 
to convict both accused of one count of murder and two counts of attempted 
murder, but appears very sympathetic towards them in the sentencing phase.  
He sentences each to eight years’ imprisonment, suspended for five years on 
condition that they are not found guilty of a violent crime or a crime against 
the state during the period of suspension, and that they each perform eight 
hours of community service per week at their local police station for a three-
year period.170  Mitchell AJ justifies his view that substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist for a lesser sentence than life imprisonment on the basis, 
inter alia, of the frustration felt by the Ocean View community at the inability of 
the police to deal with gangsterism and drug-dealing, and argues that the 
entire community should shoulder responsibility for the tragic events that 
occurred when the vigilante group descended on Ocean View.171  While he 
does not regard those factors as excusing the two accused’s behaviour, he 
does opine that they go a long way towards explaining it.172   
                                            
170 S v Thebus and another 570B-D. 
171 585E. 
172 579C. 
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By contrast, when the state appealed these sentences to the SCA on 
the basis that they were “unduly light and induced a sense of shock”,173 the 
judges of the SCA upheld the appeal.  In his minority judgment, Navsa JA 
opines that Mitchell AJ fundamentally misdirected himself, and that the 
present instance – a scenario involving “mob and gang rule and general 
lawlessness” – is precisely the type of case that the legislature had 
contemplated when providing for a life sentence for murder.174  Navsa JA 
describes the vigilante group as violent and bloody-minded, and says that 
“[w]ith the intention of rooting out drug dealers who terrorised a township they 
then proceeded to terrorise the community even further”.175  Since the deaths 
“flowed from vigilante action” and so as to send a message to “those who are 
intent on bringing their own brand of justice to bear on communities, without 
regard for the lives of innocents and the breakdown of law and order [that 
they] will face the full force of the law”, he proposes a life sentence for the 
accused.176  Similarly, Lewis AJA, who wrote the majority judgment, views the 
trial court’s sentence as “grossly inadequate for the punishment of the 
appellants and as a deterrent to others who might take it upon themselves to 
deal with criminal conduct by perpetrating crimes themselves”.177  She does 
not consider the community’s frustration with police inability to deal with drug-
dealers and gangsters to be mitigating.178  She agrees with Navsa JA that the 
conduct of the vigilante group “would have added to the fear felt generally by 
people living in Ocean View”.179  However, she does regard as extenuating 
the fact that the accused were convicted in terms of the common purpose 
doctrine: while they were legally and morally responsible for the death and 
injuries, it was significant that “they did not actually shoot and neither was 
seen using a firearm”. 180   She holds that justice would be served by 
sentencing them to fifteen years’ imprisonment rather than life 
                                            
173 570E. 
174 579D-F. 
175 579F-I. 
176 580C; 580F; 580H. 
177 586A-B. 
178 585E. 
179 585F. 
180 585G-H. 
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imprisonment181 – still a substantial increase in the sentence imposed by the 
court a quo. 
This judicial dilemma – whether to punish harshly to express 
disapproval of vigilantism and to deter others from exercising self-help, or to 
punish lightly to take into consideration the tragic societal reality precipitating 
acts of vigilantism – is eloquently addressed in a more recent sentencing 
judgment by Western Cape High Court judge Binns-Ward J in S v 
Dikqacwi.182  The three accused had been convicted of assault, kidnapping 
and housebreaking committed during an attempt to investigate and deal with 
individuals suspected of impersonating police officers in order to rob 
community members.183  In arriving at an appropriate punishment Binns-Ward 
J recognises the need to:  
“acknowledge that crimes committed in the context of vigilantism 
will often be different from the same acts perpetrated out of greed 
or delinquency.  While their gravity should not be seen as being 
diminished on that account, the context does, I think, justify 
consideration of a different response when it comes to 
sentencing; one determined with especial regard to the need to 
promote rather than retard societal reconstruction and 
rehabilitation.”184 
Even more significantly, he appreciates that the application of 
constitutional values is paramount when assessing the interests of the 
community while sentencing vigilantes.  He makes clear that a sentence 
cannot appear to be condoning vigilantism and that vigilantism should be 
“visited with the sanction of the law”, also recognising the need for 
punishment to “be of such a nature that [it] objectively promotes confidence in 
the justice system”.185  However, rather than responding in the usual knee-jerk 
fashion and taking this as an invitation to impose a severe sentence, 
                                            
181 585H-I; 586C. 
182 S v Dikqacwi and others. 
183 Para 2. 
184 Para 8 (emphasis added). 
185 Para 9. 
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substantiating his choice with reference to the interests of the community and 
the need for deterrence, what he says next comprises a refreshingly different 
and perceptive perspective into how best to incorporate constitutional values 
when sentencing vigilantes:  
“The values of the constitution do not, however, enjoin 
indiscriminately visiting brutal and brutalising behaviour in the 
context of vigilantism with uncompromising severity and 
formalised inhumanity.  There should rather, as far as possible, 
be an endeavour, in the determination of punishment, a striving 
towards a humanising and debrutalising result.  Meeting the 
problem and its effects with unmitigated harshness will do nothing 
to address the underlying causes, and does not serve the 
interests of the community, or promote the realisation of a society 
based on constitutional values.186 
Because his take on vigilante punishments is informed throughout by 
his careful reflection on why vigilantes do what they do, his focus is squarely 
on the importance of “avoiding formalised inhumanity” and the brutalising 
consequences of imposing over-harsh punishments on vigilantes.  Indeed, he 
argues against incarcerating vigilantes, whom he describes as “persons who 
are generally functioning well within society – albeit a dysfunctional society”.  
In addition to risking “returning to the community damaged, and even more 
problematic persons at the end of the exercise”, imprisonment, according to 
Binns-Ward J: 
“will not address the causes of vigilantism and is unlikely, in my 
view, to provide an effective deterrent.  On the contrary, having 
regard to the reported attitude of the affected communities 
towards vigilantes, it might well conduce to a greater alienation of 
the members of such communities from the formal criminal justice 
system.  They might see lengthy terms of imprisonment as 
indications of the system being harsh on those who they see as 
                                            
186 Para 9 (emphasis added). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 296 
the ones trying to do something effective about crime while it is 
otherwise soft on crime, or ineffective about it.”187 
With this in mind, Binns-Ward meticulously constructs a detailed set of 
community corrections for each accused in accordance with the Correctional 
Services Act.188  These include a wholly suspended prison sentence of seven 
years and a three-year period of correctional supervision, incorporating house 
arrest, 16 hours of community service a month, the retention of employment, 
the payment of monetary compensation to the victims, refraining from alcohol 
and drugs, and participation in appropriate treatment, development and 
support programmes.189  A month later, when a similar case involving the 
sentencing of vigilantes convicted of kidnapping and assault with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm came before the Western Cape High Court (S v 
Mvabaza), 190  Nyman J followed Binns-Ward J’s lead.  Considering the 
“scourge of vigilantism that has plagued the community of Khayelitsha”191 to 
be both a “mitigating and aggravating factor”,192 he imposed a comparable 
sentence to that of the accused in Dikqacwi: a wholly suspended prison 
sentence, combined with the non-custodial options of house arrest, 
community service, attendance of anger management and victim-offender 
dialogue programmes, payment of compensation to the mother of the 
deceased and abstention from using alcohol and drugs.193 
The willingness to embrace restorative and innovative approaches to 
punishing vigilantes demonstrated in the Thebus court a quo decision, 
Dikqacwi and Mvabaza is to be applauded.  While this chapter has 
concentrated mainly on the exclusionary aspect of penalties for vigilantism, 
the next chapter includes a more in-depth look at sentencing perspectives that 
are more inclusive and integrative.  It will be argued that employing and 
championing restorative justice solutions to vigilantism allows the state to 
                                            
187 Para 7. 
188 Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 s 50(1)(a) and s 52(1). 
189 S v Dikqacwi and others para 32. 
190S v Mvabaza. 
191 Para 7. 
192 Para 9. 
193 Paras 23-25. 
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demonstrate non-violent dispute resolution strategies, thereby actively 
“promot[ing] the realisation of a society based on constitutional values”.194 
 
6 4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there is a place for human-rights-
compatible exclusionary strategies in the state’s relegitimation arsenal.  First, 
it appears that the state may indeed enhance its self-legitimated dual identity 
as crime-fighter and upholder of human rights by making significant but 
affordable changes to the current policing paradigm.  If police and other 
criminal justice agents are seen as executing their core obligations in direct 
response to individual and community concerns, appearing active and 
engaged in carrying out their duties, and treating citizens with an 
acknowledgement of their shared humanity and their worthiness of equal 
respect and concern, this is likely to promote a closer affinity between the 
criminal justice system and the public. 195   Procedural justice policing 
combined with minimalist and minimal policing may thus contribute to 
increased state legitimacy, foster law-abidingness and also lessen the 
propensity of individuals to resort to vigilantism.  Second, where the state’s 
exclusionary focus is on discrediting and undermining vigilante influence, this 
can be done in such a way as to portray the state’s own exercise of crime-
fighting power as a far more just way of doing justice than vigilante self-help.  
And by criminalising vigilantism separately, and tailoring appropriately 
restorative penalties for this crime, the state may demonstrate its commitment 
to fair labelling and tackle vigilante violence in a manner that is responsive to 
the insight that vigilantism is often a product of the dysfunctionality of society, 
not necessarily the inherent deviance of vigilantes themselves.196  
The state “relegitimation through exclusion” strategies outlined above 
have as their underlying premise that vigilante legitimation occurs at the 
expense of state power: that the best way for the state to reverse such 
                                            
194 S v Dikqacwi and others para 9. 
195 Bradford, et al. (2014) Regulation & Governance 262. 
196 See S v Dikqacwi and others para 7. 
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undermining of its authority is by exercising its ostensible monopoly on the 
use of coercive force by demonstrating its ability to deal effectively and fairly 
with those who act in contravention of its decree, including vigilantes.  
However, as has already been observed197 it is not necessarily helpful to 
perceive the relationship between vigilante and state legitimacy solely as a 
“zero-sum game”.  Would it not be preferable for the state somehow to 
appropriate positive vigilante crime-fighting energies, growing stronger itself at 
the same time as empowering vigilantes to become responsible rather than 
autonomous citizens 198  in the criminal justice sphere?  Exploring this 
possibility of a “plus-sum legitimacy game” where vigilantes and the state are 
concerned is a central theme of the following chapter. 
 
                                            
197 See § 6 1 above. 
198  See § 2 5 2 above and Johnston (2001) Urban Studies for more on the distinction between 
“responsible” and “autonomous” citizenship. 
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7  CHAPTER SEVEN: RELEGITIMATION THROUGH 
VIGILANTE INCLUSION 
 
7 1 The fallacy of a “zero-sum game” with respect to vigilante 
power 
The previous chapter came to the conclusion that the state might be 
wise to concede that sovereign crime control is indeed a myth.  State options 
for regaining legitimacy in the context of non-hegemonic security provision 
focused on the efficient provision of a narrower range of core law-enforcement 
services in a manner that would promote the ideals of procedural justice and 
be responsive to community demands.  Possible ways for the state to 
undermine the particularly potent “challenge to the state’s law and order 
mythology” 1  posed by vigilantism were also explored.  However, 
acknowledging vigilantes’ crime-fighting power entails recognising the reality 
of the state’s positioning as one of many players in the security market.  
Particular strategies whereby the formal justice sector might persuade the 
public to choose them in preference to the myriad of informal options were 
highlighted.  What will be considered in this chapter is why the state might opt 
to reassert its power by channelling vigilantes’ informal crime-fighting 
energies2 into more formal avenues of security provision in partnership with 
the state, and, if it chooses this option, whether it is possible for it to achieve 
its aim without sacrificing its commitment to safeguarding human rights.   
In contrast to the exclusionary strategies explored in chapter 6 that 
presuppose that vigilante empowerment occurs at the expense of state 
legitimacy, the inclusionary options canvassed here assume that empowering 
informal criminal justice agents may even help to enhance state legitimacy.  
This chapter first unpacks the notion of “multi-choice” policing.  It next 
considers the benefits and disadvantages of co-opting informal security 
                                            
1 Garland (1996) British Journal of Criminology 448. 
2 Johns Vigilantism: The Future of South Africa's Security? 15-16. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 300 
providers within state structures, and explains the need for appropriate 
safeguards for such an endeavour.  Two contrasting means of incorporating 
informal modes of justice provision are then identified, and their strengths and 
weaknesses critically evaluated.  Finally, the chapter considers the flip-side of 
the state assimilation of informal crime-fighting power, namely how important 
it is that the state should instil a society-wide recognition of the value of 
upholding human rights in a way that favours peaceful conflict resolution, 
ubuntu and human dignity. 
 
7 2 Accepting the “multi-choice”3 nature of policing  
Taking seriously the possibility of incorporating vigilantes into the state 
crime-fighting arsenal entails recognising that, notwithstanding their 
(theoretical) monopoly over the use of legitimate coercion, state criminal 
justice agents “have been rendered merely another player in the security 
market, reliant solely on their capacity to deliver a ‘competitive product’”.4  
This trend of the so-called “commodification of security” implies that citizens 
are not merely “clients” of the police, but are “customers” or “consumers” of 
the wider security industry, who shop around for the type of policing that 
satisfies their particular needs in the most efficient and reliable manner.5  In 
this regard, Baker emphasises the “fluidity” of policing in contemporary 
society: few people use public or private policing exclusively, moving instead 
“from the sphere of one security agency to another”.6   
From a Western, neoliberal perspective on security provision, where 
the underlying presumption is that each autonomous sovereign state 
                                            
3 This term is borrowed from Bruce Baker (e.g., Baker Multi-Choice Policing; Baker (2004) Society in 
Transition). 
4 Loader (1999) Sociology 377-378.  See also Steinberg Thin Blue 98; Seekings (1992) South African 
Review of Sociology 197; Baker (2004) Journal of Contemporary African Studies; B Baker & E 
Scheye “Multi-Layered Justice and Security Delivery in Post-Conflict and Fragile States” (2007) 7 
(4) Conflict, Security & Development 503; Abrahamsen & Williams (2007) International Relations. 
5 Abrahamsen & Williams (2007) International Relations 135; Baker (2004) Society in Transition 205; 
and Loader (1999) Sociology.  
6 Baker (2004) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 170. 
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exercises exclusive force over its own territory,7 diversification among security 
providers may be understood as one of the manifestations of a global 
inclination towards “devolution” or “privatisation” of state functions: Policing 
has been transformed from a “limited activity of government into a pervasive, 
dispersed mechanism of governance”.8  The trend of states decentralising or 
delegating their police competencies to civil society9 was noted in the context 
of the state strategy of “responsibilisation” discussed in § 4 2 3.  The idea of 
“governing at a distance”10 involves the state limiting its role to controlling the 
“steering” of security governance, while expanding those involved in its 
“rowing”.11  It must be noted that this neoliberal characterisation of “multi-
choice” policing is of doubtful accuracy in countries where the notion of the 
strong nation state is lacking since, as has already been argued,12 in such 
settings it is especially erroneous to assume that absolute state sovereignty – 
including a monopoly on the use of force – was ever more than a falsehood 
perpetuated by those in power.  Be that as it may, the reality today is that all 
citizens, wherever they live, have access to a “layered network of alternative 
and overlapping provi[ders] of security and justice”. 13    
It is submitted that nodal governance theory is a useful analytical 
model for understanding the multifaceted contemporary security landscape 
that is “cluttered with a multiplicity of state and non-state, commercial and 
informal organisations whose agendas, resources and operational methods 
often vary in the extreme”.14  This perspective deconstructs the state-centred 
conception of governance referred to above, preferring instead to recast the 
various groups associated with security as “interdependent and contiguous 
nodes which interact within a broader network”. 15   What is particularly 
significant about nodal theory is the insight that no “conceptual priority” should 
                                            
7 See C Shearing & J Wood “Nodal Governance, Democracy and the New 'Denizens'” (2003) 30 (3) 
Journal of Law and Society 400 401 for more on this “Westphalian model” of state sovereignty. 
8 Loader (2000) Social and Legal Studies 329. 
9 Wisler & Onwudiwe (2008) Police Quarterly 435. 
10 See Garland Culture of Control. 
11 L Johnston “From 'Pluralisation' to 'the Police Extended Family': Discourses on the Governance of 
Community Policing in Britain” (2003) 31 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 185 188. 
12 See § 3 5 2 2 above. 
13 Baker & Scheye (2007) Conflict, Security & Development 515.   
14 J R Martin “Informal Security Nodes and Force Capital” (2012) 23 (2) Policing and Society 145 146. 
15 146. 
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be given to any particular node: security governance is a dynamic and 
ongoing process, while the exact nature of such governance and the 
contribution of the various nodes to it are “empirically open questions”.16  
Shearing and Wood differentiate the wide array of nodes involved in 
contemporary security provision according to the sector in which they are 
involved.  Three sectors, namely the state, corporate or business and non-
governmental organisations encompass the formal nodes of security 
provision, while a fourth relates to informal security provision.17   
Clearly, particularly in the context of what Baker and Scheye term 
“post-conflict or fragile states”, it would be naïve to assume that the state is 
the dominant node within existing security networks, or even that these nodes 
within networks – whether formal and informal – are co-operative rather than 
competitive.18  It is apparent that while some of the nodes responsible for 
security provision fall within the ambit of the state or are at least nominally 
formally state-sanctioned and regulated (for example commercial private 
security firms and non-commercial formal neighbourhood watch schemes), 
others – including vigilante groups – are not.  
 
7 3 Appropriating vigilante power 
In this section it is asked whether it is possible to realise Schärf’s vision 
of vigilante movements being harnessed into a “productive, legal and mutually 
beneficial” collaboration with the state, 19  and the pros and cons of 
appropriating various aspects of vigilantes’ crime-fighting power are explored.  
 
                                            
16 Shearing & Wood (2003) Journal of Law and Society 404. 
17 405.  For more information on nodal governance theory, in particular the role of informal security 
nodes, see Martin (2012) Policing and Society.  See also Venugopal (2015) Economy and Society 
170 for more on the link between “deep” neoliberalism, governmentality and nodal governance. 
18 Baker & Scheye (2007) Conflict, Security & Development. 
19 Schärf (2001) IDS Bulletin 80. 
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7 3 1 Benefits of incorporating vigilante power 
It may be in the state’s best interests to contemplate a “legitimate 
coexistence”20 with vigilantes for a variety of reasons. 
First, considering what was said earlier about the prohibitive cost of 
access to formal justice,21 it makes sense for the state to seek to co-opt “what 
enjoys popular support and legitimacy, and is appropriate in a setting of 
poverty”.22  Rather than continuing to flog the dead horse of maintaining a 
monopoly of criminal justice provision, this allows the state to accept that “the 
state police are marginal in particular contexts and geographic spaces”23 and 
opt to actively encourage and learn from non-state ways of social ordering 
instead.  Such grass-roots alternatives usually have a high degree of local 
ownership and tend to provide more effective solutions to everyday security 
problems than “‘inorganic, top-down’’ state interventions”.24 
Second, by making vigilantes “legitimate counter-partners”25 the state 
is able to extend its reach by monitoring groups that were formerly seemingly 
beyond its sphere of influence.  If informal justice initiatives are legitimised 
under law there is the potential for vigilante activity to be subjected to more 
effective scrutiny and to be held accountable for any failure to abide by 
agreed-upon norms and standards.26  For example, Meagher argues that the 
state should appropriate the “energy and integrity” of successful private 
security initiatives by bringing such initiatives under the control of the formal 
legal framework, because not doing so risks leaving them “to spin out of 
control or be derailed by opportunistic politicians”.27  Similarly, Schärf is of the 
view that having good working relationships and/or partnerships between 
police and informal criminal justice structures makes it more likely that the 
state would be able to keep such structures in in check so as to curtail 
                                            
20 Schärf & Nina The Other Law 13. 
21 See § 4 2 2 above. 
22 Baker (2007) Acta Juridica 191. 
23 Baker & Scheye (2007) Conflict, Security & Development 515. 
24 Marks, et al. (2009) Police Practice and Research 151. 
25 Buur Outsourcing the Sovereign: Local Justice and Violence in Port Elizabeth 29. 
26 For similar arguments, see Yanay (1993) Journal of Public Policy 394; Rosenbaum & Sederberg 
“Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence” in Vigilante Politics 20. 
27 Meagher (2007) Journal of Modern African Studies 112. 
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possible human rights abuses. 28   Holding non-state security providers to 
account in an efficient manner may enable the state to garner greater 
legitimacy, 29  since the state is being seen to demonstrate its capacity to 
facilitate effective security provision in a manner that is in line with its 
constitutionally-based mandate.  Concrete suggestions as to how the state 
might use its “extended capacity for action and influence” to induce vigilante 
groups to comply with basic human rights values are outlined from § 7 4 
below. 
Third, the contention that the outsourcing of “everyday policing” is 
indicative of the state’s weakness is not necessarily accurate.  On the 
contrary; in practical terms, co-opting vigilante power would only be a viable 
option in “frontier” areas where state sovereignty was never effectively 
realised in any event.  It may be argued that incorporation would at least 
empower marginalised communities to develop low-cost forms of state-
sanctioned policing where little to no state-monitored policing occurred 
before.30  Thus there is some weight to Fourchard’s claim that integrating 
former vigilante operations as part of state community policing schemes, for 
example, is “less of a challenge to state sovereignty than an aspect of the 
dynamic process of state formation”.31   
On the assumption that legitimating already-existing informal crime-
fighting bodies could enable the state to benefit vicariously from community-
supported vigilante groups’ popular mandate, a fourth, more cynical, benefit of 
vigilante incorporation is that assimilating dissenting (vigilante) voices is an 
effective means of defusing resistance to the state.32  Anthropologist Lévi-
Strauss observes that some societies are cannibalistic in that they “regard the 
absorption of certain individuals possessing dangerous powers as the only 
                                            
28 W Schärf “Policy Options on Community Justice” in W Schärf and D Nina (eds) The Other Law: 
Non-State Ordering in South Africa (2001) 53. 
29 Baker & Scheye (2007) Conflict, Security & Development 520. 
30 Hansen & Stepputat (2006) Annual Review of Anthropology 308. 
31 L Fourchard “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships” (2011) 110 
(441) African Affairs 607 627. 
32 R Coleman, J Sim & D Whyte “Power, Politics and Partnerships: The State of Crime Prevention on 
Merseyside” in G Hughes and A Edwards (eds) Crime Control and Community: The New Politics of 
Public Safety (2002) 101. 
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means of neutralizing those powers and even turning them to advantage”.33  
Nina argues that incorporating popular justice makes it possible for the state 
to colonise and counteract “people’s power” initiatives that might otherwise 
pose a threat to state authority.34  Similarly, mobilising forms of community 
justice such as vigilantism may merely be a pretext for the state to exercise 
more invasive and far-reaching social control in the name of crime 
prevention.35  This may be beneficial to the state, perhaps, but many citizens 
might prefer a more hands-off approach.  
 
7 3 2 Difficulties with incorporating vigilante power 
Despite the potential benefits, attempts to forge a working relationship 
between state and non-state policing may also have significant 
disadvantages. 
First, as was noted in chapter 4, state “responsibilisation” may 
inadvertently trigger vigilantism.  Analysing anti-paedophile vigilantism in 
Portsmouth, Evans argues that the state “language of empowerment, 
responsibility and active citizenship” may be “mentally burdensome” for 
vulnerable and ill-resourced communities, making them more susceptible to 
participating in vigilantism.36   Even where the state acts in good faith in 
attempting to incorporate informal justice structures into the formal domain, 
owing to the thin line between legitimate citizen action and vigilantism37 newly-
minted “responsible citizenship” initiatives may all too easily revert to, or 
degenerate into, chaotic “autonomous citizenship”.38  For this reason, Bénit-
                                            
33 Quoted in J Young The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity 
(1999) 56. 
34 Nina Re-Thinking Popular Justice 15; 79. 
35 Johns Vigilantism: The Future of South Africa's Security?.  
36 Evans (2003) Theoretical Criminology 180-182.  In this vein, Brown Undoing the Demos 134 also 
notes that “responsibilized individuals [may be] required to provide [public goods such as security 
provision] for themselves in the context of powers and contingencies radically limiting their ability to 
do so.” 
37 Sharp, et al. (2008) Policing and Society 248. 
38 For more on the distinction between responsible and autonomous citizenship, see Johnston Rebirth of 
Private Policing; Johnston “Private Policing, Vigilance and Vigilantism: Commercialisation and 
Citizenship and Crime Prevention Strategies” in Preventing Crime and Disorder: Targeting 
Strategies and Responsibilities and § 2 5 2 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 306 
Gbaffou condemns government efforts to urge “‘communities’ to (re)build and 
implement their own social order”, interpreting initiatives such as the public 
enhancement of street patrols as “a cynical encouragement of vigilantism”.39  
She correctly notes that the state attitude towards vigilantism is plagued by 
“very ambiguous discourse”: 40  While vigilantism is publically condemned, 
township residents are nevertheless being exhorted to implement their own 
security measures based on locally-defined social norms that frequently 
undermine basic human rights.  The state responsibilisation strategy thus 
allows scope for seemingly state-authorised forms of community control 
(including vigilantism) to develop in poorer neighbourhoods.41 
Second, co-opting vigilantes holds the danger that “legitimated” 
vigilantes will simply continue acting as they have all along, freely engaging in 
activities involving excessive force and intimidation under the guise that it is 
now state-sanctioned.  The Khayelitsha Commission report cites witnesses 
who mentioned that (presumably state-sanctioned) community patrols had 
assaulted people perceived to be criminals, remarking that “there is often a 
fine line between a community system aimed at promoting safety and 
security, and forms of vengeance attacks”. 42   Buur’s 43  description of the 
Amadlozi vigilante group vividly demonstrates that merely labelling a former 
vigilante group a CPF does not automatically alter its violent character.  Even 
though it was accepted as a formal structure, Amadlozi did not stop using 
force; it now merely had to be careful to use force in what was perceived to be 
an “acceptable” manner – i.e., in such a way that no charges could be laid 
against its members by victims.  What the Amadlozi CPF viewed as “minimal 
force”44 – compelling suspects to stand on their heads for long periods of time, 
assaulting them on body parts where marks are not left, or letting suspects 
beat each other up – is manifestly and unacceptably violent.  Fourchard’s 
account of an incident during which a group of 50 NW members severely beat 
                                            
39 Bénit-Gbaffou (2008) Journal of Southern African Studies 102. 
40 106. 
41 Bénit-Gbaffou (2006) Urban Forum 311; Bénit-Gbaffou (2008) Journal of Southern African Studies 
106. 
42 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 387. 
43  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 212-215. 
44 214. 
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a man suspected of raping his cousin while he was in a police van45 likewise 
supports the contention that being state-sanctioned does not necessarily 
divest non-state security organisations of their violent impulses.   Numerous 
other cautionary tales may be cited relating to grassroots crime-prevention 
groups that were initially operated within the parameters of the law, but whose 
increasingly violent tactics estranged them from their former “partners”, 
transforming them from crime-fighters to criminals in the eyes of the 
authorities.46  Still others were backed by the state at the outset (oddly often 
despite authorities being aware of their unorthodox crime-fighting methods!), 
but the state was forced to break ties with them at a later stage due to their 
indiscriminate and extreme use of violence, resulting in loss of both state 
credibility and public confidence.47   
Third, quite apart from the issue of vigilante groups becoming more 
punitive, radical or corrupt over time, the inherent mutability that characterises 
so much vigilantism makes negotiated tactical alliances between vigilante 
groups and the state very challenging – even “politically dangerous”.48  Nina’s 
pessimistic view is that even if manifestations of popular justice can somehow 
                                            
45 Fourchard (2011) African Affairs 624. 
46 An example is PAGAD, which transformed over a period of five years from being a bona fide crime-
fighting organisation that developed within the Neighbourhood Watch tradition and commanded 
widespread community support to a marginal group with little backing and a radical and increasingly 
violent agenda, labelled by the government as “urban terrorists” who were “firmly part of the [crime] 
problem” (Monaghan (2004) Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 8; also Fourchard (2011) 
African Affairs 617; Gottschalk Vigilantism v. the State: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of Pagad, 
1996-2000 and Dixon & Johns Gangs, Pagad and the State). 
47  A first example of this trajectory is vigilante group Mapogo A Mathamaga.  Following initial 
government ambiguity, Mapogo was invited to join the CPFs.  When this did not succeed, the 
government opted to work with Mapogo outside the structures of the CPFs, which also failed due to 
the Mapogo leadership’s continued endorsement of violent methods.  Von Schnitzler remarks, 
“Wavering between trying to confront and trying to co-opt Mapogo, the government has failed in 
both strategies.” (Von Schnizler, et al. Guardian or Gangster?  Mapogo A Mathamaga: A Case 
Study 25).  A second case study is the Bakassi Boys of Nigeria. In the beginning, no government 
action was taken to rein them in, despite knowledge of their extremely violent methods.  On the 
contrary, local politicians “seized on their popularity, providing them with legitimacy and support.” 
(Smith A Culture of Corruption 170).  State governors offered them official backing, giving them 
formal names, funding, vehicles and political cover.  Popular sentiment gradually changed towards 
the Bakassi Boys owing to the growing realisation that the Bakassi Boys “served the interests of 
politicians and used their power to exploit rather than rescue the public”.  Their popular support was 
eroded as they collaborated with politicians, became available as thugs for hire and extorted from the 
very public they were supposed to protect: “They became the criminals they were supposed to fight.”  
Eventually they were banned by the federal government (187-188; see also Meagher (2007) Journal 
of Modern African Studies and Baker (2002) Journal of Contemporary African Studies).   
48 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 35; 67-68. 
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be incorporated into the state apparatus or become institutionalised, new 
extra-legal forms will simply emerge:  
“Popular justice is a continuum which tends to reproduce itself out 
of the form that regulates it.  It is … a ‘fraction of a second’.  
Popular justice never ends, it simply transforms itself and re-
emerges in a different form with a different content.”49 
A fourth concern regarding vigilante incorporation relates to police 
complicity in vigilantism.  In contrast to the formal denunciation of vigilantism 
by the state, it is often not only the vigilantes themselves but also certain 
formal criminal justice agents who regard vigilantes’ violent conduct as a 
“locally accepted exception from the Constitution”.50  Jensen quotes a local 
police station commander in Nkomazi who admits to turning a blind eye to 
vigilante beatings “for the sake of crime”,51 and justifies her approach on the 
basis that very few complaints were received about vigilante violence.  
Clearly, what she regards as decisive is not whether excessive violence is 
used, but whether its use remains invisible in the official statistics of the 
police; if they do not officially “see” the violence, police appear to view 
themselves as absolved of the duty of dealing with vigilante excesses.52  The 
NW beating of a suspected rapist in a police van before he was handed over 
to police, recounted earlier,53 has a similar dynamic.  Fourchard observes that 
there appeared to be tacit agreement between the police and NW members 
concerning the need for the beating, and the violence therefore posed no 
challenge to the state’s authority.54  Whether or not Fourchard is correct in his 
view that the state’s authority is not threatened by such incidents, criminal 
justice agents who deliberately overlook acts of vigilantism are making 
themselves complicit in vigilantes’ use of violent crime-fighting techniques on 
                                            
49 Nina Re-Thinking Popular Justice 78. 
50  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 215. 
51 Presumably she means “prevention of crime” (Jensen “Through the Lens of Crime: Land Claims and 
the Contestations of Citizenship on the Frontier of the South African State” in The Security-
Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in Southern Africa 205). 
52 205. 
53 See above and Fourchard (2011) African Affairs 624. 
54 624. 
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the unsound basis that doing so serves the aim of bringing more criminals to 
book.   
Under the guise of community empowerment, such state agents may 
also actively co-opt vigilantes to do their “dirty work” for them.  A state that is 
under pressure to be seen to respect human rights may skirt around its 
democratic obligations by covertly encouraging vigilante violence, since 
vigilantes’ excessive use of force achieves a crime-fighting aim shared by 
formal and informal justice agents alike.  According to Buur, such informal 
groups “are not outside the law and the state as such, but act as the ‘extra’ 
element in policing that makes it possible to combat crime”.55  The state, 
which is not officially permitted to realise its crime-fighting objectives by using 
methods that violate human rights, “creates a social-political space of force 
ruled by law beyond the law”56 where vigilantes are free to use force against 
state enemies in a space outside the normal judicial order.  Buur sees this is a 
“nice and neat” way for the state to maintain the illusion that it adheres to a 
human rights credo while in effect suspending the rule of law by “outsourcing 
the sovereign power of the state” to vigilantes.57  The “cop-out”(!) attitude of 
police agents who tolerate or encourage human rights abuses, deeming 
themselves by so doing to be somehow serving the greater interests of 
justice, is undesirable in the extreme.  It not only serves to endorse and 
legitimate vigilante violence, but also clearly undermines the state’s formal 
self-legitimated identity as human rights guarantor. 
Finally, because of vigilantes’ self-admitted less-than-stellar human 
rights record, vigilante incorporation can only take place if vigilante groupings 
are indeed “reformable”58 – i.e., if they acknowledge the need to reform and 
are prepared to agree to work towards preserving law and order in a manner 
that is compatible with state-endorsed human rights-based norms and 
                                            
55  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 215. 
56  N Gazit “State-sponsored Vigilantism: Jewish Settlers’ Violence in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories” (2015) 49 (3) Sociology 438 441; see also Agamben Homo Sacer. 
57  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 215. 
58 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 66. 
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standards.  The contentious issue of state regulation of informal criminal 
justice providers is considered next. 
 
7 3 3 Regulating vigilante power 
It has been argued thus far that the state’s monopoly on policing 
cannot be realised in practice.  At most, public providers of criminal justice 
can hope to perform their core functions reasonably effectively and in a 
manner that is conducive to due process while avoiding a resort to “punitive 
and highly interventionist public policing”.59  Beyond the formal justice system 
exists a myriad of non-state actors involved in everyday policing processes.  If 
the state is willing to coexist with other security providers in a human rights 
milieu, there is no doubt that it needs to ensure that all providers – including 
formal ones – abide by certain norms and standards when delivering security 
services.60 
The core policy issue regarding vigilante incorporation is whether it is 
possible to address the issues relating to non-compliance with basic human 
rights standards that plague non-state security and justice providers such as 
                                            
59 Marks & Wood (2010) Theoretical Criminology 313. 
60 The state does indeed attempt to regulate some categories of private policing services.  In South 
Africa, the private security industry is estimated to be more than 2.5 times larger than the state police 
force (for statistics, see K Wilkinson “Does SA have the Largest Private Security Industry in the 
World?” (2015-01-23) Africa Check <https://africacheck.org/reports/does-sa-have-the-largest-
private-security-industry-in-the-world/> (2015-09-14)).  Private security is regulated by the Private 
Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 (“PSIRA”). In its preamble, PSIRA declares its purpose 
to be “to achieve and maintain a trustworthy and legitimate private security industry which acts in 
terms of the principles contained in the Constitution and other applicable law, [which] is capable of 
ensuring that there is greater safety and security in the country”.  In order to achieve this aim, those 
who wish to be remunerated for providing security services are obliged to register formally as 
security service providers in terms of the PSIRA.  Once registered, their activities are monitored by 
the Private Security Regulatory Authority, a body that is tasked inter alia with ensuring that security 
services are provided professionally, transparently, accountably, equitably, accessibly, efficiently, 
responsibly, trustworthily, fairly, objectively and timeously (see ss 3(c), (e), (g) and (i)).  Registered 
security service providers who fail to comply with the security industry’s Code of Conduct (Code of 
Conduct for Security Service Providers vol 450 no 241986 s 25-29) may have their registration 
suspended or withdrawn; they are also deemed guilty of a criminal offence.  Whether private security 
providers abide by the lofty aims of PSIRA, and whether its Code of Conduct is effectively enforced 
in practice, are matters that are beyond the scope of the present study.  What is certain is that 
vigilante activities do not fall under the auspices of the PSIRA: unlike their profit-making 
counterparts in the private security industry, they do not qualify to register.  If the state wished to 
incorporate them officially, separate regulation would be required. 
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vigilante groups.61  Can vigilante-type acts indeed take place within an agreed 
framework set by the state?62  It is often assumed that since vigilantes use 
heavy-handed, over-zealous 63  and degrading tactics and lack democratic 
accountability,64 assimilation should not even be attempted because it would 
inevitably amount to condoning human rights abuses.  Even those who view 
plural policing as a potential solution to law and order issues, like Baker, do 
not advocate a “blanket acceptance of all providers”.65  Nevertheless, Baker 
and Scheye argue that the most important consideration in deciding whether 
groups are worthy of supporting and partnering with is not their poor past 
democratic record, but whether they are willing to engage in reform.  Baker 
and Scheye strongly advocate negotiating tactical alliances66 with non-state 
partners wherever possible, stating: 
 “[T]here can be no generalised assumption that accountability 
and protection of human rights is best achieved through state 
systems.  It may, in fact, be the case that non-state systems, as 
they are closest to their clients, more ‘people-centred’, and 
‘locally-owned’ may be more amenable to the preservation of 
human rights and the delivery of an accountable service, for they 
more accurately reflect local beliefs and are regarded by local 
people to be more legitimate.”67  
They suggest that even groups with little accountability, such as 
vigilantes, are “rarely … unwilling in principle to improve”68 and are indeed 
potentially “reformable”.  And since the point of security sector reform is 
precisely to improve what is below standard, then if there is willingness to 
reform, change is possible.69  There can thus be no objection in principle to 
attempting to assimilate vigilantes within a state-legitimated criminal justice 
                                            
61 Baker & Scheye (2007) Conflict, Security & Development 517. 
62 Schärf & Nina The Other Law 2. 
63 Marks & Wood (2010) Theoretical Criminology 313. 
64 Loader (2000) Social and Legal Studies 332. 
65 Baker (2004) Society in Transition 220. 
66 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 35. 
67 Baker & Scheye (2007) Conflict, Security & Development 517. 
68 517; 523. 
69 517. 
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framework – and, as argued earlier,70 successful incorporation could hold 
significant advantages for the state. 
Now that the issue of whether vigilante incorporation is desirable from 
a policy perspective has been addressed, the more practical consideration of 
what oversight of such reform might entail must be canvassed.  As regards 
the role of the state, Baker and Scheye are of the view that it needs to: 
“license, vet, monitor and regulate justice and security services delivery”; to 
ensure the accessibility of all to public goods, including security provision; to 
protect and preserve human rights; and to establish the parameters within 
which non-state justice and security are provided.71  This proposal seems to 
amount to an uncanny mirroring of the objectives of PSIRA.72  It would seem 
that the necessary implication, then, is that only fixed and relatively stable 
private security groupings – albeit also those operating without profit motives 
– would be capable of being legitimated by the state.  This interpretation is 
bolstered by the proposed requirement that informal policing groups be 
licensed.  The licensing and vetting of all non-state policing partners so that 
supervision is possible seems unlikely to be realised in practice, however.  It 
is especially doubtful that spontaneous or once-off vigilante groups could be 
licensed, even if their members were in theory amenable to incorporation.  
The inevitable inference seems to be that spontaneous vigilante groups 
simply fall into the category of private security providers that are incapable of 
being accepted as (long-term) state partners.  At the very least, it is clear that 
the regulation of informal justice to ensure compatibility with human rights 
values is no straightforward task.  
Be that as it may, those in favour of the incorporation of informal 
policing are (rightly) unanimous in their view that monitoring is crucial to 
ensure that “popular punitiveness is not the order of the day” but that 
groupings are instead steered in the direction of moderate, human rights 
oriented policing” based on shared goals. 73   Clearly, an indispensable 
component of any state regulation would have to be some type of mechanism 
                                            
70 At § 7 3 1 above. 
71 Baker & Scheye (2007) Conflict, Security & Development 520. 
72 See chapter 7 n 60 above. 
73 Marks & Wood (2010) Theoretical Criminology 313; 315. 
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for ensuring accountability.  According to Baker, a minimum requirement is an 
“overarching framework of principles and supervision and an appeal process 
to reduce inconsistencies and poor performance”. 74   This supervision 
prerequisite presents a huge impediment to formalising informal justice.  
Accountability needs to be monitored, and this requires obtaining clarity about 
who is responsible for providing informal security services, as well as the 
resources and political will to supervise them.   
Tellingly, beyond recognising the desirability of reforming popular 
justice so that state and non-state security providers are “in the policing trade 
together”, 75  even among those advocating state appropriation of vigilante 
power there is unsatisfyingly little detail concerning the practical 
implementation or financial sustainability of the reform of informal policing 
groups.  Baker blithely suggests that the state could form varying partnerships 
and associations with non-state actors and civil society organisations76 to 
implement a “national strategy of law and order that integrates, regulates, 
mobilises and empowers all those willing to preserve law and order in an 
acceptable manner”,77 but is largely silent on exactly how to achieve this 
commendable aim.   
Marks and Wood’s proposals are slightly more concrete.  Their view is 
that regulation of the non-state security sector should be anchored at local 
community level “where harms are experienced most acutely”, rather than via 
a “centralized policing apparatus”.78  They suggest the establishment of local 
coordinating bodies that, together with the communities they are responsible 
for, could identify and “map” both security problems and the resources (state 
and non-state) that could address them.  Such coordinating bodies could fall 
under the auspices of the local government and be tasked with “facilitat[ing] a 
process of developing a set of principles that will guide the actions and 
interventions of all policing actors. … These bodies would become, in a 
                                            
74 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 67. 
75 Marks & Wood (2010) Theoretical Criminology 317. 
76 Baker & Scheye (2007) Conflict, Security & Development 519. 
77 Baker (2004) Society in Transition 220. 
78 Marks & Wood (2010) Theoretical Criminology 323. 
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sense, hubs of accountability and knowledge-sharing.”79  Their proposal is 
worryingly reminiscent of the ideals embodied by community policing, outlined 
below in § 7 4 1.  For various reasons, community policing has hardly been a 
resounding success.80  Whether Marks and Wood’s suggested intervention is 
to be a local-government-initiated add-on to community policing or a 
replacement for it, the glaring objection is that it is surely unrealistic to expect 
the poorly-resourced sphere of local government, that is not even capable of 
meeting its basic crime-fighting obligations, to be able to form effective 
partnerships with non-state groupings, let alone actively monitor and regulate 
them on an ongoing basis once they are in existence.   
A cynical but pragmatic conclusion may well be that proper – 
legitimated, accountable, human-rights-based – vigilante incorporation is an 
indulgence that a cash-strapped state can ill afford, either economically or as 
a means of enhancing its legitimacy.  Perhaps the only form of incorporation 
of vigilante groups that is likely to happen often in practice is the state’s de 
facto outsourcing of its popular sovereignty to the community whereby its 
agents implicitly condone or encourage acts of vigilantism.81   
 
7 4 State relegitimation through incorporation: practical examples  
In addition to its advantages, some of the many likely challenges of 
bringing informal modes of security provision under the auspices of formal 
state justice have been highlighted.  Before rejecting the option of vigilante 
incorporation out of hand as unfeasible, however, it may be useful to examine 
some existing initiatives aimed at achieving state-community criminal justice 
partnerships to see whether these could potentially be adapted to 
accommodate the appropriation of vigilante power.  Two options for co-opting 
vigilantes (and, indeed, other community members too) within the criminal 
justice system are highlighted below.  While they are by no means the only 
                                            
79 323-324. 
80 See § 0 below. 
81  Buur “The Sovereign Outsourced” in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World 211. 
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viable alternatives, they have been chosen because they represent how non-
state agents could be incorporated to help perform each of the two main 
functions of the criminal justice system, namely policing and the adjudication 
of disputes.   
The first option discussed is community policing (also called 
community-oriented policing or COP).   COP entails formal criminal justice 
agents (the police) and community members working together to find 
solutions to local crime and disorder concerns. The second option – 
restorative justice – involves community members helping to deal with the 
aftermath of deviant or criminal conduct in order to facilitate the repair of 
ruptured relationships without blame or retribution.  The objective of this 
section is to establish whether, through using COP and/or restorative justice-
based dispute resolution and peace-making, the state could indeed enhance 
its moral authority and legitimacy by giving away its (traditionally exclusive) 
policing and adjudication powers to those actually involved in the relevant 
criminal conflicts, including (potential) vigilantes.   
 
7 4 1 A brief introduction to COP, CPFs and NWs  
The first strategy whereby vigilantes could conceivably be co-opted as 
policing partners is COP.  COP’s five core elements are service orientation; 
partnership; problem-solving; empowerment and accountability. 82   It is an 
approach that focuses on three main aspects of policing, namely problem-
solving policing, CPFs and NW schemes. 83   The latter two, with their 
emphasis on the active involvement of community members, may offer 
opportunities for vigilante incorporation, so they merit further discussion.   
CPFs are one of the most common ways of promoting the concept of 
COP.  In South Africa, the first reference to COP as the prescribed 
methodology for policing is contained in the Interim Constitution, where 
                                            
82 E Pelser The Challenges of Community Policing in South Africa (1999) 4. This analysis was done in 
terms of the 1997 South African Community Policing Police Framework and Guidelines. 
83 Brogden (2005) Police Quarterly. 
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section 221 provides for CPFs in respect of police stations, and notes that 
their functions include: 
(a) “the promotion of accountability of the [Police] Service to 
local communities and co-operation of communities with 
the Service; 
(b) the monitoring of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Service; 
(c) advising the Service regarding local policing priorities; 
(d) the evaluation of the provision of visible police services, 
including- 
(i) the provision, siting and staffing of police stations; 
(ii) the reception and processing of complaints and charges; 
(iii) the provision of protective services at gatherings; 
(iv) the patrolling of residential and business areas; and 
(v) the prosecution of offenders; and 
(e) requesting enquiries into policing matters in the locality 
concerned.”84 
The political prerogative informing community policing is clearly one of 
democratic accountability – to democratise and legitimise the police by 
enhancing oversight and accountability generally, and particularly by 
enhancing interaction, consultation and accountability at local level.85  This 
strategy was further codified in the South African Police Services Act 68 of 
1995 (“SAPS Act”).  According to section 18 of the SAPS Act, SAPS must:  
“liaise with the community through community police forums and 
area and provincial community boards … with a view to – 
(a) establishing and maintaining a partnership between the 
community and the [Police] Service; 
(b) promoting communication between the Service and the 
community; 
                                            
84 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 s 221(2). 
85 Pelser The Challenges of Community Policing in South Africa 3-4. 
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(c) promoting co-operation between the Service and the 
community in fulfilling the needs of the community 
regarding policing; 
(d) improving the rendering of police services to the community 
at national, provincial, area and local levels; 
(e) improving transparency in the Service and accountability of 
the Service to the community; and 
(f) promoting joint problem identification and problem-solving 
by the Service and the community.”86 
The Act also stipulates that the responsibility for establishing CPFs at 
provincial police stations lies with the Provincial Police Commissioner, who 
must ensure that CPFs are “broadly representative of the community”, with 
SAPS members also being represented.87  CPFs are central to the COP 
endeavour, since they are seen as fundamental to building relations between 
the police and the communities they serve,88 ideally providing a means for 
police and community representatives and organisations to work together 
“without mistrust and antagonism”.89  
The other aspect of COP that has practical implications for vigilantism 
is the establishment of NW schemes.  NWs are actually a grassroots 
“subcategory” of CPFs in that CPFs are developed “from the bottom up”, 
starting with street committees that form NWs, then sector forums (or sub-
forums), followed by the CPF for each station precinct.90  NW activities may 
include patrolling, conducting crime-awareness campaigns and gathering 
crime-related information, but NW members’ legal rights are the same as 
those of ordinary private citizens.91  Their right to arrest suspects without a 
                                            
86 South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 s 18. 
87 S 19. 
88 Anonymous Civilian Secretariat for Police's Green Paper on Policing (2013) 37. 
89 Mr Hanif, former chairperson of the Western Cape Community Policing Board, quoted in O’Regan 
& Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 406. 
90 See the testimony of the Chair of the Provincial CPF Board at 126. 
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warrant is limited, and following the arrest the suspect must be handed over to 
police as soon as possible.92 
NWs may be legislatively regulated.  For instance, the Western Cape 
Community Safety Act93 provides for the accreditation and support of NWs.  A 
NW is described as a voluntary organisation that operates not for gain with 
“the purpose of safeguarding its members, their immovable and other property 
against crime and other safety concerns in the area where the organisation or 
association operates”94 and one of the conditions for accreditation is that it co-
operates with the area’s CPF.95  If the prescribed criteria for accreditation are 
fulfilled, a NW may obtain “funding, training or resources” from provincial 
government.96  It is interesting to note that the remit of NWs explicitly includes 
acting to safeguard “other [by implication non-criminal] safety concerns”.  
These would presumably overlap with what were defined as instances of first-
order dissonance in chapter 4, namely forms of uncriminalised social and 
moral deviance.  The implications of this will be considered shortly, but it is 
first useful to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of COP.   
 
  
                                            
92 See the Criminal Procedure Act s 42, where it is stipulated:  
(1) Any private person may without warrant arrest any person- 
(a) who commits or attempts to commit in his presence or whom he reasonably suspects of 
having committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1; 
(b) whom he reasonably believes to have committed any offence and to be escaping from and to 
be freshly pursued by a person whom such private person reasonably believes to have 
authority to arrest that person for that offence; 
(c) whom he is by any law authorized to arrest without warrant in respect of any offence 
specified in that law; 
(d) whom he sees engaged in an affray. 
(2) Any private person who may without warrant arrest any person under subsection (1) (a) may 
forthwith pursue that person, and any other private person to whom the purpose of the pursuit 
has been made known, may join and assist therein. 
(3) The owner, lawful occupier or person in charge of property on or in respect of which any person 
is found committing any offence, and any person authorized thereto by such owner, occupier or 
person in charge, may without warrant arrest the person so found.” 
93 Western Cape Community Safety Act 3 of 2013. 
94 S 6(1)(a) and (c). 
95 S 6(5)(e). 
96 S 6(8). 
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7 4 2 Critique of COP 
The idea behind COP is that policing is “everybody’s business”, with 
state police and communities needing to work together in partnership to 
enable policing to reflect local needs.97  If successful, COP may enhance 
state legitimacy, since it provides communities with a “voice and sense of 
control over the police”98 and promotes a sense of shared values between 
citizens and police based on principles of transparency and inclusivity.  COP 
is aimed at instilling an aspect of “democratic deepening”, since it 
acknowledges the need for democratic structures such as the police to be 
open and accountable.  Its implementation is a “conscious recognition of the 
interaction between political democracy and the development of grassroots 
social institutions that would hold the state to account”. 99   Policing in 
partnership with the community could also have the benefit of overcoming the 
historical mistrust towards and suspicion of the police that is the legacy of 
many years of “violent, corrupt and indifferent policing”. 100   It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that the policy shift from a philosophy of authoritarian 
policing to COP is ostensibly keenly promoted in government policing circles 
in South Africa.  For example, the 2013 Green Paper on Policing emphasises 
that “policing is not something done to people, but rather … something that is 
done with people” and pays lip service to the importance of “a community-
oriented approach to policing … grounded in a social contract between the 
police and the communities they serve.”101  
However, South African community policing in practice has been 
subject to robust criticism.  Brogden’s sceptical view is the “[a]lthough COP 
might be popular in local rhetoric, delivery of it had little actual substance.”102   
There are various reasons for this. 
  First, its objectives are hampered in settings such as South Africa 
where “[a]ffective and democratic links between police and citizen are fragile 
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and contingent”103 since the underlying premise of COP – namely that well-
established links between police and a significant proportion of the population 
already exist – is absent.  Because it failed to take into account “indigenous 
practices and forms of legitimacy”, argues Brogden, importation of the Anglo-
American notion of COP into a transitional society such as South Africa as the 
cure-all for local crime crises has been a “dramatic, well-funded failure”.104  In 
his view, the failure of COP is not simply due to ineffective implementation, 
but because COP, as borrowed from the West, is simply largely irrelevant to 
most African societies.  Comaroff and Comaroff concur, being of the view that 
community policing, while being “invoked as a panacea and a prescription in a 
disordered, violent world … has little purchase on the hard-edged realities of 
the new South Africa”.105  
A second problem with COP, highlighted by Marks et al, is that while a 
community policing narrative remains central to SAPS policy documents and 
training programmes, it has failed to realise its promise of achieving true 
police-citizen partnerships.  Instead, it has “become focused almost entirely 
on ways of mobilizing non-state actors to legitimize and increase the 
effectiveness of the police” rather than being centred on creating horizontal 
and vertical matrixes between the police and non-state groupings with the aim 
of having as many security resources and capacities as possible joining 
forces to make communities safer. 106  In practice, despite rhetoric to the 
contrary, police do not seem to have the institutional capacity or political will to 
engage in the innovation needed to properly “empower” communities.107  COP 
– chiefly embodied in practice by CPFs – is largely viewed as a symbolic 
“add-on” to the “other” responsibilities of the police rather than a fundamental 
transformation in how policing is done.108  This insight was confirmed in the 
Khayelitsha Commission report, where it is stated that “the Commission did 
not get the sense from the individual station commanders that they found their 
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relationships with CPFs to be deeply valuable for the project of community 
policing”.109  Certainly, the commissioners’ overall impression of the workings 
of the CPFs in Khayelitsha was not positive.  Although those who had dealt 
with CPFs described them as helpful, not even half of survey respondents had 
heard of CPFs, so this number was less than 10% of the total surveyed.110  
CPF members who testified: 
“generally painted a picture of organisations whose effectiveness 
fluctuates, dependent in part on who are the members of the CPF 
at any given moment, on the relationship with the SAPS 
leadership at the relevant police station and available 
resources”.111   
Political contestation,112 lack of resources and unrealistic expectations 
regarding the role of CPFs also supported the Commission’s conclusion that 
CPFs “have not played a significant role in building good relations between 
SAPS and the community in Khayelitsha”.113  
Third, the concept of “community” in the COP context is also 
contentious.  Pelser disputes whether it is even possible to identify true 
“communities” with the necessary resources and social capital to implement 
COP successfully in South Africa’s “highly politicised, divided, hostile and 
fragmented” townships114 – and in Brogden’s opinion, COP efforts seem to 
“have simply reinforced schism rather than harmony”.115  The settings where 
COP tends to be most successful are the “homogeneous, common-interest, 
wealthy suburbs where it is least needed”.116  In South Africa, middle-class 
(often white) communities tend to be better able to mobilise the necessary 
skills and resources resulting in productive partnerships with the police,117 
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112 According to Fourchard, most CPF chairs in the Western Cape are either DA or ANC activists 
(Fourchard (2011) African Affairs 614). 
113 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 411. 
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while in the “heterogeneous, lower class urban context where it is most 
needed”118 the move to rally the community to work with the police has been 
largely ineffective.  
Fourth, even if they are successfully formed, Kirsch argues that CPFs 
may struggle to gain public acceptance and legitimacy.  This is because, in 
practice, the principles of inclusiveness and transparency underlying the COP 
model may ironically serve to undermine CPFs’ visible effectiveness in crime 
prevention, and force them to resort to clandestine tactics to achieve results.  
Kirsch recounts an instance during his ethnographic fieldwork with CPFs 
where members of a CPF actually engaged in vigilante action “in order to 
provide their organisation with legitimacy as a law-abiding, morally righteous 
and principled organisation”. 119   He is of the view that demonstrating 
effectiveness may require CPF members to actively disregard CPF principles 
in order, paradoxically, to affirm them publicly.120 
Taking this critique of COP into account, the possibility of successful 
“public ownership of policing”121 in relation to vigilantism – specifically, the 
potential role of vigilantes in CPFs and NW schemes – nevertheless needs 
further elucidation. 
 
7 4 3 COP: application to vigilantism 
One of the aims of CPFs is to transform and bring together a variety of 
exclusive legal self-help groups to form one inclusive organisation that is 
state-endorsed and regulated.122  In so doing, they constitute an attempt at 
“reclaiming state sovereignty by domesticating unregulated forms of 
vigilantism and order-making”. 123   The question to be addressed in this 
section is whether vigilante groups can indeed transform into a species of 
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state-legitimated “bottom-up” community policing, as envisaged by Wisler and 
Onwudiwe.124  Notwithstanding the criticism levelled against COP, it is clear 
that SAPS is not about to abandon this approach.  On the contrary: the 
Khayelitsha Commission report proposed that trust in the police would be 
promoted by requiring each police station to make a Community Policing 
Commitment to its local community, in consultation with the CPF and other 
interested parties, which would entail, inter alia, an undertaking to take their 
obligation of partnering the community via CPFs and NWs more seriously.125  
If this ideal could be achieved in practice – which is by no means certain – 
there is definitely scope for institutionalising vigilante operations as part of 
COP schemes as one of Fourchard’s “aspect[s] of the dynamic process of 
state formation”.126   
As has already been emphasised, vigilantes view themselves as 
morally upright citizens who fill the crime-fighting breach in ways they believe 
to be more effective than the protracted and expensive formal justice system 
in reducing crime and social disorder.  They are not revolutionaries or anti-
state per se.  The study by Africa et al mentioned in chapter 4 found that 
those who support violent collective action are the same individuals who also 
favour peaceful collective action.127  There is good reason to believe that 
vigilantes’ punitive methods are a strategy that they employ because it is 
effective, not necessarily because they deem extreme violence to be 
inherently desirable; thus in theory they should be “reformable”.  By being 
involved in a well-functioning CPF devoted to joint problem-solving, vigilantes 
and their supporters could have an opportunity to air safety concerns that 
extend beyond merely criminal matters.  In their role as concerned community 
members they would be well placed to propose innovative and flexible 
solutions that focus pro-actively on the underlying causes of crime and 
violence.128  Similarly, vigilantes who were incorporated into local NWs would 
still have scope to express their collective righteous indignation in respect of 
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125 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 439-440. 
126 Fourchard (2011) African Affairs 627. 
127 Africa, et al. Crime and Community Action. 
128 V A Clapper & D König “Citizen Participation Through Small Group Activities: The Possibilities 
for Community Policing in South Africa” (1998) 28 (1) Africanus 49 51. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 324 
the social evils they encounter on patrol, but would (hopefully) have been 
educated to use methods to address such evils that did not involve resorting 
to violent self-help.  No longer would community members have to feel that 
they were the voiceless, marginalised, impotent pawns of an ineffective and 
centralised criminal justice system.  By participating in COP initiatives they 
could instead be an empowered part of the community safety solution at a 
local level. 
Fourchard’s analysis of the various informal anti-crime initiatives on the 
Cape Flats supports the contention that NWs composed of vigilantism-prone 
individuals do their job effectively and pose little threat to state legitimacy as 
such.129  His practical observations of the activities of (potentially vigilante but 
officially state-legitimated) NW groups leads him to conclude that the traits 
that could in theory be the greatest cause for concern for the state – namely, 
their inherent violence and the implicit challenge they pose to state authority – 
are more apparent than real.  Technically speaking, the NWs he studied are 
vigilante organisations, since they use violent punishment to enhance social 
order, and when the state tacitly appears to permit this130 they may be viewed 
as a manifestation of a local sovereignty.  Nevertheless, Fourchard argues 
that to label NW a vigilante organisation “is to focus on what is exceptional 
within these organizations”131 at the expense of recognising that they may 
have been successfully institutionalised in other respects.  While he does not 
deny that these organisations perpetrate violence, his view is that the 
“development of a human rights culture has gradually constrained 
violence”. 132   Fourchard cites striking examples of routine NW practices 
illustrating that “rights talk” has become prevalent not just among the elite, but 
among many sectors of post-apartheid society, including some vigilante 
organisations.133  He contends that members have become used to complying 
with human rights discourses and practices due to organisations such as NWs 
teaching members “how to become good citizens”.134  Thus he appears to 
                                            
129 Fourchard (2011) African Affairs 
130 See the example from Fouchard referred to in § 7 3 2 above. 
131 Fourchard (2011) African Affairs 625-626. 
132 626. 
133 624-625. 
134 626. 
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view NWs as a work in progress, moving gradually but promisingly in the 
direction of non-violence.135 
As regards the importance of state supervision and regulation, 
evidence before the Khayelitsha Commission pointed to the crucial role that 
the police could play in supporting NWs and other legitimated forms of 
informal policing to become truly effective.  A coordinator of the Violence 
Prevention Through Urban Upgrading project (“VPUU”) lamented that, while 
NWs act as a crime deterrent, SAPS does not take them seriously enough, 
and should work with them more closely.136  Likewise, experts testified as to 
the importance of increased police oversight and support in maximising the 
efficiency of patrols, as well as in limiting the occurrence of human rights 
abuses or instances of NWs becoming vigilante groups.137  The educative role 
that the police must play in facilitating a shift away from punitiveness towards 
adherence to human rights values was also touched on by a Khayelitsha 
Station Commander, who indicated that he was concerned that NW patrollers 
sometimes assaulted members of the community: “I have been trying to 
explain to the patrollers that we must not take the law into our own hands, we 
are working with the police and we must not do that”.138 
The perspective that vigilante incorporation via COP is desirable and 
realisable is certainly idealistic.  One might be tempted to reject such an 
option, since human rights abuses could definitely not be ruled out should 
vigilantes be incorporated as co-partners in COP.  While the possibility of 
such bodies as NWs degenerating into vigilantism cannot be excluded, it must 
be remembered that formal policing is itself by no means immune to the 
tendency to abuse human rights.  Indeed, Baker proposes that reform of 
informal policing groups: 
                                            
135 This account of an increased consciousness of the importance of human rights is supported by 
evidence before the Khayelitsha Commission.  A community activist testified that community 
members rejected a NW in his area because its members used physical punishment against people 
who disobeyed its rules (O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 111). 
136 188. 
137 304; 329. 
138 226. 
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 “necessitates a corresponding reform of the state police and 
justice sector.  People will not entertain partnerships with state 
agencies regarded as violent, corrupt, incompetent, and at times 
complicit with criminal activity.  Inadequacy of the state provision 
will only further entrench the view that state actors are 
illegitimate”.139   
It is clear that commitment on the part of police management is a 
crucial component of the process to create a co-operative policing culture 
based on human rights values.140  The state needs to “clean up its own act” – 
enhance its legitimacy in its own eyes – before any successful legitimation of 
informal co-partners in security provision can occur.  Effective COP requires 
the state to lead by example, embracing the ideal that the police and the 
public are co-producers in the eradication of crime and harnessing the 
dormant potential for organisation141 of all interested community members – 
including potential vigilantes – in the democratic policing effort.    
 
7 5  “Debrutalising” the punishment of vigilantes: Exploring 
restorative and restitutive alternatives 
In the previous chapter it was argued in favour of flexible, restorative, 
humane and human-rights-friendly sentencing choices where vigilantism is 
concerned.  This section makes the case that the state’s best hope of 
relegitimating itself vis-à-vis vigilantes is to move beyond the focus on mere 
exclusion – criminal punishment in the traditional sense of deprivation and the 
infliction of suffering142 – by relying instead on forward-focusing restorative 
justice options as much as possible, with backward-looking incapacitative 
penalty alternatives being a last resort.   
It may be asked why (as was maintained in chapter 6) it is necessary to 
criminalise vigilantism separately in order to arrive at appropriate sentencing 
                                            
139 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 67. 
140 Clapper & König (1998) Africanus 60. 
141 63. 
142 Burchell Principles 5. 
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options, if individual judges have in the past shown themselves to be perfectly 
capable of crafting creative punishment solutions in vigilantism cases.143  The 
reason is that part of the proof required to convict an accused of vigilantism is 
to show beyond reasonable doubt that their conduct is motivated by the desire 
to enhance security and order where the state appears unable to perform this 
function effectively.  The implication is that labelling vigilante crimes differently 
would acknowledge that their underlying dynamics are unlike those of 
“normal” deviance.  As Binns-Ward J evidently appreciated, recognition of this 
distinction in specific intention between vigilante and non-vigilante crimes 
forms a convincing justification for a differentiated response in respect of 
sentencing.144  If vigilantism were a distinct offence it would not once again be 
necessary at the sentencing stage to justify a restorative-type flexible 
sentence for acts of vigilantism, since the need for considering its imposition 
would already have been demonstrated by the vigilantism conviction itself.145   
But why should restorative-type penalties for vigilantes be preferred 
above those that advocate retribution, deterrence and incapacitation?  
Reasons why an over-punitive state orientation is undesirable have been 
canvassed briefly in §§ 4 2 1 and 6 2 1.  Another novel perspective 
championing an overall shift from state-run retributive punishments to 
community-based, victim-oriented restitutive and restorative options is that of 
Nils Christie.  Christie is of the opinion that the modern criminal trial in general 
– and lawyers in particular – “steal conflicts”146 from victims, who are so 
“thoroughly represented” that their role is “reduced to the triggerer-off of the 
whole thing”.147  He suggests that the victims are:  
“a sort of double loser; first vis-à-vis the offender, but secondly by 
being denied rights to full participation in what might have been 
                                            
143 See § 6 3 2 3 above. 
144 See S v Dikqacwi and others para 8, quoted above at § 6 3 2 3. 
145 While this section discusses restorative justice-type solutions in the context of those being sentenced 
for vigilantism specifically, it is important to remember that the forward-looking, problem-solving 
rationale outlined below is equally applicable to the majority of community disputes, including ones 
that tend to trigger vigilantism, such as housebreaking and disorderly conduct. 
146 N Christie “Conflicts as Property” (1977) 17 (1) British Journal of Criminology 1 4. 
147 3. 
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one of the most important ritual encounters in life.  The victim has 
lost the case to the state.”148   
The centrality of the state and its formal rituals in the criminal justice 
process deny the victim the opportunity to get to know or understand the 
offender, meaning that they will “go away more frightened than ever, more in 
need than ever of an explanation of criminals as non-human”.149  Offenders 
also lose by being denied direct participation; not only are they refused the 
opportunity to justify their misdeeds to their victim personally, to offer them 
restitution and possibly be forgiven, but they also lose the chance “to receive 
a type of blame that would be very difficult to neutralise”.150 
Restorative justice – sometimes seen as an embodiment of Christie’s 
call for parties to a dispute to take back their own conflicts – aims to counter 
the over-procedural nature of the formal criminal justice system and its 
tendency to make the offence “more abstracted, more alienated from the 
actual experiences of the victim, offender and community”. 151   Instead, 
restorative justice aspires to promote direct participation by victim, offender 
and interested community members alike in the criminal justice process, as 
opposed to professional experts. 152   The focus is on healing violated or 
ruptured human relationships, not on punishing offenders for specific 
incidents. 153   Restorative justice theory emphasises that each crime has 
unique circumstances and does not assume that formally equal treatment 
would necessarily result in a substantively equal outcome.  Participants relate 
to each other “holistically and fluidly as unique individuals.” 154   What 
                                            
148 3.  See also J Braithwaite “Building Legitimacy Through Restorative Justice” in T R Tyler (eds) 
Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International Perspectives (2007) 147, who argues that the 
professionalisation of justice has gone so far as almost totally to disempower the central stakeholder 
in crimes, namely the victim.  Also A W Dzur & S M Olson “The Value of Community Participation 
in Restorative Justice” (2004) 35 (1) Journal of Social Philosophy 91 92, who say that victims are 
“largely bystanders in their own cases”.  
149 Christie (1977) British Journal of Criminology 8. 
150 9.  Being given the chance to observe the effect of their actions on victims could allow offenders to 
appreciate the gravity of their wrongdoing, and to take responsibility for it by making amends. 
151 Dzur & Olson (2004) Journal of Social Philosophy 91. 
152  S M Olson & A W Dzur “Revisiting Informal Justice: Restorative Justice and Democratic 
Professionalism” (2004) 38 (1) Law and Society Review 139 146. 
153 Schärf “Policy Options on Community Justice” in The Other Law: Non-State Ordering in South 
Africa 47 talking about community justice. 
154 Olson & Dzur (2004) Law and Society Review 147. 
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Braithwaite terms the “legitimacy ideal” for restorative justice is that it “would 
assist the justice of the law to filter down to the justice of the people and the 
justice of the people to bubble up to the justice of the law, each checking the 
abuse of power of the other”155 – a beautifully-worded way of expressing the 
interlinked legitimacy benefits of restorative justice for all involved.   
Baker’s conception of an ideal dispute resolution process in the African 
context would also support face-to-face restorative and restitutive solutions to 
vigilantism.  In his view:  
“The poor are far less concerned with seeking the offender’s 
suffering as due punishment, than they are with the suffering of 
the victim(s) and their recompense.  What is required is a process 
that is flexible, informal, accessible and that puts the community 
relationships back together again sufficiently for the victim’s family 
to still be able to live and work alongside the perpetrator’s family 
without either side having to resort to revenge attacks, or face 
exile or loss of livelihood … In … tight urban and rural 
communities …, where neighbours and workmates are in close 
proximity and have to share their lives together tomorrow 
morning, the emphasis must always be on restoration.”156 
In respect of vigilantism, resorting to restorative justice instead of harsh 
sanctions may serve as a possible means of reinstating victims’ voices in the 
context of a human-rights-focused criminal justice process.  In addition, it may 
function as a critique of the need for private revenge, in that properly 
implemented restorative justice practices patently demonstrate to participants 
the advantages of applying non-violent problem-solving skills to community 
conflicts.157   
Favouring restorative solutions does not mean that there is no place for 
more coercive measures, however.  Braithwaite argues compellingly in favour 
                                            
155 Braithwaite “Legitimacy and Criminal Justice” in Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: International 
Perspectives 157. 
156 Baker (2007) Acta Juridica 191-192. 
157  See Braithwaite “Legitimacy and Criminal Justice” in Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: 
International Perspectives 157 and § 7 5 2 below. 
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of a “regulatory pyramid” for understanding and integrating the various 
approaches to ensuring compliance with the law.158  According to him, the 
major theories of compliance – which he identifies as restorative justice, 
deterrence and incapacitation – are “limited and flawed”, but the strengths of 
one theory may compensate for the weaknesses of another.159  According to 
Braithwaite, “more dialogic forms” of justice must have been tried and have 
failed before “more dominating, less respectful forms of social control” may 
legitimately be resorted to.160  Thus the assumption is that restorative justice 
options (situated at the bottom of the pyramid) are sufficiently coercive in the 
instance of the “virtuous actor”; if restorative justice is unsuccessful, 
deterrence alternatives (positioned in the middle of the pyramid) may be 
required, assuming the actor is rational; and only in the minority of cases 
where both restorative justice and deterrence yield no results may 
incapacitation (placed at the pinnacle of the pyramid) be resorted to, since in 
such instances the actor is assumed to be incompetent or irrational. 161  
Applying Braithwaite’s pyramid to the vigilante scenario, there is an 
expectation that vigilantes – self-styled “virtuous actors” who commit crimes in 
the name of enhancing social order and community norms – ought to be good 
candidates for restorative justice-style corrections.  If the restorative justice 
route fails, the “specter of punishment in the background”162 is still there, and 
may be utilised, but only on condition that restorative justice options are tried 
first, then deterrent punishments if those fail, and finally incapacitation only as 
a last resort.163   
Overall, it makes sense for the state to explore the possibility of 
restorative justice before relying on more coercive compliance methods, 
because restorative justice options are less costly and also more respectful of 
the human rights of those involved.164  Using restorative justice options may 
enhance the legitimacy of criminal justice institutions in various ways.  First, 
                                            
158 The underlying assumption is that the relevant law is indeed just (J Braithwaite Restorative Justice 
and Responsive Regulation (2002) 30). 
159 32. 
160 32-33. 
161 32. 
162 35. 
163 42. 
164 32. 
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by favouring inexpensive restorative forms of ensuring compliance the state is 
being seen not to waste resources that could be better employed elsewhere.  
Second, by recognising the right of all those who are affected by a crime – 
including both victim and perpetrator – to participate directly in the criminal 
justice process, the state is demonstrably treating them in a respectful, 
humane and non-brutalising manner, thereby abiding by its own claims to be 
a guarantor of constitutional rights and values.  Third, involvement in 
restorative justice proceedings may help both participants and observers to 
internalise the values of mutual respect and ubuntu, and encourage them to 
make use of non-violent conflict-resolution methods in their future problem-
solving endeavours.  Some practicalities of restorative justice penalty options 
are now considered. 
 
7 5 1 Restorative justice options: Zwelethemba and beyond 
Ideally, in line with what has been argued above, if vigilantism is 
criminalised separately the relevant statute should make provision for 
restorative justice punishment options unless this would be contrary to the 
interests of justice – i.e., the presumption should be in favour of restorative 
justice.  Regardless of whether vigilantism is separately criminalised or not, 
where an accused is convicted of committing a vigilante-type crime the first 
step should be to establish if such person is a suitable candidate for 
“community corrections”.165  Chapter VI of the Correctional Services Act166 
gives offenders the opportunity to “serve their sentences in a non-custodial 
manner”167 with the aim of enabling them to lead a “socially responsible and 
crime-free life during the period of their sentence and in future”168 as well as 
rehabilitating them “in a manner that best keeps them as an integral part of 
society”. 169   Some of the particularly restorative community corrections 
options include the offender doing community service “in order to facilitate 
                                            
165 Correctional Services Act s 50. 
166 S 50-s 72. 
167 S 50(1)(a)(i). 
168 S 50(1)(a)(ii). 
169 S 50(1)(a)(iii). 
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restoration of the relationship between the sentenced offenders and the 
community”;170 paying compensation or damages to victims;171 participating in 
treatment, development or support programmes; 172  and taking part in 
mediation between victim and offender or in family group conferencing.173  
The idea seems to be that punishment – usually a tool for exclusion – may 
actually serve to incorporate offenders into the community, thus advancing 
social inclusion.  The objectives and methods of such state-initiated 
community corrections as set out in the Correctional Services Act appear to 
be well-suited in theory to the conception of restorative and relationship-
oriented justice outlined above. 
The focus now shifts to a South African example of a non-state-initiated 
community-based restorative justice model that attempted to achieve these 
ideals in practice.  Its insights and experiences are undoubtedly relevant for 
vigilante sentencing, but may also hold promise for addressing some of the 
more general legitimacy and capacity challenges faced by the formal criminal 
justice system that were highlighted in chapters 4 and 6 above.  The so-called 
Zwelethemba model,174 run by the Community Peace Programme from 1997 
until 2009,175 was specifically designed to empower poor and marginalised 
communities to strengthen their security governance capacities.176  In contrast 
to the neo-liberal “responsibilisation” strategy of governance177 whereby the 
state “steers” and the community “rows”, the Zwelethemba model assumes 
that the power both to “steer” and to “row” should devolve to communities.178  
                                            
170 S 52(1)(a). 
171 S 52(1)(e). 
172 S 52(1)(f). 
173 S 52(1)(g). 
174  So named after the suburb outside Worcester in the Western Cape where it was developed, 
“zwelethemba” means “country or place of hope” (Brodeur & Shearing (2005) European Journal of 
Criminology 381). 
175 For more on the success of its methods and values see C Shearing “Transforming Security: A South 
African Experiment” in H Strang and J Braithwaite (eds) Restorative Justice and Civil Society 
(2001); Brodeur & Shearing (2005) European Journal of Criminology; J Froestad & C Shearing 
“Practicing Justice - The Zwelethemba Model of Conflict Resolution” in Slakmod (eds) Justicia 
Restaurativa (2005); J Wood, C Shearing & J Froestad “Restorative Justice and Nodal Governance” 
(2011) 35 (1) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 1. 
176 Froestad & Shearing “Practicing Justice - The Zwelethemba Model of Conflict Resolution” in 
Justicia Restaurativa 14. 
177 Discussed at §§ 2 5 2 and 4 2 3 above. 
178 Froestad & Shearing “Practicing Justice - The Zwelethemba Model of Conflict Resolution” in 
Justicia Restaurativa 34-35. 
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This model aims to resolve conflicts by identifying root causes and focusing 
on future-oriented solutions179 within a framework premised on non-violence 
and creative problem-solving.180  Achieving security and “doing justice” are 
seen as mutually interdependent.  Peace-creation is understood to be taking 
place when the effects of a conflict are ameliorated and the likelihood of the 
conflict continuing or recurring is reduced.181   
Crucially, Zwelethemba is not premised on a “bifurcation of the 
disputants into victims and offenders”. 182   A “crime” construction binary 
between “victims” and “offenders” is avoided altogether, with the individuals 
involved in the conflict classified as participants or “parties”.183  Conflicts or 
disputes “are understood as ongoing processes (not past and sealed) in 
which roles of victim and offender oscillate”.184 Cases brought before the 
community-run Zwelethemba “Peace Committees” are: 
“no more than a single slice in time that should be located within a 
history of conflict between the parties.  Within this context the 
‘offending’ party and the ‘harmed’ party may, and probably do, 
change places over time.  In other words, today’s offender’ may 
have been yesterday’s ‘victim’.  The model that is based on the 
argument that the language of ‘victim’ and ‘offender’ structures the 
meaning of what happened in the past in ways that make it difficult 
for parties involved to understand and articulate their own reality or 
lived experience”.185 
While the Zwelethemba model for resolving community disputes 
achieved considerable success in informal settlements and townships across 
South Africa for a period of a dozen years, involving almost half a million 
community members in the resolution more than 113 000 disputes ranging 
                                            
179 17-18. 
180 Martin (2010) Acta Criminologica 66. 
181 Brodeur & Shearing (2005) European Journal of Criminology 401. 
182 380-381; 399. 
183 Froestad & Shearing “Practicing Justice - The Zwelethemba Model of Conflict Resolution” in 
Justicia Restaurativa 17. 
184 Brodeur & Shearing (2005) European Journal of Criminology 399. 
185 Froestad & Shearing “Practicing Justice - The Zwelethemba Model of Conflict Resolution” in 
Justicia Restaurativa 17. 
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from sexual offences and assault to neighbourhood disputes and property 
offences,186 and even being “exported” to communities in South America,187 it 
ultimately petered out due to lack of state funding.  The Khayelitsha 
Commission report mourns its loss, noting that after the Department of Social 
Development terminated the Community Peace Programme funding, 
hundreds of community members who had been promised compensation for 
performing their duties as peacemakers were left with “a very bad taste in 
[the] mouth”. 188   Recognising the Programme’s potential for successfully 
reducing contact crime, the Commission recommended that a system of 
community-based mediation to resolve neighbourhood disputes along the 
lines of the Community Peace Programme be reintroduced in Khayelitsha – 
this time with the necessary government financial backing.189 
 
7 5 2 Lessons from Zwelethemba 
Although the Zwelethemba model was directed first and foremost at 
empowering communities to resolve their own conflicts instead of giving them 
away to others,190 its methods and values may nevertheless teach the state 
important lessons in respect of legitimately imposing community-based 
penalties on vigilantes. 
A first insight that is instructive in the vigilante context is the model’s 
recognition that the categories of “perpetrator” and “victim” are fluid and 
contested.  This is certainly true in communities where vigilantism proliferates.  
As demonstrated in chapter 5, vigilantes are aggrieved by the state’s labelling 
them as “criminals” and contend that they are legitimate crime-fighters 
instead, while deeming those they target for punishment the wrongdoers.  To 
avoid arousing resentment and indignation, the state may be well advised to 
implement forms of victim-offender mediation for vigilantes and those they 
                                            
186  Anonymous “Community Peace Programme” (2009-11-30) Community Peace Programme 
<http://www.ideaswork.org/> (2015-09-29) 
187 Froestad & Shearing “Practicing Justice - The Zwelethemba Model of Conflict Resolution” in 
Justicia Restaurativa 38-39. 
188 See discussion in O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 302-303. 
189 452. 
190 See Christie (1977) British Journal of Criminology 5, 7. 
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have harmed that purposely avoid pigeonholing participants as one or the 
other.  Dispensing with the criminal justice dichotomy between good (the 
victims as represented by the state) and evil (the offender) could pave the 
way for all parties to appreciate their shared humanity and 
interconnectedness.  Participants would be better empowered to settle their 
differences and restore their relationships in the spirit of ubuntu, recognising 
that “that which makes others worse off also brings harm to oneself” and that 
justice requires repairing damage done to both the wrongdoer and the 
wronged.191 
Another insight that may be instructive in bridging the divide between 
vigilante and peace-making values is the Zwelethemba model’s “forward-
looking lens”.192  The goal is instrumental – to identify root causes of a conflict 
and reduce or eliminate them to ensure that parties to the dispute can coexist 
in future without a similar conflict reccurring 193  – rather than to evoke 
emotions such as remorse or vengeance by harking back to past grievances 
and punishing them.  As has been argued, there is no state imperative for the 
state to respond purely punitively to vigilantism.  According to Binns-Ward J, 
vigilante violence is not an offence where “if the accused were not committed 
to direct imprisonment the community’s estimation of the criminal system 
would be further eroded”.  Even the Khayelitsha Commission report only 
recommends “developing a policing strategy to deal with vengeance 
attacks”,194 but does not spell out everything that such a strategy might entail.  
It is submitted that the wording of the report does not exclude the possibility 
that the state could – and should – develop and implement restorative rather 
than (or as well as) retributive approaches to dealing with vigilantism.  The 
state has the opportunity to act innovatively in devising appropriate, creative 
and individualised penalties for vigilantes that take into account the 
motivations for vigilante violence and the state’s own culpability in its 
commission. 
                                            
191 Baker (2007) Acta Juridica 190. 
192 Brodeur & Shearing (2005) European Journal of Criminology 400. 
193 Wood, et al. (2011) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 4-5. 
194 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 456. 
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An aspect of the Zwelethemba model that the state would do well to 
emulate in any of its attempts to apply restorative justice to vigilante offences 
would be its underlying values, as embodied in the Peace Committee Code of 
Good Practice (the “Code”)195 that “structures the actions of Peace Committee 
members in a way that enables them to ‘act out’ the restorative values they 
are expressing”.196  There are some similarities between the goals set out in 
the Code and vigilante objectives: Both seek to “create a safe and secure 
environment” within communities; members tend to work together as a team 
rather than as individuals; their procedures are “open for the community to 
see”; and they are “committed to what [they] do”.197  The major distinction 
between the Peace Committee Code and vigilante justice is that the Code 
specifically states that peacemakers should “work within the law” and respect 
the Constitution.  The Code also eschews violent means of problem-solving, 
with the aim being to “heal, not to hurt”.  “[R]espectful dialogue”198 rather than 
coercion is advocated to resolve disputes.199  Unlike vigilante practices, the 
Code also emphasises the value of neutrality and fair treatment of all parties 
to a dispute, upholding the audi alteram partem principle.200  
While the Zwelethemba model appeared to operate very successfully, 
it must be conceded that it is doubtful whether any state-instigated restorative 
justice initiative aimed at vigilantes could achieve the same results.  If the 
formal criminal justice system is involved, any issue reaching a restorative 
justice forum will already have been defined as a legal infraction: a “problem” 
that is merely being returned to the “community” to be resolved. 201  The 
adversarial paradigm of legal discourse deprives participants of the vital 
freedom to do the “definitional work” of framing the problem themselves by 
                                            
195 The complete Code states: “1. We help to create a safe and secure environment in our Community; 
2. We respect the South African Constitution; 3. We work within the law; 4. We do not use force or 
violence; 5. We do not take sides in disputes; 6. We work in the community as a co-operative team, 
not as individuals; 7. We follow procedures which are open for the community to see; 8. We do not 
gossip about our work or about other people; 9. We are committed in what we do; 10. Our aim is to 
heal, not to hurt” (Anonymous “Community Peace Programme” Community Peace Programme). 
196 Wood, et al. (2011) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 4. 
197 Anonymous “Community Peace Programme” Community Peace Programme. 
198 Wood, et al. (2011) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 2. 
199 Brodeur & Shearing (2005) European Journal of Criminology 381. 
200 Wood, et al. (2011) International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 4. 
201 Shearing “Transforming Security: A South African Experiment” in Restorative Justice and Civil 
Society 39-40. 
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engaging in innovative and self-directed “norm-clarification”,202 and instead 
reduces their status to mere implementers of state agency programmes.203  
This major misgiving notwithstanding, participating in even the most poorly-
implemented state-run restorative justice programme must surely be an 
improvement on being incarcerated in the average South African prison.  
Prison conditions are notoriously non-conducive to prisoner rehabilitation and 
reform.  Binns-Ward J rightly notes that imposing lengthy periods of 
incarceration “risks returning to the community damaged, and even more 
problematic persons at the end of the exercise”. 204   A recent Guardian 
newspaper article quotes crime novelist Maggie Orford as saying,  
“We have a prison system that’s completely punitive: it turns 
violent men into extremely violent men.  The gangs run the 
prisons.  It’s almost like a factory of violence and there’s little by 
way of rehabilitation programmes.  It’s like a gulag.  People who 
get out are 10 times worse than when they went in.”205  
While there are no accurate statistics, 206  the estimated rate of 
recidivism after being released from South African prisons ranges from 
47%207 to 80-94%.208  A forward-looking approach to punishing vigilantes, 
which includes – where appropriate – utilising future-oriented “community 
corrections” options such as restorative justice and compensating victims or 
their families instead of incarceration is thus deserving of wholehearted 
support.  
                                            
202 Christie (1977) British Journal of Criminology 8. 
203 Shearing “Transforming Security: A South African Experiment” in Restorative Justice and Civil 
Society 39-40. 
204 S v Dikqacwi and others para 7. 
205 D Smith “Calls for Inequality in South Africa to be Tackled as Violent Crime Rises” (2015-10-01) 
The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/01/south-africa-violent-crime-murders-
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7 5 3 An appraisal of vigilante incorporation 
Overall, it is not easy to make a definitive pronouncement on the 
desirability of state efforts to incorporate vigilante crime-fighting energies 
formally.  Vigilante incorporation is at best a hit-or-miss legitimation option that 
is fraught with unpredictability and risk.  As regards the possibility of 
transforming vigilantes into respectable CPF and NW members, in instances 
where well-organised vigilante groups are keen to make the shift from 
autonomous to responsible citizenship, they may indeed become a welcome 
addition to the state’s criminal justice arsenal at grass-roots level, thereby 
boosting state legitimacy.  However, it seems quite unlikely that a significant 
proportion of those who engage in vigilantism would be willing to renounce 
violence completely and follow the docile problem-solving criminal justice 
agenda devised for them by the state instead.  It is tempting to measure the 
success of co-opting vigilantes by its outcomes (a reduction in crime being 
potentially the most significant), while overlooking the means employed to 
achieve those outcomes.  If criminal justice authorities explicitly or implicitly 
condone human rights abuses perpetrated by “responsibilised” vigilantes-
turned-NW-members, this makes a mockery of state claims to be committed 
to upholding constitutional rights and values and undermines its overall 
legitimacy.  The effective implementation of any partnership between 
community members and police – be it in the context of COP or a more 
informal co-opting of vigilante crime-fighting resources – requires a high level 
of accountability and stringent oversight by formal criminal justice authorities.  
In practice, holding “incorporated” vigilantes to account and compelling them 
to abide by human rights standards is unlikely to be feasible in a context 
where police struggle to perform even their basic functions effectively. 
In relation to restorative justice, the discussion above demonstrates 
that something that is traditionally premised on exclusion and negative 
labelling, namely criminal punishment, does indeed have the potential to 
serve an integrative and legitimating function.   The best case scenario is that, 
having been treated in a humane and non-brutalising manner by the state, 
vigilante (and other) participants in Zwelethemba-style restorative justice 
programmes would internalise these values of nonviolence and ubuntu and 
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put into practice the peaceful conflict-resolution strategies that had been 
modelled to them in their future dealings with those they perceive to be 
deviant.  At worst, even if restorative justice initiatives for vigilantes were to 
play little or no role in changing vigilantes’ attitude to violence or fostering a 
“culture of nonviolence” in the broader community, the state would be 
legitimating its human-rights-based identity by demonstrating its commitment 
to “promot[ing] the realisation of a society based on constitutional values”209 in 
its championing of restorative justice.   
In addition to incorporating (inter alia) vigilantes as partners in the fight 
against crime, another way for the state to achieve relegitimation through 
inclusion would be to delegitimise private violence as an acceptable form of 
problem-solving interaction; fostering positive community crime-fighting 
energies and actively discouraging negative and violent solutions to societal 
concerns are two sides of the same coin.  The following section elaborates on 
the key role that the state may play in epitomising respect for human rights in 
its dealings with citizens, and the potential for the state’s positive example and 
instruction to filter down to the rest of society. 
 
7 6 Community-focused inclusion strategies: delegitimising the 
option of private violence 
State objectives for restoring its weakened legitimacy should not be 
confined to attempting to achieve vigilante exclusion or inclusion alone.  This 
section addresses state relegitimation strategies whose primary focus is on 
making citizens in general less likely to engage in – and support – violent self-
help.  As has been discussed,210 while all acts of vigilantism are triggered by 
specific instances of perceived deviance, there is a wide range of reasons 
why particular communities are more vigilante-prone.  Many of the factors that 
lead to vigilantism are matters about which the criminal justice system can do 
very little – if anything – short-term.  In South Africa there are high levels of 
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societal violence, which, it has been argued, are in large part due to 
inequality, societal polarisation and the consequent marginalisation of the 
poor.  One of the shortcomings of current efforts to tackle the high violent 
crime rate – including vigilante violence – is that such attempts seldom focus 
on the social welfare and education interventions necessary to prevent “pre-
criminals” at one end of the social stratum from becoming criminals, but 
instead concentrate on preventing crime from spreading to the privileged 
areas where those at the other end of the social stratum live. 211   This 
phenomenon of the “criminalisation of poverty” 212  is exacerbated by a 
neoliberal dual policing approach; on the one hand, there is a “zero-tolerance” 
attitude to policing richer areas213 that is aimed at making crime less visible by 
containing it in the townships, while on the other, residents of poorer areas 
are “responsibilised” to participate in COP projects aimed at enhancing street 
patrols and basically left to police themselves. 214   The result is that an 
“isolated and segmented population of ‘true citizens’” is walling itself off from a 
population that is “marginalized and delegitimized as ‘dangerous 
criminals’”.215  Unless it is possible to address the broader issue of structural 
violence and the massive divide between rich and poor, which contributes to 
the pervasive view that physical force is “the primary … social solution to 
problems”,216 there is every chance that vigilantism will continue to pose a 
daunting challenge to state legitimacy. 
Bringing down levels of social inequality – crucial for reducing a cultural 
endorsement of violence – is without doubt an expensive and long-term state 
strategy.  It is submitted, however, that initiatives aimed at undoing a punitive 
mind-set may have some impact in decreasing vigilantism in the shorter term.  
If, as is contended, high levels of vigilantism are at least partially symptomatic 
of the overall prevalence of societal aggression, it is crucial that the state 
devise interventions aimed at reversing the ubiquitous cultural endorsement of 
violence as a means of tackling societal ills.  Any state strategy aiming to 
                                            
211 Schuberth (2013) Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development 45. 
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delegitimise private violence as an acceptable form of problem-solving 
interaction must focus on enhancing the congruency between the (human-
rights-friendly) formal legal framework and the (considerably more retributive) 
popular beliefs (supposedly) sustaining it.217 
 
7 6 1 Undoing punitive self-help culture through human rights 
education 
This section discusses the role of education in general – and human 
rights education in particular – in influencing people’s attitudes towards 
vigilante violence.  Empirical analyses have convincingly established that 
there is a “strong, positive relationship between formal education and 
behaviour and attitudes favourable to democracy”, the premise being that 
education equips people with the skills necessary to understand the 
intricacies of politics and the rule of law. 218   These findings extend to 
punitiveness attitudes too – for instance, a Californian study by Tyler and 
Boeckmann found that a key predictor of a high degree of punitiveness is a 
low educational level.219  Tankebe’s Ghanaian study of vigilantism set out to 
determine whether this was true of community support for vigilantism as well – 
i.e., whether higher levels of educational attainment would lead to a drop in 
support for vigilantism.  He theorised that more educated people would 
understand that law enforcement was the primary responsibility of the state, 
and disapprove of those who resort to self-help rather than advocating reform 
by democratic means.220  His research did indeed confirm that “increased 
literacy leads to the development of greater awareness, understanding and 
tolerance of due process of criminal justice practice and rule of law”, and 
corroborates the hypothesis that support for vigilantism decreases with higher 
educational attainment.  Tankebe goes so far as to express the view that 
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greater educational attainment “comes close to being a necessary condition 
for the suppression of attitudes that are supportive of vigilante violence”.221   
It would be tempting to dismiss these findings pessimistically as merely 
confirming the truism that in practice it is only necessary for the 
disadvantaged and marginalised (who are invariably less educated) to resort 
to vigilantism, with their penchant for harsh punishments being born of 
understandable anger, resentment and desperation.  By contrast, those 
privileged enough to have received a good education do not often find 
themselves in situations where it might be necessary for them to avail 
themselves of self-help; they therefore feel less desire for retribution and a 
corresponding lack of empathy – and sympathy – for those who do feel 
compelled to take the law into their own hands.  However, faced with an 
undeniable empirical link between support for aggressive problem-solving 
methods (both punitiveness and vigilantism) and lack of education, it would be 
remiss of the state not to take seriously this avenue for delegitimising the 
option of private violence.  
The ideal would be for the state to make a concerted effort to increase 
overall academic education levels of all its citizenry, since this would be likely 
to assist in suppressing people’s eagerness both to legitimate and to resort to 
vigilante violence.222  While improving standards of education is undoubtedly 
a common societal goal, it is one that is proving expensive and protracted.  In 
the meantime, it is proposed that an education programme specifically 
targeted towards preventing vigilante attacks be implemented as part of a 
broader human rights education campaign aimed at inculcating a human 
rights culture at grassroots level. 223    In this regard, the Khayelitsha 
Commission recommended that a forum be convened consisting of all 
relevant role-players – school principals, churches and religious institutions, 
CPFs, NGOs, community-based organisations, NWs, SAPS managers and 
researchers – to develop such a public education plan to curb vigilantism.224  
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A strategy to teach people about the advantages of the rule of law, the 
procedural safeguards of the legal system and their importance to democracy 
is certainly a promising way to change people’s attitude to the use of violence 
for dealing with problems.  A study by Africa et al showed that people’s 
attitudes to violent self-help are indeed malleable.  A large majority (between 
79% and 86%) of even the most activist proportion of their sample (i.e., those 
who would participate in or support vigilante action) was prepared to “give the 
use of violence a sober second thought”, particularly if respected community 
leaders endorsed peaceful means of conflict resolution.225   Significantly, in 
line with what has been argued throughout this study, their in-depth analysis 
showed that:  
“it is not a case of one group supporting legal action and another 
illegal methods.  There is not some identifiable group of rogue 
vigilantes which only wants to pursue justice through its own 
violent methods.  Most people do not make a distinction between 
illegal and legal public responses.  Those people who were willing 
to use force and intimidation were also willing to use more 
peaceful, procedural and legal avenues.”226   
It is hoped that if the public can be properly educated about the 
reasons for and benefits of extending fundamental rights and freedoms – 
including due process rights – to even social outcasts and marginal members 
of society, this will decrease second-order dissonance227 and make citizens 
less inclined to fall back on violent means of self-help.  Replacing a punitive 
mentality with a state of mind that acknowledges that “[i]t is only if there is a 
willingness to protect the worst and weakest among us, that all of us can be 
secure that our own rights will be protected”228 would surely assuage the 
intolerance and retributive sentiments that sustain both participation in, and 
                                            
225 Africa, et al. Crime and Community Action 33.  See also Tyler (2006) Journal of Social Issues 323, 
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continued support of, vigilantism.  In contrast to a vigilante ideology that is 
aimed at marginalising, dehumanising and excluding the Other, these sort of 
attitudes accord with an ubuntu-compatible communitarian perspective that 
highlights social values such as “[g]roup solidarity … compassion, respect, 
human dignity, humanistic orientation and collective unity”. 229   The link 
between ubuntu and restorative justice has already been touched on in the 
context of discussing vigilante punishment options.230  Suffice it to say that 
because restorative justice envisages community members as making an 
indispensable contribution to restorative rehabilitation, participating in 
restorative justice initiatives may be an apposite means of socialising and 
sensitising vigilantes and law-abiding citizens alike regarding the need for 
those who do justice to abide by human rights values, as well as exposing 
them to non-violent alternatives for resolving disputes and helping equip them 
to emulate such approaches in future situations of interpersonal conflict.  
  
7 6 2 Setting a good example 
It is not enough for the state merely to instruct its citizens that forcible 
self-help is incompatible with human rights, even if this is combined with 
initiatives empowering them to employ non-violent means of problem-solving 
instead.  In order to obtain the goodwill and co-operation of citizens, the state 
needs to demonstrate actively that it is worthy of being accorded normative 
legitimacy.  It was contended above231 that it is unrealistic for any state to 
expect its citizens to recognise the exclusivity of its monopoly on the use of 
force.  Faced with a multiplicity of alternative players in the security market, 
the best the state can hope for is to instil public confidence in its status as the 
preferred provider of collective security and social order – or at least, to 
induce citizens to accord it the moral authority to decide how best to allocate 
the use of legitimate crime-fighting power to others, if it chooses not to 
                                            
229  J Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa” (1998-01-01) The Ecoport Foundation 
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exercise such power itself. 232   While it has been argued that an under-
resourced criminal justice system cannot be expected to perform sufficiently 
well to restore citizens’ faith in its law-enforcement capacity, it must be 
remembered that citizen judgments about whether a state is entitled to be 
obeyed are based on more than merely prudential considerations.  As already 
explained, 233  a central consideration shaping perceptions of the state as 
moral, legitimate and deserving of compliance is the fair and respectful 
treatment of its subjects.  If legal authorities relate to citizens in a manner that 
shows respect for their rights and recognition of their intrinsic worth and 
human dignity, citizens will be inclined to reciprocate by rendering the formal 
justice system corresponding respect and recognition.  This insight is the 
reason why all the state relegitimation strategies suggested above 
deliberately stress that the state does potentially have the capacity to be 
legitimated in the criminal justice sphere without needing to compromise its 
adherence to a constitutionally-based human rights framework.  A crucial 
distinction between state criminal justice mechanisms and their informal 
counterparts in this regard is that the state – at least in theory – can be held to 
account for failing to act in a constitutional, responsive and respectful manner 
in its capacity as security provider.  This is important, because only limited 
power can be truly legitimate.234 
In chapter 5 it was illustrated how vigilante criminal justice rituals 
frequently mirror those of the state.  Because vigilantes appear to be looking 
to the state for guidance on how to do justice, the state’s best chance of 
enhancing its moral authority may in fact be to demonstrate consistently to 
vigilantes a criminal justice model that is truly worthy of emulation.  By being 
seen to combine a reasonable degree of efficiency with the desire to prioritise 
justice over revenge, humanity over brutality, and inclusivity and ubuntu over 
intolerance, the state may re-educate citizens by its own example, thus 
serving as a positive role-model for the rest of society.  A state that puts its 
human rights culture into practice in respect of its treatment of offenders as 
well as its day-to-day interactions with ordinary citizens may induce all citizens 
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– including (potential) vigilantes – to accede to its resolve to reject the use of 
violence as a primary means of addressing social problems.  If the state can 
succeed in persuading citizens to give credence to its self-legitimated identity 
as guarantor of collective security and social order as well as human rights, 
citizens may indeed be prepared to relegitimate the criminal justice system by 
refraining from vigilantism, instead entrusting the state with the power to 
exercise legitimate force on their behalf. 
 
7 7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, and the one preceding it, the strengths and pitfalls of 
exclusionary and inclusionary approaches were weighed up at length, always 
bearing in mind the state’s need to uphold and protect human rights.  It was 
emphasised that, regardless of whether its objective is integration or 
exclusion, the state has a fundamental duty to exemplify non-violence and 
respect for human dignity in its day-to-day dealings with all its citizens.  The 
conclusion to the previous chapter argued in favour of human rights 
compatible exclusionary strategies to enhance state legitimacy in the crime-
fighting sphere, including the implementation of procedural justice policing 
combined with minimal and minimalist policing, and the separate 
criminalisation of vigilantism.235  The question was asked whether a state 
strategy premised on a “plus-sum” legitimacy game, which assumes that 
vigilante (and wider community) empowerment is not necessarily incompatible 
with state relegitimation, might not be a preferable approach to chapter 6’s 
“zero-sum” one, which conceived of the enhancement of vigilante legitimacy 
occuring at the expense of state authority.   
This chapter took up that challenge, exploring the feasibility and 
desirability of co-opting vigilantes’ crime-fighting zeal in ways that are 
compatible with human rights.  The spotlight fell on relegitimation attempts 
predominantly premised on the state resigning itself to the “multi-choice” 
nature of policing, and finding ways to incorporate or integrate aspects of 
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vigilante power in some capacity.  It was concluded that harnessing vigilantes 
to perform policing functions is at best an unpredictable and risky undertaking, 
since such newly “responsibilised” crime-fighters might not necessarily be 
prepared to renounce violence, and adequate formal oversight and monitoring 
of their activities could be unfeasible in practice.  Restorative, Zwelethemba-
type interventions, aimed at problem-solving rather than policing, were 
evaluated rather more positively.  They were judged to create a setting where 
the state could demonstrate the non-violent dispute-resolution skills it would 
prefer its citizens to utilise: Community members (and vigilantes), once they 
saw how successful such techniques can be, could be persuaded to 
reconsider their resort to brutal methods.  In the process, the state’s 
legitimacy would be enhanced.  This “inclusionary” chapter also highlighted 
relegitimation strategies aimed at the wider community – those who, while 
they may (actually or potentially) sympathise with vigilante aims and methods, 
are essentially law-abiding.  These options focused on ways to 
“devalourise”236 the use of private violence by implementing human rights 
education and promoting restorative approaches to dispute resolution.   
Some may denounce as impractical and naïve any state approach to 
tackling vigilantism whose priority is to educate its citizens by epitomising 
through its own conduct how citizens should behave in their interactions with 
fellow-citizens.  However, in light of a Constitution that enjoins the state to 
“respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”,237 it can 
hardly be deemed unrealistic to expect the state to take these responsibilities 
seriously by setting a good example in all its dealings with citizens and to hold 
it to account for failing to do so.  While achieving a “virtuous circle”238 would 
certainly require formal security providers and enforcers to undergo a change 
in their values and their way of thinking about their duties, what is certain is 
that such a paradigm shift is imperative if the aspiration of long-lasting state 
legitimacy in the domain of criminal justice is to be realised. 
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8 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
8 1 Has this study achieved its aims? 
In the same way that acts of vigilantism are triggered by a need to fill 
the gap between the ideals of formal justice and its concrete manifestations, 
the present research was sparked by a desire to draw attention to the 
sizeable gap between the social realities of vigilantism and any legal 
responses to it.  The prevalence of vigilantism, and the significant legal impact 
of the central issues of law, order, justice and power underscoring it, make it a 
topic ripe for nuanced and in-depth legal engagement.  But has this study 
done justice to its important subject matter?  The time has come to explore 
the extent to which the aims set out in its introduction have been realised and 
to outline briefly some of its tentative conclusions. 
The first objective of this study was to conceptualise vigilantism as a 
crime with distinct elements that could be employed in the criminal justice 
context.  Chapter 2 did indeed outline a workable definition of the crime of 
vigilantism, and in chapters 6 and 7 the case was made for why separate 
criminalisation is desirable, based on fair labelling and the extent to which 
such a definition could assist courts in arriving at more appropriately 
restorative and forward-looking sentences.  It was argued that utilising such 
penalties instead of automatically resorting to punitive measures could help 
prevent community alienation from the formal criminal justice system, while 
still expressing the appropriate degree of censure for vigilante violence.  
This study’s second goal was to establish the nature of the link 
between weak state legitimacy and vigilantism.  In the light of the compelling 
argument that states – and most particularly fragile ones – almost always lack 
the ability to justify their claims to monopolise legal violence by effectively 
guaranteeing social order and collective security, the erosion of state 
legitimacy was found to be by no means the only factor contributing to the 
emergence and prevalence of vigilantism.  It was concluded that no state can 
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ever be truly “legitimate” in the sense of having fully addressed all the 
underlying causes of vigilantism that are within its remit.  Nevertheless, a 
common thread running through many vigilante narratives is that the failure of 
the police (and other law-enforcement agents) to do their job properly opens a 
law-and-order gap that vigilantes are ready and willing to fill with their own 
brand of “justice”.  Even on the assumption that some such claims are merely 
an attempt on the part of vigilante groups to elicit sympathy from potential 
supporters, it would be unwise to overlook the reality that many acts of 
vigilantism are a direct response to state inaction.  
A third aim of the study was to examine vigilantes’ self-legitimation 
strategies to ascertain how they are able to garner support from external 
audiences and to perceive themselves as doers of good rather than evil.  The 
reason for examining this perspective was to emphasise that it would be 
short-sighted to presume that the state is inevitably by definition the most 
appropriate body to protect the security interests of beleaguered communities.  
This study reveals that there are many reasons why people choose to rely on 
vigilantes in the “multi-choice” policing contest – and their motivations are not 
always linked to state performance, or lack thereof.  In the same way that 
vigilante justice mirrors state justice in many respects, so, too, there are 
lessons that the state may learn from vigilante justice.  Solutions to problems 
of order and security need to be affordable and speedy, and offer real, 
concrete benefits to victims such as respectful treatment and the restoration 
of property in addition to the ideal of a satisfactory outcome.   
In addition, while the administration of formal justice tends to prioritise 
individual rights to the detriment of communal interests and solidarity, vigilante 
justice – for all its brutality – epitomises the opposite. 1   The strong 
undercurrent of communitarianism2 evidenced by many acts of vigilantism is 
admirable – in its aims, if not its method of execution.  In communities where 
vigilantism is ubiquitous, a wrong against one is a wrong against all, and all 
take responsibility for righting that wrong, rather than handing over ownership 
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2  An ideology that emphasises collective and societal interests and responsibilities, rather than 
individual rights. 
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of the dispute to remote (legal) experts.3  This attitude is poles apart from the 
notion based on the primacy of individual rights, that typically sees people as 
purely self-interested, atomistic beings existing outside and apart from 
society.  In dealing with deviance in close-knit communities, the state 
authorities would be well advised to remember that social obligations, group 
solidarity and collective unity – not individual autonomy – are viewed as the 
cornerstone of truly doing justice.   
The fourth objective of this research was to come up with – and 
consider the feasibility of – potential state relegitimation strategies in response 
to vigilantism.  The potential difficulties posed by attempts to fill the crime-
fighting gap with efficient and responsive means of protecting those living in 
communities that are most vulnerable – both to violent crime itself and to 
violent self-help solutions – were highlighted in chapters 6 and 7.  It was noted 
that relegitimation requires the state to demonstrate its capacity to reduce 
citizen insecurity and fear by dealing sufficiently severely with crime (including 
vigilantism) while also delegitimating the option of violent “problem-solving” by 
exemplifying the merits of human-rights-friendly and respectful criminal justice 
provision in its dealings with citizens.  Available options for excluding and 
punishing vigilantes were extensively considered, as was the option of 
educating vigilantes and the wider community about the benefits of due 
process and the need to uphold human rights.  What needs further 
elaboration are possible state strategies aimed at including vigilantes and 
winning them over to the extent that they are prepared to relegitimate the 
criminal justice system voluntarily.  
It was argued earlier4 that state relegitimation depends on the state 
showing itself to be capable of protecting its citizens whilst still fulfilling its 
human rights obligations.  This delicate balance between efficiency and ideals 
may be illustrated with reference to the acute tension between law and justice 
that manifests itself in the vigilante context.  From a state perspective, justice 
is simply the inevitable outcome of the rigorous application of relevant criminal 
law rules and legal principles to a particular factual scenario.  From the point 
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of view of victims and perpetrators of crime – and vigilantes may certainly 
qualify as both – application of the law cannot simply be equated with doing 
justice.  Instead of being clearly directed at righting wrongs, the criminal 
justice system’s procedures are opaque, its delays unfathomable, and its final 
pronouncements often at odds with the dictates of common sense and 
reason.  It is small wonder, then, that vigilantes and their supporters perceive 
the law and its protections to be a stumbling-block to achieving justice.  There 
is no doubt that attempts to tackle vigilante violence at source need to centre 
on decreasing the dissonance between the ideals of popular and state 
sovereignty in the criminal justice sphere. 
In an ideal world, the state would successfully be able to monopolise 
core functions such as protecting its citizens against private violence, and in 
this sense, any vindication of vigilante self-help could be construed as 
legitimating state withdrawal from a function once considered core. 5  
Realistically, however, the state cannot exercise this central government 
function alone – either through its own agents or those it authorises to act as 
its proxies in the crime-fighting arena.  There has to be some compromise 
whereby the state relinquishes some of its absolute power to decide how 
justice is to be done to those in whose interests it claims to be acting.  It is 
submitted that one way of doing this would be for the state to move away from 
a purely individualistic paradigm of formal law, and embrace the possibility 
that there are a myriad of other ways of doing justice that may be more 
effective and popular than the forms of justice espoused by the state.  Indeed, 
adopting a “spirit of plurality-consciousness”6 may sometimes oblige the state 
to recognise that achieving justice is a communal undertaking that may 
require little or no formal input.  In this regard, argues Connolly,  
“the vitality of informal systems may often derive from their 
grassroots nature – the fact that they represent the particular 
community in which they are situated.  In such cases, excessive 
government involvement – though necessary to ensure the 
                                            
5 West Normative Jurisprudence: An Introduction 195. 
6 W Menski “Monsters, Legal Pluralism and Human Rights in Africa” in M O Hinz and C Mapaure 
(eds) In Search of Justice and Peace: Traditional and Informal Justice Systems in Africa (2010) 448. 
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effective functioning of the system – may threaten to undermine 
the benefits reaped from a community-level process.”7   
Similarly, Menski criticises what he terms the demonisation of elements 
of the African culture of doing justice, in the name of protecting human rights.  
He argues that the central issue is not whether there is a need for traditional 
and informal justice systems, but rather, “to what extent existing traditional 
and informal justice systems would be able to assist in achieving better 
human rights protection on terms set by the people concerned, not provided 
by some outside interlopers armed with global visions and all sorts of more or 
less ‘soft’ legal tools.”8   The intimation that informal modes of justice might 
better protect human rights than their formal counterparts might seem 
counterintuitive.  It requires deconstructing and reversing an accepted order 
that deems the slavish adherence to due process – even at the expense of 
“factual” justice – to be a value worthy of paramount protection.  Surely, 
however, it is even more unrealistic to expect citizens to be prepared to 
identify with – and legitimate – a criminal justice system that is not only ill-
resourced and riddled with corruption and inefficiency, but also seems to 
perceive justice to be a purely abstract ideal, the attainment of which is largely 
unconnected to the lived realities of those whose interests it is meant to serve.  
If the point of departure of doing (state) justice in marginalised communities 
were based on shared societal and communal values such as the need for 
practical reparation, community participation and ubuntu, this would surely 
increase the likelihood of citizen buy-in.  As the Zwelethemba experience 
illustrates,9 community members are willing and able to take ownership of 
their conflicts, and with the proper guidelines in place, their doing so need not 
be at the expense of basic values such as non-violence and respect for the 
human dignity of all participants.   
                                            
7 B Connolly “Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposals for a Recognition Typology” (2005-
2006) 38 Connecticut Law Review 239 293-294. 
8  Menski “Monsters, Legal Pluralism and Human Rights” in In Search of Justice and Peace: 
Traditional and Informal Justice Systems in Africa 452-454. 
9 See § 7 5 1 above and Shearing “Transforming Security: A South African Experiment” in Restorative 
Justice and Civil Society; M Jenneker & J Cartwright “Mobilising Local Knowledge and Capacity 
Through Safety and Security” in Slakmond (eds) Justicia Restaurativa (2005); Froestad & Shearing 
“Practicing Justice - The Zwelethemba Model of Conflict Resolution” in Justicia Restaurativa; 
Brodeur & Shearing (2005) European Journal of Criminology. 
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Applying these insights to vigilantes specifically, it must once more be 
asked whether they are truly “reformable”10 – i.e., could those prone to violent 
self-help in good conscience be entrusted with the responsibility of 
participating in collective projects dealing with social ills in a manner that is 
congruent with fundamental human rights?  The tentative answer to this is, 
yes.  The paradox that vigilantes break the law in order to respect it has long 
been recognised.11  Although the legal purist may choose to focus on the law-
breaking aspect of vigilantes’ conduct, that their actions are motivated by a 
deep respect for justice and order is equally significant.  While vigilantism is 
undoubtedly an extreme and brutal community-initiated solution to problems 
of disorder and insecurity, violent self-help, too, has at its core ubuntu –
fostering the common good by protecting those on whose behalf adherents of 
self-help claim to act.  Vigilante violence is not gratuitous; vigilantes view 
themselves as essentially peace-loving individuals whose resort to violent 
punishment is something that must unfortunately be undertaken if they are to 
fulfil their collective responsibility to achieve and maintain order and security.  
Research indicates that the same people who are most predisposed to violent 
collective action are also most likely to engage in peaceful collective action.12  
It is submitted that if non-aggressive, Zwelethemba-style methods were 
demonstrably sufficient to realise vigilante aims, a large proportion of 
vigilante-prone individuals would actively choose such alternatives, rendering 
the resort to violent self-help redundant.  While it would be too optimistic to 
hope that vigilantism could ever be completely eliminated in marginalised 
communities where violence is rife, it seems possible that vigilantes might be 
willing to reform sufficiently to legitimate – and work in partnership with – a 
formal justice system committed to addressing issues of crime and disorder in 
a community-responsive and inclusive, reintegrative, restorative and 
respectful manner.  
                                            
10 Baker Security in Post-Conflict Africa 66. 
11 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 153. 
12 See § 7 6 1 above. 
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8 2 Future research possibilities 
A primary objective of this study was to employ legitimacy as a means 
of weaving together the disparate strands of vigilantism literature into a 
theoretical rope strong enough to string up a lynch mob victim.  While it is 
contended that legitimacy has indeed been shown to be a persuasive 
framework for understanding vigilantism, particularly in respect of bringing 
together social science and law-related aspects, it is recognised that 
vigilantism is nevertheless still under-theorised and under-researched. 13  
Without adequate empirical confirmation, this study’s conclusions amount to 
no more than tentative suggestions.  Future research, both quantitative and 
qualitative, in social sciences such as criminology may yield significant 
insights, for example into the following: The factors precipitating groups’ 
transformation from state-sanctioned community crime-control initiatives into 
vigilante groups, and vice versa; the relationship between vigilante groups’ 
internal organisation and chosen strategies and their ability to achieve 
legitimation through mass mobilisation; and the comparative wisdom and 
practical feasibility of the various state relegitimation options proposed in 
chapters 6 and 7.  Suggestions, such as the one that allowing community 
members to take ownership of their conflicts with minimal state intervention 
has a better chance of enhancing state legitimacy and reducing vigilantism 
than if CPFs were the chief community-police partnership strategy, could 
readily be tested and their accuracy verified.  For example, a study on 
whether there was a reduction in vigilantism in marginalised communities 
where Zwelethemba initiatives were successfully implemented (possibly with 
similar communities using CPFs only as a control group) could be useful in 
evaluating whether reviving community peace projects would truly be a 
worthwhile measure to use in combating vigilantism.  In addition, this study – 
while advocating Zwelethemba-style interventions to advance communitarian 
justice ideals – does not consider alternative options, such as community 
                                            
13  For examples of vigilante-specific quantitative research, see Tankebe (2009) Law and Society 
Review; Jackson, et al. (2013) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law.  For qualitative research, see 
Buur, e.g., Buur (2006) Development and Change. 
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courts14 or more state-initiated restorative justice,15 in any great detail.  All the 
various responsibilitation alternatives need to be compared, and their 
strengths and weaknesses evaluated, before it can be argued convincingly 
that community peace programmes are more beneficial than other non-violent 
informal justice solutions.16   
From a legal point of view, an issue related to criminal law that is not 
addressed here is the question of whether restorative justice sentencing 
options – if resorted to in the vigilante context, as is proposed – would be 
viewed as appropriate for all types of crime, or whether their purview might 
have to be limited to minor offences.  There is already controversial judicial 
authority to the effect that restorative-type penalties are not appropriate for 
serious offences such as rape.17  Considering states’ notorious reluctance to 
relinquish jurisdiction over criminal matters in any event,18 it would be useful 
to establish whether it is likely that there would be a similar unwillingness to 
allow non-state forms of criminal justice to apply vis-à-vis vigilantism-related 
misdeeds, particularly when it comes to deciding on appropriate punishments.  
As regards implementing recommendations such as criminalising vigilantism 
as a separate offence, this must be undertaken by parliament.  Creating 
awareness of the potential advantages of such a move is as much as this 
research can hope to achieve.   
  
  
                                            
14 For more on the benefits of community courts, see Schärf “Policy Options on Community Justice” in 
The Other Law: Non-State Ordering in South Africa; Bidaguren & Nina (2004) Social Justice 175-
177; Seekings (1992) South African Review of Sociology; and G Pavlich “People's Courts, 
Postmodern Difference, and Socialist Justice in South Africa” (1992) 19 (3) Social Justice 29. 
15 E.g., E Elliot & R M Gordon New Directions in Restorative Justice: Issues, Practice, Evaluation 
(2005); E Van der Spuy, S Parmentier & A Dissel Restorative Justice: Politics, Policies and 
Prospects (2008); D Roche “Restorative Justice and the Regulatory State in South African 
Townships” (2002) 42 British Journal of Criminology 514. 
16 For more on the benefits of non-state justice alternatives, see Connolly (2005-2006) Connecticut Law 
Review. 
17 In DPP v Thabethe 2011 2 SACR 567 (SCA), the SCA rejected restorative justice as a viable 
sentencing option in a case of the rape of a family member, overturning the High Court judgment (S 
v Tabethe 2009 (2) SACR 62 (T)) that had imposed a wholly suspended sentence with restorative 
elements such as community service and paying reparation to the victim and sentencing Thabethe to 
ten years’ imprisonment instead. 
18 Connolly (2005-2006) Connecticut Law Review 293. 
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8 3 Final thoughts 
Although vigilante and state modes of administering justice have 
generally been evaluated in contrast to each other, their exercise of power 
and legitimation strategies have much in common.  Abrahams is correct that 
they are both in their own way capable of fostering the well-being of all as well 
as the interests of a select group – and frequently mistaking one for the other.  
Likewise, each exercises power in ways that protect as well as repress those 
on whose behalf it claims to be acting.  The endeavours of either can result in 
serious miscarriages of justice, and each at times claims to be providing a 
public service in order to disguise less noble aims.  All in all, both “seem to 
serve some of their avowed purposes and at the same time to be full of 
dangerous potential”.19  Despite these similarities, each has strengths that the 
other lacks.  Maybe the best of both worlds would be to find a way to unite 
informal justice’s accessibility, informality, low cost, speed and the fact that its 
legal norms are familiar to those it serves, with formal justice’s impartiality and 
predictable, uniform rules and procedures.20  As is evident from this study, 
however, successful state appropriation and incorporation of vigilante crime-
fighting fervour is a far from straightforward undertaking.  The best that one 
can realistically hope for, says Abrahams, is that vigilantism and state justice 
may occasionally “positively combine their virtues and counteract each other’s 
faults rather than simply compound them”.21 
At the conclusion of this research, the author is left with a sense of 
profound ambivalence in respect of vigilantism.  This is unsurprising, perhaps, 
given that it is its elusive, enigmatic nature, its “twilight” quality, that makes 
vigilantism such a compelling subject of study.  What may nevertheless be 
claimed with relative certainty is that vigilantism, in challenging the formal 
boundary between crime and punishment, is symptomatic of a wider citizen 
inclination to call into question the accepted status quo in respect of state-
citizen power relations.  Vigilantes’ willingness to empower themselves by 
representing their violent self-help as a legitimate alternative means of 
                                            
19 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 170. 
20 Connolly (2005-2006) Connecticut Law Review 247. 
21 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 170. 
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punishing deviance – often to the detriment of state legitimacy – “exemplifies 
the extent to which the legitimacy of political authorities has been eroded and 
popular consent to be governed withdrawn”. 22   State claims to be the 
“predominant form of polity”23 appear to have weakened to the point that 
some call for a move away from a notion of de iure sovereignty, which has its 
ontological foundation “in formal ideologies of rule and legality”, in favour of a 
de facto perspective on sovereignty that sees the right to exercise power as “a 
tentative and always emergent form of authority grounded in violence that is 
performed and designed to generate loyalty, fear, and legitimacy from the 
neighborhood to the summit of the state.”24  By identifying vigilantism as a 
potent illustration of the precariousness of the state’s hegemony of (criminal 
justice) power, this study has highlighted the value of focusing legal attention 
on this paradoxical manifestation of crime as punishment. 
                                            
22 A Edwards & G Hughes “Introduction: The Community Governance of Crime Control” in G Hughes 
and A Edwards (eds) Crime Control and Community: The New Politics of Public Safety (2002) 3. 
23 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 171. 
24 Hansen & Stepputat (2006) Annual Review of Anthropology 296-297. 
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A. APPENDIX A: VIGILANTES’ INTERNALLY-
DIRECTED COUNTER-LEGITIMATION 
 
i. Introduction  
Chapter 5 deals with ways used by vigilantes to justify their power to 
external audiences and their strategies to undermine state legitimacy.  
However, it leaves vigilantes’ inner-directed modes of self-legitimation 
unexplored.  Barker1 observes that many of the self-legitimation rituals of 
those in power are inward-turning, serving to impress the self rather than 
those around them.  In this sense, legitimation may be viewed as an activity 
carried out by the powerful for their own benefit to justify the “deservedness” 
of their exercise of authority in their own eyes.  The power exercised by 
vigilantes in carrying out often atrocious acts of violence seems irreconcilable 
with their maintaining the moral high ground, 2  being convinced of the 
“rightness” of their own authority.  It is necessary to understand how vigilantes 
are able to maintain that their own conduct is not an aberration from their 
otherwise blameless lives, but is instead completely consistent with their self-
identity as morally upright, law-abiding citizens who are simply doing their 
duty by protecting the community from harm. 
 
ii. Relevant criminological explanations for vigilantism  
There are a number of criminological frameworks that may help to 
explain how vigilantes can maintain their self-concept as “good” people whilst 
still engaging in deviant acts.  Baker3 identifies several such criminological 
theories: The first of these is anomie theory, which postulates that where 
people are unable to gain access to socially created needs through legitimate 
behaviour, they will resort to alternative means, including deviant and criminal 
                                            
1 Barker Legitimating Identities. 
2 See Minnaar “The 'New' Vigilantism” in Informal Criminal Justice 121. 
3 See Baker (2002) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 224-225. 
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activities.4  Thus anomie theory would characterise vigilantism as a necessary 
form of deviance by which the cultural goal of protection from disorder and 
crime may be attained in circumstances where the approved means of relying 
on state policing is ineffective or unavailable.  A second relevant theory is 
labelling theory, which notes that certain forms of behaviour – especially 
elements of the behaviour of the poor and disadvantaged – are not inherently 
deviant, but are branded as such by the powerful.  These new definitions are 
imposed on the powerless against their will.  In accordance with labelling 
theory, vigilantism may be seen as a long-standing and popularly accepted 
practice that has now merely been labelled as criminal by the elite.  A last 
criminological explanation Baker highlights is social control theory.  This 
perspective says that restraints on people’s behaviour may break down under 
certain circumstances, including during periods of rapid social change when it 
is not possible for new forms of regulation to evolve quickly enough to replace 
the declining force of social integration.   It might be argued that corrupt, 
under-resourced and inefficient state policing could indeed make it impossible 
for a state to inculcate the rule of law, enabling people to justify taking the law 
into their own hands.  Other criminological explanations that have been 
applied to vigilantism include conflict theory;5 self-help theory;6 and attribution, 
symbolic interaction and equality theories.7  
                                            
4 In her testimony before the Khayelitsha Commission, Prof Godobo-Madikizela perceived anomie as a 
helpful tool for understanding patterns of crowd behaviour.  She defined anomie as situation where 
there is a breakdown in social and cultural norms – “the erosion of moral codes that often support a 
society’s stability and moral framework means that no common principles or values govern 
behaviour” – which may be fostered by a failure to enforce rules (O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha 
Commission Report 345).  This understanding of the role of anomie seems akin to Baker’s social 
control theory explanation (see below). 
5 Supancic & Willis (1998) Journal of Crime and Justice.  According to this approach, social order is 
heterogeneous, with various groups competing for power.  Since the state and its legal apparatus 
serve the current economic order and its elite, political and ideological measures are used to define 
actions threatening the economic order as deviant, singling out marginal members of society for the 
most repressive sanctions.  Economic crises and inequality may precipitate an increase in the need 
for legal justice, and where the formal justice system founders for control, it may tend to be 
supplemented by extra-legal justice such as vigilantism. 
6 W Austin “Fieldnotes on the Vigilante Movement in Mindanao: A Mixture of Self-Help and Formal 
Policing Networks” (1988) 12 International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 
205, who bases this view on Baumgartner (1984). 
7J Neapolitan “Vigilante Behavior and Attribution Bias” (1987) 14 Criminal Justice and Behavior 123.  
Attribution theory would explain how individuals who identify with the original victim of crime, 
rather than the perceived offender, would be more likely to support and engage in vigilantism (125).  
Symbolic interactionism helps clarify why if the victim of vigilante behaviour is not identified with, 
vigilantes will be less likely to justify the victim’s behaviour, but will rather justify their own (125-
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In exploring the macro-level triggers of vigilante violence, each of these 
criminological theories gives some insight into vigilantism.  However, none of 
them is a complete or satisfactory explanation for vigilantes’ sense that what 
they are doing is right and in conformity with social values, rather than 
deviant.  Models such as the anomie, self-help, conflict, equality and social 
control theories might help explain why a particular society or community 
within a particular society might be more prone to deviance, and even to 
vigilantism, but they do not clarify why specific community members might 
choose to engage in vigilantism and others not, or how those that do so are 
able to justify their behaviour to themselves.  Anomie theory also fails to 
explain why vigilantes, who are in all other ways conforming members of 
society, would engage in this particular type of “deviant” and “criminal” 
behaviour.  And while labelling theory correctly recognises that informal 
policing is branded as a crime simply because it is non-state-sanctioned, it 
would be irresponsible and unrealistic simply to write off state criminalisation 
of vigilante torture and extreme violence as a form of unfair labelling.8  The 
most important objection to all these criminological theories is their point of 
departure: that vigilantism is a species of anti-social behaviour, and that those 
who engage in it can be lumped together with all other deviants regarding the 
underlying motivations for their actions.  A basic assumption of the present 
study, in contrast, is that vigilante violence can only be explained convincingly 
by taking it “out of the realm of the exotic”:9 It cannot simply be accounted for 
with reference to conventional theories of deviance, since its dynamics and 
fundamental rationale are unlike those of most other forms of criminal 
behaviour. 
 
                                                                                                                             
126).  Neapolitan’s overall conclusion is that “vigilante behavior and approval of such behavior is 
quite likely based in part on perceptions and attributions that result from a biased subjective 
construction of reality” (136). 
8 See also Baker (2002) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 224-225 for more critical analysis of 
the three theories utilised by him.  
9 Huggins Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America 13-14. 
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iii. Relevant psychological explanations for vigilantism 
Now that some of the criminological explanations for vigilantism have 
been canvassed, two possible theoretical perspectives on vigilantism which 
focus on the individual who is involved in an act of collective vigilantism from a 
psychological – as opposed to a criminological – perspective will be 
highlighted. 10   The first of these is the theory of deindividuation.  It 
hypothesises that various factors such as anonymity, loss of individual 
responsibility, arousal or sensory overload may lead to a loss of inner 
restraint.  The weakening of controls based on guilt, shame and fear may lead 
to antisocial “deindividuated”, “antinormative” (deviant) behaviours that are 
impulsive, irrational, emotional and intense.11  The actions of the vigilante mob 
may be explained as a manifestation of this deindividuation process.  An 
alternative explanation for crowd violence is the social identity theory. 12   
According to this model, deindividuating settings do not lead to a loss of 
personal identity, as the deindividuation theory would suggest; rather, they 
can facilitate a transition from a personal to a more collective identity.13  The 
seemingly “antinormative” behaviour displayed by group members is simply a 
result of the shift from to a self-image based on group membership instead of 
on personal identity, resulting in their conforming to the local norms of that 
group or situation, rather than being restrained by their personal inhibitions.14   
It is submitted that social identity theory is a more persuasive 
hypothesis for explaining the mindset of a vigilante in action than is the 
deindividuation theory, since it allows for the possibility that vigilantism is 
underpinned and regulated by a morally coherent foundation that its 
                                            
10 These were identified in Prof Godobo-Madikizela’s testimony before the Khayelitsha Commission 
(O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 342-345); see also P Godobo-Madikizela “The 
Dynamics of a Traumatized Community: Understanding Crowd Violence and its Aftermath” (1996) 
4 (2) Psycho-analytic Psychotherapy in South Africa 1. 
11 See T Postmes & R Spears “Deindividuation and Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-Analysis” (1998) 
123 (3) Psychological Bulletin 238 239; N Kugihara “Effects of Aggressive Behaviour and Group 
Size on Collective Escape in an Emergency: A Test Between a Social Identity Model and 
Deindividuation Theory” (2001) 40 British Journal of Social Psychology 575 576; A Silke 
“Deindividuation, Anonymity and Violence: Findings From Northern Ireland” (2003) 143 (4) 
Journal of Social Psychology 493 493 and the authorities cited there. 
12 More correctly termed the Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Effects, or SIDE – Kugihara 
(2001) British Journal of Social Psychology 576. 
13 Postmes & Spears (1998) Psychological Bulletin 254. 
14 Kugihara (2001) British Journal of Social Psychology 577; Postmes & Spears (1998) Psychological 
Bulletin 254.  
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adherents use to legitimise and justify their actions.  Deindividuation theory 
would seem to paint vigilante violence as “mindless, antinormative and 
disinhibited” – i.e., it overlooks that vigilantism may be the product of 
legitimate grievances – whereas social identity theory recognises that to the 
group engaging in an act of vigilantism, their behaviour is “rational and 
normative and has its limits”.15  Far from being senseless, such vigilantism is 
based on group norms and a joint purpose (identified by Godobo-Madikizela 
as a “deep need for social justice”)16 that propels vigilantes into action, using 
collectively-sanctioned violence as the means to achieve their aim.  Of the 
theories examined so far, social identity theory appears to be the only 
approach that could account for vigilantism’s status as “moralistic crime”, 
where the role of victim and offender are reversed in the eyes of the 
perpetrator.17  However, even social identity theory fails to explain why some 
community members get swept up in the identity of the crowd and others are 
immune to its allure.  In focusing on the behaviour of individuals in crowd 
settings, social identity theory also downplays personal agency and the need 
for internal self-legitimation. 
 
iv. Neutralisation theory and vigilante internal self-legitimation 
If the focus is purely on vigilantes’ need to portray their actions to 
others – but more importantly to themselves – as congruent with a morally 
upright and law-abiding self-concept, the most persuasive criminological 
framework for endogenous self-legitimation of vigilantes’ particular “deviance” 
is perhaps Sykes and Matza’s neutralisation theory. 18   Sykes and Matza 
contend that, prior to committing deviant acts, offenders 19  utilise certain 
techniques that enable them to justify departure from societal norms, making 
                                            
15 Postmes & Spears (1998) Psychological Bulletin 254. 
16 O’Regan & Pikoli Khayelitsha Commission Report 343. 
17 Black “Crime as Social Control” in Towards a General Theory of Social Control Volume 2: Selected 
Problems 12. 
18 G Sykes & D Matza “Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency” (1957) 22 American 
Sociological Review 664.  
19 These could be single perpetrators as well as those who act as part of a group; thus unlike social 
identity theory, neutralisation theory could account for the reasoning process of lone vigilantes as 
well as those who act in concert with others.  Sykes and Matza’s focus is specifically on young 
offenders (whom they term “delinquents”) but their insights could be applied more generally too. 
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deviance possible by rendering norm violations “‘acceptable’ if not ‘right’”.20  
Significantly, they observe that neutralisations “represent tangential or 
glancing blows at the dominant normative system rather than the creation of 
an opposing ideology; and they are extensions of patterns of thought 
prevalent in society rather than something created de novo”. 21   There is 
indeed empirical support for Sykes and Matza’s claim that those who are 
more likely to employ neutralisations display high levels of societal attachment 
and are essentially still bonded to society: they tend to be committed to 
conventional and pro-social beliefs, despite their offending.22  These findings 
are entirely in line with the contention outlined in § 3 4 1 above that vigilantism 
does not directly undermine the state’s legal legitimacy, being the action of a 
“conservative mob” 23  rather than a display of outright rebellion.  It also 
substantiates the argument posed in § 5 2 1 that vigilantes legitimate their 
power with reference to ideologies, values and rituals that are central to the 
mainstream cultural ethos.  From a criminal law perspective, too, it will 
become clear that many neutralisations correspond closely with existing legal 
defences, confirming yet again the uncanny resemblance between a posited 
vigilante mindset and practices, and the formal criminal justice process.  
Indeed, Sykes and Matza’s central hypothesis is that “much delinquency is 
based on what is essentially an unrecognized extension of defenses to 
crimes, in the form of justifications for deviance that are seen as valid by the 
delinquent but not by the legal system or society at large.”24   
Sykes and Matza’s premise is that neutralisation makes deviant 
behaviour possible by “deactivating” the social controls that restrain criminal 
behaviour, a process Bandura terms “selective disengagement of self-
                                            
20 Sykes & Matza (1957) American Sociological Review 667.  It is acknowledged that the process of 
neutralisation itself is very difficult, if not impossible, to validate.  The theory assumes that offenders 
are enabled to commit crimes because they employ neutralisation techniques prior to offending, but 
“[n]o-one has yet been able to empirically verify the existence of preevent neutralizations.  In fact, 
neutralization theory depends on postevent accounts by the offender” (P Cromwell & Q Thurman 
“'The Devil Made Me Do It': Use of Neutralizations by Shoplifters” (2003) 24 Deviant Behavior 535 
547).  This does not detract from the argument that neutralisation is an attractive framework for 
explaining why a person may endorse pro-social values whilst simultaneously violating them.  
21 Sykes & Matza (1957) American Sociological Review 669. 
22 R Agnew “The Techniques of Neutralization and Violence” (1994) 32 (4) Criminology 555; H Copes 
“Societal Attachments, Offending Frequency and Techniques of Neutralization” (2003) 24 (2) 
Deviant Behavior 101. 
23 Abrahams Vigilant Citizens 4. 
24 Sykes & Matza (1957) American Sociological Review 666. 
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sanctions”. 25   The primary function of neutralisation is to avoid cognitive 
dissonance26 by “mitigating the genuine guilt or tension resulting from the 
conflict between inconsistent self-images – that of the upright citizen and that 
of the social deviant”. 27   Sykes and Matza identify several neutralisation 
techniques that are especially relevant for present purposes. 
First, vigilantes may employ denial of the victim, whereby they take 
responsibility both for causing harm and injury, but neutralise the injury 
caused as amounting to rightful retaliation or deserved punishment.  As 
already discussed, vigilantes perceive themselves to be “purifiers of society, 
restorers of order, avengers of wrong”, thereby transferring blame to the 
targets of their violence.  They are assisted in this endeavour to transform 
their victim into a wrongdoer by their steadfast belief that the target of their 
violence is indeed the perpetrator of some wrongdoing.  Thus it is relatively 
easy for vigilantes to label their victims as less-than-human outsiders who 
merit elimination.  This further erodes vigilante-victim empathy, thereby 
facilitating the violence perpetrated.28 
Relating this neutralisation technique to available criminal law 
defences, it is apparent that “denial of the victim” may overlap with the ground 
of justification of private defence discussed in chapter 2.  The reason that it is 
not contrary to the legal convictions of the community to use reasonable force 
to ward off an unlawful attack is because the victim “had it coming to them” in 
the sense that they were the initial aggressor whose attack it was necessary 
to repel – a clear example of state-endorsed reversal of the roles of 
perpetrator and victim.  In chapter 2 it was explained why vigilantes would find 
it hard to justify their conduct as lawful on the basis of having acted in private 
defence.  Nevertheless, despite vigilantes’ not meeting all the legal 
requirements for this defence, transforming the victim into “a person deserving 
                                            
25 A Bandura “Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control” (1990) 46 Journal of Social 
Issues 27 28. 
26 S Eliason & R Dodder “Techniques of Neutralization Used by Deer Poachers in the Western United 
States: A Research Note” (1999) 20 Deviant Behavior 233. 
27 M Hazani “The Universal Applicability of the Theory of Neutralization: German Youth Coming to 
Terms With the Holocaust.  An Empirical Study With Theoretical Implications” (1991) 15 Crime, 
Law and Social Change 135 136. 
28 See Bandura (1990) Journal of Social Issues. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 365 
injury”29 is an integral component of vigilante violence, and this neutralisation 
strategy may be viewed as an extension of private defence in that sense. 
A second neutralisation technique applicable to vigilantism is 
condemnation of the condemners, which Sykes and Matza note may be of 
particular importance when directed towards those “assigned the task of 
enforcing or expressing the norms of the dominant society”30 – the police, for 
example.  By characterising their acts as done in reaction to state inaction, 
incompetence or blatant wrongdoing, vigilantes do indeed attempt to shift the 
focus from their own violence to the reprehensible behaviour and motives of 
those who denounce them, thereby downplaying or repressing the 
blameworthiness of their own behaviour.  In emphasising criminal justice 
system failings they deflect the negative sanctions attached to their own 
norm-violation back to law-enforcers. 
Although there is not a particular criminal defence that is comparable to 
this neutralisation technique, judges do sometimes take judicial notice of 
these types of considerations when deciding on appropriate punishments.  An 
example of this is the perspective of Binns-Ward J in the sentencing judgment 
of S v Dikqacwi: 
“The commission of the crimes is a manifestation of a broad 
problem affecting a large section of South African society, notably 
those living in the widely impoverished, densely populated and 
under-resourced townships in our cities like Khayelitsha and 
Philippi, that is of persons in communities taking over and 
carrying out themselves the functions that in a properly 
functioning society would be discharged by the criminal justice 
system – the police and the courts. … On reflection, even if wholly 
unacceptable, this much is understandable in the context of a 
perception by a community that the formal and constitutionally 
established criminal justice system is not functioning.”31 
                                            
29 Sykes & Matza (1957) American Sociological Review 668. 
30 668. 
31 S v Dikqacwi and others paras 4; 6 (emphasis added). 
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It is submitted that there are instances where it is eminently 
understandable for vigilantes to feel that their condemners – the state – are 
worthy of censure, and this perspective deserves legal recognition.  While the 
immediate function of this technique may be the (self-serving) one of ensuring 
that the wrongfulness of vigilantes’ own behaviour “is more easily repressed 
or lost to view”, 32  its utilisation nevertheless serves as a reminder that 
resorting to vigilantism is in essence a response to something – that 
“something” being state inadequacy. 
A third neutralisation technique is the appeal to higher loyalties, 
whereby internal and external social controls are neutralised “by sacrificing 
the demands of the larger society for the demands of the smaller social 
groups to which the [perpetrator] belongs”.33  Sykes and Matza emphasise 
that failure to follow the imperatives of the dominant normative system does 
not necessarily imply that perpetrators repudiate such norms; rather, they 
simply decide that other norms are more pressing and choose to follow them 
instead.34  Vigilantes do indeed minimise blameworthiness by prioritising the 
collective security interests of a particular community or group over the 
demands of society at large – giving precedence to (local) “order” over 
(national) “law”.  Potential vigilantes are well aware that murder is against the 
law, for instance, and would no doubt agree that it should be criminalised, but 
even so, when a neighbour shouts, “Thief!” they may have no qualms about 
helping to beat a suspected housebreaker to death.  This loyalty to the 
communal group may also help explain why those living in vigilante-prone 
communities choose not to inform the police about vigilante activities: they 
deem it more important to demonstrate allegiance to local community 
members than to assist the police in their inquiries.  This aspect of community 
loyalty is also recognised by Binns-Ward J in Dikqacwi, where he remarks: 
“[V]igilantes are seen by many in the communities in which the 
phenomenon of vigilantism and mob justice occurs as upstanding 
                                            
32 Sykes & Matza (1957) American Sociological Review 668. 
33 669. 
34 669. 
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and respectable members of the community, and indeed see 
themselves as serving the interests of their community.”35 
Minor 36  proposes an additional neutralisation technique, namely 
necessity.  Necessity may come into play if vigilantes ease their conscience 
by neutralising their violence as a “morally painful but necessary business”, 
claiming to act as a last resort “with deep sorrow”.37  The idea that breaking 
the law might be a necessary evil is also endorsed in criminal law.  Necessity 
is a ground of justification whereby a person chooses to break the law, usually 
by infringing the interests of an innocent third party, in order to avoid suffering 
some evil.  The law recognises that individuals in an emergency situation may 
be faced with a choice between two inevitable evils, and that it would be 
against public policy to penalise them for weighing up the evils and 
consciously choosing the lesser of the two.38  The legal defence of necessity 
would not avail vigilantes, however.  Not only do vigilantes inflict punishment 
on victims they perceive to be unlawful attackers (rather than innocent third 
parties as is required by the defence of necessity), but necessity is only a 
permissible defence where the inevitable evil threatens an interest of greater 
value than the interest being infringed by warding it off.39  In other words, 
because vigilantes punish those who have in their eyes committed acts of 
deviance, not “innocents”, and because the harm caused by such deviance is 
usually of a less severe nature than the harm inflicted by vigilantes when 
exacting punishment, they cannot rely on necessity as ground of justification.  
While vigilante conduct cannot technically be justified as legal necessity, the 
insight that vigilantes may perceive themselves to be warding off an 
impending crisis situation with the only feasible option to escape harm being 
to break the law must nevertheless not be dismissed out of hand.  
Now that the various neutralisations have been identified, the 
legitimation value of employing techniques of neutralisation needs to be 
                                            
35 S v Dikqacwi and others para 6. 
36 W Minor “Techniques of Neutralization: A Reconceptualization and Empirical Examination” (1981) 
18 Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 295. 
37 Burrows Vigilante! 13. 
38 Burchell Principles 160. 
39 See Snyman Criminal Law 119-120. 
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considered briefly.  As regards external legitimation, is the state of mind of a 
vigilante accused who has employed neutralisations of legal relevance – i.e., 
may it result in a degree of state legitimation for vigilante violence?  Where 
vigilantes employ one or more of the neutralisations discussed above, it may 
be argued that, even though no legally-recognised defence is available, 
vigilantes’ criminal responsibility is somehow diminished, and their guilty mind 
(mens rea) is of a less serious degree.  If so, it is not unreasonable to 
maintain that where vigilantes truly perceive their conduct to be necessary 
intervention aimed at protecting their community from an inevitable wrongful 
attack where the state is not prepared to offer assistance, their mindset might 
at the very least be a factor to be considered in mitigation of sentence, due to 
the reduced blameworthiness of their actions.  Reducing vigilante’s 
punishment on this basis would amount to a grudging and indirect legitimation 
of vigilante violence by the state.  The possibility of whether and how the 
vigilante state of mind may be accommodated by the formal criminal justice 
system is a topic that is considered at length in chapters 6 and 7. 
Even if the argument is rejected that using neutralisation techniques 
reduces the blameworthiness of vigilante conduct from the perspective of the 
state, successful neutralisation may nevertheless contribute to vigilantes’ 
internal self-legitimation, in addition to their ability to legitimate themselves in 
the eyes of their potential supporters.  In order for them to convince others of 
the legitimacy of their appropriation of an aspect of state authority (the power 
to punish), vigilantes must first sustain a genuine belief in the rightfulness of 
their own use of power.  Eliminating self-blame by using neutralisation 
techniques to render their own norm violations acceptable to themselves may 
better empower vigilantes to justify their moral authority to others as well. 
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